tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-54484112144944132172024-02-20T01:27:24.053-08:00 Beauty and the BeastAnonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10303290079976590343noreply@blogger.comBlogger28125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5448411214494413217.post-22869504487492973942013-03-11T08:27:00.001-07:002013-07-01T16:59:01.413-07:00The Completeness of the Quantum Mechanical Description<div id="aueditable">
Bohmian mechanics, which can also be called the de Broglie-Bohm idea, the pilot-wave mannequin, and the causal interpretation of quantum mechanics, is a version of quantum concept found by Louis de Broglie in 1927 and rediscovered by David Bohm in 1952. It is the easiest example of what is usually referred to as a hidden variables interpretation of quantum mechanics. In Bohmian mechanics a system of particles is described partially by its wave perform, evolving, as ordinary, in line with Schrödinger's equation. Nevertheless, the wave perform provides only a partial description of the system. This description is accomplished by the specification of the particular positions of the particles. The latter evolve in line with the “guiding equation,” which expresses the velocities of the particles when it comes to the wave function. Thus, in Bohmian mechanics the configuration of a system of particles evolves through a deterministic movement choreographed by the wave function. In particular, when a particle is shipped right into a two-slit equipment, the slit via which it passes and its location upon arrival on the photographic plate are completely determined by its preliminary place and wave function.<a name='more'></a><br /><br />Bohmian mechanics inherits and makes explicit the nonlocality implicit in the notion, widespread to just about all formulations and interpretations of quantum theory, of a wave operate on the configuration space of a many-particle system. It accounts for all the phenomena ruled by nonrelativistic quantum mechanics, from spectral strains and scattering principle to superconductivity, the quantum Hall impact and quantum computing. In particular, the same old measurement postulates of quantum theory, together with collapse of the wave function and possibilities given by the absolute square of probability amplitudes, emerge from an analysis of the 2 equations of movement: Schrödinger's equation and the guiding equation. No invocation of a particular, and considerably obscure, standing for commentary is required.<br /><hr />
<h2>
<a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" id="com" name="com">1. The Completeness of the Quantum Mechanical Description</a></h2>
Conceptual difficulties have plagued quantum mechanics since its inception, despite its extraordinary predictive successes. The basic problem, plainly put, is this: It is not at all clear what quantum mechanics is about. What, in fact, does quantum mechanics describe?<br />
It might seem, since it is widely agreed that any quantum mechanical system is completely described by its wave function, that quantum mechanics is fundamentally about the behavior of wave functions. Quite naturally, no physicist wanted this to be true more than did Erwin Schrödinger, the father of the wave function. Nonetheless, Schrödinger ultimately found this impossible to believe. His difficulty had little to do with the novelty of the wave function (Schrödinger 1935): “That it is an abstract, unintuitive mathematical construct is a scruple that almost always surfaces against new aids to thought and that carries no great message.” Rather, it was that the “blurring” that the spread out character of the wave function suggests “affects macroscopically tangible and visible things, for which the term ‘blurring’ seems simply wrong.”<br />
For example, in the same paper Schrödinger noted that it may happen in radioactive decay that<br />
<blockquote>
the emerging particle is described … as a spherical wave … that impinges continuously on a surrounding luminescent screen over its full expanse. The screen however does not show a more or less constant uniform surface glow, but rather lights up at <i>one</i> instant at <i>one</i> spot ….</blockquote>
And he observed that one can easily arrange, for example by including a cat in the system, “quite ridiculous cases” with<br />
<blockquote>
the ?-function of the entire system having in it the living and the dead cat (pardon the expression) mixed or smeared out in equal parts.</blockquote>
It is thus because of the “measurement problem,” of macroscopic superpositions, that Schrödinger found it difficult to regard the wave function as “representing reality.” But then what does? With evident disapproval, Schrödinger observes that<br />
<blockquote>
the reigning doctrine rescues itself or us by having recourse to epistemology. We are told that no distinction is to be made between the state of a natural object and what I know about it, or perhaps better, what I can know about it if I go to some trouble. Actually — so they say — there is intrinsically only awareness, observation, measurement.</blockquote>
Many physicists pay lip service to the Copenhagen interpretation — that quantum mechanics is fundamentally about observation or results of measurement. But it is becoming increasingly difficult to find any who, when pressed, will defend this interpretation. It seems clear that quantum mechanics is fundamentally about atoms and electrons, quarks and strings, not those particular macroscopic regularities associated with what we call <i>measurements</i> of the properties of these things. But if these entities are not somehow identified with the wave function itself — and if talk of them is not merely shorthand for elaborate statements about measurements — then where are they to be found in the quantum description?<br />
There is, perhaps, a very simple reason why it is so difficult to discern in the quantum description the objects we believe quantum mechanics ought to describe. Perhaps the quantum mechanical description is not the whole story, a possibility most prominently associated with Albert Einstein. (For a general discussion of Einstein's scientific philosophy, and in particular of his approach to the conflicting positions of realism and positivism, see the entry on Einstein's philosophy of science.)<br />
In 1935 Einstein, Boris Podolsky and Nathan Rosen defended this possibility in their famous EPR paper (Einstein et al. 1935). They concluded with this observation:<br />
<blockquote>
While we have thus shown that the wave function does not provide a complete description of the physical reality, we left open the question of whether or not such a description exists. We believe, however, that such a theory is possible.</blockquote>
The argument that the EPR paper advances to support this conclusion invokes quantum correlations and an assumption of locality. (See the entries on the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen argument in quantum theory and on quantum entanglement and information.)<br />
Later, on the basis of more or less the same considerations as those of Schrödinger quoted above, Einstein again concluded that the wave function does not provide a complete description of individual systems, an idea he called “this most nearly obvious interpretation” (Einstein 1949, p. 672). In relation to a theory incorporating a more complete description, Einstein remarked that “the statistical quantum theory would … take an approximately analogous position to the statistical mechanics within the framework of classical mechanics.” We note here, and show below, that Bohmian mechanics exactly fits this description.<br />
<h2>
<a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" id="hv" name="hv">2. The Impossibility of Hidden Variables … or the Inevitability of Nonlocality?</a></h2>
John von Neumann, one of the greatest mathematicians of the twentieth century, claimed that he had proven that Einstein's dream of a deterministic completion or reinterpretation of quantum theory was mathematically impossible. He concluded that (von Neumann 1932, p. 325 of the English translation)<br />
<blockquote>
It is therefore not, as is often assumed, a question of a re-interpretation of quantum mechanics — the present system of quantum mechanics would have to be objectively false, in order that another description of the elementary processes than the statistical one be possible.</blockquote>
Physicists and philosophers of science almost universally accepted von Neumann's claim. For example, Max Born, who formulated the statistical interpretation of the wave function, assured us that (Born 1949, p. 109)<br />
<blockquote>
No concealed parameters can be introduced with the help of which the indeterministic description could be transformed into a deterministic one. Hence if a future theory should be deterministic, it cannot be a modification of the present one but must be essentially different.</blockquote>
Bohmian mechanics is a counterexample to the claims of von Neumann. Thus von Neumann's argument must be wrong. In fact, according to John Bell (Mermin 1993, p. 805), von Neumann's assumptions (about the relationships among the values of quantum observables that must be satisfied in a hidden-variables theory) are so unreasonable that the “the proof of von Neumann is not merely false but <i>foolish</i>!” Nonetheless, some physicists continue to rely on von Neumann's proof.<br />
Recently, however, physicists more commonly cite the Kochen-Specker Theorem and, more frequently, Bell's inequality in support of the contention that a deterministic completion of quantum theory is impossible. We still find, a quarter of a century after the rediscovery of Bohmian mechanics in 1952, statements such as these (Wigner 1976):<br />
<blockquote>
The proof he [von Neumann] published …, though it was made much more convincing later on by Kochen and Specker, still uses assumptions which, in my opinion, can quite reasonably be questioned. … In my opinion, the most convincing argument against the theory of hidden variables was presented by J. S. Bell (1964).</blockquote>
Now there are many more statements of a similar character that we could cite. This quotation is significant because Wigner was one of the leading physicists of his generation. Unlike most of his contemporaries, moreover, he was also profoundly concerned about the conceptual foundations of quantum mechanics and wrote on the subject with great clarity and insight.<br />
There was, however, one physicist who wrote on this subject with even greater clarity and insight than Wigner himself: the very J. S. Bell whom Wigner praises for demonstrating the impossibility of a deterministic completion of quantum theory such as Bohmian mechanics. Here's how Bell himself reacted to Bohm's discovery (Bell 1987, p. 160):<br />
<blockquote>
But in 1952 I saw the impossible done. It was in papers by David Bohm. Bohm showed explicitly how parameters could indeed be introduced, into nonrelativistic wave mechanics, with the help of which the indeterministic description could be transformed into a deterministic one. More importantly, in my opinion, the subjectivity of the orthodox version, the necessary reference to the ‘observer,’ could be eliminated. …<br />
But why then had Born not told me of this ‘pilot wave’? If only to point out what was wrong with it? Why did von Neumann not consider it? More extraordinarily, why did people go on producing ‘‘impossibility’’ proofs, after 1952, and as recently as 1978? … Why is the pilot wave picture ignored in text books? Should it not be taught, not as the only way, but as an antidote to the prevailing complacency? To show us that vagueness, subjectivity, and indeterminism, are not forced on us by experimental facts, but by deliberate theoretical choice?</blockquote>
Wigner to the contrary notwithstanding, Bell did not establish the impossibility of a deterministic reformulation of quantum theory, nor did he ever claim to have done so. On the contrary, until his untimely death in 1990, Bell was the prime proponent, and for much of this period almost the sole proponent, of the very theory, Bohmian mechanics, that he supposedly demolished.<br />
Bohmian mechanics is of course as much a counterexample to the Kochen-Specker argument for the impossibility of hidden variables as it is to the one of von Neumann. It is obviously a counterexample to any such argument. However reasonable the assumptions of such an argument, some of them must fail for Bohmian mechanics.<br />
Wigner was quite right to suggest that the assumptions of Kochen and Specker are more convincing than those of von Neumann. They appear, in fact, to be quite reasonable indeed. However, they are not. The impression that they are arises from a pervasive error, an uncritical realism about operators, that we discuss below in the sections on quantum observables, spin, and contextuality.<br />
John Bell replaced the “arbitrary axioms” (Bell 1987, page 11) of Kochen-Specker and others by an assumption of locality, of no action-at-a-distance. It would be hard to argue against the reasonableness of such an assumption, even if one were so bold as to doubt its inevitability. Bell showed that any hidden-variables formulation of quantum mechanics must be nonlocal, as, indeed, Bohmian mechanics is. But he showed much much more. (For more detail on Bell's locality assumption, see Bell's theorem in Scholarpedia.)<br />
In a celebrated paper he published in 1964, Bell showed that quantum theory itself is irreducibly nonlocal. (More precisely, Bell's analysis applies to any single-world version of quantum theory, i.e., any version for which measurements have outcomes that, while they may be random, are nonetheless unambiguous and definite, in contrast to the situation with Everett's many-worlds version of quantum theory.) This fact about quantum mechanics, based as it is on a short and mathematically simple analysis, could have been recognized soon after the discovery of quantum theory in the 1920's. That this did not happen is no doubt due in part to the obscurity of orthodox quantum theory and to the ambiguity of its commitments. It was, in fact, his examination of Bohmian mechanics that led Bell to his nonlocality analysis. In the course of investigating Bohmian mechanics, he observed that (Bell 1987, p. 11):<br />
<blockquote>
in this theory an explicit causal mechanism exists whereby the disposition of one piece of apparatus affects the results obtained with a distant piece.<br />
Bohm of course was well aware of these features of his scheme, and has given them much attention. However, it must be stressed that, to the present writer's knowledge, there is no <i>proof</i> that <i>any</i> hidden variable account of quantum mechanics <i>must</i> have this extraordinary character. It would therefore be interesting, perhaps, to pursue some further “impossibility proofs,” replacing the arbitrary axioms objected to above by some condition of locality, or of separability of distant systems.</blockquote>
In a footnote, Bell added that “Since the completion of this paper such a proof has been found.” He published it in his 1964 paper, “On the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen Paradox.” In this paper he derives Bell's inequality, the basis of his conclusion of quantum nonlocality. (See the entry on Bell's Theorem. For a discussion of how nonlocality emerges in Bohmian mechanics, see Section 13.)<br />
It is worth stressing that Bell's analysis indeed shows that any (single-world) account of quantum phenomena must be nonlocal, not just any hidden variables account. Bell showed that the predictions of standard quantum theory itself imply nonlocality. Thus if these predictions govern nature, then nature is nonlocal. [That nature is so governed, even in the crucial EPR-correlation experiments, has by now been established by a great many experiments, the most conclusive of which is perhaps that of Aspect (Aspect et al., 1982).]<br />
Bell, too, stressed this point (by determinism Bell here means hidden variables):<br />
<blockquote>
It is important to note that to the limited degree to which <i>determinism</i> plays a role in the EPR argument, it is not assumed but <i>inferred</i>. What is held sacred is the principle of ‘local causality’ — or ‘no action at a distance’…<br />
It is remarkably difficult to get this point across, that determinism is not a <i>presupposition</i> of the analysis. (Bell 1987, p. 143)<br />
Despite my insistence that the determinism was inferred rather than assumed, you might still suspect somehow that it is a preoccupation with determinism that creates the problem. Note well then that the following argument makes no mention whatever of determinism. … Finally you might suspect that the very notion of particle, and particle orbit … has somehow led us astray. … So the following argument will not mention particles, nor indeed fields, nor any other particular picture of what goes on at the microscopic level. Nor will it involve any use of the words ‘quantum mechanical system’, which can have an unfortunate effect on the discussion. The difficulty is not created by any such picture or any such terminology. It is created by the predictions about the correlations in the visible outputs of certain conceivable experimental set-ups. (Bell 1987, p. 150)</blockquote>
The “problem” and “difficulty” to which Bell refers above is the conflict between the predictions of quantum theory and what can be inferred, call it <i>C</i>, from an assumption of locality in Bohm's version of the EPR argument, a conflict established by Bell's inequality. <i>C</i> happens to concern the existence of a certain kind of hidden variables, what might be called local hidden variables, but this fact is of little substantive importance. What is important is not so much the identity of <i>C</i> as the fact that <i>C</i> is incompatible with the predictions of quantum theory. The identity of <i>C</i> is, however, of great historical significance: it is responsible for the misconception that Bell proved that hidden variables are impossible, a belief that physicists until recently almost universally shared, as well as for the view, even now almost universally held, that what Bell's result does is to rule out local hidden variables, a view that is misleading.<br />
Here again is Bell, expressing the logic of his <i>two-part</i> demonstration of quantum nonlocality, the first part of which is Bohm's version of the EPR argument:<br />
<blockquote>
Let me summarize once again the logic that leads to the impasse. The EPRB correlations are such that the result of the experiment on one side immediately foretells that on the other, whenever the analyzers happen to be parallel. If we do not accept the intervention on one side as a causal influence on the other, we seem obliged to admit that the results on both sides are determined in advance anyway, independently of the intervention on the other side, by signals from the source and by the local magnet setting. But this has implications for non-parallel settings which conflict with those of quantum mechanics. So we <i>cannot</i> dismiss intervention on one side as a causal influence on the other. (Bell 1987, p. 149)</blockquote>
As with just about everything else in the foundations of quantum mechanics, there remains considerable controversy about what exactly Bell's analyis demonstrates. Nonetheless, the opinion of Bell himself about what he showed is perfectly clear.<br />
<h2>
<a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" id="hist" name="hist">3. History</a></h2>
The pilot-wave approach to quantum theory was initiated by Einstein, even before the discovery of quantum mechanics itself. Einstein hoped that interference phenomena involving particle-like photons could be explained if the motion of the photons was somehow guided by the electromagnetic field — which would thus play the role of what he called a <i>Führungsfeld</i> or guiding field (see Wigner 1976, p. 262 and Bacciagaluppi and Valentini 2009, Ch. 9). While the notion of the electromagnetic field as guiding field turned out to be rather problematical, Max Born explored the possibility that the wave function could play this role, of guiding field or pilot wave, for a system of electrons in his early paper founding quantum scattering theory (Born 1926). Heisenberg was profoundly unsympathetic.<br />
Not long after Schrödinger's discovery of wave mechanics in 1926, i.e., of Schrödinger's equation, Louis de Broglie in effect discovered Bohmian mechanics: In 1927, de Broglie found an equation of particle motion equivalent to the guiding equation for a scalar wave function (de Broglie 1928, p. 119), and he explained at the 1927 Solvay Congress how this motion could account for quantum interference phenomena. However, despite what is suggested by Bacciagaluppi and Valentini (2009), de Broglie responded very poorly to an objection of Wolfgang Pauli (Pauli 1928) concerning inelastic scattering, no doubt making a rather bad impression on the illustrious audience at the congress.<br />
Born and de Broglie very quickly abandoned the pilot-wave approach and became enthusiastic supporters of the rapidly developing consensus in favor of the Copenhagen interpretation. David Bohm (Bohm 1952) rediscovered de Broglie's pilot-wave theory in 1952. He was the first person to genuinely understand its significance and implications. John Bell became its principal proponent during the sixties, seventies and eighties.<br />
<h2>
<a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" id="eqs" name="eqs">4. The Defining Equations of Bohmian Mechanics</a></h2>
In Bohmian mechanics the wave function, obeying Schrödinger's equation, does not provide a complete description or representation of a quantum system. Rather, it governs the motion of the fundamental variables, the positions of the particles: In the Bohmian mechanical version of nonrelativistic quantum theory, quantum mechanics is fundamentally about the behavior of particles; the particles are described by their positions, and Bohmian mechanics prescribes how these change with time. In this sense, for Bohmian mechanics the particles are primary, or primitive, while the wave function is secondary, or derivative.<br />
Warning: It is the positions of the particles in Bohmian mechanics that are its “hidden variables,” an unfortunate bit of terminology. As Bell (1987, page 201) writes, referring to Bohmian mechanics and similar theories,<br />
<blockquote>
Absurdly, such theories are known as ‘hidden variable’ theories. Absurdly, for there it is not in the wavefunction that one finds an image of the visible world, and the results of experiments, but in the complementary ‘hidden’(!) variables. Of course the extra variables are not confined to the visible ‘macroscopic’ scale. For no sharp definition of such a scale could be made. The ‘microscopic’ aspect of the complementary variables is indeed hidden from us. But to admit things not visible to the gross creatures that we are is, in my opinion, to show a decent humility, and not just a lamentable addiction to metaphysics. In any case, the most hidden of all variables, in the pilot wave picture, is the wavefunction, which manifests itself to us only by its influence on the complementary variables.</blockquote>
Bohmian mechanics is the minimal completion of Schrödinger's equation, for a nonrelativistic system of particles, to a theory describing a genuine motion of particles. For Bohmian mechanics the state of a system of <i>N</i> particles is described by its wave function ? = ?(<b><i>q</i></b><sub>1</sub>,…,<b><i>q</i></b><sub><i>N</i></sub>) = ?(<i>q</i>), a complex (or spinor-valued) function on the space of possible configurations <i>q</i> of the system, together with its actual configuration <i>Q</i> defined by the actual positions <b>Q</b><sub>1</sub>,…,<b>Q</b><sub><i>N</i></sub> of its particles. (The word ‘spinor’ refers to a suitable array of complex numbers in place of a single one. Spinor-valued wave functions are used in quantum mechanics to describe electrons and other quantum particles that ‘have spin’.) The theory is then defined by two evolution equations: Schrödinger's equation<br />
<blockquote>
<i>i</i>?(??/?<i>t</i>) = <i>H</i>?</blockquote>
for ?(<i>t</i>), where <i>H</i> is the nonrelativistic (Schrödinger) Hamiltonian, containing the masses of the particles and a potential energy term, and (writing Im[<i>z</i>] for the imaginary part <i>b</i> of a complex number <i>z</i> = <i>a</i> +i<i>b</i>) a first-order evolution equation,<br />
<blockquote>
<a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" id="ge" name="ge"><b>The Guiding Equation</b></a>:<br /><i>d</i><b>Q</b><sub><i>k</i></sub>/<i>dt</i> = (?/<i>m<sub>k</sub></i>) Im [?*?<sub><i>k</i></sub>?/ ?*?] (<b>Q</b><sub>1</sub>,…,<b>Q</b><sub><i>N</i></sub>)</blockquote>
for <i>Q(t)</i>, the simplest first-order evolution equation for the positions of the particles that is compatible with the Galilean (and time-reversal) covariance of the Schrödinger evolution (Dürr et al. 1992, pp. 852–854). Here ? is Planck's constant divided by 2p, <i>m<sub>k</sub></i> is the mass of the <i>k</i>-th particle, and ?<sub><i>k</i></sub> = (?/?<i>x</i><sub><i>k</i></sub>,?/?<i>y</i><sub><i>k</i></sub>,?/?<i>z</i><sub><i>k</i></sub>) is the gradient with respect to the generic coordinates <b><i>q</i></b><sub><i>k</i></sub> = (<i>x</i><sub><i>k</i></sub>,<i>y</i><sub><i>k</i></sub>,<i>z</i><sub><i>k</i></sub>) of the <i>k</i>-th particle. If ? is spinor-valued, the two products involving ? in the equation should be understood as scalar products (involving sums of products of spinor components). When external magnetic fields are present, the gradient should be understood as the covariant derivative, involving the vector potential. (Since the denominator on the right hand side of the guiding equation vanishes at the nodes of ?, global existence and uniqueness for the Bohmian dynamics is a nontrivial matter. It is proven in Berndl, Dürr, et al. 1995 and in Teufel and Tumulka 2005.)<br />
For an <i>N</i>-particle system these two equations (together with the detailed specification of the Hamiltonian, including all interactions contributing to the potential energy) completely define Bohmian mechanics. This deterministic theory of particles in motion accounts for all the phenomena of nonrelativistic quantum mechanics, from interference effects to spectral lines (Bohm 1952, pp. 175–178) to spin (Bell 1964, p. 10). It does so in an entirely ordinary manner, as we explain in the following sections.<br />
For a scalar wave function, describing particles without spin, the form of the guiding equation above is a little more complicated than necessary, since the complex conjugate of the wave function, which appears in the numerator and the denominator, cancels out. If one looks for an evolution equation for the configuration compatible with the space-time symmetries of Schrödinger's equation, one almost immediately arrives at the guiding equation in this simpler form as the simplest possibility.<br />
However, the form above has two advantages: First, it makes sense for particles with spin — and, in fact, Bohmian mechanics without further ado accounts for all the apparently paradoxical quantum phenomena associated with spin. Secondly, and this is crucial to the fact that Bohmian mechanics is empirically equivalent to orthodox quantum theory, the right hand side of the guiding equation is <i>J</i>/?, the ratio of the quantum probability current to the quantum probability density. This shows that it should require no imagination whatsoever to guess the guiding equation from Schrödinger's equation, provided one is looking for one, since the classical formula for current is density times velocity. Moreover, it follows from the quantum continuity equation ??/?<i>t</i> + div <i>J</i> = 0, an immediate consequence of Schrödinger's equation, that if at some time (say the initial time) the configuration <i>Q</i> of our system is random, with distribution given by |?|<sup>2</sup> = ?*?, this will always be true (provided the system does not interact with its environment).<br />
This demonstrates that it is wrong to claim that the predictions of quantum theory are incompatible with the existence of hidden variables, with an underlying deterministic model in which quantum randomness arises from averaging over ignorance. Bohmian mechanics provides us with just such a model: <a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" id="e4" name="e4">For</a> any quantum experiment we merely take as the relevant Bohmian system the combined system, including the system upon which the experiment is performed as well as all the measuring instruments and other devices used to perform the experiment (together with all other systems with which these have significant interaction over the course of the experiment). We then obtain the “hidden variables” model by regarding the initial configuration of this big system as random in the usual quantum mechanical way, with distribution given by |?|<sup>2</sup>. The guiding equation for the big system then transforms the initial configuration into the final configuration at the conclusion of the experiment. It then follows that this final configuration of the big system, including in particular the orientation of instrument pointers, will also be distributed in the quantum mechanical way. Thus our deterministic Bohmian model yields the usual quantum predictions for the results of the experiment.<br />
As the preceding paragraph suggests, and as we discuss in more detail later, Bohmian mechanics does not need any “measurement postulates” or <i>axioms</i> governing the behavior of other “observables”. Any such axioms would be at best redundant and could be inconsistent.<br />
Besides the guiding equation, there are other velocity formulas with nice properties, including Galilean symmetry, and yielding theories that are empirically equivalent to orthodox quantum theory — and to Bohmian mechanics (Deotto and Ghirardi, 1998). The Bohmian choice is arguably the simplest. Moreover, Wiseman (2007) has shown that it is the Bohmian velocity formula, given by the guiding equation, that, according to orthodox quantum theory, would be found in a “weak measurement” of the velocity of a particle. And, somewhat paradoxically, it can be shown (Dürr et al., 2009) that according to Bohmian mechanics such a measurement is indeed a genuine measurement of the particle's velocity — despite the existence of empirically equivalent velocity formulas! Similarly, weak measurements could be used to measure trajectories. In fact, quite recently Kocsis et al. (2011) have used weak measurements to reconstruct the trajectories for single photons “as they undergo two-slit interference,” finding “those predicted in the Bohm-de Broglie interpretation of quantum mechanics.”<br />
<h2>
<a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" id="qp" name="qp">5. The Quantum Potential</a></h2>
Bohmian mechanics as presented here is a first-order theory, in which it is the velocity, the rate of change of position, that is fundamental. It is this quantity, given by <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qm-bohm/#ge">the guiding equation</a>, that the theory specifies directly and simply. The second-order (Newtonian) concepts of acceleration and force, work and energy do not play any fundamental role. Bohm, however, did not regard his theory in this way. He regarded it, fundamentally, as a second-order theory, describing particles moving under the influence of forces, among which, however, is a force stemming from a “quantum potential.”<br />
In his 1952 hidden-variables paper (Bohm 1952), Bohm arrived at his theory by writing the wave function in the polar form ? = <i>R</i>exp(<i>iS</i>/?), where <i>S</i> and <i>R</i> are real, with <i>R</i> nonnegative, and rewriting Schrödinger's equation in terms of these new variables to obtain a pair of coupled evolution equations: the continuity equation for ? = <i>R<sup>2</sup></i> and a modified Hamilton-Jacobi equation for <i>S</i>. This differs from the usual classical Hamilton-Jacobi equation only by the appearance of an extra term, the <i>quantum potential</i><br />
<blockquote>
<i>U</i> = -?<sub><i>k</i></sub>(?<sup>2</sup>/<i>2m</i><sub><i>k</i></sub>) (?<sub><i>k</i></sub><sup>2</sup><i>R</i> / <i>R</i> ),</blockquote>
alongside the classical potential energy term.<br />
Bohm then used the modified Hamilton-Jacobi equation to define particle trajectories just as one does for the classical Hamilton-Jacobi equation, that is, by identifying ?<sub><i>k</i></sub><i>S</i> with <i>m</i><sub><i>k</i></sub><b><i>v</i></b><sub><i>k</i></sub>, i.e., by setting<br />
<blockquote>
<i>d</i><b>Q</b><sub><i>k</i></sub>/<i>dt</i> = ?<sub><i>k</i></sub><i>S</i> / <i>m</i><sub><i>k</i></sub>.</blockquote>
This is equivalent to the guiding equation for particles without spin. [In this form the (pre-Schrödinger equation) de Broglie relation <b><i>p</i></b> = ?<b><i>k</i></b>, as well as by the eikonal equation of classical optics, already suggest the guiding equation.] The resulting motion is precisely what would be obtained classically if the particles were acted upon by the force generated by the quantum potential, in addition to the usual forces.<br />
The quantum potential formulation of the de Broglie-Bohm theory is still fairly widely used. For example, the monographs by Bohm and Hiley and by Holland present the theory in this way. And regardless of whether or not we regard the quantum potential as fundamental, it can in fact be quite useful. In order to see most clearly that Newtonian mechanics should be expected to emerge from Bohmian mechanics in the classical limit, it is convenient to transform the theory into Bohm's Hamilton-Jacobi form. Then the (size of the) quantum potential provides a measure of the deviation of Bohmian mechanics from its classical approximation. Moreover, the quantum potential is also useful for developing approximation schemes for solutions to Schrödinger's equation (Nerukh and Frederick 2000).<br />
However, Bohm's rewriting of Schrödinger's equation in terms of variables that seem interpretable in classical terms is not without a cost. The most obvious is an increase in complexity: Schrödinger's equation is rather simple, and it is linear, whereas the modified Hamilton-Jacobi equation is somewhat complicated, and highly nonlinear. Moreover the latter, since it involves <i>R</i>, requires the continuity equation for its closure. The quantum potential itself is neither simple nor natural. Even to Bohm it seemed “rather strange and arbitrary” (Bohm 1980, p. 80). And it is not very satisfying to think of the quantum revolution as amounting to the insight that nature is classical after all, except that there is in nature what appears to be a rather ad hoc additional force term, the one arising from the quantum potential. The artificiality that the quantum potential suggests is the price one pays for casting a highly nonclassical theory into a classical mold.<br />
Moreover, the connection between classical mechanics and Bohmian mechanics that the quantum potential suggests is rather misleading. Bohmian mechanics is not simply classical mechanics with an additional force term. In Bohmian mechanics the velocities are not independent of positions, as they are classically, but are constrained by the guiding equation. (In classical Hamilton-Jacobi theory we also have this equation for the velocity, but there the Hamilton-Jacobi function <i>S</i> can be entirely eliminated and the description in terms of <i>S</i> simplified and reduced to a finite-dimensional description, with basic variables the positions and the (unconstrained) momenta of all the particles, given by Hamilton's or Newton's equations.)<br />
Arguably, the most serious flaw in the quantum potential formulation of Bohmian mechanics is that it gives a completely false impression of the lengths to which we must go in order to convert orthodox quantum theory into something more rational. The quantum potential suggests, as has often been stated, that transforming Schrödinger's equation into a theory that can account in “realistic” terms for quantum phenomena, many of which are dramatically nonlocal, requires adding to the theory a complicated quantum potential of a grossly nonlocal character. It should be clear that this view is inappropriate. After all, the quantum potential need not even be mentioned in the <i>formulation</i> of Bohmian mechanics, and it in any case merely reflects the wave function, which Bohmian mechanics shares with orthodox quantum theory.<br />
<h2>
<a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" id="2s" name="2s">6. The Two-Slit Experiment</a></h2>
According to Richard Feynman, the two-slit experiment for electrons is (Feynman et al. 1963, p. 37–2) “a phenomenon which is impossible, <i>absolutely</i> impossible, to explain in any classical way, and which has in it the heart of quantum mechanics. In reality it contains the <i>only</i> mystery.” This experiment (Feynman 1967, p. 130) “has been designed to contain all of the mystery of quantum mechanics, to put you up against the paradoxes and mysteries and peculiarities of nature one hundred per cent.” As to the question (Feynman 1967, p. 145), “How does it really work? What machinery is actually producing this thing? Nobody knows any machinery. Nobody can give you a deeper explanation of this phenomenon than I have given; that is, a description of it.”<br />
But Bohmian mechanics is just such a deeper explanation. It resolves in a rather straightforward manner the dilemma of the appearance of both particle and wave properties in one and the same phenomenon: Bohmian mechanics is a theory of motion describing a particle (or particles) guided by a wave. Here we have a family of Bohmian trajectories for the two-slit experiment.<br />
<blockquote>
<img alt="figure 1" src="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qm-bohm/figure1.gif" /><br />
Figure 1: An ensemble of trajectories for the two-slit experiment, uniform in the slits.<br />(Adapted by Gernot Bauer from Philippidis et al. 1979.)</blockquote>
While each trajectory passes through only one slit, the wave passes through both; the interference profile that therefore develops in the wave generates a similar pattern in the trajectories guided by the wave.<br />
Compare Feynman's presentation with Bell's (Bell 1987, p. 191):<br />
<blockquote>
Is it not clear from the smallness of the scintillation on the screen that we have to do with a particle? And is it not clear, from the diffraction and interference patterns, that the motion of the particle is directed by a wave? De Broglie showed in detail how the motion of a particle, passing through just one of two holes in screen, could be influenced by waves propagating through both holes. And so influenced that the particle does not go where the waves cancel out, but is attracted to where they cooperate. This idea seems to me so natural and simple, to resolve the wave-particle dilemma in such a clear and ordinary way, that it is a great mystery to me that it was so generally ignored.</blockquote>
Perhaps the most puzzling aspect of the two-slit experiment is the following: If, by any means whatsoever, it is possible to determine the slit through which the particle passes, the interference pattern will be destroyed. This dramatic effect of observation is, in fact, a simple consequence of Bohmian mechanics. To see this, one must consider the meaning of determining the slit through which the particle passes. This must involve interaction with another system that the Bohmian mechanical analysis must include.<br />
The destruction of interference is related, naturally enough, to the Bohmian mechanical analysis of quantum measurement (Bohm 1952). It occurs via the mechanism that in Bohmian mechanics leads to the “collapse of the wave function.”<br />
<h2>
<a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" id="mp" name="mp">7. The Measurement Problem</a></h2>
The measurement problem is most the commonly cited of the conceptual difficulties that plague quantum mechanics. (It amounts, more or less, to the paradox of Schrödinger's cat.) Indeed, for many physicists the measurement problem is not merely one conceptual difficulty of quantum mechanics; it is <i>the</i> conceptual difficulty.<br />
The problem is as follows. Suppose that the wave function of any individual system provides a complete description of that system. When we analyze the process of measurement in quantum mechanical terms, we find that the after-measurement wave function for system and apparatus that arises from Schrödinger's equation for the composite system typically involves a superposition over terms corresponding to what we would like to regard as the various possible results of the measurement — e.g., different pointer orientations. In this description of the after-measurement situation it is difficult to discern the actual result of the measurement — e.g., some specific pointer orientation. But the whole point of quantum theory, and the reason we should believe in it, is that it is supposed to provide a compelling, or at least an efficient, account of our observations, that is, of the outcomes of measurements. In short, the measurement problem is this: Quantum theory implies that measurements typically fail to have outcomes of the sort the theory was created to explain.<br />
In contrast, if we, like Einstein, regard the description provided by the wave function as incomplete, the measurement problem vanishes: There is no measurement problem with a theory or interpretation in which, as in Bohmian mechanics, the description of the after-measurement situation includes, in addition to the wave function, at least the values of the variables that register the result. In Bohmian mechanics pointers always point.<br />
Often, the measurement problem is expressed a little differently. Textbook quantum theory provides two rules for the evolution of the wave function of a quantum system: A deterministic dynamics given by Schrödinger's equation when the system is not being “measured” or observed, and a random collapse of the wave function to an <i>eigenstate</i> of the “measured observable” when it is. However, the objection continues, textbook quantum theory does not explain how to reconcile these two apparently incompatible rules.<br />
That this formulation of the measurement problem and the preceding one are more or less equivalent should be reasonably clear: If a wave function provides a complete description of the after-measurement situation, the outcome of the measurement must correspond to a wave function that describes the actual result, that is, a “collapsed” wave function. Hence the collapse rule. But it is difficult to take seriously the idea that different laws than those governing all other interactions should govern those interactions between system and apparatus that we happen to call measurements. Hence the apparent incompatibility of the two rules.<br />
The second formulation of the measurement problem, though basically equivalent to the first, raises an important question: Can Bohmian mechanics itself reconcile these two dynamical rules? How does Bohmian mechanics justify the use of the “collapsed” wave function instead of the original one? This question was answered in Bohm's first papers on Bohmian mechanics (Bohm 1952, Part I, Section 7, and Part II, Section 2). What would nowadays be called effects of decoherence, which interaction with the environment (air molecules, cosmic rays, internal microscopic degrees of freedom, etc.) produces, make difficult the development of significant overlap between the component of the after-measurement wave function corresponding to the actual result of the measurement and the other components of the after-measurement wave function. (This overlap refers to the configuration space of the very large system that includes all systems with which the original system and apparatus come into interaction.) But without such overlap that component all by itself generates to a high degree of accuracy the future evolution of the configuration of the system and apparatus. The replacement is thus justified as a practical matter. (See also Dürr et al. 1992, Section 5.)<br />
Many proponents of orthodox quantum theory believe that decoherence somehow resolves the measurement problem itself. It is not easy to understand this belief. In the first formulation of the measurement problem, nothing prevents us from including in the apparatus all sources of decoherence. But then decoherence can no longer be in any way relevant to the argument. Be that as it may, Bohm (Bohm 1952) gave one of the best descriptions of the mechanisms of decoherence, though he did not use the word itself. He recognized its importance several decades before it became fashionable. (See also the encyclopedia entry on The Role of Decoherence in Quantum Mechanics.)<br />
<h2>
<a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" id="cwf" name="cwf">8. The Collapse of the Wave Function</a></h2>
In the previous section we indicated that collapse of the wave function can be regarded in Bohmian mechanics as a pragmatic affair. However, there is a sense in which the collapse of the wave function in Bohmian mechanics is more than a matter of convenience. If we focus on the appropriate notion of the wave function, not of the composite of system and apparatus — which strictly speaking remains a superposition if the composite is treated as closed during the measurement process — but of the system itself, we find that for Bohmian mechanics this does indeed collapse, precisely as the quantum formalism says. The key element here is the notion of the <i>conditional wave function</i> of a subsystem of a larger system, which we describe briefly in this section and that Dürr et al. 1992, Section 5, discuss in some detail, together with the related notion of the effective wave function.<br />
For the evolution of the wave function, Bohmian mechanics is formulated in terms of Schrödinger's equation alone. Nonetheless the textbook collapse rule is a consequence of the Bohmian dynamics. To appreciate this one should first note that, since observation implies interaction, a system under observation cannot be a closed system but rather must be a subsystem of a larger closed system, which we may take to be the entire universe, or any smaller more or less closed system that contains the system to be observed, <i>the subsystem</i>. The configuration <i>Q</i> of this larger system naturally splits into <i>X</i>, the configuration of the subsystem, and <i>Y</i>, the configuration of the <i>environment</i> of the subsystem.<br />
Suppose the larger system has wave function ? = ?(<i>q</i>) = ?(<i>x</i>, <i>y</i>). According to Bohmian mechanics, the larger system is then completely described by ?, evolving according to Schrödinger's equation, together with <i>X</i> and <i>Y</i>. The question then arises — and it is a critical question — as to what should be meant by the wave function of the subsystem.<br />
There is a rather obvious answer for this, a natural function of <i>x</i> that suitably incorporates the objective structure at hand, namely the <i>conditional wave function</i><br />
<blockquote>
?(<i>x</i>) = ?(<i>x</i>, <i>Y</i>)</blockquote>
obtained by plugging the actual configuration of the environment into the wave function of the larger system. (This definition is appropriate only for scalar wave functions; for particles with spin the situation would be a little more complicated.) It then follows immediately that the configuration of the subsystem obeys the guiding equation with the conditional wave function on its right-hand side.<br />
Moreover, taking into account the way that the conditional wave function depends upon time <i>t</i><br />
<blockquote>
?<sub><i>t</i></sub>(<i>x</i>) = ?<sub><i>t</i></sub>(<i>x</i>, <i>Y</i><sub><i>t</i></sub>)</blockquote>
via the time dependence of <i>Y</i> as well as that of ?, it is not difficult to see (Dürr et al. 1992) the following two things about the evolution of the conditional wave: First, that it obeys Schrödinger's equation for the subsystem when that system is suitably decoupled from its environment. Part of what is meant by this decoupling is that ? has a special form, what might be called an effective product form (similar to but more general than the superposition produced in an “ideal quantum measurement”), in which case the conditional wave function of the subsystem is also called its <i>effective wave function</i>. Second, using the quantum equilibrium hypothesis, that it randomly collapses according to the usual quantum mechanical rules under precisely those conditions on the interaction between the subsystem and its environment that define an ideal quantum measurement.<br />
It is perhaps worth noting that orthodox quantum theory lacks the resources that make it possible to define the conditional wave function, namely, the actual configuration <i>Y</i> of the environment. Indeed, from an orthodox point of view what should be meant by the wave function of a subsystem is entirely obscure.<br />
<h2>
<a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" id="qr" name="qr">9. Quantum Randomness</a></h2>
According to the quantum formalism, for a system with wave function ? the probability density for finding its configuration to be <i>q</i> is |?(<i>q</i>)|<sup>2</sup>. To the extent that the results of measurement are registered configurationally, at least potentially, it follows that the predictions of Bohmian mechanics for the results of measurement must agree with those of orthodox quantum theory (assuming the same Schrödinger equation for both) provided that it is somehow true for Bohmian mechanics that configurations are random, with distribution given by the <i>quantum equilibrium</i> distribution |?(<i>q</i>)|<sup>2</sup>. Now the status and justification of this <i>quantum equilibrium hypothesis</i> is a rather delicate matter, one that has been explored in considerable detail (Dürr et al. 1992). Here are a few relevant points.<br />
It is nowadays a rather familiar fact that dynamical systems quite generally give rise to behavior of a statistical character, with the statistics given by the (or a) stationary probability distribution for the dynamics. So it is with Bohmian mechanics, except that for the Bohmian system stationarity is not quite the right concept. Rather it is the notion of <i>equivariance</i> that is relevant. A probability distribution on configuration space ?<sup>?</sup>, depending upon the wave function ?, is <i>equivariant</i> if<br />
<blockquote>
(?<sup>?</sup>)<sub><i>t</i></sub> = ?<sup>?<sub><i>t</i></sub></sup></blockquote>
where the dependence on <i>t</i> on the right arises from Schrödinger's equation and on the left from the evolution on probability distributions arising from the flow that the guiding equation induces. Thus equivariance expresses the mutual compatibility, relative to ?<sup>?</sup>, of the Schrödinger evolution of the wave function and the Bohmian motion of the configuration. It is an immediate consequence of the guiding equation and the quantum continuity equation that ?<sup>?</sup> = |?(<i>q</i>)|<sup>2</sup> is equivariant. (It can be shown in fact that this is more or less the only equivariant possibility that is suitably local (Goldstein and Struyve 2007).)<br />
In trying to understand the status in Bohmian mechanics of the quantum equilibrium distribution, it is perhaps helpful to think of<br />
<blockquote>
<i>quantum equilibrium</i>, ? = |?|<sup>2</sup></blockquote>
as roughly analogous to (classical)<br />
<blockquote>
<i>thermodynamic equilibrium</i>, ? = exp(-<i>H</i>/<i>k</i><i>T</i>) /<i>Z</i>,</blockquote>
the probability distribution of the phase-space point of a system in equilibrium at temperature <i>T</i>. (<i>Z</i> is a normalization constant called the partition function and <i>k</i> is Boltzmann's constant.) This analogy has several facets: In both cases the probability distributions are naturally associated with their respective dynamical systems. In particular, these distributions are stationary or, what amounts to the same thing within the framework of Bohmian mechanics, equivariant. In both cases it seems natural to try to justify these equilibrium distributions by means of mixing-type, convergence-to-equilibrium arguments (Bohm 1953, Valentini and Westman 2005). It has been argued, however, that in both cases the ultimate justification for these probability distributions must be in terms of statistical patterns that ensembles of actual subsystems within a <i>typical</i> individual universe exhibit (Bell 1987, page 129, Dürr et al. 1992). In both cases the status of, and justification for, equilibrium distributions is still controversial. It is also perhaps worth noting that the typicality-grounded account of quantum randomness in Bohmian mechanics is extremely similar to Everett's account (Everett III 1957) of quantum randomness for “many worlds,” despite the huge metaphysical differences that exist between these two versions of quantum theory. It can be shown (Dürr et al. 1992) that probabilities for positions given by the quantum equilibrium distribution emerge naturally from an analysis of “equilibrium” for the deterministic dynamical system that Bohmian mechanics defines, much as the Maxwellian velocity distribution emerges from an analysis of classical thermodynamic equilibrium. (For more on the thermodynamic side of the analogy see Goldstein 2001.) Thus with Bohmian mechanics the statistical description in quantum theory indeed takes, as Einstein anticipated, “an approximately analogous position to the statistical mechanics within the framework of classical mechanics.”<br />
<h2>
<a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" id="qo" name="qo">10. Quantum Observables</a></h2>
Orthodox quantum theory supplies us with probabilities not merely for positions but for a huge class of quantum observables. It might thus appear that it is a much richer theory than Bohmian mechanics, which seems exclusively concerned with positions. Appearances are, however, misleading. In this regard, as with so much else in the foundations of quantum mechanics, Bell made the crucial observation (Bell 1987, p. 166):<br />
<blockquote>
[I]n physics the only observations we must consider are position observations, if only the positions of instrument pointers. It is a great merit of the de Broglie-Bohm picture to force us to consider this fact. If you make axioms, rather than definitions and theorems, about the “measurement” of anything else, then you commit redundancy and risk inconsistency.</blockquote>
Consider classical mechanics first. The observables are functions on phase space, functions of the positions and momenta of the particles. The axioms governing the behavior of the basic observables — Newton's equations for the positions or Hamilton's for positions and momenta — define the theory. What would be the point of making additional axioms, for other observables? After all, the behavior of the basic observables entirely determines the behavior of any observable. For example, for classical mechanics, the principle of the conservation of energy is a theorem, not an axiom.<br />
The situation might seem to differ in quantum mechanics, as usually construed. Here there is no small set of basic observables having the property that all other observables are functions of them. Moreover, no observables at all are taken seriously as describing objective properties, as actually having values whether or not they are or have been measured. Rather, all talk of observables in quantum mechanics is supposed to be understood as talk about the measurement of the observables.<br />
But if this is so, the situation with regard to other observables in quantum mechanics is not really that different from that in classical mechanics. Whatever quantum mechanics means by the measurement of (the values of) observables — that, we are urged to believe, don't actually have values — must at least refer to some experiment involving interaction between the “measured” system and a “measuring” apparatus leading to a recognizable result, as given potentially by, say, a pointer orientation. But then if some axioms suffice for the behavior of pointer orientations (at least when they are observed), rules about the measurement of other observables must be theorems, following from those axioms, not additional axioms.<br />
It should be clear from the discussion towards the end of Section 4 and at the beginning of Section 9 that, assuming the quantum equilibrium hypothesis, any analysis of the measurement of a quantum observable for orthodox quantum theory — whatever it is taken to mean and however the corresponding experiment is performed — provides ipso facto at least as adequate an account for Bohmian mechanics. The only part of orthodox quantum theory relevant to the analysis is the Schrödinger evolution, and it <i>shares</i> this with Bohmian mechanics. The main difference between them is that orthodox quantum theory encounters the measurement problem before it reaches a satisfactory conclusion while Bohmian mechanics does not. This difference stems of course from what Bohmian mechanics <i>adds</i> to orthodox quantum theory: actual configurations.<br />
The rest of this section will discuss the significance of quantum observables for Bohmian mechanics. (It follows from what has been said in the three preceding paragraphs that what we conclude here about quantum observables for Bohmian mechanics holds for orthodox quantum theory as well.)<br />
Bohmian mechanics yields a natural association between experiments and so-called <i>generalized observables</i>, given by positive-operator-valued measures (Davies 1976), or POVM's, <i>O</i>(<i>dz</i>), on the value spaces for the results of the experiments (Berndl, Daumer, et al. 1995). This association is such that the probability distribution of the result <i>Z</i> of an experiment, when performed upon a system with wave function ?, is given by O</div>
(<i>dz</i>)?> (where < | > is the usual inner product between quantum state vectors).<br />
Moreover, this conclusion is follows immediately from the very meaning of an experiment from a Bohmian perspective: a coupling of system to apparatus leading to a result <i>Z</i> that is a function of the final configuration of the total system, e.g., the orientation of a pointer. Analyzed in Bohmian mechanical terms, the experiment defines a map from the initial wave function of the system to the distribution of the result. It follows directly from the structure of Bohmian mechanics, and from the fact that the quantum equilibrium distribution is quadratic in the wave function, that this map is bilinear (or, more precisely, sesquilinear, in that its dependence on one factor of the wave function is antilinear, involving complex conjugation, rather than linear). Such a map is equivalent to a POVM.<br />
The simplest example of a POVM is a standard quantum observable, corresponding to a self-adjoint operator <i>A</i> on the Hilbert space of quantum states (i.e., wave functions). For Bohmian mechanics, more or less every “measurement-like” experiment is associated with this special kind of POVM. The familiar quantum measurement axiom that the distribution of the result of the “measurement of the observable <i>A</i>” is given by the <i>spectral measure</i> for <i>A</i> relative to the wave function (in the very simplest cases just the absolute squares of the so-called <i>probability amplitudes</i>) is thus obtained.<br />
For various reasons, after the discovery of quantum mechanics it quickly became almost universal to speak of an experiment associated with an operator <i>A</i> in the manner just sketched as a <i>measurement</i> of the <i>observable</i> <i>A</i> — as if the operator somehow corresponded to a property of the system that the experiment in some sense measures. It has been argued that this assumption, which has been called <i>naive realism about operators</i>, has been a source of considerable confusion about the meaning and implications of quantum theory (Daumer et al., 1997).<br />
<h2>
<a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" id="sp" name="sp">11. Spin</a></h2>
The case of spin illustrates nicely both the way Bohmian mechanics treats non-configurational quantum observables, and some of the difficulties that the naive realism about operators mentioned above causes.<br />
Spin is the canonical quantum observable that has no classical counterpart, reputedly impossible to grasp in a nonquantum way. The difficulty is not quite that spin is quantized in the sense that its allowable values form a discrete set (for a spin-1/2 particle, ±?/2). Energy too may be quantized in this sense. Nor is it precisely that the components of spin in the different directions fail to commute — and so cannot be simultaneously discussed, measured, imagined, or whatever it is that we are advised not to do with noncommuting observables. Rather the problem is that there is no ordinary (nonquantum) quantity which, like the spin observable, is a 3-vector and which also is such that its components in all possible directions belong to the same discrete set. The problem, in other words, is that the usual vector relationships among the various components of the spin vector are incompatible with the quantization conditions on the values of these components.<br />
For a particle of spin-1 the problem is even more severe. The components of spin in different directions aren't simultaneously measurable. Thus, the impossible vector relationships for the spin components of a quantum particle are not observable. Bell (1966), and, independently, Simon Kochen and Ernst Specker (Kochen and Specker 1967) showed that for a spin-1 particle the squares of the spin components in the various directions satisfy, according to quantum theory, a collection of relationships, each individually observable, that taken together are impossible: the relationships are incompatible with the idea that measurements of these observables merely reveal their preexisting values rather than creating them, as quantum theory urges us to believe. Many physicists and philosophers of physics continue to regard the Kochen-Specker Theorem as precluding the possibility of hidden variables.<br />
We thus might naturally wonder how Bohmian mechanics copes with spin. But we have already answered this question. Bohmian mechanics makes sense for particles with spin, i.e., for particles whose wave functions are spinor-valued. When such particles are suitably directed toward Stern-Gerlach magnets, they emerge moving in more or less a discrete set of directions — 2 possible directions for a spin-1/2 particle, having 2 spin components, 3 for spin-1 with 3 spin components, and so on. This occurs because the Stern-Gerlach magnets are so designed and oriented that a wave packet (a localized wave function with reasonably well defined velocity) directed towards the magnet will, by virtue of the Schrödinger evolution, separate into distinct packets — corresponding to the spin components of the wave function and moving in the discrete set of directions. The particle itself, depending upon its initial position, ends up in one of the packets moving in one of the directions.<br />
The probability distribution for the result of such a <i>Stern-Gerlach experiment</i> can be conveniently expressed in terms of the quantum mechanical spin operators — for a spin-1/2 particle given by certain 2 by 2 matrices called the Pauli spin matrices — in the manner alluded to above. From a Bohmian perspective there is no hint of paradox in any of this — unless we assume that the spin operators correspond to genuine properties of the particles.<br />
<h2>
<a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" id="c" name="c">12. Contextuality</a></h2>
The Kochen-Specker Theorem, the earlier theorem of Gleason (Gleason 1957 and Bell 1966), and other no-hidden-variables results, including Bell's inequality (Bell 1964), show that any hidden-variables formulation of quantum mechanics must be <i>contextual</i>. It must violate the noncontextuality assumption “that measurement of an observable must yield the same value independently of what other measurements may be made simultaneously” (Bell 1987, p. 9). To many physicists and philosophers of science contextuality seems too great a price to pay for the rather modest benefits — largely psychological, so they would say — that hidden variables provide.<br />
Even many Bohmians suggest that contextuality departs significantly from classical principles. For example, Bohm and Hiley (1993) write that “The context dependence of results of measurements is a further indication of how our interpretation does not imply a simple return to the basic principles of classical physics.”<br />
However, to understand contextuality in Bohmian mechanics almost nothing needs to be explained. Consider an operator <i>A</i> that commutes with operators <i>B</i> and <i>C</i> (which however don't commute with each other). What is often called the “result for <i>A</i>” in an experiment for “measuring <i>A</i> together with <i>B</i>” usually disagrees with the “result for <i>A</i>” in an experiment for “measuring <i>A</i> together with <i>C</i>.” This is because these experiments differ and different experiments usually have different results. The misleading reference to measurement, which suggests that a pre-existing value of <i>A</i> is being revealed, makes contextuality seem more than it is.<br />
Seen properly, contextuality amounts to little more than the rather unremarkable observation that results of experiments should depend upon how they are performed, even when the experiments are associated with the same operator in the manner alluded to above. David Albert (Albert 1992, p. 153) has given a particularly simple and striking example of this dependence for Stern-Gerlach experiments “measuring” the <i>z</i>-component of spin. Reversing the polarity in a magnet for “measuring” the <i>z</i>-component of spin while keeping the same geometry yields another magnet for “measuring” the <i>z</i>-component of spin. The use of one or the other of these two magnets will often lead to opposite conclusions about the “value of the <i>z</i>-component of spin” prior to the “measurement” (for the same initial value of the position of the particle).<br />
As Bell insists (Bell 1987, p. 166):<br />
<blockquote>
A final moral concerns terminology. Why did such serious people take so seriously axioms which now seem so arbitrary? I suspect that they were misled by the pernicious misuse of the word ‘measurement’ in contemporary theory. This word very strongly suggests the ascertaining of some preexisting property of some thing, any instrument involved playing a purely passive role. Quantum experiments are just not like that, as we learned especially from Bohr. The results have to be regarded as the joint product of ‘system’ and ‘apparatus,’ the complete experimental set-up. But the misuse of the word ‘measurement’ makes it easy to forget this and then to expect that the ‘results of measurements’ should obey some simple logic in which the apparatus is not mentioned. The resulting difficulties soon show that any such logic is not ordinary logic. It is my impression that the whole vast subject of ‘Quantum Logic’ has arisen in this way from the misuse of a word. I am convinced that the word ‘measurement’ has now been so abused that the field would be significantly advanced by banning its use altogether, in favour for example of the word ‘experiment.’</blockquote>
<h2>
<a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" id="nl" name="nl">13. Nonlocality</a></h2>
Bohmian mechanics is manifestly nonlocal. The velocity, as expressed in the guiding equation, of any particle of a many-particle system will typically depend upon the positions of the other, possibly distant, particles whenever the wave function of the system is entangled, i.e., not a product of single-particle wave functions. This is true, for example, for the EPR-Bohm wave function, describing a pair of spin-1/2 particles in the singlet state, that Bell and many others analyzed. Thus Bohmian mechanics makes explicit the most dramatic feature of quantum theory: quantum nonlocality, as discussed in Section 2.<br />
It should be emphasized that the nonlocality of Bohmian mechanics derives solely from the nonlocality, discussed in <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qm-bohm/#hv">Section 2</a>, built into the structure of standard quantum theory. This nonlocality originates from a wave function on configuration space, an abstraction which, roughly speaking, combines — or binds — distant particles into a single irreducible reality. As Bell (1987, p. 115) has stressed,<br />
<blockquote>
That the guiding wave, in the general case, propagates not in ordinary three-space but in a multidimensional-configuration space is the origin of the notorious ‘nonlocality’ of quantum mechanics. It is a merit of the de Broglie-Bohm version to bring this out so explicitly that it cannot be ignored.</blockquote>
Thus the nonlocal velocity relation in the guiding equation is but one aspect of the nonlocality of Bohmian mechanics. There is also the nonlocality, or nonseparability, implicit in the wave function itself, which is present even without the structure — actual configurations — that Bohmian mechanics adds to orthodox quantum theory. As Bell has shown, using the connection between the wave function and the predictions of quantum theory about experimental results, this nonlocality cannot easily be eliminated (see Section 2).<br />
The nonlocality of Bohmian mechanics can be appreciated perhaps most efficiently, in all its aspects, by focusing on the conditional wave function. Suppose, for example, that in an EPR-Bohm experiment particle 1 passes through its Stern-Gerlach magnet before particle 2 arrives at its magnet. Then the orientation of the Stern-Gerlach magnet for particle 1 will significantly affect the conditional wave function of particle 2: If the Stern-Gerlach magnet for particle 1 is oriented so as to “measure the <i>z</i>-component of spin,” then after particle 1 has passed through its magnet the conditional wave function of particle 2 will be an eigenvector (or eigenstate) of the <i>z</i>-component of spin (in fact, belonging to the eigenvalue that is the negative of the one “measured” for particle 1), and the same thing is true for any other component of spin. You can dictate the <i>kind</i> of spin eigenstate produced for particle 2 by appropriately choosing the orientation of an arbitrarily distant magnet. As to the future behavior of particle 2, in particular how its magnet affects it, this of course depends very much on the character of its conditional wave function and hence the choice of orientation of the distant magnet strongly influences it.<br />
This nonlocal effect upon the conditional wave function of particle 2 follows from combining the standard analysis of the evolution of the wave function in the EPR-Bohm experiment with the definition of the conditional wave function. (For simplicity, we ignore permutation symmetry.) Before reaching any magnets the EPR-Bohm wave function is a sum of two terms, corresponding to nonvanishing values for two of the four possible joint spin components for the two particles. Each term is a product of an eigenstate for a component of spin in a given direction for particle 1 with the opposite eigenstate (i.e., belonging to the eigenvalue that is the negative of the eigenvalue for particle 1) for the component of spin in the same direction for particle 2. Moreover, by virtue of its symmetry under rotations, the EPR-Bohm wave function has the property that any component of spin, i.e., any direction, can be used in this decomposition. (This property is very interesting.)<br />
Decomposing the EPR-Bohm wave function using the component of spin in the direction associated with the magnet for particle 1, the evolution of the wave function as particle 1 passes its magnet is easily grasped: The evolution of the sum is determined (using the linearity of Schrödinger's equation) by that of its individual terms, and the evolution of each term by that of each of its factors. The evolution of the particle-1 factor leads to a displacement along the magnetic axis in the direction determined by the (sign of the) spin component (i.e., the eigenvalue), as described in the fourth paragraph of Section 11. Once this displacement has occurred (and is large enough) the conditional wave function for particle 2 will correspond to the term in the sum selected by the actual position of particle 1. In particular, it will be an eigenstate of the component of spin “measured by” the magnet for particle 1.<br />
The nonlocality of Bohmian mechanics has a remarkable feature: it is screened by quantum equilibrium. It is a consequence of the quantum equilibrium hypothesis that the nonlocal effects in Bohmian mechanics don't yield observable consequences that can be controlled — we can't use them to send instantaneous messages. This follows from the fact that, given the quantum equilibrium hypothesis, the observable consequences of Bohmian mechanics are the same as those of orthodox quantum theory, for which instantaneous communication based on quantum nonlocality is impossible (see Eberhard 1978). Valentini (1991) emphasizes the importance of quantum equilibrium for obscuring the nonlocality of Bohmian mechanics. (Valentini (2010a) has also suggested the possibility of searching for and exploiting quantum non-equilibrium. However, in contrast with thermodynamic non-equilibrium, we have at present no idea what quantum non-equilibrium, should it exist, would look like, despite claims and arguments to the contrary.)<br />
<h2>
<a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" id="li" name="li">14. Lorentz Invariance</a></h2>
Like nonrelativistic quantum theory, of which it is a version, Bohmian mechanics and special relativity, a central principle of physics, are not compatible: Bohmian mechanics is not Lorentz invariant. Nor can it easily be modified to accommodate Lorentz invariance. Configurations, defined by the <i>simultaneous</i> positions of all particles, play too crucial a role in its formulation, with the guiding equation defining an evolution on <i>configuration</i> space. (Lorentz invariant extensions of Bohmian mechanics for a single particle, described by the Dirac equation (Bohm and Hiley 1993, Dürr et al. 1999) or the Klein-Gordon equation (Berndl et al. 1996, Nikolic 2005), can easily be achieved, though for a Klein-Gordon particle there are some interesting subtleties, corresponding to what might seem to be a particle traveling backwards in time.)<br />
This difficulty with Lorentz invariance and the nonlocality in Bohmian mechanics are closely related. Since quantum theory itself, by virtue merely of the character of its predictions concerning EPR-Bohm correlations, is irreducibly nonlocal (see Section 2), one might expect considerable difficulty with the Lorentz invariance of orthodox quantum theory as well with Bohmian mechanics. For example, the collapse rule of textbook quantum theory blatantly violates Lorentz invariance. As a matter of fact, the intrinsic nonlocality of quantum theory presents formidable difficulties for the development of any (many-particle) Lorentz invariant formulation that avoids the vagueness of orthodox quantum theory (see Maudlin 1994).<br />
Bell made a somewhat surprising evaluation of the importance of the problem of Lorentz invariance. In an interview with the philosopher Renée Weber, not long before he died, he referred to the paradoxes of quantum mechanics and observed that “Those paradoxes are simply disposed of by the 1952 theory of Bohm, leaving as <i>the</i> question, the question of Lorentz invariance. So one of my missions in life is to get people to see that if they want to talk about the problems of quantum mechanics — the real problems of quantum mechanics — they must be talking about Lorentz invariance.”<br />
The most common view on this issue is that a detailed description of microscopic quantum processes, such as would be provided by a putative extension of Bohmian mechanics to the relativistic domain, must violate Lorentz invariance. In this view Lorentz invariance is an emergent symmetry obeyed by our observations — for Bohmian mechanics a statistical consequence of quantum equilibrium that governs the results of quantum experiments. This is the opinion of Bohm and Hiley (1993), of Holland (1993), and of Valentini (1997).<br />
However — unlike nonlocality — violating Lorentz invariance is not inevitable. It should be possible, it seems, to construct a fully Lorentz invariant theory that provides a detailed description of microscopic quantum processes. One way to do this is by using an additional Lorentz invariant dynamical structure, for example a suitable time-like 4-vector field, that permits the definition of a foliation of space-time into space-like hypersurfaces providing a Lorentz invariant notion of “evolving configuration” and along which nonlocal effects are transmitted. See Dürr et al. 1999 for a toy model. Another possibility is that a fully Lorentz invariant account of quantum nonlocality can be achieved without the invocation of additional structure, exploiting only what is already at hand, for example, the wave function of the universe (see Dürr et al. 1999) or light-cone structure. For a step in this direction, see Goldstein and Tumulka 2003's model in which they reconcile relativity and nonlocality through the interplay of opposite arrows of time.<br />
Be that as it may, Lorentz invariant nonlocality remains somewhat enigmatic. The issues are extremely subtle. For example, Bell (1987, page 155) rightly would find “disturbing … the impossibility of ‘messages’ faster than light, which follows from ordinary relativistic quantum mechanics in so far as it is unambiguous and adequate for procedures <i>we</i> [emphasis added] can actually perform. The exact elucidation of concepts like ‘message’ and ‘we’, would be a formidable challenge.” While quantum equilibrium and the absolute uncertainty that it entails (Dürr et al. 1992) may be of some help here, the situation remains puzzling.<br />
<h2>
<a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" id="o" name="o">15. Objections and Responses</a></h2>
Bohmian mechanics has never been widely accepted in the mainstream of the physics community. Since it is not part of the standard physics curriculum, many physicists—probably the majority—are simply unfamiliar with the theory and how it works. Sometimes the theory is rejected without explicit discussion of reasons for rejection. One also finds objections that are based on simple misunderstandings; among these are claims that some no-go theorem, such as von Neumann's theorem, the Kochen-Specker theorem, or Bell's theorem, shows that the theory cannot work. Such objections will not be dealt with here, as the reply to them will be obvious to those who understand the theory. In what follows only objections that are not based on elementary misunderstandings will be discussed.<br />
A common objection is that Bohmian mechanics is too complicated or inelegant. To evaluate this objection one must compare the axioms of Bohmian mechanics with those of standard quantum mechanics. To Schrödinger's equation, Bohmian mechanics adds the guiding equation; standard quantum mechanics instead requires postulates about experimental outcomes that can only be formulated in terms of a distinction between a quantum system and the experimental apparatus. And, as noted by Hilary Putnam (2005),<br />
<blockquote>
In Putnam ([1965]), I rejected Bohm's interpretation for several reasons which no longer seem good to me. Even today, if you look at the Wikipedia encyclopaedia on the Web, you will find it said that Bohm's theory is mathematically inelegant. Happily, I did not give that reason in Putnam ([1965]), but in any case it is not true. The formula for the velocity field is extremely simple: you have the probability current in the theory anyway, and you take the velocity vector to be proportional to the current. There is nothing particularly inelegant about that; if anything, it is remarkably elegant!</blockquote>
One frequent objection is that Bohmian mechanics, since it makes precisely the same predictions as standard quantum mechanics (insofar as the predictions of standard quantum mechanics are unambiguous), is not a distinct theory but merely a reformulation of standard quantum theory. In this vein, Heisenberg wrote,<br />
<blockquote>
Bohm's interpretation cannot be refuted by experiment, and this is true of all the counter-proposals in the first group. From the fundamentally “positivistic” (it would perhaps be better to say “purely physical”) standpoint, we are thus concerned not with counter-proposals to the Copenhagen interpretation, but with its exact repetition in a different language (Heisenberg 1955, p. 18).</blockquote>
More recently, Sir Anthony Leggett has echoed this charge. Referring to the measurement problem, he says (Leggett 2005) that Bohmian mechanics provides “little more than verbal window dressing of the basic paradox.” And in connection with the double-slit experiment, he writes,<br />
<blockquote>
No experimental consequences are drawn from [the assumption of definite particle trajectories] other than the standard predictions of the QM formalism, so whether one regards it as a substantive resolution of the apparent paradox or as little more than a reformulation of it is no doubt a matter of personal taste (the present author inclines towards the latter point of view) (Leggett 2002, p. R419).</blockquote>
Now Bohmian mechanics and standard quantum mechanics provide clearly different descriptions of what is happening on the microscopic quantum level. So it is only with a purely instrumental attitude towards scientific theories that Bohmian mechanics and standard quantum mechanics can possibly be regarded as different formulations of exactly the same theory. But even if they were, why would this be an objection to Bohmian mechanics? Even if they were, we should still ask which of the two formulations is superior. Those impressed by the “not-a-distinct-theory” objection presumably give considerable weight to the fact that standard quantum mechanics came first. Supporters of Bohmian mechanics give more weight to its greater simplicity and clarity.<br />
The position of Leggett, however, is very difficult to understand. There should be no measurement problem for a physicist with a purely instrumentalist understanding of quantum mechanics. But for more than thirty years Leggett has forcefully argued that quantum mechanics indeed suffers from the measurement problem. For Leggett the problem is so serious that it has led him to suggest that quantum mechanics might fail on the macroscopic level. Thus Leggett is no instrumentalist, and it is hard to understand why he so cavalierly dismisses a theory like Bohmian mechanics that obviously doesn't suffer from the measurement problem, with which he has been so long concerned.<br />
Sir Roger Penrose (2005, page 811) also seems to have doubts as to whether Bohmian mechanics indeed resolves the measurement problem. He writes that<br />
<blockquote>
it seems to me that some measure of scale is indeed needed, for defining when classical-like behaviour begins to take over from small-scale quantum activity. In common with the other quantum ontologies in which no measurable deviations from standard quantum mechanics is expected, the point of view (e) [Bohmian mechanics] does not possess such a scale measure, so I do not see that it can adequately address the paradox of Schrödinger's cat.</blockquote>
But contrary to what he writes, his real concern seems to be with the emergence of classical behavior, and not with the measurement problem per se. With regard to this, we note that the Bohmian evolution of particles, which is always governed by the wave function and is always fundamentally quantum, turns out to be approximately classical when the relevant de Broglie wave length, determined in part by the wave function, is much smaller than the scale on which the potential energy term in Schrödinger's equation varies (see Allori et al., 2002). Under normal circumstances this condition will be satisfied for the center of mass motion of a macroscopic object.<br />
It is perhaps worth mentioning that despite the empirical equivalence between Bohmian mechanics and orthodox quantum theory, there are a variety of experiments and experimental issues that don't fit comfortably within the standard quantum formalism but are easily handled by Bohmian mechanics. Among these are dwell and tunneling times (Leavens 1996), escape times and escape positions (Daumer et al. 1997a), scattering theory (Dürr et al., 2000), and quantum chaos (Cushing 1994, Dürr et al., 1992a).<br />
Another claim that has become popular in recent years is that Bohmian mechanics is an Everettian, or “many worlds,” interpretation in disguise (see entry on the many worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics for an overview of such interpretations). The idea is that Bohmians, like Everettians, must take the wave-function as physically real. Moreover, since Bohmian mechanics involves no wave-function collapse (for the wave function of the universe), all of the branches of the wave function, and not just the one that happens to be occupied by the actual particle configuration, persist. These branches are those that Everettians regard as representing parallel worlds. As David Deutsch expresses the charge,<br />
<blockquote>
the ‘unoccupied grooves’ must be physically real. Moreover they obey the same laws of physics as the ‘occupied groove’ that is supposed to be ‘the’ universe. But that is just another way of saying that they are universes too. … In short, pilot-wave theories are parallel-universes theories in a state of chronic denial (Deutsch 1996, p. 225).</blockquote>
See Brown and Wallace (2005) for an extended version of this argument. Not surprisingly, Bohmians do not agree that the branches of the wave function should be construed as representing worlds. For one Bohmian response, see Maudlin (2010). Other Bohmian responses have been given by Lewis (2007) and Valentini (2010b).<br />
The claim of Deutsch, Brown, and Wallace is of a novel character that we should perhaps pause to examine. On the one hand, for anyone who, like Wallace, accepts the viability of a functionalist many-worlds understanding of quantum mechanics — and in particular accepts that it follows as a matter of functional and structural analysis that when the wave function develops suitable complex patterns these ipso facto describe what we should regard as worlds — the claim should be compelling. On the other hand, for those who reject the functional analysis and regard many worlds as ontologically inadequate (see Maudlin 2010), or who, like Vaidman (see the SEP entry on the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics), accepts many worlds on non-functionalist grounds, the claim should seem empty. In other words, one has basically to have already accepted a strong version of many worlds and already rejected Bohm in order to feel the force of the claim.<br />
Another interesting aspect of the claim is this: It seems that one could consider, at least as a logical possibility, a world consisting of particles moving according to some well-defined equations of motion, and in particular according to the equations of Bohmian mechanics. It seems entirely implausible that there should be a logical problem with doing so. We should be extremely sceptical of any argument, like the claim of Deutsch, Brown, and Wallace, that suggests that there is. Thus what, in defense of many worlds, Deutsch, Brown, and Wallace present as an objection to Bohmian mechanics should perhaps be regarded instead as an objection to many worlds itself.<br />
There is one striking feature of Bohmian mechanics that is often presented as an objection: in Bohmian mechanics the wave function acts upon the positions of the particles but, evolving as it does autonomously via Schrödinger's equation, it is not acted upon by the particles. This is regarded by some Bohmians, not as an objectionable feature of the theory, but as an important clue about the meaning of the quantum-mechanical wave function. Dürr et al. 1997 and Goldstein and Teufel 2001 discuss this point and suggest that from a deeper perspective than afforded by standard Bohmian mechanics or quantum theory, the wave function should be regarded as nomological, as an object for conveniently expressing the law of motion somewhat analogous to the Hamiltonian in classical mechanics, and that a time-dependent Schrödinger-type equation, from this deeper (cosmological) perspective, is merely phenomenological.<br />
Bohmian mechanics does not account for phenomena such as particle creation and annihilation characteristic of quantum field theory. This is not an objection to Bohmian mechanics but merely a recognition that quantum field theory explains a great deal more than does nonrelativistic quantum mechanics, whether in orthodox or Bohmian form. It does, however, underline the need to find an adequate, if not compelling, Bohmian version of quantum field theory, and of gauge theories in particular. Some rather tentative steps in this direction can be found in Bohm and Hiley 1993, Holland 1993, Bell 1987 (p. 173), and in some of the articles in Cushing et al. 1996. A crucial issue is whether a quantum field theory is fundamentally about fields or particles — or something else entirely. While the most common choice is fields (see Struyve 2010 for an assessment of a variety of possibilities), Bell's is particles. His proposal is in fact the basis of a canonical extension of Bohmian mechanics to general quantum field theories, and these “Bell-type quantum field theories” (Dürr et al., 2004 and 2005) describe a stochastic evolution of particles that involves particle creation and annihilation. (For a general discussion of this issue, and of the point and value of Bohmian mechanics, see the exchange of letters between Goldstein and Weinberg by following the link provided in the Other Internet Resources section below.)Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10303290079976590343noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5448411214494413217.post-90827967501639854252013-03-06T08:00:00.000-08:002013-03-06T08:00:03.887-08:00Your Hair Care Resource Center <div id="mainFeatureWrap" readability="22.126829268293"><div class="contentRight"><a href="http://www.totalbeauty.com/content/gallery/2013-hair-color-trends" title="Hair Color Ideas That'll Inspire a Trip to the Salon"><img src="http://images.totalbeauty.com/uploads/editorial/lg/2013-hair-color-trends-L.jpg" alt="Hair Color Ideas That'll Inspire a Trip to the Salon" /></a></div><div class="contentLeft" readability="23.180487804878"><h3><a href="http://www.totalbeauty.com/content/gallery/2013-hair-color-trends" class="singleCta" title="Hair Color Ideas That'll Inspire a Trip to the Salon">Hair Color Ideas That'll Inspire a Trip to the Salon</a></h3><p>Still wearing your same old subtle highlights? 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href="http://www.medialens.org/index.php/alerts/alert-archive/alerts-2013/715-eyes-like-blank-discs-the-guardian-s-steven-poole-on-george-orwell-s-politics-and-the-english-language.html">Eyes Like Blank Discs - The Guardian's Steven Poole On George Orwell's Politics And The English Language</a>.</em></p><br />This post was made using the <a href='http://www.webmagnates.org/auto-blogging-software.html' title='auto-blogging software'>Auto Blogging Software</a> from <a href='http://www.webmagnates.org' title'make money online'>WebMagnates.org</a> This line will not appear when posts are made after activating the software to full version.Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10303290079976590343noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5448411214494413217.post-91760645507590201182013-03-05T04:50:00.000-08:002013-03-05T04:50:00.396-08:00Dewey's Aesthetics <div id="aueditable"><div id="pubinfo"><em>First published Fri Sep 29, 2006; substantive revision Mon Mar 4, 2013</em></div><p>John Dewey is well known for his work in logic, scientific inquiry, and philosophy of education. His fame is based largely on his membership in the school of American Pragmatists of which Charles Sanders Peirce and William James were the leading early figures. He has also had a great deal of influence in aesthetics and the philosophy of art. His work <em>Art as Experience</em> (1934) is regarded by many as one of the most important contributions to this area in the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Yet it is not as widely discussed as that evaluation would indicate. There are several reasons for this.</p><p>First, although Dewey seems to write in an almost folksy style, his philosophical prose is often difficult and dense. Second, the book early on had the misfortune of receiving two reviews that negatively impacted its reception. The first, by an avowed follower, Stephen Pepper, complained that it was not truly pragmatist and that Dewey had reverted to an earlier Hegelianism (Pepper 1939). The second, by Benedetto Croce, seemed to confirm this (Croce 1948). Croce, widely seen as Hegelian himself, saw so many similarities between Dewey's work and his own that he accused Dewey of lifting his ideas. Dewey (1948) insisted otherwise, but the sense that there was something too Hegelian in <em>Art as Experience</em> remained. This did not stop many philosophers, educators, and other intellectuals from producing works in aesthetic theory that were strongly influenced by Dewey. Even before <em>Art as Experience</em> Dewey's writings on aesthetics and art influenced such writers as Lawrence Buermeyer (1924), Albert Barnes (1928) and Thomas Munro (1928). After the book's publication his followers included Irwin Edman (1939), Stephen Pepper (1939, 1945, 1953), Horace Kallen (1942), Thomas Munro again (numerous books) and Van Meter Ames (1947, 1953).</p><p>However, in the 1950s there was an analytic revolution in English-speaking aesthetics. Prior aesthetic theories were considered to be too speculative and unclear. Dewey's work was caught up in this condemnation. Arnold Isenberg (1987, orig. 1950) for instance, in a founding document of analytic aesthetics, dismissed <em>Art as Experience</em> as a “hodgepodge of conflicting methods and undisciplined speculations,” (p. 128) although he found it full of profound suggestions. Dewey's theories of expression and creativity were particular targets of analytic attack. Dewey's was among the views singled out in a general critique of expression as a defining characteristic of art, although often his own distinctive theory was ignored in the process. A situation followed, and continued well into the 1980s, in which, according to one editor of <em>The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism</em>, Dewey's aesthetics was virtually ignored (Fisher 1989). While Monroe Beardsley, one of the most important late 20<sup>th</sup> century aestheticians, kept an interest in Dewey alive (1958, 1975, 1982), particularly in his discussions of aesthetic experience, other major figures, including Arthur Danto, Mary Mothersill and Richard Wollheim, completely ignored him. Nelson Goodman may be a partial exception (Freeland 2001). Goodman certainly shared with Dewey a conviction that art and science are close in many ways and, like Dewey, he replaced the question “what is art?” with “when is art?” They also both took a naturalist approach to the arts. However, Goodman, who never refers to Dewey in his <em>Languages of Art</em> (1976), saw art in terms of languages and other symbol systems, whereas Dewey saw it in terms of experience. Joseph Margolis (1980) is perhaps the most important contemporary aesthetician coming out of the analytic school to take Dewey seriously, having a natural affinity to pragmatist ways of thought. His idea that works of art are culturally emergent but physically embodied entities is Deweyan in spirit, as is his insistence on a robust relativist theory of interpretation. However, Margolis seldom refers to Dewey and, although he believes himself closer to Dewey's “Hegelianism” than to Peirce's “Kantianism,” he finds Peirce more interesting. He also faults Dewey for not being an historicist (1999). Another contemporary American aesthetician, Arnold Berleant, has continuously developed themes similar to Dewey's, for example, in his concepts of the “aesthetic field” and “engagement.”(1970,1991).</p><ul><li><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dewey-aesthetics/#Int">1. Introduction</a></li><li><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dewey-aesthetics/#ArtExp">2. <em>Art as Experience</em></a><ul><li><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dewey-aesthetics/#LivCre">2.1 The Live Creature</a></li><li><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dewey-aesthetics/#LivCreEthThi">2.2 The Live Creature and “Etherial Things”</a></li><li><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dewey-aesthetics/#HavExp">2.3 Having an Experience</a></li><li><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dewey-aesthetics/#ActExp">2.4 The Act of Expression</a></li><li><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dewey-aesthetics/#ExpObj">2.5 The Expressive Object</a></li><li><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dewey-aesthetics/#SubFor">2.6 Substance and Form</a></li><li><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dewey-aesthetics/#NatHisFor">2.7 Natural History of Form</a></li><li><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dewey-aesthetics/#OrgEne">2.8 Organization of Energies</a></li><li><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dewey-aesthetics/#ComSubArt">2.9 The Common Substance of the Arts</a></li><li><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dewey-aesthetics/#VarSubArt">2.10 The Varied Substance of the Arts</a></li><li><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dewey-aesthetics/#HumCon">2.11 The Human Contribution</a></li><li><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dewey-aesthetics/#Cha">2.12 The Challenge to Philosophy</a></li><li><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dewey-aesthetics/#CriPer">2.13 Criticism and Perception</a></li><li><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dewey-aesthetics/#ArtCiv">2.14 Art and Civilization</a></li></ul></li><li><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dewey-aesthetics/#CriRea">3. Critical Reactions</a></li><li><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dewey-aesthetics/#Bib">Bibliography</a><ul><li><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dewey-aesthetics/#PriSou">Primary Sources</a></li><li><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dewey-aesthetics/#SecSou">Secondary Sources</a></li></ul></li><li><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dewey-aesthetics/#Aca">Academic Tools</a></li><li><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dewey-aesthetics/#Oth">Other Internet Resources</a></li><li><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dewey-aesthetics/#Rel">Related Entries</a></li></ul><hr /><h2><a name="Int" id="Int">1. Introduction</a></h2><p>The relative lack of interest in Dewey changed for several reasons in the late 1970s. First, Richard Rorty turned analytic philosophy on its head by advocating a return to pragmatism (Rorty 1979, 1982). In this, Dewey was one of his avowed heroes. Unfortunately, Rorty was not a close reader of Dewey's aesthetics. The Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy along with their publication, <em>The Journal of Speculative Philosophy</em>, as well as the Center for Dewey Studies also contributed to this revival. Dewey was further promoted in aesthetics through the work of Richard Shusterman (1992, 1997a, 2000) who went so far as to advocate a pragmatist aesthetics, with Dewey as his main champion. He particularly emphasized the possibilities of treating popular art as fine art with his well-known example of rap as fine art. He also extended aesthetics into the realm of everyday life through his concept of “somaesthetics.” This strand of pro-Deweyan thinking has also been recently pursued by Crispin Sartwell in response to multi-culturalism and everyday aesthetics (Sartwell 1995, 2003) and by Yuriko Saito (Saito 2007) in her effort to extend aesthetics to everyday life. In the 1980s Dewey's aesthetics finally received an excellent exposition in the work of Thomas Alexander (Alexander 1987). Meanwhile, there has been a steady interest in Dewey's aesthetics in the philosophy of education, with articles appearing on a regular basis in such publications as the <em>Journal of Aesthetic Education</em> and <em>Studies in the Philosophy of Education</em> and several books (Jackson 1998, Garrison 1997, Greene 2001, Maslak 2006, Granger 2006a).</p><p>Dewey's renewed influence was due in part to increased interest in various continental aestheticians. The similarities between Dewey and Merleau-Ponty are the most striking (Ames 1953, Kestenbaum 1977), but he also shares certain features with Gadamer (Gilmour 1987, who also notes important differences, and Jeannot 2001). Given his critique of capitalism, one can also find connections between his thinking and that of Marxist aestheticians, particularly Adorno (Lysaker 1998). Some contemporary feminist aestheticians have come to realize that Dewey shares many of their concerns, for example their rejection of mind/body dualism, their democratic instincts, their contextualism, and their tendency to break down traditional distinctions (Seigfried 1996b, Duran 2001). There has also been some work on marked similarities between Dewey's aesthetic thought and that of Taoism (Grange 2001), Transcendental Meditation (Zigler 1982), Dogen's version of Zen (Earls 1992), the great Indian aesthetician, Abhinavagupta (Mathur 1981), the Bhagavad-Gita (Stroud 2009), and Confucius (Shusterman 2009, Man 2007, Mullis 2005, Grange 2004). Alexander has recently discussed relations between Dewey and Eastern Aesthetics generally (Alexander 2009)</p><p>An interesting aspect of Dewey's writing, and perhaps another reason for the lack of on-going positive reception, was his lack of strong interest in the history of aesthetics. He seldom explicated or critiqued the aesthetic works of others. Although full of quotations, <em>Art as Experience</em> originally lacked adequate footnotes. (Fortunately, the recent Boydston edition tracks down all quotations and even notes which books were in Dewey's library.) Poets figure as strongly in Dewey's reading list as philosophers, especially Coleridge, Housman, Keats, Poe, Shakespeare and Wordsworth. Visual artists are often quoted, especially Cezanne, Constable, Delacroix, Manet, Matisse (whom he met), Reynolds, and Van Gogh. As for philosophers, he was of course aware of the work of Plato and Aristotle. Yet in <em>Art as Experience</em> he never mentions Hume's aesthetics, Hegel receives only one citation (surprisingly, given the accusation that Dewey was too Hegelian), and Nietzsche none. Kant, however, plays an important role as an opponent, and Schopenhauer receives a few mentions. Amongst contemporaries, he references Matthew Arnold, Clive Bell, Bernard Bosanquet, Andrew Bradley, Benedetto Croce, Roger Fry, Thomas Hulme, Violet Paget (who wrote under the name Vernon Lee), Walter Pater, George Santayana, Hippolyte Taine, and Leo Tolstoy.</p><p>Since Dewey was a pragmatist it is worthwhile to look for antecedents in that tradition (see Shusterman 2006b). A strong case can be made for many parallels with Emerson, whom many see as a proto-pragmatist. Charles S. Peirce also touched on themes more familiar in Dewey, for example the continuity of aesthetics and ethics. Although William James did not write in aesthetics, his psychological views had a strong influence on Dewey's aesthetics. Alain Locke, the African-American philosopher and pragmatist culture-theorist, probably had some influence as well.</p><p>Other important thinkers of the 19th century also influenced Dewey. Dewey's idea of the live creature interacting with its environment owes much to Charles Darwin (Perricone 2006), and although Dewey never cites Karl Marx, perhaps because he was so committed in his public life to defending an anti-communist form of social liberalism, his views on the relation between art and society were very close to those of Marx, especially the young Marx. Another figure hovering in the background was Sigmund Freud for, although in other books he is critical of Freud's hypostatization of entities within the unconscious, in <em>Art as Experience</em> he gives <em>subconscious</em> processes a significant role in the creative process.</p><p>Albert C. Barnes, the industrialist and collector, was Dewey's strongest influence in aesthetics. The two were close friends, and Dewey was a member of the staff of the Barnes Foundation of which he was named Director in 1925 (Barnes Foundation 2011). Barnes, who took a seminar under Dewey in 1917, avidly advocated Dewey's form of pragmatism. He considered himself a strong defender of democracy, although ironically, he made it very difficult for people to see his own extensive collection and was thought by some to be authoritarian in his formalist theories of appreciation. Dewey not only quotes extensively from Barnes' writings but dedicates <em>Art as Experience</em> to him. Many of the illustrations in Dewey's book came from the Barnes collection.</p><p>Dewey was ahead of his time in his devotion to multiculturalism. The selection of illustrations Dewey chose for <em>Art as Experience</em> included Pueblo Indian pottery, Bushmen rock-painting, Scythian ornament, and African sculpture, as well as works by El Greco, Renoir, Cezanne and Matisse. He was interested in traditional and folk arts in Mexico, admiring the designs of the rural schools over those of the cities (1926c). He was also associated, mainly through Barnes, with African-American culture. Barnes was invited to write a chapter for <em>The New Negro</em> edited by Alain Locke (Locke 1925) and one of the founding documents of the Harlem Renaissance. The students in Dewey's and Barnes' first experimental classes in art education were mainly from the black working class. Barnes collected African-American art and also encouraged African-American students to study at the Barnes Foundation. African-American painter and illustrator Aaron Douglas, who came to the foundation in 1927, studied in Paris in 1931 under a Foundation fellowship (Jubilee 1982). Barnes also had a long association with Lincoln University, a historically black college, many students of which studied at the Barnes Foundation (Hollingsworth 1994). Dewey was also one of the founding members of the NAACP (National Association for the Advancement of Colored People). In addition, Dewey sought to promote cross-cultural understanding through his founding of the China Institute in New York City in 1926. The China Institute, which continues today, advertises itself as the only institution in that city to focus solely on Chinese civilization, art and culture. Hu Shih, a student of Dewey's at Columbia who invited Dewey to Peking in 1919, and Paul Monroe, were the two other leading figures in the creation of this Institute (Ho 2004—see the Other Internet Resources).</p><p>Although Dewey was widely versed in literature, architecture, painting, sculpture, and the theater, he was relatively uneducated in music, and he was said to be tone-deaf. Yet he often had insightful things to say about music, and many musicians and music educators have drawn inspiration from his theory (e.g., Zeltner 1975). He seemed, unfortunately, to have been totally unaware of both photography and film as separate art forms.</p><p>Many writers complain that Dewey showed little interest in the avant-garde art of his time. It is true that neither Cubism, Dadaism nor Surrealism play a role in his writing. His theory seems to actually preclude Non-objective painting (Jacobson 1960), although he does speak positively of abstract art. Nor did he refer much to such innovative poets as T.S. Eliot or Ezra Pound. Although this may indicate a conservative approach to the arts, he nonetheless had considerable influence on various innovative art movements both in his own time and later. Perhaps most significantly, the director of the Federal Art Project from 1935–1943, Holger Cahill, was a Dewey follower (Mavigliano 1984). Amongst painters, Thomas Hart Benton, the regionalist realist, was an early convert to his philosophy. In Mexico, Escuelas de Pintura al Aire Libre, or open-air painting schools, began during the Mexican Revolution and achieved an established structure under the government of Alvaro Obregon (1920–24). They were promoted by Alfredo Ramos Martinez who was inspired by the ideas of Dewey. (Dictionary of Art and Artist 2011—see Other Internet Resources)</p><p>Turning to late 20th century artists, Dewey's influence on Abstract Expressionism was especially strong (Buettner 1975, Berube 1998). For example, Robert Motherwell, who studied <em>Art as Experience</em> when he was a philosophy major at Stanford, considered it to be one of his bibles (Berube 1998). Donald Judd, the Minimalist sculptor, read and admired Dewey (Raskin 2010). Earth Art, with its emphases on getting art out of the museum, might even be seen as applied Dewey. There is also reason to believe that Allan Kaprow, one of the originators of Happenings and Performance Art, read Dewey and drew on his ideas (Kelly 2003). Although one author has argued that contemporary Body Art has moved away from the integrated consummated aesthetic experience Dewey commends (Jay 2002), another argues that Dewey anticipates this movement (Brodsky 2002).</p><p>Dewey's methodology may be off-putting to readers trained in analytic philosophy. He was not much given to argument. (See Aldrich 1944, for a partial defense of Dewey's philosophical method.) However, he did give reasons for rejecting other leading theories in the field. Nor was he adverse to public debate in philosophical journals. Given his emphasis on experience, his method was somewhat similar to that of phenomenologists in the tradition of Edmund Husserl. Yet, unlike Husserl, he was strongly committed to a scientific world-view and did not bracket scientific knowledge in his search for philosophical understanding. His anti-dualism would have also made him hostile to Husserl's Cartesian tendencies. This same anti-dualism meant that he was constantly engaged in undercutting distinctions. It is not surprising then that he did not follow the method of contemporary analytic philosophy of progressively making more and more subtle distinctions in the search for precise definition. Because of his undercutting of distinctions his thinking can sometimes seem similar to the deconstructionism of Jacques Derrida (Derrida 1976). However, unlike Derrida, Dewey would never claim that there is nothing “outside the text,” since the starting point of his philosophy was always the live creature in its environment. Also his emphasis on continuity and his commitment to organicism exhibit a typically modernist belief in harmonious wholes that was not shared by Derrida or by postmodernists generally. Nor would he have accepted Derrida's one-sided insistence on the importance of differences and deferral as found in his idea of <em>différance</em>. Dewey could be seen as against method if method is seen as requiring certainty, but not if it focuses on probability. He did share with analytic philosophy a tendency to back up his points with appeals to common sense and to the meanings of words. In evaluating Dewey's method one must also take into account his considered views on the logic of inquiry as expressed in several books which will be reviewed in other articles in this encyclopedia.</p><p><em>Art as Experience</em>, Dewey's greatest work in aesthetics, had its antecedents. There were scattered short essays and remarks in the 1880s (Dewey 1896, 1897) as well as significant discussion in his <em>Psychology</em> (Dewey 1887). Some discussion appears in <em>Democracy and Education</em> (Dewey 1915) and in his other works on education. He also published a few short articles on aesthetics in the publication of the Barnes foundation in 1925 and 1926 (Dewey 1927). Dewey laid out the beginnings of a theory of aesthetic experience in his major work, <em>Experience and Nature</em> (Dewey 1925a). There are also two important essays in <em>Philosophy and Civilization</em> (Dewey 1931) that address aesthetics. These are all described in the supplementary document</p><blockquote><p><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dewey-aesthetics/supplement.html" name="return-1" id="return-1">Dewey's Early Aesthetic Theory</a>.</p></blockquote><h2><a name="ArtExp" id="ArtExp">2. <em>Art as Experience</em></a></h2><p>As much as there is fascinating preliminary material in his earlier writings the primary goal of none of these was an aesthetics or a theory of art. Moreover, the understanding of the arts in these writings is relatively primitive compared to <em>Art as Experience</em>. Not only is the density of thought and insight in the later work much greater, but the writing is much clearer. Also, only in the later work do we get a full account of the phenomenology of aesthetic and artistic experience. The explication of this book will follow Dewey's own chapter headings. Explication of some additional chapters can be found in “Additional Materials on Dewey's Aesthetics” (see the Other Internet Resources).</p><h3><a name="LivCre" id="LivCre">2.1 The Live Creature</a></h3><p>Dewey somewhat surprisingly begins this work with the claim that the very existence of works of art hinders any aesthetic theory that seeks to understand them. Art products exist externally and physically, whereas, on his view, the work of art is really what the physical object does <em>within</em> experience. Also the classic status of many works of art isolates them from the conditions within which they came to be, and hence from their experiential function. The business of aesthetics is to restore the continuity between the refined experiences that are works of art and the experiences of everyday life. We must, in short, turn away from artistic products to ordinary experience. To understand the Parthenon, which is widely believed to be a great work of art, one must turn to cultural context of Athens and the lives of the citizens who were expressing their civic religion through its creation.</p><p>Dewey then argues that we must begin with the aesthetic “in the raw” in order to understand the aesthetic “refined.” To do this we must turn to the events and scenes that interest the man-in-the-street such as the sounds and sights of rushing fire-engines, the grace of a baseball player, and the satisfactions of a housewife. We find then that the aesthetic begins in happy absorption in activity, for example in our fascination with a fire in a hearth as we poke it. Similarly, Dewey holds that an intelligent mechanic who does his work with care is “artistically engaged.” If his product is not aesthetically appealing this probably has more to do with market conditions that encourage low-quality work than with his abilities.</p><p>This move to the everyday entails recognition of the aesthetic nature of the popular arts. Average folk may be repelled by the thought that they enjoy their casual recreation in part for aesthetic reasons. They do not realize that what has life for them, such as movies, jazz, the comics, and sensational newspaper stories, is art. Relegating art to the museum comes with separating it from the experiences of everyday life. Fine art fails to appeal to the masses when it is remote, and so they seek aesthetic pleasure in “the vulgar.” The cause of this is the common separation between spirit and matter, and the consequent downgrading of matter.</p><p>There are, however, still people in the world who admire whatever intensifies immediate experience. Practices and artifacts from traditional cultures were, in their original contexts, enhancements of everyday life. Dance, pantomime, music, and architecture were originally connected with religious rites, not with theaters and museums. In prehistoric cultures the various arts consummated the meaning of the community. This is also true for contemporary traditional cultures.</p><p>The segregation of art from everyday life came with the rise of nationalism and imperialism. The Louvre began as a place to house Napoleon's loot. The rise of capitalism, with its valuation of rare and costly objects, also contributed to the development of the museum, as did the need to show good taste in an increasingly materialist world.</p><p>For Dewey, experience should be understood in terms of the conditions of life. Man shares with animals certain basic vital needs, and derives the means for satisfying these needs from his animal nature. Life goes on not only <em>in</em> an environment but in interaction <em>with</em> that environment. The live creature uses its organs to interact with the environment through defense and conquest. Every need is a lack of adequate adjustment to the environment, and also a demand to restore adjustment—and each recovery is enriched by resistance met and overcome.</p><p>Life overcomes and transforms factors of opposition to achieve higher significance. Harmony and equilibrium are the results not of mechanical processes but of rhythmic resolution of tension. The rhythmic alternation within the live creature between disunity and unity becomes conscious in humans. Emotion signifies breaks in experience which are then resolved through reflective action. Objects become interesting as conditions for realizing harmony. Thought is then incorporated into them as their meaning.</p><p>The artist, especially, cultivates resistance and tension to achieve a unified experience. By contrast, although the scientist, like the artist, is interested in problems, she always seeks to move on to the next problem. Yet both artist and scientist are concerned with the same materials, both think, and both have their aesthetic moments. The aesthetic moment for the scientist happens when her thought becomes embedded as meaning in the object. The artist's thought is more immediately embodied in the object as she works and thinks in her medium.</p><p>Emotions are not merely in the mind. The live animal confronts a nature which already has emotional qualities. Aspects of nature may be, for example, irritating or comforting. Nature has such qualities even before it has mathematical or secondary qualities. Direct experience is a function of man/nature interaction in which human energy is constantly transformed.</p><p>Aesthetic experience involves a drama in which action, feeling, and meaning are one. The result is balance. Such experience would not occur in a world of mere flux in which there was no cumulative change. Nor would it occur in a world that is finished, for then there would be no resolution or fulfillment. It is only possible in a world in which the live being loses and reestablishes equilibrium with its environment.</p><p>Passing from disturbance to harmony provides man's most intense experience. Happiness is the result of a deep fulfillment in which our whole being has adjusted to the environment. Any such consummation is also a new beginning. In happiness, an underlying harmony continues through the rhythmic phases of conflict and resolution. Dewey contrasts a life in which the past is a burden to one that sees it as a resource that can be used to inform the present. In this instance, the future is a promise that surrounds the present as an aura. Happy periods, in which memories and anticipations are absorbed into the present, are an aesthetic ideal. Art celebrates these moments with peculiar intensity.</p><p>Dewey held that the sources of aesthetic experience are to found in sub-human animal life. Animals often attain a unity of experience that we lose in our fragmented work-lives. The live animal is fully present with all its senses active, especially when it is graceful. It synthesizes past and future in the present. Similarly, tribal man is most alive when most observant and filled with energy. He does not separate observation, action, and foresight. His senses are not mere pathways for storage. Rather, they prepare him for thought and action. Experience signifies heightened life and active engagement with the world. In its highest form it involves an identification of self and world. Such experience is the beginning of art.</p><h3><a name="LivCreEthThi" id="LivCreEthThi">2.2 The Live Creature and “Etherial Things”</a></h3><p>Theorists have often supposed that ethereal meanings and values are inaccessible to sense. This presupposes a nature/spirit dualism which Dewey rejects. That people commonly resist connecting fine art and everyday life is explained by the current disorganization of our cultural lives. This disorder is hidden by the <em>apparent</em> order of social classes and the compartmentalization of life in which religion, morals, politics and art all have separate domains, and practice and insight, and imagination and doing, are kept separate.</p><p>Dewey thought that the economic institutions of his time (1930s—the Depression) encouraged these separations. Under these conditions, sensations are mere mechanical stimuli that do not tell us anything about the reality behind them, and the various senses operate in isolation from each other. Moralists, at least, see sense as closely related to emotion and appetite. Unfortunately, they see the sensuous as identical with the sensual, and the sensual with the lewd.</p><p>The sense organs are carried to their full realization through sense itself, i.e., through meaning embodied in experience. The world is made actual in the qualities so experienced. Here, meaning cannot be separated from action, will, or thought. Experience is not only the result of interaction of subject and world, but also the subject's reward when it transforms interaction into participation. Dualisms of mind and body, by contrast, Dewey believed, come from a fear of life.</p><p>Dewey thinks it important here to distinguish mere recognition from perception. Recognition uses matter as means. Perception, by contrast, entails the past being carried into the present to enrich its content. A life that involves merely labeling things is not really conscious. The conscious activity of man develops out of a cooperation of internal needs and external materials that results in a culminating event. Man converts cause and effect into means and end, and thereby makes organic stimulation the bearer of meaning.</p><p>Rather than reducing the human to the animal, Dewey holds that man takes the unity of sense and impulse of animal life and infuses it with conscious meaning through communication. Human is more complex than animal life: for humans there are more opportunities for resistance and tension, for invention, and for depth of insight and feeling. The rhythms of struggle and consummation are more varied and long-lasting, and the fulfillments are more intense.</p><p>Space and time are also different. For humans, space is not just a void filled with dangers and opportunities. It is a scene for their doings and undergoings. Time, also, is not a mere continuum, but an organized medium of the rhythms of impulse and the processes of growth. These involve pauses and completions that themselves begin new developmental processes. It is form in art that makes clear the organization of space and time in life experience.</p><p>In art, man uses the materials and energies of nature to expand life. Art is proof that man can consciously restore the union of sensation, needs, and actions found in animal life. Consciousness adds regulation, selection and variation to this process. The idea of art is, then, humanity's greatest accomplishment. The Greeks distinguished order from matter, and man from the rest of nature, by way of art. Art, for them, was the guiding ideal for humankind. For Dewey, historically, science was developed as a means to generate other arts, and ultimately it is only their handmaiden.</p><p>Although it is sometimes helpful to distinguish between fine and useful art, Dewey thinks this extrinsic to art itself. What makes the work “fine” is that the artist lived fully while producing it. Fine art involves completeness of living in perception and making. Whether the thing is put to use is irrelevant. That most utensils today are non-aesthetic is because of the unhappy conditions of their production and consumption.</p><p>Dewey thought that those who reject the continuity between everyday experience and fine art fail to see that matter is needed to realize ideals. Nature is man's habitat, and culture endures because men find a support for it in nature. Culture results from prolonged, cumulative interaction with the environment. We deeply respond to art because of its connection with both cultural and natural experience.</p><p>Rather than giving art primacy in aesthetic, Dewey believes that humans only feel properly alive when absorbing the aesthetic features of nature. Aesthetic experience of the natural environment can even take the form of ecstatic communion. This is due to ancient habits gained in the relations between the living being and its environment. Sensuous experience can absorb into itself meanings and values that are designated “ideal” or “spiritual.” Dewey observes that belief that nature is full of spirits is closely tied to poetry. The sensuous surfaces of things incorporate not only what is given by the senses but the most profound insight. Many of the arts originate in primitive rituals which were not simply intended as means to get rain, etc., but for the enhancement of experience. Similarly myth was not just an early form of science.</p><p>Dewey concludes that the idea of the supernatural is more a function of the psychology that generates works of art than of science or philosophy. This can be seen by the solemn processions and other artistic phenomena in churches. Keats famously wrote “Beauty is truth, truth beauty—that is all ye know on earth, and all ye need to know.” Dewey agrees that any reasoning that excludes imagination and the embodiment of ideas in emotionally charged sense cannot reach truth. For Keats, “truth” meant wisdom, which in turn meant trust in the good. All we need to know then is the insight of imagination exemplified in beauty. It is not surprising then that moments of intense aesthetic perception were Keats's ultimate solace. The philosophy of Keats, shared by Dewey, accepts life with all its uncertainty and turns that experience into art.</p><h3><a name="HavExp" id="HavExp">2.3 Having an Experience</a></h3><p>This chapter is Dewey's most famous writing in aesthetics. Here he defines the important concept of “<em>an</em> experience.” “<em>An</em> experience” is one in which the material of experience is fulfilled or consummated, as for example when a problem is solved, or a game is played to its conclusion. Dewey contrasts this with inchoate experience in which we are distracted and do not complete our course of action. “<em>An</em> experience,” is also marked off from other experiences, containing within itself an individualizing quality. Dewey believes his talk of “<em>an</em> experience” is in accord with everyday usage, even though it is contrary to the way philosophers talk about experience. For Dewey, life is a collection of histories, each with their own plots, inceptions, conclusions, movements and rhythms. Each has a unique pervading quality.</p><p>Dewey then proceeds to offer a more dramatic sense of “<em>an</em> experience.” Two examples of this sort of “<em>an</em> experience” are a quarrel with a friend and that meal in Paris which seemed to capture all that food can be. In “an experience” every part flows freely into what follows, carrying with it what preceded without sacrificing its identity. The parts are phases of an enduring whole. Nor are there any holes or mechanical dead spots in <em>an</em> experience. Rather, there are pauses that define its quality and sum up what has been undergone.</p><p>Works of art are important examples of “<em>an</em> experience.” Here, separate elements are fused into a unity, although, rather than disappearing, their identity is enhanced. The unity of <em>an</em> experience, which is neither exclusively emotional, practical, nor intellectual, is determined by a single pervasive quality. Contra Locke and Hume, Dewey holds that the trains of ideas in thought are not just linked by association, but involve the development of an underlying quality. Conclusions in thought are similar to the consummating phase of “<em>an</em> experience.” Thinking has its own aesthetic quality. It differs from art only in that its material consists of abstract symbols rather than qualities. The experience of thinking satisfies us emotionally because it is internally integrated, and yet no intellectual activity is integrated in this way unless it has aesthetic quality. Thus, for Dewey, there is no clear separation between the aesthetic and the intellectual.</p><p>Dewey thought that practical action, too, can involve meaning growing towards a consummation. The Greek concept of good conduct as graceful is an example of the aesthetic in the moral. On the other hand, much moral action has no aesthetic quality and is mere half-hearted duty-following.</p><p>In aesthetic experience there is concern for the connection between each incident in a series and what went before. Interest controls what is selected or rejected in the developing experience. By contrast, in non-aesthetic experience we drift, evade, and compromise. The non-aesthetic is a function either of loose succession or mechanical connection of parts. Since so much of experience is like one of these we take this to be the norm and place aesthetic experience outside everyday life. But no experience has unity without aesthetic quality.</p><p>Still, Dewey does not hold “<em>an</em> experience” to be co-extensive with aesthetic experience. Philosophical and scientific inquiries can have aesthetic quality every bit as much as art. Their parts may link to each other and move to consummation. The consummation may even be anticipated and savored. However, such experiences are mostly intellectual or practical in nature. Also, whereas intellectual effort may be summarized in a “truth” there is no such thing in art.</p><p>When Dewey says that every integral experience (another term for “<em>an</em> experience”) moves to a close he means that the energies within it have done the work they are supposed to do. An element of “undergoing” or suffering may occur in this, for incorporating what preceded can be painful, and yet the suffering is part of the complete enjoyed experience.</p><p>Dewey holds that aesthetic quality is emotional. Emotions are not static entities with no element of growth. When significant, they are qualities of a complex changing experience, of a developing drama. There are no separate things called emotions. Emotions, rather, are aspects of events and objects. They are not, generally speaking, private. They belong to a self concerned with movement and change. Unlike automatic reflexes, they are parts of an on-going situation.</p><p>Emotion is a cementing force that gives diverse things their qualitative unity. This can give an experience aesthetic character. For example, an employee interview can either be mechanical and ordinary or can involve an interplay that turns it into <em>an</em> experience. In the latter case, the events are connected, each changing the underlying quality as they collectively move to consummation. This may involve the employer's imaginative projection of the character of the applicant onto the job, with resultant harmony or conflict.</p><p>The structure of “<em>an</em> experience” goes as follows. The subject undergoes something or some properties, these properties determine his or her doing something, and the process continues until the self and the object are mutually adapted, ending with felt harmony. This even holds for the thinker interacting with his or her ideas. When the doing and undergoing are joined in perception they gain meaning. Meaning, in turn, is given depth through incorporating past experience.</p><p>Excess of doing, or excess of undergoing, may interfere with experience. For example, desire for action may lead to treating resistance as mere obstacle and not as a moment for reflection. Also, the undergoing may be valued without any perception of meaning. A balance is required between doing and undergoing to achieve <em>an</em> experience.</p><p>Dewey does not separate artistic practice from intellect. Intelligence is what perceives the relation between doing and undergoing. The artist thinks as intently as the scientist. Thus, thinking should not be identified with using mathematical or verbal symbols. The artist must respond intelligently to every brush stroke to know where she is going. She must see each element in the creative process in relation to the whole to be produced. The quality of her art depends on the intelligence she brings to bear.</p><p>Dewey believed it unfortunate that no term covers the act of production and the act of appreciation combined as one thing. Perception and enjoyment of art are often seen as having nothing in common with the creative act. The term “aesthetic” is sometimes used to designate the entire field and sometimes just the perceptual side. Once we see conscious experience as “doing and undergoing” we can see the connection between the productive and appreciative aspects of art. “Art” denotes the process of making something out of physical material that can be perceived by one of the senses. “Aesthetic” refers to experience as both appreciative and perceptive. It is the side of the consumer. And yet, production and consumption should not be seen as separate. Perfection of production is in terms of the enjoyment of the consumer: it is not a mere matter of technique or execution. Craftsmanship is only artistic if it cares deeply about the subject matter <em>and</em> is directed towards enjoyed perception.</p><p>Dewey believed that art brings together the same doing/undergoing relation that makes <em>an</em> experience what it is. Something is artistic when the qualities of the result control the process of production. That the aesthetic experience is connected with the experience of making can be seen in the fact that if we believed a product to be of some primitive people, and then discovered that it was a product of nature, it would be perceived differently. Aesthetic satisfaction must be linked to the activity that gave rise to it. For example the taste of the epicure includes qualities that depend on reference to the manner of production of the thing enjoyed.</p><p>The process of artistic production is involved from the start with perception. It entails sensitive awareness of the evolving object and its aesthetic qualities. The artist ends the process when she perceives directly that the product is good. The sensitivity of the artist directs the continuous shaping and reshaping of the work. In the creative process, hand and eye are intimately connected. Both act as instruments of the live creature as a whole. When the potter's actions for example are regulated by a series of perceptions, the bowl is graceful.</p><p>The product is aesthetic only if the doing and undergoing are related to form a perceptual whole. This occurs in imagination as well as in observation. The artist must build up a coherent experience continuously through constant change. Even when an author writes down what she had already clearly conceived her work is not private: art is made for public consumption. Similarly, the architect must think in the medium. Even here, doings and perceptions interact and mutually affect each other in imagination.</p><p>The activities of the perceiver are comparable to those of the creator. Reception that is full perception, and not mere recognition, is a series of responsive acts resulting in fulfillment. In perception, consciousness becomes alive. Consciousness requires implicit involvement of motor response throughout the organism, which entails that the scene perceived be pervaded by emotion. Although this phase of experience involves surrender, this can only be done through controlled activity, not withdrawal. It is a “going-out” of energy which is also a “plunging” into the subject-matter.</p><p>We need apprenticeship to perceive great works of art. Aesthetic experience of art requires a continuous interaction between the total organism and the object. The typical guided tour in a museum does not involve such interaction. In proper appreciation the beholder must create her own experience in such a way as to include relations similar to those perceived by the artist. Re-creation is required for the object to be seen <em>as</em> a work of art. The beholder as well as the producer selects and simplifies according to her interests, gathering details into a whole.</p><p>The end of art is significant only as an integration of parts. Dominant in aesthetic experience are the characteristics that cause the experience to be integrated and complete. In integral experience there is a dynamic form that involves growth. This form has three stages: inception, development, and fulfillment. Aesthetic experience converts resistances into movement towards a close. Experiencing is a rhythm of intake and outgiving between which there are pauses each of which, in turn, incorporates within itself the prior doing. Thus the form of the whole is in each part. The consummation phase of experience is not merely located at the end. For an artist is engaged in completing her work at every stage of the process. And this involves summing up what has gone before.</p><h3><a name="ActExp" id="ActExp">2.4 The Act of Expression</a></h3><p>Dewey's theory of creativity is developed within the context of a theory of expressive acts (Dewey 1934, Chapter 4). Leo Tolstoy had featured expression in his theory of art and there are some similarities between Dewey's handling and his. However Dewey begins from a naturalist standpoint. His first move is to claim that every experience begins as an impulsion. “Impulsion,” as distinguished from “impulse,” is a developmental movement of the <em>whole</em> organism in response to a need arising from interaction with the environment, for example a craving for food. It is the beginning stage of a complete experience, whereas impulse is momentary, for example a tongue reacting to a sour taste.</p><p>For Dewey, the epidermis is only superficially the limit of the body. In fact, various external things belong to, and are needed by, the body. This includes not only such things as food and air, but tools and other aspects of human culture. In short, the self depends on its environment for its survival, and must secure its materials through forays into the world. Because of this, the initial impulsion meets things that oppose it. The self must convert these obstacles into something useful, thus transforming its blind efforts into purpose and meaning.</p><p>Impulsion becomes aware of itself only through overcoming obstacles. When resistance generates curiosity and is overcome, the result is elation. Emotion is then converted into both interest and reflective action through assimilating meanings from the past. In this re-creative act the impulsion gains form and solidity, and old material is given new life. What would otherwise be either a smooth passageway or an obstruction becomes a medium for creativity.</p><p>Not all outward activity is expression. Dewey insists that someone who simply acts angrily is not <em>expressing</em> anger. What may seem expressive to an outside observer because it tells us something about the state of the person observed may not be expressive from the standpoint of the subject. Mere “giving way” to impulsion does not constitute expression. Expression requires clarification, which for Dewey means an ordering of impulsion by way of incorporating values of prior experiences. Although emotional discharge is necessary for expression, it is not sufficient. To discharge is to get rid of, whereas to express is to carry to completion.</p><p>A baby learns that it gains attention when it cries. As it becomes aware of the meaning of its actions it performs those previously blind acts <em>on purpose</em>. In this way, consequences are incorporated as the meaning of future doings. The baby is then capable of expression. Primitively spontaneous acts, for example smiles, are thereby converted into means of rich human intercourse. Similarly, the art of painting uses paint to express imaginative experience.</p><p>Dewey stresses that expression and art require material used as media. An intrinsic connection exists between medium and the act of expression. Tones only express emotion, and hence are musical, when they occur in a medium of other tones, as when they are ordered in a melody. “Expression” etymologically refers to a squeezing out. Yet, even the expression of wine from a wine press is not a mere discharge. It involves interaction between wine press and grapes to transform primitive material into something expressed. The work of art involves a building of experience out of interaction of various conditions and energies in which the thing expressed is wrung from the producer.</p><p>For Dewey, the act of expression is a construction in time. It is a prolonged interaction of self and objective conditions that gives form and order to both. The author only comes to recognize what he/she set out to do with raw materials at the end of a process that began with excitement about the subject matter. That excitement in turn stirs up meanings based on prior experience. These, finally, enter a conscious stage. The fire of inspiration results in either painful disruption or the creation of a refined product in expressive action.</p><p>Dewey observes that inspiration has often been attributed to a muse or god because it is based on unconscious sources. It involves inner material finding objective fuel to burn. The act of expression brings to completion the act of inspiration by means of this material. For an impulsion to lead to expression there must be conflict, a place where inner impulse meets the environment. The tribal war dance for example requires the uncertainty of an impending raid for its excitement. The emotion is not complete in itself within the individual: it is about something objective. Thus, emotion is implied in a situation, for example a situation may be depressing or threatening.</p><h3><a name="ExpObj" id="ExpObj">2.5 The Expressive Object</a></h3><p>In the fifth chapter Dewey turns to the expressive object. He believes that the object should not be seen in isolation from the process that produced it, nor from the individuality of vision from which it came. Theories which simply focus on the expressive object dwell on how the object represents other objects and ignore the individual contribution of the artist. Conversely, theories that simply focus on the act of expressing tend to see expression merely in terms of personal discharge.</p><p>Works of art use materials that come from a public world, and they awaken new perceptions of the meanings of that world, connecting the universal and the individual organically. The work of art is representative, not in the sense of literal reproduction, which would exclude the personal, but in that it tells people about the nature of their experience.</p><p>Dewey observes that some who have denied art meaning have done so on the assumption that art does not have connection with outside content. He agrees that art has a unique quality, but argues that this is based on its concentrating meaning found in the world. For Dewey, the actual Tintern Abbey expresses itself in Wordsworth's poem about it and a city expresses itself in its celebrations. In this, he is quite different from those theorists who believe that art expresses the inner emotions of the artist. The difference between art and science is that art expresses meanings, whereas science states them. A statement gives us directions for obtaining an experience, but does not <em>supply</em> us with experience. That water is H<sub>2</sub>0 tells us how to obtain or test for water. If science expressed the inner nature of things it would be in competition with art, but it does not. Aesthetic art, by contrast to science, <em>constitutes</em> an experience.</p><p>A poem operates in the dimension of direct experience, not of description or propositional logic. The expressiveness of a painting is the painting itself. The meaning is there beyond the painter's private experience or that of the viewer. A painting by Van Gogh of a bridge is not representative of a bridge or even of Van Gogh's emotion. Rather, by means of pictorial presentation, Van Gogh presents the viewer with a new object in which emotion and external scene are fused. He selects material with a view to expression, and the picture is expressive to the degree that he succeeds.</p><p>Dewey notes that formalist art critic Roger Fry spoke of relations of lines and colors coming to be full of passionate meaning within the artist. For Fry the object as such tends to disappear in the whole of vision. Dewey agrees with the first point and with the idea that creative representation is not of natural items as they literally happen. He adds however that the painter approaches the scene with emotion-laden background experiences. The lines and colors of the painter's work crystallize into a specific harmony or rhythm which is a function also of the scene in its interaction with the beholder. This passion in developing a new form is the aesthetic emotion. The prior emotion is not forgotten but fused with the emotion belonging to the new vision.</p><p>Dewey, then, opposes the idea that the meanings of the lines and colors in a painting would completely replace other meanings attached to the scene. He also rejects the notion that the work of art only expresses something exclusive to art. The theory that subject-matter is irrelevant to art commits its advocates to seeing art as esoteric. To distinguish between aesthetic values of ordinary experience (connected with subject-matter) and aesthetic values of art, as Fry wished, is impossible. There would be nothing for the artist to be passionate about if she approached the subject matter without interests and attitudes. The artist first brings meaning and value from earlier experience to her observation giving the object its expressiveness. The result is a completely new object of a completely new experience.</p><p>For Dewey, an artwork clarifies and purifies confused meaning of prior experience. By contrast, a non-art drawing that simply suggests emotions through arrangements of lines and colors is similar to a signboard that indicates but does not contain meaning: it is only enjoyed because of what they remind us of. Also, whereas a statement or a diagram takes us to many things of the same kind, an expressive object is individualized, for example in expressing a particular depression.</p><h3><a name="SubFor" id="SubFor">2.6 Substance and Form</a></h3><p>Chapter Six begins with a discussion of medium. Dewey asserts that there are many languages of art, each specific to the medium. He believes that meanings expressed in art cannot be translated into words. Moreover, language requires not only speakers but listeners. Thus, in art, the work is not complete until it is experienced by someone other than the artist. Artist, work and audience form a triad, for even when the artist works in isolation she is herself vicariously the audience.</p><p>Language involves both what is said and how it is said: substance and form. The artist's creative effort is in forming the material so that it is the authentic substance of a work of art. If art were mere self-expression, substance and form would fall apart. Still, self-expression is important. Without it, the work would lose freshness and originality, and although the material out of which the work is made comes from the public world the manner of its making is individual.</p><p>Dewey holds that someone who perceives a work aesthetically will create an experience in which the subject is new. A poem is a succession of experiences, and no two readers have the same experience. Indeed each reader creates his or her own poem out of the same raw material. The work of art is only actually such when it lives in a person's experience. As physical object, the work remains identical, but as work of art, it is recreated. It would be absurd to ask the artist what she meant by her work, for she would find different meanings in it at different times. What the artist means in a work, then, is whatever the perceiver can get out of it that is living. This does not mean that any interpretation is as good as any other, as will be seen when we discuss Dewey's chapter on criticism.</p><h3><a name="NatHisFor" id="NatHisFor">2.7 Natural History of Form</a></h3><p>In philosophy, “relation” generally refers to something intellectual that subsists in propositions. But, as Dewey observes in his seventh chapter, it refers in everyday discourse to something direct and active. It leads us to think of the clashings and unitings of things, of modes of interaction. For Dewey, the relation that characterizes a work of art is mutual adaptation of the parts to constitute the whole. This is also true for the aesthetic experience of a city. A person who aesthetically perceives New York from a ferry would see the buildings as colorful volumes in relation to each another and to the sky and river. The focus would be on a perceptual whole made up of related parts, the values of each part modifying and modified by the values of the other parts.</p><p>Returning to art, Dewey notes that Matisse describes the process of painting in terms of putting down patches of color, which then lose importance as other patches are put down, so that the different colors need to be balanced. Similarly, a homeowner furnishes a room by interrelating the parts in perception. In general, perception consists in a sequence of acts that build up on one another to achieve unity of form. Art only does this more deliberately than ordinary perception. Within art, form is the working of forces that carry an experience of some thing to fulfillment. Thus, form needs to be appropriate to the subject matter.</p><p>For fulfillment or consummation there must be a process of building up values. This requires conserving the meaning of what has preceded. There must also be anticipation of the future in each aspect or phase of the process. Consummation is, then, relative. Dewey concludes from his discussion up to this point that continuity, cumulation, conservation, tension and anticipation are the conditions of aesthetic form.</p><p>Since resistance or tension is needed for development, intelligence in art-making consists in overcoming difficulties. The perceiver <em>also</em> needs to solve problems in order to better appreciate the work. He or she must remake past experiences so that they may enter into the new one. Rigidly pre-determined products, by contrast, are academic. A true artist cares about the end product as the completion of what went before, not as something conforming to a prior plan.</p><p>Dewey believed that the beauty of fine art involves some strangeness or discovery that keeps it from being mechanical. This allows us to experience the thing for its own sake. Unlike mechanical production, in artistic production the consummatory phase recurs throughout the work. Thus the work is both instrumental and final. Art is instrumental not in serving narrow purposes but in giving us a refreshed attitude about ordinary experience and contributing to an enduring sense of serenity.</p><p>We admire skill as enhanced expression belonging to the <em>product</em> and not merely to the <em>producer</em>. Dewey believed that technique that emphasizes the artist is obtrusive insofar as it does not carry the object to consummation. Properly, technique is the skill of managing the making of form. Advances in technique come from solving problems that grow out of our need for new modes of experience. Historically, Dewey observes, three-dimensional painting was motivated by the need for something more than depiction of religious scenes. For example, the Venetian painters' use of color for sculptural effect arose from the secularization of values which was characteristic of their time. In general, a new technique passes through three stages: experimentation and exaggeration, incorporation and validation, and imitation and academicism.</p><p>Dewey asserts that new materials demand new techniques, and the artist is a born experimenter. Through experimentation, the artist opens up new areas, or reveals new qualities in the familiar. What is now classic is the result of previous adventure, which is why we still find adventure in the classics.</p><p>There is in aesthetic experience a rhythm of surrender and reflection. We interrupt the surrender aspect to attend to the above-mentioned formal conditions. The first, pre-analytic, phase of aesthetic experience is one of overwhelming impression. We might, for example, be seized by the glory of a landscape or by the magic of a painting. This seizure is at a high level only to the extent that the viewer is cultivated. Like Hume, Dewey holds that cultivation comes through practice in discrimination. However he also sees aesthetic experience in terms of phases. In this mode, the seizure phase is followed by the discrimination phase, which can either affirm the object's value or convince us that it was <em>not</em> worthy of our initial response. This phase can, in turn, expand into criticism.</p><p>Dewey believed that there is objectivity in art evaluation based on several factors. First, works of art are parts of the objective world and are conditioned by materials and energies of that world. Second, for an object to be the content of aesthetic experience it must satisfy objective conditions which belong to that world. This is why the artist shows interest in the world, and in her materials.</p><p>The first and most important of these objective conditions is rhythm. Rhythm already exists in nature. The rhythms of dawn and sunset, rain and shine, the seasons, the movements of the moon and the stars, reproduction and death, waking and sleeping, heartbeat and breath, and the rhythms involved in working with materials, were all seen by early men as having mysterious meaning related to their survival. Even more significant were the rhythms involved with preparing for war and for planting. Dramatic events also led men to impose or introduce rhythms that were not previously there.</p><p>Reproducing the rhythms of nature generated a sense of drama in life. The essences of animals were brought to life in the rhythms of dance, sculpture and painting. Combining the formative arts and the rhythms of voice and dance led to fine art. Man came to use the rhythms of nature to celebrate his relationship with nature and to commemorate his most intense experiences. At first no distinction was made between art and science in the reproduction of these changes. For example, the first Greek stories about the origins of nature had aesthetic form, and the idea of natural law came from the idea of harmony.</p><p>For Dewey, every regular change in nature is a rhythm. Science progresses as we refine our understanding of these changes. Science, however, parts ways with art when it presents rhythms through symbols that mean nothing to perception. Nonetheless, even today science and art have a common interest in rhythm. Man uses rhythms to commemorate his most intense experiences. The rhythms of art are grounded in the basic patterns of the relation of live creature and its environment.</p><h3><a name="OrgEne" id="OrgEne">2.8 Organization of Energies</a></h3><p>The art product is physical and potential, whereas the work of art is active and experienced. It is what the product does. Dewey gives his definition of art in this, the eighth chapter <em>Art as Experience</em>. (Casey Haskins (1998) makes a case, however, for Dewey's definition of art being found in the chapter titled “The Varied Substance of the Arts.”) Contrary to many interpreters, he neither claims that art is identical to expression or to experience. Moreover, like Nelson Goodman later (1978), he asks “when is art?” rather than “what is art?” For Dewey, a work of art happens when the structure of the object interacts with the energies of the subject's experience to generate a substance that develops cumulatively towards fulfillment of impulsions. To fully understand this definition we must understand the role of rhythm in art. Only when rhythm incorporated into the external object is <em>experienced</em> is it aesthetic. Since rhythm is a matter of perception, not of mere regularity, it includes what is contributed by the self.</p><p>It is often thought that there are two kinds of art, spatial and temporal, and that only the latter can have rhythm. But, Dewey argues, perception of rhythm in pictures and sculpture is as essential to their experience as that of music. Rhythm is a matter of bringing about a complete and consummatory experience. The theory that rhythm is literal recurrence, what Dewey calls the tick-tock theory, sees it as merely mechanical. Yet, constant variation is as important to rhythm as is order. Indeed, more variation produces more interesting effects, provided that order is maintained and there is progress towards fulfillment.</p><p>Dewey explicates this point through analyzing some lines from Wordsworth's <em>Prelude</em>. He notes that no one word in this poem has the meaning we would find in a dictionary. Rather, the meaning is a function of the situation expressed. He also believes that an individual experience, in this case a feeling of desolation, is constantly built as the poem develops. The meaning of each word both determines, and is determined by, this developing experience. By contrast, a popular gospel hymn is relatively external, physical, and uniform in both matter and form, although even here the process is cumulative. Although rhythm requires recurrence, recurrence is not the same as literal repetition, for it involves relationships that both sum up and also carry forward. These relationships define parts, give them individuality, and connect them to the whole.</p><p>Another theory of rhythm, the “tom-tom theory,” sees it as a matter of repetition of beats. On this view, variation comes merely from the piling up of such uniform rhythms. The theory, Dewey believes, is based on a misunderstanding of tribal music in which it is forgotten that such rhythms usually occur in the context of singing and dance and involve development to greater levels of excitement. Also, tribal rhythms are more complex and subtle than those of western music with its emphasis on harmony.</p><h3><a name="ComSubArt" id="ComSubArt">2.9 The Common Substance of the Arts</a></h3><p>What subject-matter is appropriate to art? Reynolds in the 18th century thought that only instances of heroic action and suffering would count. However in the 19th century such ordinary topics of everyday life as railway-coaches and plates became the subject-matter of painting. The same democratic widening of subject-matter occurred in the other arts. In general, one of art's functions is to question the limitations of subject-matter set by convention and moralism. The only limitation set is by the interest of the artist. However, universality and originality in art depends on the artist's interest being sincere. Whatever narrows the permitted subject-matter of art narrows the artist's ability to be sincere and hinders his or her imagination. This happens for example when the artist is required to work on proletarian subject-matter, as in the Soviet Union. All of this diversity suggests that there is some common substance to the arts. But to say that this common substances is form is to arbitrarily separate form and matter.</p><p>Not only is there community of form in the arts but also community of substance, which is the topic of Dewey's ninth chapter. The creative process begins with a “total seizure,” an inclusive qualitative whole (a “mood”) which is then articulated, and even continues after articulation. This qualitative whole determines the development of a poem into parts, and when this does not happen we become aware of breaks.</p><p>This element, which he also refers to as a “penetrating quality,” is immediately experienced in all parts of the work. Yet it cannot be described, or even specified. It is so pervasive we take it for granted. It is an emotionally intuited fusion of the different elements of the work— without it, the parts would only be mechanically related. The organic whole is the parts permeated by it. It may be called the spirit of the work. It is also the work's “reality” in that it makes us experience the work <em>as</em> real. It is the background that qualifies everything in the foreground.</p><p>For Dewey, this background extends surprisingly far. Although we may assume that experiences have bounded edges like those of their objects, the whole of an experience, and especially its qualitative background, which he calls “the setting,” extends indefinitely. By “setting,” Dewey simply means the background aspect of the experience, that which is not focused in the experience. The margins of our experience shade into that indefinite expanse we call the universe. However, this experiential background is only made conscious in the specific objects that form the focus. Behind every explicit object there is something implicit that, although we call it vague, is not so in the original experience, for it is a function of the whole situation. An experience is mystical, Dewey believes, to the extent that this feeling of an unlimited background is intense, and it is particularly intense in certain works of art, for example in tragedy. Symbolist poets stress it when they say that a work of art must include something not understood.</p><p>That the pervasive quality binds together the various elements of the work is shown by the fact that we constantly see things immediately as belonging to a work or not. That art enhances the pervasive quality explains why we experience increased clarity in front of any work of art we experience intensely, and why we experience religious feelings in connection with aesthetic intensity. This sense of a world beyond us gives us an expanded sense of self and a feeling of unity. However, Dewey is not making a metaphysical claim here: although he is speaking of an intuition it is not of the Absolute but of a deeper dimension of ordinary reality as experienced.</p><p>Every work of art uses a medium associated with different organs. Art intensifies the significance of the fact that our experience is mediated through these organs. In painting, color gives us a scene without mixture of the other senses. Color must then carry the qualities given by the other senses, thus enhancing its expressiveness. There is something magical in the power of flat pictures to depict a diverse universe, as also in the power of mere sounds to express events. In art media all the possibilities of a specialized organ of perception are exploited. Seeing, for example, operates with “full energy” in the medium of paint. Medium is “taken up” into it and remains within the result.</p><p>Aesthetic effects necessarily attach to their medium. When another medium is substituted, as in boards painted to look like stone, the result looks fake. When means and ends are external to each other the experience is non-aesthetic. This also applies to ethics when considered from the standpoint of aesthetics. For example, being good to avoid punishment has no aesthetic value. The Greeks recognized that good conduct has grace and proportion, fusing means and ends.</p><p>Sensitivity to a medium is essential both to artistic creation and aesthetic perception. Thus Dewey, like Clive Bell before him (Bell 1914), warns us away from looking at paintings as illustrations. Nor are we to look at them in terms of technique. Both approaches involve separation of means and ends. The medium mediates between the artist and the perceiver. The artist, unlike the ordinary person, is able to transform material into medium. Non-artists, by contrast, require many materials to express themselves, and the results of their efforts are often confused.</p><h3><a name="VarSubArt" id="VarSubArt">2.10 The Varied Substance of the Arts</a></h3><p>In his tenth chapter Dewey insists that art is the quality of a thing and is thus adjectival. To say that tennis is an art is to say that there is art in tennis. The product is not the work of art, rather the work is the enjoyed experience of a human. Since art does not denote objects it is not divided into different classes. It is simply an activity that is differentiated based on the medium used. Artists are concerned with qualities, and qualities are concrete and particular. For a painter, there are no two reds because each is influenced by its context.</p><p>Dewey is critical of various classifications of the arts, for instance that between higher and lower sense organs, or between the arts of space and time, or between representative and non-representative art. He also has problems with rigid classification and definition in terms of genus and species when it comes to aesthetics. The idea of fixed classes is associated with the idea of fixed rules which Dewey also rejects. Classification limits perception and inhibits creativity. As a consequence, Dewey spends much time in this chapter discussing specific differences between the various fine art media which will not be surveyed here.</p><h3><a name="HumCon" id="HumCon">2.11 The Human Contribution</a></h3><p>In his eleventh chapter Dewey expresses a wish to overcome what he believes to be false and antiquated psychological theories that hinder aesthetic understanding. For example, he denies the Lockean view that the undergoings of the self are mere impressions stamped on wax. Experience is neither merely physical nor merely mental. Rather, things and events of the world are transformed in the context of the live creature, and the creature itself is transformed through this interaction. Contrary theories hold that experience happens exclusively within the mind, fragmenting the self into sense, feeling, and desire. However, these are actually only different aspects of the interaction of self and environment. The separation, for example, between intellectual and sensual aspects of the soul is based rather on differences in social class. Dewey believed that badly ordered societies exaggerate these distinctions, which is the business of art to overcome.</p><p>Theories that assume that aesthetic quality is projected onto the aesthetic object, for example Santayana's idea that art is objectified pleasure, exemplify this separation. Although the separation of self and object has practical importance in everyday life it dissolves in aesthetic experience. Dewey opposes the idea, set forth by I. A. Richards, that a painting causes certain effects in us. Rather, a painting is a total effect arising from the interaction of live creature and such external factors as pigment and light. Its beauty is a part of that effect. Dewey also criticizes Kant's reduction of attentive observation to mere contemplation and his reduction of the emotional element of the aesthetic to pleasure taken in contemplation. The problem with Kant is that he drew distinctions and then made them into compartmental divisions, thus separating the aesthetic from other modes of experience. His notion of pure feeling led to beauty being seen as remote from desire and action. Dewey, by contrast, sees aesthetic experience as incorporation of desire and thought into the perceptual.</p><p>The pleasure taken in reading a poem is not in the contemplation but in fulfillment of tendencies in the subject perceived. As opposed to traditional psychology, Dewey holds that impulsion comes first, followed by sensation. The presence of intense sensuous qualities shows the presence of impulsion. Aesthetic appreciation has balance when many impulses are involved. Aesthetic experience may only be said to be disinterested if this means that it contains no specialized interest.</p><p>For Dewey, imagination is not a self-contained faculty but a quality that pervades all making and observation. It is a way of seeing that makes old things new. Following Coleridge, he holds that the imagination welds together diverse elements into a new unified experience. Contrary to Coleridge, however, it is not a power. Rather, it is something that happens when various materials come together. Nor is it simply giving familiar experience a new look, for it only happens when mind and material interpenetrate. The role of imagination can be seen in terms of the dialectic of inner and outer vision in creative making in which inner vision seems at first richer, and then outer vision seems to have more energy, although the inner vision controls the outer. Imagination is the interaction of the two.</p><h3><a name="Cha" id="Cha">2.12 The Challenge to Philosophy</a></h3><p>Dewey's twelfth chapter draws implications from his aesthetic theory for philosophy in general. Continuing his discussion of imagination, he holds that all conscious experience has some element of imagination, for imagination is conscious adjustment of the new and the old. Yet all imaginative experience is not the same. Art is distinguished from reverie and dream in that the meanings of art are embodied in material. Aesthetic experience is distinguished from other imaginative experience by the fact that the meanings embodied are especially wide and deep. Although scientific inventions are also products of imagination, works of art do not operate in the realm of physical existence. A work of art concentrates and enlarges immediate experience, directly expressing imaginatively-evoked meaning. It also encourages its audience to carry out a similar imaginative act.</p><p>Aesthetic experience is a challenge to philosophy because it is free to develop <em>as</em> experience. Thus, philosophers must go to aesthetics to find out what experience is. Moreover, a philosopher's aesthetic theory will test his or her ability to understand experience itself. Aesthetic theories have typically taken a single factor and explained aesthetic experience in terms of it, for example, taking imagination as a single element rather than as that which holds all the elements together. The various aesthetic theories may be classified according to which element they emphasize. Dewey believes that each theory imposes preconceived ideas upon the subject matter. The make-believe theory, for example, tends to see the imaginative experience of art in terms of reverie. Although reverie is not absent from art, there are equally essential elements, especially the element of creative control that causes ideas to be embodied in an object. In art, the product must be saturated both with the qualities of the represented object and those of the emotion expressed.</p><p>Because art often gives us a sense of increased understanding, some philosophers have seen it as a mode of knowledge, sometimes even as superior to science. There have been many different things suggested as what is known through art. This shows that the philosophers involved were not thinking about art or aesthetic experience. On Dewey's view, the sense of increased understanding in art comes from the fact that knowledge is transformed both in production and in experience by being merged with non-intellectual elements. Life is made more intelligible by art not through conceptualization but through clarification and intensification in experience.</p><p>Dewey does not reject essences, he simply rejects previous theories of them. He insists that essences exists even though they are not objects in the mind. For Dewey, essence appears as the quality of intense aesthetic experience which is so immediate as to be mystical. But it is not to be associated with the ultimate essences of traditional metaphysics. Following ordinary language, Dewey notes that “essence” can also mean the “gist” of a thing, what is indispensable. For Dewey, all artistic expression moves towards organization of meaning that captures essences in this sense. An example of this is the painter Courbet who conveys the essence liquidity saturating the landscape. The work of art forms “an experience as an experience” (Dewey 1934, p. 298). The essential is the result of art and of artists having expressed essential meanings in perception, and not something that exists prior to art.</p><p>Dewey then turns to various traditional theories of art. Plato, as he noted earlier, unconsciously borrows his idea of essence from the arts. When Croce sees essence as the object of intuition and identifies this with expression he is just imposing his prior philosophical speculations on aesthetic experience. Dewey rejects Croce's idea that the only real existence is mind and that the work of art is a state of mind. (This comment led to Croce's published review of Dewey and to the ongoing reception of Dewey's book mentioned in the introduction and elaborated in the last section of this article.) Schopenhauer is also dismissed as just a dialectical development of Kant. Dewey objects specifically to Schopenhauer's ruling charm out of aesthetic experience and even more to his fixed hierarchies of beauty and of the arts. Dewey's main purpose in these attacks is to show that philosophy also involves imagination and that art controls the imaginative adventures of philosophy through integrating opposites and overcoming isolation in thought.</p><h3><a name="CriPer" id="CriPer">2.13 Criticism and Perception</a></h3><p>Dewey's thirteenth chapter addresses the nature of criticism. For Dewey, judgment is an act of intelligence performed on perception for the purpose of more adequate perception. It is development in the medium of thought of deeply realized experience. He rejects therefore judicial criticism in which the verdict is central. Such criticism is produced out a desire for authority on the side of critics, and for protection on the part of the audience.</p><p>Dewey holds that there are no infallible touchstones in criticism. In fact, it is harmful to think that there are such. This can be seen in the blunders of the judicial critic, for example the attacks on postimpressionists in the 1913 Armory show. In general, judicial criticism confuses a particular technique with aesthetic form. This is not to say, however, that judgment is arbitrary. Rather, good judgment requires a rich background, disciplined insight, and the capacity to discriminate and to unify. Judicial criticism fails because it cannot handle new movements in art which, by their nature, express something new in human experience.</p><p>The opposite extreme is impressionist criticism, which holds that judgment is impossible and that all that is needed is a statement of response. For Dewey, impressions, i.e., unanalyzed qualitative effects, are only the beginnings of judgments. To analyze an impression is to go beyond it to grounds and consequences. Even defining an impression by grounding it in personal history is moving towards judgment. Just as the artist takes objective material from a common world and transforms it by imaginative vision, so too the critic must attend to objective features of the work he or she is studying. The result is perceptive appreciation that is also knowledgeable.</p><p>Dewey believes that although there are no standards for critical judgment there are criteria of judgment. Previous discussions of the relation of form and matter, and of the role of medium in art, have addressed this point. These criteria are not rules but rather means of discovering what the work of art is <em>as an experience</em>. The business of criticism is to deepen experience <em>for others</em> through re-educating perception. We fully understand the work only when we go through the same processes the artist went through when producing it, and the critic shares in promoting this process.</p><p>Dewey holds that judgment has two main functions: discrimination and unification. The first involves understanding of parts, and the second leads to understanding how they are related to each other and to the whole. The first is analysis, and the second is synthesis. The two are inseparable. The critic gains a capacity for analysis through a long-standing consuming interest in the subject. She should intensely <em>like</em> the subject and also have rich and full experience of it, as well a personal intimacy with the tradition of the subject's art form. Acquaintance with the masterpieces of the tradition will be her touchstone, although they, too, are appreciated only within the context of that tradition. The critic should also be familiar with an international <em>variety</em> of traditions, African, Persian, etc. Lack of such knowledge leads to overestimation of some artists at the expense of others. Since the critic will have knowledge of a wide variety of conditions and materials, she will appreciate a multitude of forms and will not praise work simply for technical skill. This wide knowledge will also allow for discrimination, and for determining the intent of the artist. The critic should also have knowledge of the logical development of the individual artist's work.</p><p>As both critics and artists have personal areas of interest, they tend to push the unique modes of vision associated with these areas to their limits. Each mode of vision is associated with a method, and each method has its own failing: for example symbolism can become unintelligible, and abstract art can become a mere scientific exercise. Each tendency succeeds, Dewey believes, when matter and form achieve equilibrium. The critic fails when she thinks that her own tendency is the only legitimate one.</p><p>For Dewey, the synthetic or unifying phase of judgment involves the insight of the critic. There are no rules in the synthetic phase, for this aspect of criticism is an art. Parts should be seen in terms of their role within the larger integral whole. The critic must discover some “unifying strand” in the work, one that is not simply imposed on the work. There can be many unifying ideas in a work of art, but the theme and the design described by the critic must be really present throughout.</p><p>Danger in criticism includes reduction of an entire work to an isolated element, for example looking at technique apart from form. Also, although one should take into account cultural milieus, it is dangerous to reduce works to economic, political, sociological, or psychoanalytic terms. Certain factors may be relevant to the biography of the artist but not to understanding the work itself. In short, (and anticipating Monroe Beardsley) Dewey believes that the aesthetic merit of a work is <em>within</em> the work, and extraneous material should not substitute for understanding the work itself.</p><p>Nor is there any value in judging art by the philosophical position presented. If one valued Milton for this reason one would have to reject Dante, Lucretius and Goethe, each of whom presents a different philosophy. Confusion comes from neglecting significance of the medium. The material of science, philosophy, and the arts is the same: the live creature and its environment. However, whereas science uses its medium to control and predict, art uses its medium to enhance experience. Dewey, in opposition to Santayana, admired Shakespeare for holding that nature offers many meanings. The value of experience is greatest in its ability to reveal many ideals, and the value of ideals is in the experiences they generate.</p><p>Dewey also favors poet Robert Browning's view of the relation between the individual and the universal. Nature manifests continuity, i.e., endurance through change. The critic must be sensitive to the signs of change. Although the critic is an individual and hence has his or her own bias, he should transform this bias into a means of sensitive perception and insight while not allowing it to harden. He should also recognize that there are a multitude of other qualities in the world worthy of art. He may then help others to have a fuller appreciation of the objective properties of artworks. Critical judgment depends on deepening the perception of others. Its business is not to evaluate but to re-educate perception, the perfection of perception being the moral purpose of art. We only fully understand the meaning of a work when we have gone through the processes the artist went through, and the critic promotes this experience.</p><h3><a name="ArtCiv" id="ArtCiv">2.14 Art and Civilization</a></h3><p>Dewey's last chapter addresses the large issue of art and civilization. He begins by noting that communication is the foundation of all activities that involve “internal” union between human beings. Many relations between persons, for example between investors and laborers, are “external” and mechanical, and hence not really communication. Art is a universal mode of language. It is not affected by the accidents of history in the way that speech is. Music for example can bring people together in loyalty and inspiration. Although each culture is held together by its own individuality, it is still possible to create continuity and community between cultures as long as one does not try to reduce one to the other. One can expand experience to absorb the attitudes and values of other cultures. Friendship is, on a smaller scale, a solution to the same problem, for it comes from sympathy through imagination. We understand others when their desires and aims expand us. To civilize is to instruct others in life, and this requires communication of values by way of imagination. The arts aid individuals in achieving this.</p><p>However Dewey believed that today the arts fail to organically connect with other aspects of culture, especially science and industry. The isolation of art is one manifestation of the incoherence of our society. Science gives us a new conception of the physical world. But we also hold a conception of the world which we inherited from older moral and religious traditions. Thus, the moral and physical worlds are separated, resulting in philosophical dualism. Recovering an organic place for the arts in our society is closely tied to this problem.</p><p>Dewey believed that as the scientific method has not yet become a natural part of experience its impact will continue to be both external and disintegrating. Yet although science strips things of their value, the world in which art operates remains the same. Thus the death of art is not imminent. Moreover, science shows that man is a part of nature. This helps man to recognize that his ideas are the result of nature within. Also, resistance and conflict contribute to art. So, when science discloses such resistance, it promotes art, as it does when it arouses curiosity, enlivens observation, and gives us respect for experience. A new unity would come with integration of science into the cultural whole.</p><p>Dewey observes that the separation between fine art and useful art, although it goes back to the Greeks, is intensified today by mass production and the greater importance of industry and trade. Production of goods is now mechanical, and this is opposed to the aesthetic. Still, integration of art in civilization is not impossible. Although well-constructed objects have form, the aesthetic comes only when external form fits our larger experience. If the parts are efficiently related, as in a well-constructed machine, the result is aesthetically favorable. Dewey was a fan of aesthetics of modernist design. He believed that recent commercial products have improved form and color, train cars are no longer overloaded with silly ornament, and apartment interiors are better adapted to our needs. Although he admits that factories and slums mar the landscape, he observes that the human eye is adapting to the shapes and colors of urban life. Even objects in the natural landscape are perceived in terms of these new forms. But, given that the human organism needs satisfaction through the various organs, the surroundings that have resulted from industrialism are less fulfilling than previously .</p><p>Dewey believes that the trouble is with the economic system. The problem cannot be resolved merely through increased wages or reduced work hours. Increasing leisure hours only reinforces the dualism of labor and leisure. A radical social change which would allow for more worker participation in the production and distribution of products is the only thing that would improve the quality of experience. Increased sense of freedom and increased control in the processes of production would give the worker an intimate interest and hence aesthetic satisfaction in his work. Nothing about machine production <em>per se</em> makes worker satisfaction impossible. It is private control of forces of production for private gain that impoverishes our lives. When art is merely the “beauty parlor of civilization,” both art and civilization are insecure. We can only organize the proletariat into the social system via a revolution that affects the imagination and emotions of man. Art is not secure until the proletariat are free in their productive activity and until they can enjoy the fruits of their labor. To do this, the material of art should be drawn from all sources, and art should be accessible to all.</p><p>Although this view is similar to Marxist theory Dewey does not favor reducing art to propaganda. Indeed, he asserts that theories that see art as directly moral ultimately fail because they see it in terms of how we personally relate to selected works. They fail to look at the larger context of civilization. Poetry criticizes not directly but by means of an imaginative vision of an alternate reality. Art instructs by way of communicating, but we need to understand such instruction as including imagination. Moral action depends on being able to imaginatively put oneself into another's shoes and art encourages this. Indeed, art is more moral than morality, for morality tends to be bogged down in convention, unless it is the product of moral prophets, who have always been poets. If art were to be recognized as going beyond idle pleasure or luxurious display, and morals were seen as a matter of shared values, then the problem of their relation would be resolved. Art is morally powerful because it is indifferent to moral praise and blame. Dewey agrees with Shelley that morals require going out of ourselves and identifying with the beautiful. The union of the possible and the actual in art is continued in the moral realm.</p><h2><a name="CriRea" id="CriRea">3. Critical Reactions</a></h2><p>Dewey's ideas on aesthetics and arts have been frequently both criticized and defended over the seventy-five years following the publication of <em>Art as Experience</em>. These will be reviewed in their order of appearance. Vivas (1937) argues that Dewey holds two theories about the emotions' role in aesthetic experience, one that the esthetic object arouses emotion in the spectator, and the other that the content of meaning of art, objectively speaking, is emotion. But, he argues, experimental aesthetics has shown that emotion is an accidental consequence of aesthetic apprehension, and so should not be included in its definition. The same aesthetic object can arouse different emotional reactions in different spectators. Some trained persons in music even deny that adequate aesthetic experience involves emotion. Dewey also has not given an explanation of the means by which the object expresses emotion. Vivas himself defines aesthetic experience in terms of rapt attention involving apprehension of the object's immanent meanings.</p><p>In a second article (Vivas 1938), he asks: Are emotions attached to the material? How is this consistent with the idea that emotion is not expressed in the object? And how are these ideas consistent with the idea that emotion is aroused in the spectator? Vivas insists that not all art arouses emotion in everyone who has effective intercourse with it. Music, for sophisticated listeners, is often not suggestive of emotions. When we find “sadness” in music we would do better to call it an objective character of the music than an emotion. Another problem for Dewey: if the self disappears in experience then how can the object arouse emotion in the self or have emotion attached to it? Also, if the self disappears into harmony, how can there be the kind of disharmony associated with emotion?</p><p>I have already mentioned Pepper's objection that Dewey's theory is not sufficiently pragmatic (Pepper 1939). His specific objection is that Dewey's views were eclectic, incorporating elements both of pragmatism and of Hegelian organicism. Pepper believes that both theories, as well as formalism, can be valuable when taken separately, but that the mixture in Dewey hurts pragmatism. Pepper identified organicism with the view that the ultimate reality is The Absolute. Dewey replied (1939b) that he had based his aesthetic theory on examination of the subject-matter and not on any <em>a priori</em> theory. Words he used, such as “coherence,” “whole,” “integration,” and “complete,” were intended to have meaning consistent with his pragmatic empiricism and did not by themselves indicate a commitment to idealism. Moreover, it was one of his main points that although these terms <em>were</em> applicable to aesthetic matters they could not, contra the idealists, be extended to the world as a whole. The terms had a special sense applying only to experiences as aesthetic. Dewey rejected any theory of a great cosmic harmony associated with the Hegelian notion of the Absolute.</p><p>In a later work, Pepper (1945) agrees with Dewey that each reading of a poem brings a new experience, but thinks that, since there is also identity of context that can make the differences minor, we can speak of an identical quality running through the different situations. Pepper has many positive things to say about Dewey's “contextualism” (his word for pragmatism in aesthetics), but he insists that there is much more permanence of aesthetic values in the world than Dewey would admit. A great work of art may be appreciated as long as the physical work exists and someone exists to perceive it, and insofar as it appeals to common instincts, it may appeal to people of varied cultures.</p><p>The Italian philosopher and aesthetician Benedetto Croce read Dewey's <em>Art as Experience</em> and responded to it. He rightly pointed out many similarities between his own and Dewey's thought. (Croce 1948). There were, however, still three points of serious contention: (1) Croce places significantly more importance on the universality of art than Dewey, (2) he still insists that the material of art consists not of external things but of internal sentiments of human passions: a characteristically idealist position that Dewey vehemently rejects, and (3) whereas he believes that art gives knowledge of a higher reality, Dewey does not. Croce asserts that Dewey is still arguing against Hegelians of his youth who held, for example, to a notion of “the Absolute,” which Croce had rejected. Dewey (1948), in responding to Croce, argues that the list of shared beliefs Croce mentioned in his review were just ideas widely familiar to aestheticians. He thinks that because of Croce's idealism there can be no common ground of discussion between them. He also makes an unsatisfactory distinction between pragmatism, which he claims is a theory of knowledge, and aesthetic theory, which he thinks has nothing to do with knowledge. Also, he seems inconsistently dualist when, in his reply to Croce, he cuts his own system into two parts, pragmatic and aesthetic. His criticism that Croce is simply applying to the domain of aesthetics ideas drawn from a preconceived system of philosophy, seems unfair, since he does this to some extent himself. In his reply, Croce (1952) argues that Dewey is too wedded to empiricism and pragmatism and that it is only because Dewey, contrary to his own claims, is committed to a kind of dualism, that he cannot understand Croce's identification of intuition and expression or recognize how similar Croce's view is to his own. Simoni (1952) argues that neither Croce nor Dewey were Hegelian in the sense of believing in the Absolute. Douglas (1970) agrees with Simoni, finding many similarities between Dewey and Croce. However, Douglas does agree with Pepper (1939) that Dewey never reconciled the pragmatist and historicist (Hegelian) dimensions of his thought.</p><p>Romanell (1949) held that Croce and Dewey at least share the view that art is about aesthetic experience. However, Dewey's definition of the subject-matter of philosophy of art as aesthetic experience (which treats it as a special type of experience) is inconsistent with his definition of it as the aesthetic phase of experience. Also, when Dewey speaks of aesthetic experience he is not functionalist and is not consistent with his pragmatism. Dewey should have held that just as there is no such thing as religious experience, there is no such thing as aesthetic experience. Dewey (1950) replied that every normally complete experience is aesthetic in its consummatory phase, that the arts and their experience are developments of this primary phase, and that there is nothing inconsistent in this. Where Romanell sees incompatibility Dewey sees continuity of development. Ames (1953) provides an excellent defense against Dewey's critics up to this point in time.</p><p>As mentioned earlier, many attacks on Dewey focused on his views on expression. Although Hospers (1946) does not specifically criticize him, and Bouwsma (1954) does not mention him, their attacks on expression theory can be taken to be indirectly against Dewey. Tormey (1986) fills this gap. He chides Dewey for assuming that an artist is always expressing something and that the expressive qualities in the work are the result of that act. He thinks that Dewey wrongly abandons the distinction between voluntary and involuntary expression, and in doing so, undermines paradigmatic examples of expressive behavior. A work of art may possess expressive qualities of sadness but this is not necessarily the intended consequence of the productive activity of the artist. For Tormey, the artist is not expressing him or herself: he/she is simply making an expressive object. Mitias (1992) defends Dewey against these criticisms.</p><p>Scruton (1974) objects mainly to Dewey's naturalism. He thinks that Dewey insists that aesthetic need must underlie all our interest in art, and that he fails to capture what we mean when we say that we are interested in a picture ‘for its own sake.’ Needs can be satisfied by many objects but one cannot substitute pictures for one another. Unlike animal need, interest in a picture involves thought of its object. As a political conservative, Scruton has been opposed to Dewey's views on education. However, his work on architecture (Scruton 1979), with its emphasis on context, unity, functionalism, and the relations between architecture and everyday aesthetics, are remarkably similar to Dewey's views about art in general, although Dewey's name is never mentioned.</p><p>Although Beardsley (1982) often speaks positively of Dewey's notion of aesthetic experience, he thinks that Dewey was obsessed with the dangers of dualism and that he talked about “separation” in a misleading way. Dewey thinks the practices of hanging paintings in special buildings would deny continuity between art and life. Yet Beardsley sees no real problem here, for people who see a painting in a museum bring their culture with them. Also, against Dewey's stress on continuity, Beardsley thinks that <em>discontinuity</em> in nature and in culture is required for the emergence of genuine novelty in art. As opposed to Dewey, Beardsley stresses the ways in which art is independent, relatively self-sufficient, and autonomous to a degree. Goldman (2005) argues that Beardsley borrows too much from Dewey's obscure discussion of experience, but articulates better than Dewey the idea that aesthetic experience is a matter of complete engagement of our faculties with both instrumental and intrinsic benefits.</p><p>Novitz (1992), who approves of Dewey's ideas that art derives from experiences of everyday life and that the artistic process infuses our daily lives, questions the idea that fine art always embodies consummatory or unified experiences. He thinks Dewey has an idealized view of art that borrows from the very aestheticist theories he criticizes, and that Dewey does not sufficiently question the boundaries of art.</p><p>Shusterman (1992, etc., see bibliography) is the most widely known advocate of Dewey's pragmatist aesthetics. He strikingly contrasts Dewey's approach to that of analytic aesthetics. Like Dewey, he stresses the idea that art and aesthetics are both culturally and philosophically central. Some of his most trenchant comments involve similarities between Dewey's thought and such continental thinkers as Foucault and Adorno. However he also has his criticisms of Dewey. He takes Dewey to be redefining art in terms of aesthetic experience, which he believes to be too slippery a concept to explain much. Moreover, he asserts that although Dewey has much to say about aesthetic experience, Dewey also holds that it is indefinable, and this leads to problems with its being a criterion of value in art. On the other hand, Shusterman thinks that Dewey sees defining art in terms of experience as a matter of getting us to have more and better experiences with art, and not of giving a definition in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. So, although he doubts that philosophical theory can redefine art, he suspects Dewey is not trying to do this anyway. Moreover, he thinks it not only possible but valuable to make less dramatic classificatory changes, as for example in legitimating rock music as fine art. He believes that whereas Dewey sought a global redefinition of art, he is simply trying to remedy certain limitations in art practice. Later, he (Shusterman 2000) has said that much art fails to generate Dewey's aesthetic experience. He also observes that art cannot be redefined to be <em>equal</em> to aesthetic experience as we are hardly going to reclassify an incredible experience of a sunset as art. Shusterman also insists on the value of aesthetic experiences that are fragmented and ruptured, contrary to Dewey's emphasis on unity, and notes that Dewey neglected the possibility of lingering reflection after moments of consummation (Shusterman 2004).</p><p>Seigfried (1996b) takes a long overdue feminist look at Dewey's aesthetics, finding several aspects that may enrich feminist exploration of women's experiences, including his antidualism, his perspectivalism, his working from concrete experience, his emphasis placed on the role of feeling in experience, his emphasis on doing and making, and his attack on the division between practice and theory. However she notes that Dewey neglected sexism in his analysis, and sometimes made sexist assumptions.</p><p>Carroll (2001) thinks Dewey's theory of art fails to cover many contemporary works which then act as counterexamples to his definition of art as experience. For example, as Rothko's paintings can overwhelm us at one shot they may not have Dewey's requisite development and closure. Carroll also thinks that the view that experiences of art must be unified is too narrow. Cage's <em>4'33?</em>, which Carroll takes to obviously be a work of art, does not consummate or have qualitative unity. Finally, he thinks that if experiences of everyday dispersion can be aesthetic then Dewey's distinction between “an experience” and disconnected daily experience dissolves. However, Jackson (1998) defends Dewey against similar criticisms, especially with respect to Cage's <em>4'33?</em> which he sees as fitting Dewey's definition nicely. For Jackson, it is the <em>experience</em> that requires unity, not the physical product.</p><p>Dickie (2001) says that Dewey sets forth an expression theory of art without any supporting argument. Lumping Dewey with Collingwood, he thinks such theorists place art in the same domain with the growl of a dog with a bone. They make the creation of art like the bowerbird's production of bowers, i.e., a result of innate natures without a plan in mind. For Dickie, expression of emotion is neither sufficient nor necessary for defining art. He thinks these theories wrongly hold that psychological mechanisms in human nature are sufficient for the production of art, as if the production of artworks is teleologically determined by psychological mechanisms.</p><p>Freeland (2001) observes that Dewey held that art is the best window to another culture, that it is a universal language, and that we should try to experience another culture as from within. It is possible for barriers and prejudices to melt away when we enter into the spirit of another culture's art. Although this universalism seems similar to Clive Bell's formalism, Freeland notes that for Dewey art is defined not as form but as expression of the life of community. She thinks however that we must also know many external facts about the community, and that we must recognize that no culture is homogeneous: there may not be <em>one</em> viewpoint in a culture. She also gives a positive nod to Dewey's call for a revolution in which the values leading to intelligent enjoyment of art are incorporated into our social relations. Finally, she classifies Dewey's aesthetics as a cognitive theory since it focuses on art's role in helping people to perceive and manipulate reality, finding continuity between Dewey's and Goodman's approaches to art as a kind of language.</p><p>Dewey's thought in aesthetics has also sometimes been brought to bear in analysis of other aspects of his philosophy. Noteworthy in this regard is the ethical work of Pappas (2008), especially his chapter titled “The Intelligent, Aesthetic, and Democratic Way of Life.” Here he discusses Dewey's aesthetic notion of balance as it applies to ethics. Johnson (1994) and Fesmire (1999, 2003) also introduce Dewey's aesthetic theories into discussion of ethics.</p><p>Recently there have been lively debates over the Deweyan tradition in the aesthetics of everyday life. Most of the contestants are inspired by Dewey's valuation of everyday aesthetic experience but depart from him in various ways. Irvin (2008a) has argued that the fragmented character of everyday aesthetic experiences might, contra Dewey's emphasis on consummation, be what gives them their distinctive quality. She goes so far as to assert that even scratching an itch can be aesthetically appreciated (Irvin 2008b). Parsons and Carlson (2008) contend that although Dewey's aesthetic theory may seem particularly appropriate to appreciating everyday objects since we interact with them in a more intimate and multi-sensory way than with art objects, this approach, shared by Korsmeyer (1999), Brady (2005), Leddy (2005), Shusterman (2006a), and Saito (2007), fails to honor traditional distinctions between aesthetic and mere “bodily” pleasures. (They might have also mentioned Kuehn (2005) who takes an explicitly Deweyan approach to the aesthetics of food.) They think it wrong that the pleasures of taking a bath, for example, could be considered aesthetic. Rather, the objects of everyday aesthetic should be appreciated mainly for their functional beauty (pleasures of the proximal senses are not aesthetic, although they may still add some value to the overall experience), and knowledge of the function of everyday objects is required for their appropriate appreciation. Soucek (2009) and Dowling (2010) raise criticisms against everyday aesthetics along similar lines.</p><p>It is a mark of the endurance and power of Dewey's aesthetic theory that it has been so frequently criticized and defended from so many different angles. 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Margolis (ed.), Philosophy Looks at the Arts: Contemporary Readings in Aesthetics, 3<sup>rd</sup>. edition, Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 421–437.</li><li>Vivas, E., 1937, “A Definition of the Esthetic Experience,” <em>Journal of Philosophy</em>, 34: 628–634.</li><li>–––, 1938, “A Note on the Emotion in Mr. Dewey's Theory of Art,” <em>The Philosophical Review</em>, 47: 527–531.</li><li>Warbeke, J., 1941, “Form in Evolutionary Theories of Art,” <em>The Journal of Philosophy</em>, 38: 393–300.</li><li>Wert, S., 2010, “Art's Detour: A Clash of Aesthetic Theories,” <em>The Journal of Aesthetic Education</em>, 44: 100–106.</li><li>Westbrook, R., 1991, <em>John Dewey and American Democracy</em>, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.</li><li>White, M., 2002, <em>A Philosophy of Culture: The Scope of Holistic Pragmatism</em>, Princeton: Princeton University Press, Chapter 3: 24–43.</li><li>Whitehouse, P., 1978, “The Meaning of ‘Emotion’ in Dewey's ‘Art as Experience’,” <em>Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism</em>, 37: 149–156.</li><li>Zeltner, P., 1975, <em>John Dewey's Aesthetic Philosophy</em>, Amsterdam: Grüner.</li><li>Zigler, R., 1982, “Experience and Pure Consciousness: Reconsidering Dewey's Aesthetics,” <em>Philosophical Studies in Education</em>, 107–114.</li><li>Zink, S., 1943, “The Concept of Continuity in Dewey's Theory of Esthetics,” <em>Philosophical Review</em>, 52: 392–399.</li><li>Zuniga, J., 1989, “An Everyday Aesthetic Impulse: Dewey Revisited,” <em>British Journal of Aesthetics</em>, 29: 41–46.</li></ul><h2><a name="Aca" id="Aca">Academic Tools</a></h2><blockquote><table><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://plato.stanford.edu/symbols/sepman-icon.jpg" alt="sep man icon" /></td><td><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/cgi-bin/encyclopedia/archinfo.cgi?entry=dewey-aesthetics" target="other">How to cite this entry</a>.</td></tr><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://plato.stanford.edu/symbols/sepman-icon.jpg" alt="sep man icon" /></td><td><a href="https://leibniz.stanford.edu/friends/preview/dewey-aesthetics/" target="other">Preview the PDF version of this entry</a> at the <a href="https://leibniz.stanford.edu/friends/" target="other">Friends of the SEP Society</a>.</td></tr><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://plato.stanford.edu/symbols/inpho.png" alt="inpho icon" /></td><td><a href="https://inpho.cogs.indiana.edu/entity?sep=dewey-aesthetics&redirect=True" target="other">Look up this entry topic</a> at the <a href="https://inpho.cogs.indiana.edu/" target="other">Indiana Philosophy Ontology Project</a> (InPhO).</td></tr><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://plato.stanford.edu/symbols/pp.gif" alt="phil papers icon" /></td><td><a href="http://philpapers.org/sep/dewey-aesthetics/" target="other">Enhanced bibliography for this entry</a> at <a href="http://philpapers.org/" target="other">PhilPapers</a>, with links to its database.</td></tr></table></blockquote><h2><a name="Oth" id="Oth">Other Internet Resources</a></h2><ul><li><a href="http://www.sjsu.edu/people/thomas.leddy/courses/c3//" target="other">Additional Materials on Dewey's Aesthetics</a>, This page by Tom Leddy includes material on Dewey's aesthetics as found in his early books <em>Psychology</em>, <em>Reconstruction in Philosophy</em> and <em>The Public and its Problems</em>. It also includes explication of material from <em>Art as Experience</em> not included in the Stanford Encyclopedia article for reasons of space. It also includes material on additional critical reactions to Dewey's aesthetics.</li><li><a href="http://www.chinainstitute.org/" target="other">China Institute</a>, founded in 1926 by John Dewey, Hu Shih, Paul Monroe, and Dr. Kuo Ping-wen.</li><li>Ho, Y., Sept. 2004, “<a href="http://chineselectures.org/cicu.htm" target="other">China Institute and Columbia University</a>,” presented at the Columbia's China Connection Conference at Columbia University.</li><li><a href="http://www.barnesfoundation.org/" target="other">The Barnes Foundation</a></li><li><a href="http://deweycenter.siu.edu/index.html" target="other">Center for Dewey Studies</a></li><li><a href="http://deweycenter.siu.edu/about_bio.html" target="other">Timeline/Biography of John Dewey Work</a>, maintained at the Center for Dewey Studies.</li><li><em>Dictionary of Art and Artists</em>, 2011, “<a href="http://www.all-art.org/artists-e.html" target="other">Escuelas de Pintura al Aire Libre</a>,” (accessed July 14, 2001).</li><li><a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/etext/852" target="other"><em>Democracy and Education</em></a>, by John Dewey, free e-book available Project Gutenberg.</li><li><a href="http://doe.concordia.ca/jds/" target="other">The John Dewey Society</a>.<ul><li><a href="http://docs.lib.purdue.edu/eandc/" target="other"><em>Education and Culture</em></a>, the journal of the John Dewey Society.</li></ul></li><li><a href="http://www.epistemelinks.com/Main/Philosophers.aspx?PhilCode=Dewe" target="other">Epistemelinks page on Dewey</a>, This page includes links to electronic texts of some of Dewey's works.</li><li><a href="http://www.scienzepostmoderne.org/OpereComplete/Dewey.John..Experience%20and%20Nature%20%281925,%201929%29.pdf" target="other">Excepts from <em>Experience and Nature</em></a>.</li><li><a href="http://www.iep.utm.edu/d/dewey.htm" target="other">John Dewey</a>, entry by John Field in the <em>Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy</em>.</li><li><a href="http://www.ffst.hr/ENCYCLOPAEDIA/john_dewey.htm" target="other">John Dewey</a>, entry by Jim Garrison in <em>Encyclopedia of the Philosophy of Education</em>.</li><li><a href="http://dewey.pragmatism.org/" target="other">John Dewey, American Pragmatist</a>, at pragmatism.org.</li><li><a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Dewey" target="other">John Dewey</a>, entry in the Wikipedia.</li></ul><h2><a name="Rel" id="Rel">Related Entries</a></h2><p><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/croce-aesthetics/">Croce, Benedetto: aesthetics</a> | <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/democracy/">democracy</a> | <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/meaning/">meaning, theories of</a> | <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/music/">music, philosophy of</a> | <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pragmatism/">pragmatism</a> | primary and secondary qualities | <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/substance/">substance</a></p></div><div id="foot"><span class="c3"><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/info.html#c">Copyright © 2013</a> by</span><br />Tom Leddy <<a href="mailto:tle403%40aol.com"><em>tle403<abbr title=" at ">@</abbr>aol<abbr title=" dot ">.</abbr>com</em></a>></div><p><em>This entry passed through the <a href="http://fivefilters.org/content-only/">Full-Text RSS</a> service — if this is your content and you're reading it on someone else's site, please read the FAQ at <a href="http://fivefilters.org/content-only/faq.php#publishers">fivefilters.org/content-only/faq.php#publishers</a>. <a href="http://fivefilters.org">Five Filters</a> recommends: <a href="http://www.medialens.org/index.php/alerts/alert-archive/alerts-2013/715-eyes-like-blank-discs-the-guardian-s-steven-poole-on-george-orwell-s-politics-and-the-english-language.html">Eyes Like Blank Discs - The Guardian's Steven Poole On George Orwell's Politics And The English Language</a>.</em></p><br />This post was made using the <a href='http://www.webmagnates.org/auto-blogging-software.html' title='auto-blogging software'>Auto Blogging Software</a> from <a href='http://www.webmagnates.org' title'make money online'>WebMagnates.org</a> This line will not appear when posts are made after activating the software to full version.Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10303290079976590343noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5448411214494413217.post-13702354289055096752013-03-05T04:28:00.000-08:002013-03-05T04:28:00.181-08:00Red Carpet Roundup <div id="mainFeatureWrap" readability="22.922535211268"><div class="contentRight"><a href="http://www.totalbeauty.com/content/gallery/best-hair-makeup-2013-oscars" title="The Oscar Looks We Think Deserve Their Own Awards"><img src="http://images.totalbeauty.com/uploads/editorial/lg/Zoe_Saldana_L.jpg" alt="The Oscar Looks We Think Deserve Their Own Awards" /></a></div><div class="contentLeft" readability="24.014084507042"><h3><a href="http://www.totalbeauty.com/content/gallery/best-hair-makeup-2013-oscars" class="singleCta" title="The Oscar Looks We Think Deserve Their Own Awards">The Oscar Looks We Think Deserve Their Own Awards</a></h3><p>Consider this the Super Bowl of red carpet hair and makeup! See which celebrities took home our top prizes in best beauty looks at the 2013 Academy Awards<br /><a title="See looks" href="http://www.totalbeauty.com/content/gallery/best-hair-makeup-2013-oscars">See looks</a></p></div></div><p class="avgRating"><a class="rateImg lowLevel" href="http://www.totalbeauty.com/content/article/red-carpet-roundup#rateThisJump" title="Rate this story">Rate this story</a><span>|</span>Avg member rating: 6</p><p><em>This entry passed through the <a href="http://fivefilters.org/content-only/">Full-Text RSS</a> service — if this is your content and you're reading it on someone else's site, please read the FAQ at <a href="http://fivefilters.org/content-only/faq.php#publishers">fivefilters.org/content-only/faq.php#publishers</a>. <a href="http://fivefilters.org">Five Filters</a> recommends: <a href="http://www.medialens.org/index.php/alerts/alert-archive/alerts-2013/715-eyes-like-blank-discs-the-guardian-s-steven-poole-on-george-orwell-s-politics-and-the-english-language.html">Eyes Like Blank Discs - The Guardian's Steven Poole On George Orwell's Politics And The English Language</a>.</em></p><br />This post was made using the <a href='http://www.webmagnates.org/auto-blogging-software.html' title='auto-blogging software'>Auto Blogging Software</a> from <a href='http://www.webmagnates.org' title'make money online'>WebMagnates.org</a> This line will not appear when posts are made after activating the software to full version.Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10303290079976590343noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5448411214494413217.post-61592580278175083212013-03-05T04:06:00.000-08:002013-03-05T04:07:15.810-08:00Why NoFollow Should Only Be Used on Content You Don’t Control <a id="dd_start" name="dd_start"></a><div class="dd_post_share"><div class="dd_buttons"><div class="dd_button"><a onclick="javascript:pageTracker._trackPageview('/outgoing/twitter.com/share');" href="http://twitter.com/share" class="twitter-share-button" data-url="http://socialnewswatch.com/why-nofollow-should-only-be-used-on-content-you-dont-control/" data-count="horizontal" data-text="Why NoFollow Should Only Be Used on Content You Don't Control" data-via="@socialnews"></a></div><div class="dd_button"><iframe src="http://www.facebook.com/plugins/like.php?href=http%3A%2F%2Fsocialnewswatch.com%2Fwhy-nofollow-should-only-be-used-on-content-you-dont-control%2F&locale=en_US&layout=button_count&action=like&width=92&height=20&colorscheme=light" scrolling="no" frameborder="0" class="c1" allowtransparency="true">[embedded content]</iframe></div><div class="dd_button"></div><div class="dd_button"></div></div><div class="c2"></div></div><div class="c2"></div><p><a onclick="javascript:pageTracker._trackPageview('/downloads/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/NoFollow.jpg');" href="http://socialnewswatch.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/NoFollow.jpg"><img class="alignnone size-full wp-image-555" title="NoFollow" src="http://socialnewswatch.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/NoFollow.jpg" alt="NoFollow" width="600" /></a></p><p>The idea of the NoFollow attribute on links was to help prevent spam from appearing on user generated content sites, particularly Wikipedia. It was intended as a way to tell Google (and eventually all major search engines) that a link was not supposed to transfer any “link juice” to the recipient of the link. In essence, it was designed to stop SEO spammers from trying to insert their links where they didn’t belong for the sake of improved rankings.</p><p><span id="more-554"></span>It has become an abused attribute. This needs to stop.</p><p>Modern use of nofollow by many websites is to prevent link juice “leakage” from a website onto other websites. Many put the attribute on any link that isn’t internal. Some go so far as to put it on every link, internal or external. This is ludicrous.</p><p>There may be some merits to the idea that leaking PageRank juice to others is a detriment to the optimization of a website, but if there is, it’s minimal. I’ve seen websites that have a completely closed nofollow policy that doesn’t “leak” any juice at all that have major troubles ranking and I’ve seen sites (such as all of my sites) that rank exceptionally well while giving link value to everyone.</p><p>There are exceptions. UGC, as mentioned before, should have nofollow attributes attached to links that are not vetted. If it’s a UGC site that passes through the eyes and scrutiny of an editor, the nofollow attribute isn’t necessary. If it goes live immediate, it’s necessary.</p><p>Comments or other areas where links can be added by anyone should also be nofollow. Some use plugins like <a onclick="javascript:pageTracker._trackPageview('/outgoing/wordpress.org/extend/plugins/commentluv/');" href="http://wordpress.org/extend/plugins/commentluv/" target="_blank">CommentLuv</a> to encourage comments by making links followed. This is up to site owner and as long as the comments and links are vetted I have no problem with it at all. If the links in comments aren’t vetted, I don’t suggest it.</p><p>Otherwise, there should never be nofollow links on websites. If a link is good enough to post, it’s good enough to get juice. 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please read the FAQ at <a href="http://fivefilters.org/content-only/faq.php#publishers">fivefilters.org/content-only/faq.php#publishers</a>. <a href="http://fivefilters.org">Five Filters</a> recommends: <a href="http://www.medialens.org/index.php/alerts/alert-archive/alerts-2013/715-eyes-like-blank-discs-the-guardian-s-steven-poole-on-george-orwell-s-politics-and-the-english-language.html">Eyes Like Blank Discs - The Guardian's Steven Poole On George Orwell's Politics And The English Language</a>.</em></p><br />This post was made using the <a href='http://www.webmagnates.org/auto-blogging-software.html' title='auto-blogging software'>Auto Blogging Software</a> from <a href='http://www.webmagnates.org' title'make money online'>WebMagnates.org</a> This line will not appear when posts are made after activating the software to full version.Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10303290079976590343noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5448411214494413217.post-56021789541080598582013-03-03T09:52:00.000-08:002013-03-03T09:52:00.987-08:00How My Mom Suckered Me Into Seeing a Fancy Beverly Hills Dermatologist <div id="photoGallery"><a href="http://www.totalbeauty.com/content/gallery/beverly-hills-dermatologist-trip/p130232/page2" title="Next"><img src="http://images.totalbeauty.com/uploads/editorial/lg420x280/secret-dermatologists-L1.jpg" alt="" /></a></div><p class="photoDescription">"All I want for Christmas is for you to make an appointment with a renowned dermatologist."</p><p>As bizarre as this request sounds, I wasn't surprised when my mom called to tell me this last December. Most mothers ask their daughters for a pair of slippers, or maybe a cute scarf. But my mom? She's a special one.</p><p>My mom is so obsessed with skin care you'd think she was the First Lady running on a platform of sun damage awareness. Seriously, she makes Michelle Obama look lazy when it comes to her childhood obesity campaign. Mom sent me a box filled with almost a dozen types of sunscreen -- all with an SPF of 75 or higher -- when I told her I was moving to Los Angeles. The note read, "A few essentials for your move to Southern California."</p><p>So I wasn't exactly shocked when my mom insisted that my Christmas gift to her focus on <em>my</em> skin care regimen. "You live in Beverly Hills," she said. "There have to be some renowned dermatologists there. Please make an appointment with a really good one. That's all I want."</p><p>I rolled my eyes, and tried to suppress a whiny, "But, <em>mommmm</em>." I'm 27 and my mom is still making me do stuff. But what kind of awful daughter would I be to deny my mom this totally selfless Christmas present?</p><p>"OK, I'll make an appointment -- but that's not all you're getting. Expect some clothes or something from J.Crew," I say, defiantly. My mom laughed. "The dermatologist appointment is the only thing I want!" She paused and added, "Well, that, and maybe take your car in for an oil change. I feel like you haven't done that in a while."</p><p>She's not joking.</p><p>Even though I acted totally put out by my mom's request, it's actually not <em>that</em> hard to make an appointment with an excellent derm. I am a beauty editor, and I live in the land of renowned dermatologists. I figure if I'm going to do this, I may as well do it up right. It is my mom's Christmas present, after all. So I make an appointment with the most renowned dermatologist I can think of, <a href="http://www.avamd.com" target="new">Dr. Ava Shamban</a>, who is the expert dermatologist from "Extreme Makeover" and author of <a href="http://www.amazon.com/Heal-Your-Skin-Breakthrough-Renewal/dp/0470532157" target="new">"Heal Your Skin"</a>.</p><p>After I book my appointment, I actually start to get kind of excited. My mom is right; I haven't seen a dermatologist in a while, and I probably should. I actually like my skin, and it <em>is</em> the largest organ in my body (a fact that's always freaked me out), so I want to keep it looking good for as long as possible. I've heard amazing things about Dr. Shamban, and I feel like I've won the skin care lottery by scoring an appointment with her.</p><p>OK, so essentially what I'm dancing around here is … maybe my mom was right.</p><p><em>Photos by Lindsey Sierra</em></p><a href="http://www.totalbeauty.com/content/gallery/beverly-hills-dermatologist-trip/p130232/page2"><span class="seeNext">See Next Page:</span> <span class="seeNextTitle">And the Waiting Room Jitters Hit</span></a><p class="byLine">By <span>Emily Popp</span></p><p class="avgRating"><a class="rateImg lowLevel" href="http://www.totalbeauty.com/content/gallery/beverly-hills-dermatologist-trip#rateThisJump" title="Rate this story">Rate this story</a><span>|</span>Avg member rating: 10</p><p><em>This entry passed through the <a href="http://fivefilters.org/content-only/">Full-Text RSS</a> service — if this is your content and you're reading it on someone else's site, please read the FAQ at <a href="http://fivefilters.org/content-only/faq.php#publishers">fivefilters.org/content-only/faq.php#publishers</a>. <a href="http://fivefilters.org">Five Filters</a> recommends: <a href="http://www.medialens.org/index.php/alerts/alert-archive/alerts-2013/715-eyes-like-blank-discs-the-guardian-s-steven-poole-on-george-orwell-s-politics-and-the-english-language.html">Eyes Like Blank Discs - The Guardian's Steven Poole On George Orwell's Politics And The English Language</a>.</em></p><br />This post was made using the <a href='http://www.webmagnates.org/auto-blogging-software.html' title='auto-blogging software'>Auto Blogging Software</a> from <a href='http://www.webmagnates.org' title'make money online'>WebMagnates.org</a> This line will not appear when posts are made after activating the software to full version.Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10303290079976590343noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5448411214494413217.post-33438601811940131542013-03-03T09:29:00.000-08:002013-03-03T09:29:00.213-08:00Ford to Give 100 Fiestas to Social Media Influencers <a id="dd_start"/><div class="dd_post_share"><div class="dd_buttons"><div class="dd_button"><a onclick="javascript:pageTracker._trackPageview('/outgoing/twitter.com/share');" href="http://twitter.com/share" class="twitter-share-button" data-url="http://socialnewswatch.com/ford-to-give-100-fiestas-to-social-media-influencers/" data-count="horizontal" data-text="Ford to Give 100 Fiestas to Social Media Influencers" data-via="@socialnews"/></div><div class="dd_button"><iframe src="http://www.facebook.com/plugins/like.php?href=http%3A%2F%2Fsocialnewswatch.com%2Fford-to-give-100-fiestas-to-social-media-influencers%2F&locale=en_US&layout=button_count&action=like&width=92&height=20&colorscheme=light" scrolling="no" frameborder="0" class="c1" allowtransparency="true">[embedded content]</iframe></div><div class="dd_button"/><div class="dd_button"/></div><div class="c2"/></div><div class="c2"/><p><a onclick="javascript:pageTracker._trackPageview('/downloads/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/Ford-Fiesta-Movement.jpg');" href="http://socialnewswatch.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/Ford-Fiesta-Movement.jpg"><img class="alignnone size-full wp-image-560" alt="Ford Fiesta Movement" src="http://socialnewswatch.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/Ford-Fiesta-Movement.jpg" width="610" height="375"/></a></p><p>The search has begun for “Fiesta Agents” in the latest version of the <a onclick="javascript:pageTracker._trackPageview('/outgoing/www.fiestamovement.com/');" href="http://www.fiestamovement.com/" target="_blank">Fiesta Movement</a>. For the 2014 Ford Fiesta, they’re going all out to get user-generated content that truly exemplifies the sporty sub-compact, offering the car, gas, and insurance to 100 agents who can prove that they’d be the best agents in the world through a video submission.</p><p><span id="more-559"/>This will be the third Fiesta Movement. The first two were well-received by both bloggers and the automotive industry. This one hopes to expand on that success and translate it into increased sales for the inexpensive vehicle in a highly competitive segment.</p><p><a onclick="javascript:pageTracker._trackPageview('/downloads/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/Fiesta-Movement.jpg');" href="http://socialnewswatch.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/Fiesta-Movement.jpg"><img class="alignnone size-large wp-image-561" alt="Fiesta Movement" src="http://socialnewswatch.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/Fiesta-Movement-1024x464.jpg" width="610" height="276"/></a></p><p>To <a onclick="javascript:pageTracker._trackPageview('/outgoing/www.fiestamovement.com/apply');" href="http://www.fiestamovement.com/apply" target="_blank">apply</a>, one only needs to tell their story in a video. Ford will likely select people who are true social media influencers – those with a blog, strong Twitter and Facebook presence, or a great YouTube channel. They say that they’ll be going based upon the merits of the video but they’ll surely look at the applicants’ reach when determining who to put in the drivers’ seats of their micro-flagship.</p><p>Check out the video that is calling all “car freaks, tech geeks, music makers, picture takers, wordsmiths of the world wide web, and social media maestros whose friends list could form a small country” to join the movement. It’s “A Social Remix” for the automotive industry.</p><p><object width="600" height="338" classid="clsid:d27cdb6e-ae6d-11cf-96b8-444553540000" codebase="http://download.macromedia.com/pub/shockwave/cabs/flash/swflash.cab#version=6,0,40,0"><param name="allowFullScreen" value="true"/><param name="allowscriptaccess" value="always"/><param name="src" value="http://www.youtube.com/v/CyD653QnM3Y?hl=en_US&version=3&rel=0"/><param name="allowfullscreen" value="true"/><embed width="600" height="338" type="application/x-shockwave-flash" src="http://www.youtube.com/v/CyD653QnM3Y?hl=en_US&version=3&rel=0" allowscriptaccess="always" allowfullscreen="true"/></object></p><h6 class="zemanta-related-title c3">Related articles</h6><ul class="zemanta-article-ul zemanta-article-ul-image c8"><li class="zemanta-article-ul-li-image zemanta-article-ul-li c7"><a 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href='http://www.webmagnates.org/auto-blogging-software.html' title='auto-blogging software'>Auto Blogging Software</a> from <a href='http://www.webmagnates.org' title'make money online'>WebMagnates.org</a> This line will not appear when posts are made after activating the software to full version.Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10303290079976590343noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5448411214494413217.post-52642562606639647622013-03-02T04:03:00.000-08:002013-03-02T04:04:08.852-08:00Hair Color Ideas That'll Inspire a Trip to the Salon <div id="photoGallery"><a href="http://www.totalbeauty.com/content/gallery/2013-hair-color-trends/p130172/page2" title="Next"><img src="http://images.totalbeauty.com/uploads/editorial/lg420x280/2013-hair-color-trends-L1.jpg" alt="" /></a></div><p class="photoDescription">Taking the plunge on a new hair trend can be risky. You worry about whether or not it'll work with your skin tone. You worry about coming off like you're trying too hard. You worry about the colorist doing a total botch job..</p><p>But after you've sifted through countless hair color ideas and finally decide to try a new hair trend, you also have to wonder if it's going to fall out of style as quickly as it came in (feather hair extensions come to mind!).</p><p>Click here to see the <a href="http://www.totalbeauty.com/content/gallery/2013-hair-color-trends/p130172/page2">hottest hair color trends for 2013</a>.</p><p>Granted, there's no real guarantee that a trend will stay in style for a while, but there <em>is</em> a way to make your gamble a bit safer. How? By following the advice of a hair trend guru, like celebrity hair colorist and all-around color expert <a href="http://www.artistsbytimothypriano.com/colorist/debi-dumas" target="new">Debi Dumas</a> of the gorgeous <a href="http://www.byronbeautyroom.com" target="new">Byron Salon</a> in Beverly Hills, Calif. We recently met up with her at her salon to talk about the hot new hair color ideas you'll want to consider trying.</p><p>How can Dumas help you prevent a hair color disaster? "I take more into consideration than just hair color," she says. "I look at what hairstyles are gaining popularity, but even beyond hair, I look at fashion. They all work together." Based on what she's seen, Dumas gave us her top five predictions for 2013's hottest hair colors. Keep clicking to see the hair color ideas that are guaranteed to inspire you to make an appointment at your favorite salon.</p><a href="http://www.totalbeauty.com/content/gallery/2013-hair-color-trends/p130172/page2"><span class="seeNext">See Next Page:</span> <span class="seeNextTitle">No. 1: Blended ombré</span></a><p class="byLine">By <span>Sarah Carrillo</span></p><p class="avgRating"><a class="rateImg lowLevel" href="http://www.totalbeauty.com/content/gallery/2013-hair-color-trends#rateThisJump" title="Rate this story">Rate this story</a><span>|</span>Avg member rating: 9</p><p><em>This entry passed through the <a href="http://fivefilters.org/content-only/">Full-Text RSS</a> service — if this is your content and you're reading it on someone else's site, please read the FAQ at <a href="http://fivefilters.org/content-only/faq.php#publishers">fivefilters.org/content-only/faq.php#publishers</a>. <a href="http://fivefilters.org">Five Filters</a> recommends: <a href="http://www.medialens.org/index.php/alerts/alert-archive/alerts-2013/715-eyes-like-blank-discs-the-guardian-s-steven-poole-on-george-orwell-s-politics-and-the-english-language.html">Eyes Like Blank Discs - The Guardian's Steven Poole On George Orwell's Politics And The English Language</a>.</em></p><br />This post was made using the <a href='http://www.webmagnates.org/auto-blogging-software.html' title='auto-blogging software'>Auto Blogging Software</a> from <a href='http://www.webmagnates.org' title'make money online'>WebMagnates.org</a> This line will not appear when posts are made after activating the software to full version.Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10303290079976590343noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5448411214494413217.post-13972339617642105972013-03-01T10:09:00.000-08:002013-03-01T10:10:16.551-08:00Saint Bonaventure <div id="aueditable"><div id="pubinfo"><em>First published Tue Nov 1, 2005; substantive revision Wed Feb 27, 2013</em></div><p>Bonaventure of Bagnoregio (ca. 1217 to 15 July 1274), the religious name of Giovanni di Fidanza, was a Franciscan friar, Master of Theology at the University of Paris, Minister General of the Franciscan Order, and Cardinal of the Catholic Church. During his lifetime he rose to become one of the most prominent men in Latin Christianity. His academic career as a theologian was cut short when in 1257 he was put in charge of the Order of Friars Minor (O.F.M.). He steered the Franciscans on a moderate and intellectual course that made them the most prominent order in the Catholic Church until the coming of the Jesuits. His theology was marked by an attempt completely to integrate faith and reason. He thought of Christ as the “one true master” who offers humans knowledge that begins in faith, is developed through rational understanding, and is perfected by mystical union with God.</p><p>A master of the memorable phrase, Bonaventure held that philosophy opens the mind to at least three different routes humans can take on their journey to God. Non-intellectual material creatures he conceived as shadows and vestiges (literally, footprints) of God, understood as the ultimate cause of a world philosophical reason can prove was created at a first moment in time. Intellectual creatures he conceived of as images and likenesses of God, the workings of the human mind and will leading us to God understood as illuminator of knowledge and donor of grace and virtue. The final route to God is the route of being, in which Bonaventure brought Anselm's argument together with Aristotelian and Neoplatonic metaphysics to view God as the absolutely perfect being whose essence entails its existence, an absolutely simple being that causes all other, composite beings to exist. These three routes are outlined in Sections 3, 4, and 5 below.</p><ul><li><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bonaventure/#1">1. Life and Works</a></li><li><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bonaventure/#2">2. Philosophy, Faith, and Theology</a></li><li><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bonaventure/#3">3. Physical Creation</a><ul><li><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bonaventure/#3.1">3.1 The Physical World</a></li><li><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bonaventure/#3.2">3.2 Creation</a></li><li><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bonaventure/#3.3">3.3 Matter</a></li><li><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bonaventure/#3.4">3.4 Light</a></li><li><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bonaventure/#3.5">3.5 Seminal Reasons</a></li><li><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bonaventure/#3.6">3.6 Living Things</a></li><li><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bonaventure/#3.7">3.7 Sense Cognition</a></li></ul></li><li><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bonaventure/#4">4. Intellectual Creatures</a></li><li><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bonaventure/#5">5. God</a><ul><li><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bonaventure/#5.1">5.1 Bonaventure's Illumination Argument</a></li><li><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bonaventure/#5.2">5.2 Bonaventure's Aitiological Argument</a></li><li><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bonaventure/#5.3">5.3 Bonaventure's Ontological Argument</a></li></ul></li><li><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bonaventure/#Bib">Bibliography</a></li><li><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bonaventure/#Aca">Academic Tools</a></li><li><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bonaventure/#Oth">Other Internet Resources</a></li><li><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bonaventure/#Rel">Related Entries</a></li></ul><hr /><h2><a name="1" id="1">1. Life and Works</a></h2><p>On 2 February 1257, Br. Bonaventure was appointed Minister General in charge of the Franciscan Order.<sup>[<a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bonaventure/notes.html#1" name="note-1" id="note-1">1</a>]</sup> This act of ecclesiastical preferment effectively split his life into two halves, the burdens of the ecclesiastical administrator replacing the leisure of the scholar. He is thought to have been forty years old at the time—the minimum age for a Minister General—giving him a birth date of 1217.</p><p>Bonaventure was born Giovanni di Fidanza in Bagnoregio in Tuscany. He himself attests that he was healed miraculously as a child by the intervention of Francis of Assisi, shortly after the saint's death on 3 October 1226<sup>[<a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bonaventure/notes.html#2" name="note-2" id="note-2">2</a>]</sup>: “when I was a boy, as I still vividly remember, I was snatched from the jaws of death by his invocation and merits.” He did not rush to join the Franciscans, but matriculated as a layman in the Arts faculty at the University of Paris in 1235 and proceeded all the way to the Master of Arts, around 1243. The Arts curriculum at Paris then consisted of the seven liberal arts, supplemented by some works of Aristotle. Heavily weighted in favor of the trivium—the linguistic arts of grammar, rhetoric, and logic—teaching in the quadrivium—the four mathematical and scientific disciplines—was somewhat limited, partially due to the prohibition of Aristotle's works in natural philosophy at Paris in 1210. Though some Masters of Arts, such as Roger Bacon and Richard Rufus, were teaching the Aristotelian natural philosophy, the requirements for becoming a Master of Arts as late as 1252 listed only the old logic, new logic, and the <em>On the Soul</em> (<em>De anima</em>) among Aristotle's works; the earliest record of Aristotle's entire natural philosophy and metaphysics as required for graduation only appears in 1255,<sup>[<a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bonaventure/notes.html#3" name="note-3" id="note-3">3</a>]</sup> two years before Bonaventure left the University. His writing reflects this education; a master of logic and rhetoric, he was less deeply read in the Aristotelian and Islamic philosophical texts than his Dominican contemporaries, Albert and Thomas.</p><p>About the time young Giovanni began to study Arts, Alexander of Hales, Master of Theology and initiator of the practice of commenting on the Sentences of Peter Lombard, took the Franciscan habit. His conversion gave the Franciscans a Chair in Theology, the Dominicans having acquired two Chairs during the university strike of 1229–30. Hales held him in the highest regard and said that “in him Adam seemed not to have sinned (Salimbene 1905–1912, 664). Giovanni took the Franciscan habit in 1243/4, using the name ”Bonaventure“ to celebrate his ”good-fortune“ under Francis and Hales.</p><p>Bonaventure attended lectures and disputations in theology from 1243 to 1248. Writing about 1280, the Franciscan chronicler Salimbene said: ”Br. John of Parma [Franciscan Minister General] gave the license to Br. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio to read at Paris, which he had never yet done because he was not yet installed in a Chair. He then read the whole Gospel of St. Luke, a commentary that is very beautiful and complete. This was in 1248.“<sup>[<a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bonaventure/notes.html#4" name="note-4" id="note-4">4</a>]</sup> This entry refers to Bonaventure's <em>cursorie</em> lectures as ”Bachelor of the Bible,“ 1248–1250. From 1250–2 he commented on the <em>Sentences</em> (<em>Sententiae in IV Libris Distinctae</em>). Once Master, he revised the <em>Commentary</em> (<em>Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum</em>), his major philosophical and theological work. In 1252–3 he was a ”formed Bachelor“ of Theology, performing the three duties of a Master: lecturing on the Bible, engaging in disputations, and preaching. In 1253 the Masters and students of the University of Paris went on strike, all but the friars. The two Dominicans and William of Meliton, O.F.M., continued to teach and refused to take an oath of loyalty to the University corporation, for which they were expelled from the ”university of masters,“ an action defended by the University in a letter of 4 February.<sup>[<a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bonaventure/notes.html#5" name="note-5" id="note-5">5</a>]</sup> Bonaventure received the <em>licentia docendi</em> by Easter 1254, in the midst of this conflict. He assumed the Franciscan Chair in theology immediately, but taught only at the Franciscan convent, unrecognized by the University.</p><p>Bonaventure performed all three tasks of a Master of Theology from 1254–57. He revised his commentary on Luke and composed commentaries on John and Ecclesiastes. He also held three sets of disputed questions. The questions <em>On the Knowledge of Christ</em> (<em>De scientia Christi</em>), which develop his illumination theory of knowledge, probably came out of his inception as Master in 1254. The questions <em>On the Mystery of the Trinity</em> (<em>De mysterio Trinitatis</em>), which elaborated his view of God, were likely the last ones he wrote (Hayes 1992, 40–44; 1979, 24–29). Both were composed in a lofty style that gives no evidence of the conflict embroiling Paris at the time. The third set of disputed questions, however, were <em>On Evangelical Perfection</em> (<em>De perfectione evangelica</em>) and consisted in a defense of the friars' way of life, under attack by non-mendicant Masters led by William of St. Amour. In October 1256, Pope Alexander IV ordered the secular Masters at Paris to accept Bonaventure and the Dominican Thomas of Aquino in their rightful places as Masters of Theology, but it was not until 12 August 1257 that they did so. But six months earlier Bonaventure had been appointed Minister General.<sup>[<a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bonaventure/notes.html#6" name="note-6" id="note-6">6</a>]</sup> In addition to the normal magisterial writings, Bonaventure also wrote <em>On Retracing the Arts to Theology</em> (<em>Opusculum de reductione artium ad theologiam</em>) while Master; and probably in 1257, while leaving the University, he managed to compose his <em>Breviloquium</em>, a ”short reading“ that contains in outline the main theses of a theological summa that would never be composed.</p><p>From this point on, Bonaventure's writing reflected the needs of the Order, but he did not cast aside his philosophical mind. Bonaventure quickly set a firm direction for the Order in an ”encyclical letter“ to all the friars on 23 April 1257, which admonished them to recover the ”somewhat tarnished“ luster of the Order. The Minister General followed with three tracts written in 1259–60 for the spiritual edification of the friars: <em>A Soliloquy about Four Mental Exercises</em> (<em>Soliloquium de quatuor mentalibus exercitiis</em>), <em>The Tree of Life</em> (<em>Lignum vitae</em>), and <em>The Triple Way</em> (<em>De Triplici via</em>).</p><p>Bonaventure's most influential work over the centuries was composed at this time. For Francis's feast day in October, 1259, Bonaventure visited Mt. Alverna, the very place where Francis himself had received a mystical vision of Christ ”under the appearance“ of ”a Seraph having six wings“ and had had ”imprinted in his flesh“ the stigmata or wounds of Christ<sup>[<a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bonaventure/notes.html#7" name="note-7" id="note-7">7</a>]</sup> Here Bonaventure conceived the idea for his <em>Journey of the Mind to God</em> (<em>Itinerarium mentis in Deum</em>), a mental and spiritual journey to God whose basic outline—though not its details—could be understood by even the simplest friar. The journey follows the route first charted by St. Augustine—from the exterior world to the interior mind, and from the interior but inferior human mind to the superior mind, namely, to God. Bonaventure allegorically understood the six wings of the angelic Seraph Francis saw to stand for six ways God can be approached and therefore arranged his <em>Journey</em> into seven chapters. The two lower wings of the Seraph symbolize seeing God through ”footprints (<em>vestigia</em>),“ signs in the sub-human world that point to God, including signs in the physical universe itself (c. 1) and signs found in the sensory life humans have in common with other animals (c. 2). The two middle wings of the Seraph symbolize seeing God in his ”image,“ namely, in humans understood as bearing within their intellectual nature special signs pointing to God. Here Bonaventure distinguished signs of God found in the ”natural“ exercise of the mind in theoretical knowledge (c. 3) from those found in its exercise in the practical sphere ”reformed by grace“ (c. 4). The two highest wings of the Seraph symbolize seeing God in himself, first in the way reason sees God as having one divine nature (c. 5) and then as faith sees God in the Trinity of persons (c. 6). These three sets of twin ”steps“ culminate in the ”mental and mystical transport“ found in mystical experience (c. 7), the end of the <em>Journey</em>. For each step, Bonaventure used material from earlier writings; but the <em>Journey</em>, like all his later works, is only a sketch the Minister General knew he would never have the leisure to complete. The result is his writing achieves a combination of scriptural imagery, philosophic depth, mystical yearning, and density more meditative than demonstrative. But the <em>Journey</em> does provide an appropriate outline for looking at Bonaventure's philosophy. After considering his views on the relation of philosophy, faith, and theology (Section 2), we shall look respectively at Bonaventure's views on physical creation (Section 3), human nature and cognition (Section 4), and on God (Section 5).</p><p>The General Chapter of 1260 held in Narbonne, France, the first where Bonaventure presided, ratified his codification of the legal statutes under which Franciscans lived, known as the ”Constitutions of Narbonne“ and also asked him to write a definitive <em>Life of St. Francis</em>, which he did in 1261. These two works set the Order on a moderate course that lasted for centuries and led Franciscans to call Bonaventure their ”second founder.“</p><p>For most of the period from 1257 through 1266 Bonaventure trekked through France and Italy by foot, as did all friars when they traveled. In 1266 he returned to Paris, where his friars were under attack both from conservatives in the Theology faculty and from radicals in Arts. Bonaventure began a series of writings devoted primarily to moral matters: <em>Collations on the Ten Commandments</em> (<em>Collationes de decem praeceptis</em>), Lent of 1267; <em>Collations on the Seven Gifts of the Holy Spirit</em> (<em>Collationes de septem donis Spiritus sancti</em>), Lent of 1268; a defense of the friars bearing the Socratic title <em>Apologia pauperum</em> (<em>Defense of the Mendicants</em>), 1269. On 10 December 1270, Etienne Tempier, bishop of Paris, condemned certain erroneous Aristotelian propositions. During Easter-tide of 1273 Bonaventure delivered his magisterial <em>Collations on the Hexameron</em> (<em>Collationes in Hexaemeron</em>).</p><p>The last period of Bonaventure's life saw him rise to become one of the most prominent men in Christendom. During the three year Papal vacancy, from 29 November 1268 to 1 September 1271, Bonaventure preached an important sermon in Viterbo and was probably instrumental in the invention of conclave. He is said to have been offered the papacy by the electors and to have suggested Teobaldi Visconti instead. After Teobaldi's election as Pope Gregory X, he appointed Bonaventure cardinal on 28 May 1273,<sup>[<a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bonaventure/notes.html#8" name="note-8" id="note-8">8</a>]</sup> where he preached on reunification of eastern and western Churches, a major goal of the council which seemed to have been achieved when he suddenly fell ill on 15 July 1274 and ”at the hour of Matins died Br. Bonaventure of happy memory, Bishop of Albano, who was a man eminent for his knowledge and eloquence (<em>homo eminentis scientie et eloquentie</em>), a man outstanding for his sanctity and acknowledged for the excellence of his life, both religious and moral…Br. Peter of Tarantasia [also a Cardinal] celebrated the funeral mass and preached on the theme ‘I am saddened over you, my brother Jonathan.’ There were many tears and much weeping, for the Lord had given him such grace that the hearts of all who saw him were seized with a desire for his love.“<sup>[<a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bonaventure/notes.html#9" name="note-9" id="note-9">9</a>]</sup></p><h2><a name="2" id="2">2. Philosophy, Faith, and Theology</a></h2><p>Without exception, every word of philosophy Bonaventure ever wrote is contained in works explicitly religious—in sermons, works of spiritual direction, and theology. He never wrote the kind of introductions to the principles of metaphysics and natural philosophy that Thomas Aquinas composed in his <em>On Being and Essence</em> (<em>De ente et essentia</em>) and <em>On the Principles of Nature</em> (<em>De principiis naturae</em>), nor did he comment on Aristotle's works. Commentators writing during the twentieth century neo-thomistic revival compared Bonaventure with three other thinkers: Aristotle, Augustine, and Aquinas. P. Mandonnet thought he had no philosophy of his own, but was an Augustinian theologian, pure and simple, all of whose conclusions depend on faith. E. Gilson thought Bonaventure developed an Augustinian philosophy within his theology: ”with St. Bonaventure the mystical synthesis of mediaeval Augustinianism was fully formed, just as that of Christian Aristotelianism was fully formed with St. Thomas.“ F. Van Steenberghen thought his philosophy a failed Aristotelianism separate from but at the service of his Augustinian theology.<sup>[<a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bonaventure/notes.html#10" name="note-10" id="note-10">10</a>]</sup> None of these interpretations quite captures Bonaventure's relation to these three philosophers or his own approach to the relations among reason, faith, and theology, because they implicitly employed a Thomistic model for being an Aristotelian, with the result that Bonaventure's failures derive from his not being the kind of Aristotelian Thomas Aquinas was.</p><p>Bonaventure's approach to Aristotle was quite different from Albert and Thomas. He felt no need for detailed knowledge of the text of Aristotle. As a student in Arts he had learned from his Masters, not from detailed study of Aristotle's text, broadly Aristotelian philosophical principles—the categories and transcendentals, the causes and predicables, and fundamental notions like potency and act, possible and necessary—sufficient to do his own work. As a philosopher and theologian, he was perfectly capable of using such borrowed principles to draw his own conclusions, ones which he himself said depended more on Alexander of Hales than on any philosopher: ”For I do not intend to advocate new opinions, but to reweave the common and approved ones.“ Consequently, Bonaventure was not a failed Aristotelian for the simple reason that he never tried to be an Aristotelian in the Dominican way at all. On the other hand, while Augustine was clearly Bonaventure's favorite theological authority, he was not, properly speaking, an Augustinian. Even when he draws Augustinian conclusions, Bonaventure does not employ Augustinian arguments. In truth, Bonaventure was, broadly speaking, an Aristotelian in his philosophical principles, but not in his conclusions. A better way to describe his philosophical conclusions and his way of drawing them is that his thought was <em>Franciscan</em> in inspiration and <em>Bonaventurean</em> in execution.</p><p>The pressing issue concerning philosophy, faith, and theology in the 1250s was how to set up theology as an Aristotelian demonstrative science. Albert had done so in his commentary on the <em>Sentences</em> (1243–9), which Bonaventure had on hand when writing his own commentary. Demonstration is causal knowledge, and a science in Aristotle's sense is systematic knowledge of one limited subject developed through demonstrating necessary conclusions by making use of certain fundamental causal principles relevant to the subject at hand. The task theology had set itself, then, was to discover and present systematically the truths set out in that most unsystematic of books—the Bible.</p><p>Since a ”science“ is causal knowledge, Bonaventure devoted the four questions of the prologue to his commentary on Book 1 of the <em>Sentences</em>, which serves as his introduction the whole ”science“ of theology, to its four causes—efficient, final, formal, and material. These causes in turn clarify the relations between philosophy, faith, and theology.</p><p>Since science exists as an intellectual habit in the mind of the knower, the <em>efficient</em> cause of any book of theology is the author who wrote it, Peter Lombard in the case of his <em>Sentences</em>, Bonaventure himself in the case of his commentary. Lombard was no mere scribe, compiler, or commentator; he was an ”author,“ and the same is true of Bonaventure himself. This simple point distinguishes faith, whose sole efficient cause is God working through grace, from both philosophy and theology, whose efficient cause is the human mind, though even here God has a role to play.</p><p>When he came to clarify the <em>end</em> of theology, Bonaventure understood that Aristotle had sharply distinguished practical science—whose end is deeds—from theoretical science—whose end is knowledge. So he asks whether theology is ”for the sake of contemplation or for the sake of our becoming good.“ The answer is that theology is more perfect than any philosophical science because it breaks through the bounds of this Aristotelian dichotomy. Neither theoretical knowledge nor practical deeds get to the center of the moral life, which is love—both the ”affection“ of love and the theological virtue of charity. The kind of intellectual virtue that prepares the mind for charity is a ”wisdom“ that ”involves knowledge and affection together.“ The ”knowledge that Christ died for us,“ for example, is far different from the knowledge of the geometer or the knowledge of the general. Consequently, theological wisdom is both ”for the sake of contemplation and also for our becoming good, but principally for the sake of our becoming good“ through enlivening our knowledge and deeds with Christian ”affection.</p><p>The <em>form</em> that produces “science” is its “method of proceeding.” Now “the end imposes necessity on the means, since ‘teeth are sharp in order to cut,’ as Aristotle says.” Since theology is “designed to promote the faith,” it employs “the method of argumentation or inquiry” first developed by Aristotle. By adapting the philosophical method to the data of faith, theology attempts to “confound the adversaries of the faith,” “strengthen those weak in their faith,” and “delight those whose faith is complete.” Bonaventure situated theology within the hierarchy of the sciences by adverting to Aristotle's notion of “subalternated sciences.” The Philosopher had recognized that optics—which studies visible lines—is a science “subalternated” to geometry—which studies lines as such. Theology depends upon Scripture in a similar way, for scripture offers certain truths to be believed, but theology looks at the same truths “as made intelligible.” In this way, theology is different from the faith it tries to understand and from the Scripture that offers faith to us.<sup>[<a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bonaventure/notes.html#11" name="note-11" id="note-11">11</a>]</sup></p><p>To understand theology as a “science” making faith intelligible, Bonaventure must clarify its <em>material</em> cause. Determining that <em>material</em> cause of theology is the same as settling on its <em>subject</em>. On this point, there had been considerable dispute among the Masters. Aristotle's “sciences” were all limited to a particular genus, such as “animal” or “soul” or “memory” or “ethics.” Even his universal science of metaphysics was limited to studying substances; it eschewed the other categories. Theology, by contrast, cuts across all genera and includes God, who is not confined within any genus. Bonaventure was familiar with many accounts of the subject of theology: “things and signs,” the work of “reparation for sin,” “Christ—head and members,” “God,” and “the object of belief (credibile). To throw light on these conflicting answers, Bonaventure turned to his study of the Arts. Priscian had noted three different senses of the subject of grammar. Its subject in the sense of its ”root principle“ is the ”letter“ that makes up words; its subject conceived as an ”integral whole“ is ”a fitting and complete oration;“ and its subject conceived as ”universal whole“ is ”meaningful sound, articulated and ordered.“ There are three correlative senses of the subject of theology: ”God“ is the ”principle“ of the subject and ”Christ—head and members“ is the ”integral whole,“ the entirety of what theology studies. But the most important sense of ”subject“ is the ”universal whole.“ Therefore, ”the subject of this book, properly speaking,“ is the ”object of belief,“ a subject that lets theology range over all realities and all thoughts about which one can have religious faith.</p><p>Bonaventure does not explicitly address the principles of theology. But he further clarifies its ”subject“ in a way that points to those principles. To faith, Scripture adds the notion of ”authority,“ and to the faith and authority of Scriptural revelation, theology adds ”proof.“ Theology presupposes faith but adds to it rational demonstrations about matters of faith. Consequently, Bonaventure adds a telling qualification to his description of the subject of theology. Theology's subject is the object of belief ”in so far as the believable <em>is transformed into the notion of the intelligible, and this happens by the addition of reasoning</em>.“<sup>[<a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bonaventure/notes.html#12" name="note-12" id="note-12">12</a>]</sup> With this concise formula, Bonaventure includes within theology both religious belief transformed by arguments from natural reason and natural reason transformed by arguments based on religious revelation. If so, then theology must have the kinds of principles that make possible both kinds of arguments: the fundamental truths of faith drawn from the Bible and tradition, but also fundamental truths of reason. What makes all such basic truths theological is their argumentative function. Theological arguments may draw from revelation by using revealed truths as premises and they may draw from reason by using rational truths as premises. Both kinds of arguments are theological because of the use to which they are put. In this way, philosophical <em>reasoning</em> has an integral place within the domain of Bonaventurean theology.</p><p>Bonaventure showed how philosophical reasoning works in theology in the very structure of his disputed question <em>On the Mystery of the Trinity.</em> Each question is divided into two articles, the first proven using rational premises and the second proven using premises drawn from faith. In Question 1, for example, God is rationally proven to exist in Art. 1, then shown to be a trinity of persons using arguments based on faith and reason in Art. 2. Theology, then, consists most fundamentally in the understanding that results from joining rational arguments and faith-based arguments together.<sup>[<a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bonaventure/notes.html#13" name="note-13" id="note-13">13</a>]</sup> The same mode of reasoning is found in <em>On Reducing the Arts to Theology</em>. Here ”reduction“ consists in developing analogies that move the mind from the liberal arts to theology and back again. Bonaventure argues for each point by combining one claim based on reason with another based on revelation, as though they were wall and buttress of the cathedral of theology. Philosophical reasoning, then, is an absolutely integral part of Bonaventure's faith-based theology.</p><h2><a name="3" id="3">3. Physical Creation</a></h2><p>In the first step of the <em>Journey</em> Bonaventure focuses upon the sensible objects of the physical world around us, both taken in themselves and in reference to our sense awareness of them. Like all creatures, sensible things are understood to be signs that ultimately can direct humans to the divine art or wisdom through which all things have been made. Bonaventure's semiotics distinguishes four sorts of signs. All creatures can be seen as ”shadows“ (<em>umbra</em>) and ”vestiges“ (lit. footprints, <em>vestigia</em>): ”For a creature is called a shadow based on its properties which point to God in some type of causality in an indeterminate way. But a creature is called a vestige based on properties which point to God as triple cause–efficient, formal, and final cause; for example, the properties: one, true, and good.“<sup>[<a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bonaventure/notes.html#14" name="note-14" id="note-14">14</a>]</sup> In addition, Bonaventure posits two higher types of semiosis pertinent solely to rational creatures, which are ”images“ (<em>imago</em>) pointing to the First Principle through its properly rational powers which have their source and highest object in God and ”likenesses“ (<em>similitudo</em>) of God to the extent that they are recipients of divine grace and conform themselves to the divine will. All creatures, from rocks to angels, are signs in the sense of shadows and traces of God, for they all bear a relation of causal dependency upon God as their source; but only rational creatures can have the divine as an object of their activities and, for that reason, can conform themselves to the divine will and become likenesses of God.</p><h3><a name="3.1" id="3.1">3.1 The Physical World</a></h3><p>Bonaventure's understanding of the physical world is heavily indebted to two fundamental sources: the Biblical account of creation, mediated by Patristic commentaries, and the Aristotelian view of nature, taken chiefly from Aristotle's writings on natural philosophy, such as the <em>Physics</em> (<em>Physica</em>) and <em>On the Heavens</em> (<em>De caelo</em>), but combined with the commentaries of Averroes, the tracts of Avicenna, and the <em>Timaeus</em> of Plato in the Latin translation of Chalcidius. Bonaventure constructs a view of the physical world that is indebted to both of his fundamental sources, but ultimately gives the Scriptural text and the related Patristic tradition precedence whenever his sources come into conflict. His manner of synthesizing those sources into a coherent and impressive whole is what gives his views on nature their distinctive character.</p><h3><a name="3.2" id="3.2">3.2 Creation</a></h3><p>The tension between the newly translated Aristotelian corpus and the traditional theological teaching of the Church regarding the doctrine of creation was well understood by Bonaventure's time. Indeed, the prohibitions of 1215 and 1231 regarding the teaching of the Aristotelian writings on natural philosophy had given way to the direct teaching of Aristotle in the Faculty of Arts by the time Bonaventure took his master of arts degree at the University of Paris, and by the time he left the University, the Aristotelian corpus in its entirety was a subject of examination for candidates for degrees in the Faculty of Arts. Yet the Aristotelian doctrine of the eternity of the world was given various interpretations. Some favored a benign interpretation, claiming that all Aristotle meant in <em>Physics</em> VIII was that the world and its motion did not arise from some earlier motion, but rather time, moveable things, and motion were all coeval and concomitant.<sup>[<a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bonaventure/notes.html#15" name="note-15" id="note-15">15</a>]</sup> Others, however, chief among them Robert Grosseteste, argued that the views of Aristotle should be taken at face value and what the Stagirite intended was the eternity of the past; the Greek Fathers and Aristotle's own commentators both were in accord that the Aristotelian outlook involved the beginninglessness of the past and unoriginated matter.<sup>[<a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bonaventure/notes.html#16" name="note-16" id="note-16">16</a>]</sup></p><p>Bonaventure's own position takes its origins from a combination of elements coming from Alexander of Hales and Grosseteste. Following the lead of the latter, Bonaventure rejects, albeit with some hesitation, the benign reading of the Stagirite; in all likelihood, Aristotle did intend to teach that the world was beginningless:</p><blockquote><p>And this view [i.e., that matter eternally existed under some form] seems more reasonable than its opposite, namely, that matter existed eternally incomplete, bereft of form and divine influence, as some of the philosophers posited. Indeed, this view seems so reasonable that the most excellent of the philosophers, Aristotle, fell into this error, at least as the saints impute it to him, his commentators expound him, and his own words indicate.<sup>[<a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bonaventure/notes.html#17" name="note-17" id="note-17">17</a>]</sup></p></blockquote><p>Yet the most striking feature of Bonaventure's account of the philosophers is the manner in which he juxtaposes the doctrine of creation, as he understands it, with the philosophical theory of origins. According to Bonaventure, only two theories regarding the origin of the cosmos are really tenable: first, the theory of the pagan philosophers according to which the world is eternal and the matter of the universe is without ultimate causal origin; second, the Christian doctrine of creation according to which the universe depends entirely for its being on God, is produced ”from nothing (ex nihilo),“ and is temporally finite in the past. The third possibility, namely that the world is both produced from nothing and eternal, Bonaventure vehemently rejects on the grounds that such a position is inherently contradictory:</p><blockquote><p>Response: To posit that the world is eternal or eternally produced, while positing likewise that all things have been produced from nothing, is altogether opposed to the truth and reason, just as the last reason stated showed. Indeed, it is so opposed to reason that I do not believe any philosopher, however small his intellectual abilities, took this position. For this involves, in itself, an obvious contradiction. To posit, however, that the world is eternal on the supposition that matter is eternal seems reasonable and understandable… <sup>[<a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bonaventure/notes.html#18" name="note-18" id="note-18">18</a>]</sup></p></blockquote><p>Returning to the last argument, we find the reasoning to which Bonaventure refers. The argument is an elegant synthesis and restatement of the position of Parisian theologians since the time of William of Auxerre, but is especially indebted to the <em>Quaestiones</em> of Alexander of Hales. Everything that depends entirely for its being on something else is produced by that thing from nothing. The world depends entirely for its being on God. Hence, the world must be produced from nothing. If the world is produced from nothing, it must either arise out of the ”nothing“ as out of matter or out of the ”nothing“ as out of a point of origin. The world cannot arise out of nothing as out of matter. Thus the world must arise out of nothing as out of a point of origin. If, however, the world arises out of nothing as out of a point of origin, then the world has being after non-being. Nothing having being after non-being can be eternal. The world, as a created thing, has being after non-being. Therefore, the world, precisely as created ”out of nothing,“ cannot be eternal.<sup>[<a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bonaventure/notes.html#19" name="note-19" id="note-19">19</a>]</sup> The philosophical force of the expression that there be a logical moment at which we could say that the world is not and with reference to which the world begins to be. The ontological reference of such a logical moment is the divine eternity with respect to which (‘after’ which) the world begins.</p><p>To Bonaventure's mind, the creationist view of the universe alone accounts for the total being of the universe in the sense of explaining both its structure and the fact that it exists; the view of the ancients only explains the order and the pattern of the universe without reaching the depths of accounting for why the universe exists at all. A sign of this shortcoming is to be seen in the shared presupposition of Plato and Aristotle that matter is unoriginated. Furthermore, to the extent that the ancient pagan views of the universe involve the infinity of past time, with all the philosophical difficulties that the eternity of past time entails, natural reason would seem capable of arriving, in principle, at the conclusion that the world was created, even though, historically speaking, the greatest of the ancient philosophers failed to do so.</p><h3><a name="3.3" id="3.3">3.3 Matter</a></h3><p>The conflict between Scriptural sources and the Aristotelian writings on the issue of the primordial state of matter is not so severe, because in the Aristotelian corpus there is no description of the primordial state of matter, and the other sources available to Bonaventure are themselves in disagreement. Augustine, for example, had suggested in his literal commentary on Genesis that the matter of the world could have been made all at once, whereas in his <em>Confessions</em> (<em>Confessiones</em>) he had suggested that there might be an indeterminate and inchoate initial state of matter. This possibiliity was further corroborated by such pagan authors as Plato and Ovid, who had posited a primordial chaotic state of matter out of which the present cosmic order gradually emerged (Plato, <em>Timaeus</em> 52D-53C, 54-55; Ovid, <em>Metamorphoses</em>, 43:5–45:7).</p><p>Bonaventure begins by distinguishing the consideration of matter from the actual existence of matter in the order of natural history.<sup>[<a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bonaventure/notes.html#20" name="note-20" id="note-20">20</a>]</sup> We may consider matter simply as a constitutive principle of things and as such it is pure potency; this is the way that the concept of matter functions in Aristotle's <em>Physics</em> and, to Bonaventure's mind, how Augustine spoke of matter in the <em>Confessions</em>. But we may also think of matter as it actually exists in time. In this respect, matter never exists and cannot exist as lacking all form. Such a claim, however, does not require that material creation was brought forth as fully formed, even if such a position might be more philosophically defensible than its opposite.<sup>[<a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bonaventure/notes.html#21" name="note-21" id="note-21">21</a>]</sup> Instead, Bonaventure suggests that physical matter was created in a state wherein it had a tendency and capacity to admit many different forms, though it had none of them in its own right. Rather, its potentiality to develop distinct forms required further external, divine agency in order for the distinct things having diverse forms to fully emerge.<sup>[<a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bonaventure/notes.html#22" name="note-22" id="note-22">22</a>]</sup> Physical matter's properties in its incomplete state included extension and visibility (properties arising from the form common to all physical things, namely, light). These features are still shared by all the items in the physical world, even though Bonaventure admits, in accord with the Aristotelian teaching on the heavens, that heavenly bodies, such as the stars, have matter that differs in kind from that of terrestrial things. Accordingly, after things were fully produced matter was twofold, terrestrial and celestial, but in its primordial state physical matter enjoyed a corresponding unity that was one of contiguity, i.e., it was one mass.<sup>[<a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bonaventure/notes.html#23" name="note-23" id="note-23">23</a>]</sup> This primordial unity of physical matter continues to have some scientific bearing for Bonaventure since it grounds the consideration of the general physicist who may prescind from the process of generation and corruption and consider bodies simply in terms of their mobility in place and extension.<sup>[<a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bonaventure/notes.html#24" name="note-24" id="note-24">24</a>]</sup></p><h3><a name="3.4" id="3.4">3.4 Light</a></h3><p>Bonaventure's treatment of light is mainly found in the discussion of light in his commentary on Lombard's <em>Sentences</em>, Bk. 2, d. 13. In this theological context, light mainly bears upon the work of the six days of creation, and Bonventure must take a position on the Genesis account of the creation of light. Though he acknowledges Augustine's spiritualizing interpretation of light, an interpretation that identifies the light spoken of in Genesis with the creation and activities of the angels, Bonaventure inclines to a more literal interpretation.<sup>[<a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bonaventure/notes.html#25" name="note-25" id="note-25">25</a>]</sup> This means that Bonaventure had to take a position on the contemporary debates on light and its nature.</p><p>The two positions that Bonaventure discusses are what we may call a broadly Aristotelian position, one eventually adopted by Thomas Aquinas, and a broadly Augustinian position advocated by Robert Grosseteste in his <em>On light</em> (<em>De luce</em>). According to the first, light is simply an accidental form, one found in degrees in different bodies, but according to the second, light is perhaps a substance or at least a substantial form communicating extension and visibility to physical things.</p><p>Bonaventure discounts the possibility that light is a substance, because it is purely active and if it were a substance in its own right it would be God and not a creature. He does allow, however, that light is a substantial form and is the substantial form that is concomitant with the mass of matter in its primordial state.<sup>[<a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bonaventure/notes.html#26" name="note-26" id="note-26">26</a>]</sup> In this originating condition, light gave the mass of matter its extension and visibility and the hierarchy of heavenly bodies corresponds to the hierarchy of things capable of partaking either more or less in the light that renders bodies active and extended. For Bonaventure, then, light is a substantial form, but only the partial perfection of any given physical substance, whether celestial or terrestrial. Since Bonaventure endorses, usually without any elaborate argumentation, the general claim that there is a plurality of substantial forms within any composite thing, his doctrine of light really means that light is the first form, endowing each thing with extension, and preparing the way for further perfections such as the forms of the elements or the forms of mixtures or compounds.</p><h3><a name="3.5" id="3.5">3.5 Seminal reasons</a></h3><p>The transition in the order of natural history from bodies that are simply such, extended and endowed with the ability to act and be acted upon, to the bodies of plants and animals is explained in part through the motions of the celestial bodies and their causal influences on matter. In part, however, matter itself has latent structures that simply await the correct circumstances and conditions to cause the emergence of a higher type of body. These latent structures, originally sown into matter at its creation, Bonaventure calls, following the terminology of St. Augustine, <em>rationes seminales</em> or seminal reasons, a term hearkening back to the cosmology of the ancient Stoics. Seminal reasons amount to a lingering impact of the creator on the matter of the physical world since their presence in matter originates with creation. In physical science, Bonaventure believes seminal reasons help to explain the successive emergence of the different kinds of bodies suitable for higher and higher types of life. But this process of gradual emergence does not apply to the creation of human life, since human souls for Bonaventure are incorruptible and can only arise through the direct action of the creator.</p><p>Though from our post-Darwinian perspective we may be tempted to see in the doctrine of seminal reasons, whether in Augustine or Bonaventure, a curious, yet awkward anticipation of the doctrine of evolution, similarities between the doctrine of seminal reasons and certain elements in evolutionary theory are more apparent than real. First, though seminal reasons do provide directionality and progression for the succession of physical types in natural history, they are themselves latent forms within matter and not reducible to more fundamental mechanical or chemical processes; rather, they underlie such processes. Second, seminal reasons are never appealed to in order to explain the demise of one living species and the emergence of another species to replace the former, a key feature of Darwinian explanations. Third, seminal reasons are not, as we have just seen, universal in their application to the living things that occur within the order of natural history; human beings, at least in terms of their souls, fall outside the range of influence of seminal reasons.</p><h3><a name="3.6" id="3.6">3.6 Living Things</a></h3><p>Bonaventure's doctrines regarding living things are mainly inspired by an Aristotelian biology. Living things are such thanks to the kind of forms they have, namely, soul, which is defined as the first actuality of a body having life potentially. Soul is understood as the form that makes a thing alive and able to enjoy the type of life that it does. Consequently, souls are termed either vegetative, sensitive, or rational, according to the functions that the living things themselves exercise.</p><h3><a name="3.7" id="3.7">3.7 Sense Cognition</a></h3><p>The world as it is revealed to us through the senses provides the means for our re-entering ourselves and ascending to higher things. Furthermore, the senses themselves are equally signs of higher things.</p><p>Physical things considered in their own right evidence ”weight, number, and measure“ (Psalm 83:8), thereby causing us to contemplate their own measure, beauty, and order. These features are grounded in the activities and natural powers of sensible substances. The nature of sensible substances accordingly expresses in their actions and interactions the measure, beauty, and order of their origin and thereby attest to the power, wisdom, and goodness of the Source from which they spring.<sup>[<a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bonaventure/notes.html#27" name="note-27" id="note-27">27</a>]</sup> Likewise, the origin, size, number, beauty, fullness, function, and origin of physical things point to the Divine Source and its essential properties of power, wisdom, and goodness.<sup>[<a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bonaventure/notes.html#28" name="note-28" id="note-28">28</a>]</sup></p><p>The pointing of physical things towards their Source finds its parallel in sense cognition itself, which also points towards that same Source. Drawing his point of departure from the Neoplatonic theme of macrocosm and microcosm, Bonaventure discovers an analogy between Aristotelian cosmology and the process of sensation. Each sensible object generates a likeness of itself in the medium through which it is perceived, and that likeness in turn generates another likeness successively in the sense organ, causing the sense power to apprehend the sensible object. The process so described reflects the process of the emanation of forms from the heavenly bodies and also the manner in which creatures, going forth from their Principle, return to their Source through the exercise of their natural activities. A similar pattern emerges within the different acts exercised by each sense power: the sense apprehends (<em>apprehensio</em>) the object, delights (<em>delectatio</em>) in its object, provided that the object does not exceed the natural limits of the organ, and judges (<em>diiudicatio</em>) or discriminates the quality of its object. This last act, found in both the external senses and the internal senses, takes on a special role for Bonaventure. Such a sense judgement, through comparative awareness, detaches the object from a given place and time, thereby preparing the way within the realm of sense cognition for intellectual cognition.<sup>[<a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bonaventure/notes.html#29" name="note-29" id="note-29">29</a>]</sup></p><h2><a name="4" id="4">4. Intellectual Creatures</a></h2><p>When we arrive at the threshold of intellectual cognition, we are entering the next step along the Bonaventurian journey. This level of creaturely being points to the Divine Source, but in ways that are more direct than those in which sensible creatures do. In exercising their powers of intellect and will, intellectual creatures discover the highest and most perfect object of their powers in the Divine Source of their being, since God is the First or Highest Truth and the First or Chief Good. Accordingly, intellectual creatures have God as their ultimate object, whereas all creatures have God as their Cause. Consequently, intellectual creatures show themselves to be ”images“ and ”likenesses“ of God, while they show that all creatures are ”shadows“ and ”vestiges“ of God.</p><p>Bonaventure traces out how intellectual creatures and intelligible objects reflect the divine Source. If we begin with something as immediate and basic as simple apprehension on the part of the human intellect, we find that an object of simple apprehension (such as the natural kind ”dog“) is susceptible of definition. Yet every definition requires a genus and a differentia. Through the generic term we are led to a further object of simple apprehension, usually itself susceptible of definition. If the genus is definable, we may state its definition, but we shall eventually find ourselves through continuing the process of definition arriving similarly at one of the supreme general or Aristotelian categories; if the genus is not definable, then we have arrived at one of the Aristotelian categories. Once we arrive at a category, we confront an item not susceptible of further definition, though it admits of description. If the categorical item is an accident, it satisfies the description of an accident as ‘being through another;’ if we are dealing with substance, then the item we are considering satisfies the description of substance as ‘being in itself’.</p><p>The resolution of all our items of simple apprehension into the concept of being is metaphysically and epistemologically crucial: metaphysically, it opens up a route of argumentation that leads to the existence of God; epistemologically, such a resolution means that behind all, even the most determinate and specific, conceptions of things lies a transcendental awareness of being that informs all of our knowledge. If we take the concept of substance as being in itself, we cannot come to know a particular substance's definition without the concept of being presupposed in the background, and in addition we are concomitantly aware of the transcendental properties of being (unity, truth, and goodness) in any such notion. Such co-extensive transcendental properties, however, are only one of the two types of properties that belong to being; the other transcendental properties (later called disjunctive properties) prove extremely useful for increasing our metaphysical knowledge. Being may be conceived of as either actual or potential, absolute or dependent, prior or posterior, immutable or mutable. Yet to conceive of being as potential, dependent, posterior, or mutable requires that we already be acquainted with being as actual, independent, prior and immutable. In other words, the more perfect of the two disjuncts in any of the disjunctive transcendentals must be an item we acknowledge in our awareness of being:</p><blockquote><p>Since privations and defects may only be known through positive features, our intellect does not fully resolve the understanding of any one created thing unless it is assisted by an understanding of the purest, most actual, complete, and absolute being, which is being simply and eternally and in which are found all the formulas of things in their purity. Indeed, how can the mind know that this being is defective and incomplete unless it has some awareness of being without defect? And the same line of analysis pertains to the other conditions of being mentioned above.<sup>[<a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bonaventure/notes.html#30" name="note-30" id="note-30">30</a>]</sup></p></blockquote><p>At one level, this line of argumentation is part of an argument for the existence of God. But, at another level, it is an effort to demarcate the proper object of the human mind as being and to point out that, if we reflect upon the notion of being (<em>ens</em>) in terms of its actuality (<em>esse</em>) we are inexorably led to the conclusion that there is a Perfect Being.<sup>[<a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bonaventure/notes.html#31" name="note-31" id="note-31">31</a>]</sup> We reach the same kind of conclusion if we reflect, not upon the primary object of the mind, but upon its operations. The certainty of judgment requires that we be aware of the impossibility of our being mistaken combined with our awareness that the truth that we know cannot be otherwise; indeed, the most fundamental truths we know are all immutable. But, following Augustine, Bonaventure claims that there is no source for immutable truth other than God, since God is the only immutable and unchanging Being.<sup>[<a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bonaventure/notes.html#32" name="note-32" id="note-32">32</a>]</sup></p><p>What we find when we look within ourselves is that we are pointed above to God, who is the light of the mind, guaranteeing the certainty of our judgments. This thesis, usually called by scholars divine illumination, was quite ancient by Bonaventure's time; it was part of the philosophical teaching of Augustine. What makes Bonaventure's version so philosophically distinctive is that he proposes to synthesize the epistemology of divine illumination with the Aristotelian account of abstraction. Bonaventure is thoroughly committed to the integral role played by the agent and possible intellects in human intellectual cognition. The agent and possible intellects are not separated substances, in the way envisaged by Averroes, but properly human faculties essential to the constitution of the human soul. <sup>[<a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bonaventure/notes.html#33" name="note-33" id="note-33">33</a>]</sup> Hence, unlike his contemporaries, who often thought of the human possible intellect as being illumined by God functioning as an agent intellect, Bonaventure assigns each human being an agent intellect. Differing from other of his contemporaries, Bonaventure also insists that the possible intellect always remains the recipient of the intelligible species abstracted by the agent intellect and the faculty of apprehension; accordingly, the possible intellect continues to be part of the human soul even when the soul is separated by death from the body.<sup>[<a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bonaventure/notes.html#34" name="note-34" id="note-34">34</a>]</sup> Abstraction is, for Bonaventure, the source of our concepts of things. How then does illumination work and why is it necessary? The divine light works together with the human intellectual faculties as a ”regulative and moving cause,“ ensuring that the human mind grasps the immutable truth of the creature; it does not and cannot replace the human intellectual faculties in their proper roles.<sup>[<a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bonaventure/notes.html#35" name="note-35" id="note-35">35</a>]</sup> The appeal to divine illumination is justified, primarily if not exclusively, for the reason that there is an incommensurability between our intellectual faculties and the ordinary objects we know as created and mutable, on the one hand, and the immutable truths we come to know. Inasmuch as things cannot give what they do not have, the only source of eternal and immutable truth is God's Light.</p><p>In general, the activities proper to intellectual creatures point much more directly than merely sensible or sentient creatures to the divine Source. Both the objects of the understanding and the will are ultimately rooted in God as Being and Goodness. This more direct pointing to God on the part of the intellectual creature is also seen in the intellectual creature's constitution, both psychological and ontological. The image of God is found in the fundamental interrelatedness of the memory, understanding, and will. Each act of memory calls to mind the past, is aware of the present and anticipates the future; each act of understanding presupposes the memory of first principles; and each act of will presupposes the act of understanding and moves the mind to further acts of memory. This triadic structure of the human mind reflects its Source: the Perfect Being that is simultaneously, Highest Unity, Supreme Truth, and Ultimate Good.<sup>[<a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bonaventure/notes.html#36" name="note-36" id="note-36">36</a>]</sup> Likewise, the ontological constitution of intellectual creatures, humans and angels, moves us along the road to the consideration of God. Each intellectual creature is composed of act and potency, metaphysical principles that Bonaventure understands to be co-extensive with matter and form.<sup>[<a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bonaventure/notes.html#37" name="note-37" id="note-37">37</a>]</sup> Accordingly, even intellectual creatures are composed of form and matter.<sup>[<a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bonaventure/notes.html#38" name="note-38" id="note-38">38</a>]</sup> For Bonaventure, it is the conjunction of form and matter that explains the individuality of each thing.<sup>[<a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bonaventure/notes.html#39" name="note-39" id="note-39">39</a>]</sup> But that even the highest creatures are composed of potency and act in this fashion entails that they are derived from a Source that is not so composed, but is, instead, pure act and hence pure form.</p><h2><a name="5" id="5">5. God</a></h2><p>In his <em>Collations on the Hexameron</em> Bonaventure read Genesis spiritually, distinguishing seven levels of ”vision“ corresponding to the seven days of creation. The first level is ”understanding naturally given“ or philosophy, which he divided following the Stoics into logic, ethics, and physics, the last further subdivided following Aristotle into natural philosophy, mathematics, and metaphysics. The focus of metaphysics is on causal relations between God and creatures. Here ”the philosophers—the finest and the ancient philosophers—came to this conclusion: there is a beginning, and an end, and an exemplar cause“ of the universe,<sup>[<a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bonaventure/notes.html#40" name="note-40" id="note-40">40</a>]</sup> that is, God is the efficient, final, and formal cause of the world. Since efficient causality connects metaphysics to physics and final causality connects it with ethics, the ”true metaphysician“ focuses on <em>exemplar</em> causality,<sup>[<a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bonaventure/notes.html#41" name="note-41" id="note-41">41</a>]</sup> a kind of formal causality which is the grand theme of Bonaventurean metaphysics.</p><p>To pursue this theme, Bonaventure made use of materials drawn from earlier philosophers about three important points: the transcendentals, the three Neoplatonic routes to God, and the difference between scientific principles and conclusions. About the transcendentals, Aristotle made metaphysics the science of substance. Centuries later, Avicenna transformed it into a science truly universal in scope by insisting that it study the nine accidents, as well as substance, and also the attributes that transcend the categories (Avicenna, <em>Metaphysica</em>, 1.5, 8). Philip the Chancellor codified this doctrine into four transcendentals—being, one, true, and good (Aertsen 1996, 25–70). Bonaventure opens consideration of God in his <em>Commentary on the Sentences</em> by noting that the categorical attributes of being are ”its special properties which characterize its <em>imperfection</em>,“ but the transcendentals are ”its general conditions which characterize its <em>perfection</em>.“<sup>[<a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bonaventure/notes.html#42" name="note-42" id="note-42">42</a>]</sup> The transcendentals therefore set the terms for treating God.</p><p>When he read ”the books of the Platonists,“ Augustine opened up three routes to proving the existence of God, though he himself explored only one. Arguments like Aristotle's that begin in the world must proceed from effect to cause and have been called <em>cosmological</em> arguments, though <em>aitiological</em>—meaning simply an argument uncovering causes<em>—</em>seems a better description. When Augustine turned within his mind he opened up two other routes to God. The second route also proceeds from effect to cause, but starts within the mind and searches out God as the ultimate cause of the mind's knowledge. This is the <em>illumination</em> argument for God. Augustine's turn inward also opened up a third route, later given by Kant the unhappy name of <em>ontological</em> argument. The fullest development of this neoplatonic approach to God stood ready to be realized, when all three routes, the aitiological, illuminationist, and ontological, would be scouted out by one and the same philosophical mind. That mind was not Augustine's or Anselm's but Bonaventure's.</p><p>If the transcendentals came primarily from Muslim Aristotelians, especially Avicenna, and the three routes to God were opened by Augustine, the last set of materials Bonaventure used to construct his arguments for the existence of God came from Aristotle himself. ”Science“ consists in knowledge of a limited subject achieved through demonstrating conclusions about it based on un-demonstrated principles. Bonaventure was one of a group of Parisian theologians, including the Dominicans Albert and Thomas, who attempted to set up Christian theology as an Aristotelian science. He therefore approached the issue of the existence of God with a sharp distinction between principles and conclusions in mind. The question he asks is not ”Does God exist?“ but ”Is the divine being so true that it cannot be thought not to be?“ This Anselmian formulation offers two options: God's existence is either a principle or a demonstrated conclusion. Philosophers are inclined to pick one route to God and reject all others, but Bonaventure had learned from Francis, the poor man of Assisi, that the world is filled with signs of God that even the simplest peasant can grasp. Bonaventure's response to the problem of the existence of God was therefore most unusual. He pursued all three routes to God; and he even ranked them: Illumination arguments make us ”certain“ of God's existence; aitiological arguments give us ”more certain“ knowledge of God's existence; while ontological arguments show that God's existence is ”a truth that is most certain in itself, in as far as it is the <em>first</em> and <em>most immediate</em> truth.“<sup>[<a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bonaventure/notes.html#43" name="note-43" id="note-43">43</a>]</sup> Let us look at each of them in turn.</p><h3><a name="5.1" id="5.1">5.1 Bonaventure's Illumination Argument</a></h3><p>The transcendental that initially opens up arguments for the existence of God is ”truth.“ Bonaventure bases his illumination argument on the epistemological sense of truth, inspired by Augustine's memorable description of his own inward route to God:</p><blockquote><p>And admonished by all this to return to myself, I entered inside myself, you leading and I able to do so because you had become my helper. And I entered and with the eye of my soul, such as it was, I saw above that eye of my soul, above my mind, an unchangeable light.…Whoever knows <em>the truth</em> knows this light…. O <em>eternal truth</em> and true love and loved eternity, you are my God; to you do I sigh both night and day. (Augustine, <em>Confessiones</em>, 7.10; CCSL 27: 103)</p></blockquote><p>In his <em>Commentary on the Sentences</em>, Bonaventure extracted from Augustine's stirring rhetoric the logical core of the illumination argument, reducing it to plain and dispassionate syllogisms, as he had learned from his teachers in Arts at Paris:</p><blockquote><p>All <em>correct understanding</em> proves and concludes to the truth of the divine being, because knowledge of the divine truth is impressed on every soul, and all knowledge comes about through the divine truth. Every affirmative proposition proves and concludes to that truth. For every such proposition posits something. And when something is posited, the <em>true</em> is posited; and when the true is posited that <em>truth</em> which is the cause of the true is also posited.<sup>[<a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bonaventure/notes.html#44" name="note-44" id="note-44">44</a>]</sup></p></blockquote><p>Bonaventure understood that the step from a true proposition to divine truth is a large one, so he advocates a moderate illuminationist position, one that depends on both divine and created causes. Bonaventure's Augustinian illumination theory avoids the problems of Platonism, which turns knowing the world into knowing God, and the problems of Muslim illuminationism, which thought a creature could do what it takes the infinite mind of God to accomplish.<sup>[<a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bonaventure/notes.html#45" name="note-45" id="note-45">45</a>]</sup> ”For <em>certain</em> knowledge, <em>eternal reason</em> is necessarily involved as a regulative and motive cause, however, not as the sole cause or in its full clarity, but along with a <em>created cause</em> and as contuited by us ‘in part’ in accord with our present state of life.“<sup>[<a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bonaventure/notes.html#46" name="note-46" id="note-46">46</a>]</sup></p><p>To explain the contribution of the ”created“ causes of knowledge, Bonaventure noted that the <em>content</em> of human knowledge comes from four kinds of ”created“ causes: the passive intellect within the individual soul as <em>material</em> cause, for it receives knowledge; the individual agent intellect as <em>efficient</em> cause, for it abstracts the content of knowledge from sensation; the essence of an individual creature known as <em>formal</em> cause, for the creature is ”what“ we know; and epistemological truth as <em>end</em>. These ”proper principles“ of knowledge do not involve God.<sup>[<a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bonaventure/notes.html#47" name="note-47" id="note-47">47</a>]</sup></p><p>Above and beyond these ”created“ causes, knowledge also requires an ”eternal“ cause. In the mental acts of abstracting universals and arguing inductively, the human mind generalizes well beyond the data of our experience. It is one thing to be able to generalize so, quite another to be sure one has succeeded. Intuition into the essence of a creature involves truths that are not only universal, but also necessary and certain. God is acquainted with the full extension of any universal, since the divine idea of any truth consists in knowledge of that truth in <em>absolutely all its actual and possible instantiations</em>. The infinite extension of God's knowledge is what makes divine understanding certain, and this certainty in the divine mind is on loan, so to speak, to the human mind. ”If full knowledge requires recourse to a <em>truth</em> which is fully immutable and stable, and to a <em>light</em> which is completely infallible, it is necessary for this sort of knowledge to have recourse to the heavenly art as to light and truth: a light, <em>I say</em>, which gives infallibility to the [created] knower, and a truth which gives immutability to the [created] object of knowledge.“<sup>[<a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bonaventure/notes.html#48" name="note-48" id="note-48">48</a>]</sup> Here Bonaventure makes more precise Augustine's ”light“ and ”truth.“ They are the two sides of certitude, so it is the certainty, and only the certainty, found in human knowledge that requires divine illumination; all other features of human knowledge–abstraction, universality, correspondence–come from created causes.</p><h3><a name="5.2" id="5.2">5.2 Bonaventure's Aitiological Argument</a></h3><p>The aitiological argument is ”more certain,“ because it begins with a real effect outside the mind and therefore better fits Aristotle's model of demonstration. But Bonaventure does not follow Aristotle's argument from motion, because motion falls under the categories. More promising were neoplatonic aitiological arguments (Boethius <em>Consolatio philosophiae</em> III 10; Anselm, <em>Monologion</em> 1–3), which combine an empirical premise with a participation premise. This is how Bonaventure packed his aitiological argument into a single syllogism: ”Every truth and every created nature proves and leads to the existence of the divine truth. For if there is being by participation and from another, there must exist a being due to its own essence and not from another.“<sup>[<a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bonaventure/notes.html#49" name="note-49" id="note-49">49</a>]</sup></p><p>For his <em>empirical</em> premise Bonaventure turns again to truth, but ontological truth. All creatures are true to the extent that they actualize the potential perfections of their natures, and they are false to the extent that they fail to do so, because ontological truth is ”the indivision of act and potency.“ So ”in a <em>creature</em> there is indivision combined with difference between act and potency.“ All creatures are <em>partial</em> actualizations of truth. Ontological truth takes us to the heart of Bonaventurean metaphysics. Aristotle's definition of prime matter as pure potency means that everything that contains potency of any sort, even an angel, must contain matter. This universal hylomorphism leads in turn to Bonaventure's doctrine of being: ”Matter gives independent existence (<em>existere</em>) to form, while form gives the act of being (<em>essendi actum</em>) to matter.“<sup>[<a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bonaventure/notes.html#50" name="note-50" id="note-50">50</a>]</sup> Every created being (<em>ens</em>) is an ontological composite of independent existence (<em>existere</em>) and being (<em>esse</em>), where <em>esse</em> signifies the nature or essence of the thing. From rocks to angels, all creatures are true to the extent that the potencies of their ”existence“ given by matter are realized through the perfection of their ”being“ through form.</p><p>The <em>participation</em> premise moves from effect to cause within the line of formal causality. A necessary condition for the existence of any attribute <em>by participation</em> is that the same attribute is present in its exemplar <em>essentially</em>, that is, intrinsically. Participation does not immediately take us to God, but initially describes relations between creatures. A statue or computer can have certain human attributes–shape, color, size, computational skill–but only because these features are caused by the artisan who made it. This is how participation works <em>within the created order.</em> It is transcendenal ”truth“ that moves the argument beyond creatures to God. If incomplete realization of an intrinsically imperfect categorical attribute–like white or horse or dirt–implies that those attributes must also exist in some other creature ”essentially,“ then transcendental attributes should behave the same way. But no creature could be such an exemplar. The exemplar for ontological truth must therefore be God, who perfectly realizes his own essence, which is to say that God is true ”essentially.“ In <em>On the Mystery of the Trinity</em>, Bonaventure expands this line of argument further in the direction of the transcendentals. There he identifies nine more disjunctive transcendentals, in addition to the pair ”by participation“ and ”essentially,“ where the lesser implies the existence of the greater.<sup>[<a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bonaventure/notes.html#51" name="note-51" id="note-51">51</a>]</sup></p><p>Just as his illumination argument uncovered God as a kind of formal and efficient cause of certitude, so Bonaventure's aitiological argument uncovers God as formal cause of truth in creatures. But in addition it ends just where his ontological argument begins. For what does an ontological argument do but peer into the inner logic of such an exemplar essence and try to capture the logical consequence that it must exist?</p><h3><a name="5.3" id="5.3">5.3 Bonaventure's Ontological Argument</a></h3><p>Bonaventure was the first thirteenth-century thinker to pay serious attention to the ontological argument. He read the <em>Proslogion</em> of Anselm through Aristotelian lenses. Now Aristotle had recognized three different kinds of scientific principles: common axioms governing all thought, so well known that no one can deny them, and proper principles limited in range to a given science–its definitions and postulates. Anselm seemed to mean that God's existence is an axiom of thought known by all humans, and Bonaventure agrees: ”since our intellect is never deficient in knowing about God <em>if it is</em>, so it cannot be ignorant of God's existence, absolutely speaking, nor even think God does not exist.“<sup>[<a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bonaventure/notes.html#52" name="note-52" id="note-52">52</a>]</sup></p><p>While Anselm thought this conclusion rules out even the possibility of atheism, Bonaventure more realistically shows how atheism is possible. The problem is with our defective knowledge of God's <em>nature</em>. Error there can lead by logical inference to the conclusion that God does not exist in the first place. We are spontaneously theists, but can convince ourselves to become atheists. Inadequate definition of God points to a second problem. Knowing God exists is similar to knowing axioms because both are recognized by all. The difference is that we are quite certain ”the whole is greater than the part,“ because the terms involved in this axiom are so familiar to us; but about God's existence we have more an opinion than certain knowledge, because we lack an adequate definition of God's nature.</p><p>There are two remedies for the defects in our knowledge of ”what“ God is, one taken from faith, the other from reason. Both make knowledge of God's existence more like a postulate known with certitude by the ”wise“ than like an axiom recognized by ”all“ humans (Boethius, <em>De hebdomadibus</em>, 40). For Christian belief and for theology, God's existence is an article of faith. The other remedy is Bonaventure's adaptation of Anselm's argument conceived as a philosophical argument on behalf of a metaphysical postulate.</p><p>Bonaventure's ontological argument contains two moments, so to speak, one negative, the other positive. Negatively, Bonaventure's ontological argument proceeds as a reduction to absurdity of the atheistic proposition. Anselm had taken a peculiar description of God, ”something than which a greater cannot be thought,“ which Augustine had used to argue through a <em>reductio ad absurdum</em> to the conclusion that God must be incorruptible, and Boethius used to argue that God must be good, and he had used it to argue by <em>reductio</em> that God must exist in the first place. Bonaventure recognized the affinity with arguing by <em>reductio</em> in support of the principle of non-contradiction:</p><blockquote><p>As a union of things in the greatest degree distant from each other is entirely repugnant to our intellect, because no intellect can think that <em>one thing at the same time both is and is not</em>, so also the division of something entirely one and undivided is entirely repugnant to that same intellect. For this reason, just as it is most evidently false to say that <em>the same thing is and is not</em>, so also it is most evidently false to say at the same time that the same thing is in the greatest degree and <em>in no way is</em>.”<sup>[<a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bonaventure/notes.html#53" name="note-53" id="note-53">53</a>]</sup></p></blockquote><p>But his study of Aristotelian philosophy made Bonaventure more sensitive than Anselm to the limitations of <em>reductio</em> arguments. Positive insight into principles is more than negative <em>reductio</em> leading up to principles, so snaring the atheist in a contradiction is still one step away from affirming that God exists. To make this step intelligible he emended the ontological argument in a positive direction.</p><p>Bonaventure therefore explains what makes a proposition “self-evident,” which in turn opens the way for deducing God's existence out of God's essence.</p><p>Principles are “self-evident” (cf. Aristotle, <em>Topics</em>, 100a31–b21). In the second of Aristotle's modes of <em>per se</em> (Aristotle, <em>Posterior Analytics</em> 73a34–b3), the essence of the subject <em>causes</em> the predicate. This provided Bonaventure with an ingenious explanation of why principles are self-evident: “We know principles to the extent that we understand the terms which make them up, because the cause of the predicate <em>is included in</em> the subject.” If the essence of the subject term is what connects it to the predicate term in a self-evident proposition, then the essence of God must be what makes “God exists” self-evident. The positive ontological argument contains an inference to the existence of God that runs <em>through the divine essence</em>.</p><p>Most descriptions of the divine essence are inappropriate for the ontological argument, but the transcendentals are the right terms because they do not imply imperfection, can be predicated non-metaphorically of God, and are primordial, the “first notions falling into the mind.”<sup>[<a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bonaventure/notes.html#54" name="note-54" id="note-54">54</a>]</sup> All more specific concepts presuppose transcendental notions, and Anselm's own formula was no exception to this rule. In his <em>Commentary on the Sentences</em> Bonaventure used the transcendental “true” as the middle term of his positive ontological argument; in the disputed question <em>On the Mystery of the Trinity</em> he used “good,” and in the <em>Journey of the Mind to God</em> he used “being.”</p><p>In the <em>Commentary</em>, Bonaventure introduces his arguments for God's existence with an elaborate treatment of truth. As a relation, truth always involves a comparison. Epistemological truth is an “indivision” between the human mind and the thing known. Ontological truth is an “indivision” between potency and act within a creature; the more it fulfills its nature, the truer it is. These two senses of truth open up a comparison of creature as participant to God as exemplar. All three, epistemological, ontological, participationist truths, are imperfect, combinations of truth and falsity. They point to their exemplar, the one “pure” truth, present only in God, where there is “pure indivision mixed with no diversity.”<sup>[<a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bonaventure/notes.html#55" name="note-55" id="note-55">55</a>]</sup> This last sense of truth Bonaventure uses in his ontological argument:</p><blockquote><p>We know <em>principles</em> to the extent that we understand the terms which make them up, because the cause of the predicate is included in the subject. This is why principles are self-evident. <em>The same thing is true about God</em>. For God, or the highest truth, is being itself, that than which nothing greater can be thought. Therefore, God cannot be thought not to be, for the predicate is already included in the subject.<sup>[<a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bonaventure/notes.html#56" name="note-56" id="note-56">56</a>]</sup></p></blockquote><p>Bonaventure includes the negative reasoning so prominent in Anselm's version, but to Anselm's formula he adds “being itself” and “the highest truth.” While each of these three descriptions casts a different light on why the inference to God's existence is valid, Bonaventure here seems to prefer “the highest truth” because the definition of truth as “indivision” is the basis for re-conceiving the ontological argument as establishing an “indivision” between the middle term and the predicate “exists.” If the “highest truth” is “pure indivision,” then the highest truth cannot be divided off from existence.</p><p>In <em>On the Mystery of the Trinity</em>, Bonaventure changes the focus of the ontological argument to goodness, with a memorable result. The basic notion of goodness is not by itself sufficient to mount an ontological argument, but analysis of goodness uncovers the relevant terms:</p><blockquote><p>No one can be ignorant of the fact that this is true: the best is the best; or think that it is false. But the best is a being which is absolutely complete. Now any being which is absolutely complete, for this very reason, is an actual being. Therefore, if the best is the best, the best is. In a similar way, one can argue: If God is God, then God is. Now the antecedent is so true that it cannot be thought not to be. Therefore, it is true without doubt that God exists.<sup>[<a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bonaventure/notes.html#57" name="note-57" id="note-57">57</a>]</sup></p></blockquote><p>The logic of “the best” (<em>optimum</em>) is different from the logic of “the good.” Since goodness completes or perfects something, “the best” must be “a being which is fully complete (<em>ens completissimum</em>).” Now what is absolutely complete must possess all possible perfections. But existence is not just <em>a</em> perfection, one component among many making up such ontological completeness, it is <em>the</em> most fundamental feature of such completeness. Consequently, such an absolutely perfect being must exist. Bonaventure's argument runs from the subject “God,” through the middle terms “the best” and “absolutely complete being,” to the predicate “exists.” In the shorter and even more memorable formulation, “If God is God, God is,” the premise <em>If God is God</em> is not an empty tautology (Seifert 1992, 216–217). It means ‘if the entity to which the term God refers truly possesses the divine essence.’ And the conclusion means that such an entity must exist.</p><p>Bonaventure was well aware of criticisms of the ontological argument, beginning with Gaunilo's retort that the greatest of all possible islands should also really exist. His reply is more effective than Anselm's because it uses the transcendentals. An island is an inherently imperfect being (<em>ens defectivum</em>) because categorical; but <em>ens completissimum</em> is not because a transcendental.<sup>[<a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bonaventure/notes.html#58" name="note-58" id="note-58">58</a>]</sup></p><p>In <em>The Journey of the Mind to God</em>, c. 5, Bonaventure focuses the ontological argument on “being” and develops it far beyond anything he had previously done. He qualifies <em>esse</em> in two different ways, creating two different middle terms: “divine being” (<em>esse divinum</em>) and “completely pure being (<em>esse purissimum</em>).” First he uses “completely pure being” to deduce the predicate “exists,” then uses “divine being” to ensure that it is <em>God</em> who is so proven to exist. In this way the basic steps of this argument closely parallel those of the argument based on goodness: ‘God (<em>Deus</em>) who is divine being (<em>esse divinum</em>) is also seen to be completely pure being (<em>esse purissimum</em>) and therefore must exist (<em>est</em>).’</p><p>Bonaventure begins<sup>[<a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bonaventure/notes.html#59" name="note-59" id="note-59">59</a>]</sup> by repeating the essentials of the earlier versions of the argument, but then moves well beyond them:</p><blockquote><p>For completely pure being itself occurs only in full flight from non-being, just as nothingness is in full flight from being. Therefore, complete nothingness contains nothing of being or its attributes, so by contrast being itself contains no non-being, neither in act nor in potency, neither in reality nor in our thinking about it.<sup>[<a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bonaventure/notes.html#60" name="note-60" id="note-60">60</a>]</sup></p></blockquote><p>If “being itself” (<em>ipsum esse</em>) distinguishes the being (<em>esse</em>) of a creature from its independent existence (<em>existere</em>), adding the superlative <em>completely pure</em> to <em>being itself</em> (<em>esse purissimum</em>) refers to the notion of an <em>essence</em> that does not involve non-being <em>in any way</em>: a completely pure or perfect essence. The notion of <em>esse purissimum</em> does not presuppose the real existence of God; rather, it implies that real existence. But at this point this inference may not yet be clear, so Bonaventure devotes the rest of this short text to showing why the notion of <em>completely pure being itself</em> actually entails the real existence of God.</p><p>In contrast with creatures, which are mid-level on the scale of being because they are open to existence and non-existence, the notions of complete nothingness (<em>omnino nihil</em>) and completely pure being (<em>esse purissimum</em>) have absolutely opposed implications for existence. “Complete nothing-ness” is logically inconsistent with real existence, so there is a perfectly valid inference from the <em>notion</em> of nothing to non-being (<em>non-esse</em>). Nothing cannot exist. If the nature of nothing entails its non-existence, the nature of its opposite, <em>completely pure being</em>, entails its real existence. Making use of the categories of his own metaphysics in this way shows more effectively than merely backing the mind into a contradiction why the ontological inference is valid.</p><p>The basis for the argument thus far is a notion, not of God but of an essence, completely pure, of non-being. One might ask where Bonaventure acquires this notion, seemingly drawn from thin air. His reply is that conceptual analysis of the first of all notions, transcendental being (<em>ens</em>), reveals this purely metaphysical notion.</p><blockquote><p>Now since non-being is the privation of being, it does not fall into the mind except through being; while being does not fall into the mind through something else. For everything which is thought of is either thought of as a non-being, or as a being in potency, or as a being in act. Therefore, if a non-being is intelligible only through a being, and a being in potency is intelligible only through a being in act, and being denominates the pure actuality of a being, it follows that being is that which first falls into the intellect, and that this being is that which is pure actuality.<sup>[<a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bonaventure/notes.html#61" name="note-61" id="note-61">61</a>]</sup></p></blockquote><p>Here Bonaventure peers into the notion of “a being” (<em>ens</em>) and finds it has two component principles: independent existence (<em>existere</em>), which gives the being the potential to have a certain essence; and being (<em>esse</em>), the actuality of such an essence. It is <em>esse</em> rather than <em>existere</em> which “denominates the pure actuality of a being.” Here “actuality” (<em>actus</em>) means ‘that which makes the being actually intelligible, by giving it the actual essence it has.’ This movement of <em>conceptual analysis</em> opens the mind to see that we can understand a creature as “a being” (<em>ens</em>) only by referring to the notion of an act of being which is pure from non-being (<em>esse purum</em>), indeed, which is pure from <em>any</em> non-being (<em>esse purissimum</em>). Implicit within the very <em>notion</em> of transcendental “being” and <em>a presupposition of our understanding the notion of transcendental being</em>, is the notion of being with no hint of non-being (<em>esse purissimum</em>). Even if only implicit, this notion must be present in the mind of anyone who understands being (<em>ens</em>), that is, everyone who understands anything at all.</p><p>Once it has been shown that <em>esse purissimum</em> is a notion which implies real existence and that we all possess this notion as a component of the fundamental notion of a being (<em>ens</em>), it remains only to identify <em>esse purissimum</em> with God.</p><blockquote><p>But this is not particular being, which is limited being because mixed with potency, nor is it analogous being, because that has the least actuality, since it is to the least degree. Therefore, the result is that this being is divine being.<sup>[<a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bonaventure/notes.html#62" name="note-62" id="note-62">62</a>]</sup></p></blockquote><p>If <em>esse purissimum</em> really exists, as has been proven, it must exist in one of three modes. But since particular and intentional being cannot be completely perfect, <em>esse purissimum</em> must be identical with the divine being.</p><p>The real but initially hidden starting point for Bonaventure's ontological argument in the <em>Journey</em> is the notion of <em>esse purissimum</em>, taken not subjectively as existing as a concept in a human mind, but in its objective meaning,<sup>[<a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bonaventure/notes.html#63" name="note-63" id="note-63">63</a>]</sup> that is, as signifying a certain kind of quiddity or essence. The achievement of the ontological argument, as Bonaventure saw it, is twofold: it shows that this essence must really exist, and it shows that this essence is none other than God.</p><p>Bonaventure locates knowledge of God's existence within all three parts of an Aristotelian science–as demonstrated conclusion, as common axiom, and as proper postulate. It can be proven through two kinds of demonstrations of the fact, by an illumination argument starting inside the mind and an aitiological argument starting outside. Such proofs proceed from created truth as a <em>vestige</em> to the <em>one</em> God as its cause. But “God exists” is also a principle recognized by virtually all humans, a kind of axiom built upon creatures conceived as <em>shadows</em> of the <em>one</em> divinity for whom explicit arguments specifying God's causality are no more needed than for other axioms. Finally, there are two ways God's existence is known as a postulate: first, through the ontological argument, where the transcendental attributes found in creatures function as <em>vestiges</em> providing the mind the notions it uses in the argument for the <em>one</em> God's existence; and second, as an article of faith. Here faith is postulated on the authority of revelation and is certain, but its certainty comes from God, not human reason. And here, too, features of intellectual creatures, especially humans, function as <em>images and likenesses</em> of the <em>Trinitarian</em> God. Knowledge of God's existence, in sum, is ubiquitous. Thus spoke the follower of Francis.</p><h2><a name="Bib" id="Bib">Bibliography</a></h2><h3>Primary Sources</h3><h4>Original Texts of Bonaventure</h4><ul class="hanging"><li><em>S. Bonaventurae opera omnia</em>, Vols. I-IX, The Fathers of the Collegii S. Bonaventura (eds.), Florence: Quaracchi, 1882–1902.</li><li><em>S. Bonaventurae opera theologica selecta</em>, Vols. I-V, The Fathers of the Collegii S. Bonaventura (eds.), Florence: Quaracchi, 1934–1965.</li><li><em>Collationes in Hexaëmeron et Bonaventuriana quaedam selecta</em>, The Fathers of the Collegii S. Bonaventura (eds.), Florence: Quaracchi, 1938.</li><li><em>S. Bonaventurae decem opuscula ad theologiam mysticam spectantia</em>, The Fathers of the Collegii S. Bonaventura (eds.), Florence: Quarachi, 1949.</li><li><em>Tria opuscula Seraphici Doctoris S. Bonaventurae. Breviloquium, Itinerarium mentis in Deum, et De reductione artium ad theologiam</em>, The Fathers of the Collegii S. Bonaventura (eds.), Florence: Quaracchi, 1938.</li></ul><h4>Translations of Bonaventure</h4><ul class="hanging"><li>Hayes, Z. (ed.), 1992, <em>Disputed Questions on the Knowledge of Christ</em>, O.F.M. St. Bonaventure, NY: St. Bonaventure Press.</li><li>Hayes, Z. (ed.), 1979, <em>Disputed Questions on the Mystery of the Trinity</em>, O.F.M. St. Bonaventure, NY: St. Bonaventure Press, 1979.</li></ul><h4>Other Primary Sources</h4><ul class="hanging"><li>Anselm, <em>Monologion</em>, Edinburgh: Thomas Nelson and Sons, Ltd., 1946.</li><li>Aristotle, <em>Posterior Analytics</em>, Cambridge/London: Harvard University Press/William Heinemann Ltd., 1976.</li><li>Aristotle, <em>Topics</em>, Cambridge/London: Harvard University Press/William Heinemann Ltd., 1976.</li><li>Augustine, <em>Confessiones</em>, Brepols: Brepols Publishers, 2002.</li><li>Avicenna, <em>Liber de philosophia prima</em>, Louvain/Leiden: E. Peeters/E.J. Brill, 1977.</li><li>Boethius, <em>Consolatio philosophiae</em>, Cambridge/London: Harvard University Press/William Heinemann Ltd., 1973.</li><li>Boethius, <em>De hebdomadibus</em>, Cambridge/London: Harvard University Press/William Heinemann Ltd., 1973.</li><li>Ovid, <em>Metamorphoses</em>, A.G. Lee (ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1953.</li><li>Plato, <em>Timaeus</em>, F. Cornford (trans.), Oskar Piest (ed.), New York/London: Macmillan Publishing Company/Collier Macmillan Publishers, 1959.</li></ul><h3>Secondary Sources</h3><ul class="hanging"><li>Aertsen, J., 1996. <em>Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals: the Case of Thomas Aquinas</em>, Leiden: Brill.</li><li>Baldner, Stephen, 1989. “Saint Bonaventure and the Temporal Beginning of the World,” <em>New Scholasticism</em>, 63: 206–28.</li><li>Benson, Joshua C., 2009. “Identifying the Literary Genre of the De reductione artium ad theologiam: Bonaventure's Inaugural Lecture at Paris,” <em>Franciscan Studies</em>, 67: 149–178.</li><li>Benson, Joshua C., 2011.“Bonaventure's De reductione artium ad theologiam and its Early Reception as an Inaugural Sermon,” <em>American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly</em> (Special Issue: Bonaventure), 85: 7–24.</li><li>Bérubé, Camille, 1973. “De la théologie de l'image à la philosophie de l'objet de l'intelligence chez saint Bonaventure,” in <em>S. Bonaventura 1274–1974</em>, Vol. 3, E. Synan (ed.), Rome: Collegio S. Bonaventura Grottaferrata, pp. 161–200.</li><li>Bissen, Jean-Marie, 1934. “De la contuition,” <em>Études franciscaines</em>, 46: 559–69.</li><li>Bonansea, Bernardino, 1974. “The Question of the Eternal World in the Teaching of St. Bonaventure,” <em>Franciscan Studies</em>, 34: 7–33.</li><li>Bougerol, J.G., 1988. <em>Introduction a l'étude de saint Bonaventure</em>, 2nd ed., Paris.</li><li>Bowman, Leonard, 1973. “The Development of the Doctrine of the Agent Intellect in the Franciscan School of the Thirteenth Century,” <em>The Modern Schoolman</em>, 50: 251–79.</li><li>Crowley, Theodore, 1974. “St. Bonaventure's Chronology Revisited,” <em>Franziskanische Studien</em>, 46: 310–22.</li><li>Cullen, Chrsitopher, 2006. <em>Bonaventure</em>, Oxford: Oxford University Press.</li><li>Cullen, Christopher, 2011. “Bonaventure on Nature Before Grace: A Historical Moment Reconsidered,” <em>American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly</em> (Special Issue: Bonaventure), 85: 161–176.</li><li>Emery, Kent, 1983. “Reading the World Rightly and Squarely: Bonaventure's Doctrine of the Cardinal Virtues,” <em>Traditio</em>, 39: 183–218.</li><li>Gendreau, Bernard, 1961. “The Quest for Certainty in Bonaventure,” <em>Franciscan Studies</em>, 21: 104–227.</li><li>Gilson, Etienne, 1965. <em>The Christian Philosophy of St. Bonaventure</em>, Illtyd Trethowan and Frank Sheed (trans.), St. Anthony Guild.</li><li>Goris, Wouter, 2011. “Two-Staged Doctrines of God as First Known and the Transformation of the Concept of Reality in Bonaventure and Henry of Ghent,” <em>American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly</em> (Special Issue: Bonaventure), 85: 77–97</li><li>Houser, R.E., 1999. “Bonaventure's Three-Fold Way to God,” <em>Medieval Masters: Essays in Memory of E.A. Synan</em>, R.E. Houser (ed.), University of St. Thomas: Center for Thomistic Studies, pp. 91–145.</li><li>Matthews, Scott, 1999. “Arguments, Texts, and Contexts: Anselm's Argument and the Friars,” <em>Medieval Philosophy and Theology</em>, 8: 83–104.</li><li>Monti, D., 1994. “Introduction,” <em>Writings concerning the Franciscan Order</em>, in <em>Works of Saint Bonaventure</em>, Volume 5, St. Bonaventure, NY: Franciscan Institute, pp. 1–36.</li><li>Noone, Timothy B., 1999. “The Franciscan and Epistemology: Reflections on the Roles of Bonaventure and Scotus,” <em>Medieval Masters: Essays in Memory of E.A. Synan</em>, R.E. Houser (ed.), University of St. Thomas: Center for Thomistic Studies, pp. 63–90.</li><li>Noone, Timothy B., 2011. “Saint Bonaventure and Angelic Natural Knowledge of Singulars: A Source for the Doctrine of Intuitive Cognition?” <em>American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly</em> (Special Issue: Bonaventure), 85: 143–159.</li><li>Pegis, Antonio, 1953. “St. Bonaventure, St. Francis and Philosophy,” <em>Mediaeval Studies</em>, 15: 1–13.</li><li>Quinn, J., 1982. “Bonaventure,” <em>Dictionary of the Middle Ages</em>, 2: 313–19.</li><li>Quinn, J., 1972. “Chronology of St. Bonaventure (1217–1274),” <em>Franciscan Studies</em>, 22: 168–186.</li><li>Quinn, John, 1973. <em>The Historical Constitution of St. Bonventure's Philosophy</em>, Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies.</li><li>Ratzinger, Joseph, 1971. <em>The Theology of History in St. Bonaventure</em>, Zachary Hayes (trans.), Chicago: Franciscan Herald.</li><li>Salimbene, A., 1905–1912. <em>Catalogus generalium</em>, Holder-Egger (ed.), in <em>Monumenta Germaniae Historica</em>, 32.</li><li>Seifert, Josef, 1992. “‘<em>Si Deus est Deus, Deus est</em>’: Reflections on St. Bonaventure's Interpretation of St. Anselm's Ontological Argument,” <em>Franciscan Studies</em>, 52: 215–231.</li><li>Speer, A., 1997. “Bonaventure and the Question of a Medieval Philosophy,” <em>Medieval Philosophy and Theology</em>, 6(1): 25–46.</li><li>Speer, A., 2011. “Illumination and Certitude: The Foundaton of Knowledge in Bonaventure,” <em>American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly</em> (Special Issue: Bonaventure), 85: 127–141.</li><li>Walz, Matthew D., 1998. “Theological and Philosophical Dependencies in St. Bonaventure's Argument against an Eternal World and a Brief Thomistic Reply,” <em>American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly</em>, 72(1): 75–98.</li><li>White, John, 2011. “St. Bonaventure and the Problem of Doctrinal Development,” <em>American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly</em> (Special Issue: Bonaventure), 85: 177–202.</li></ul><h2><a name="Aca" id="Aca">Academic Tools</a></h2><blockquote><table><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://plato.stanford.edu/symbols/sepman-icon.jpg" alt="sep man icon" /></td><td><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/cgi-bin/encyclopedia/archinfo.cgi?entry=bonaventure" target="other">How to cite this entry</a>.</td></tr><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://plato.stanford.edu/symbols/sepman-icon.jpg" alt="sep man icon" /></td><td><a href="https://leibniz.stanford.edu/friends/preview/bonaventure/" target="other">Preview the PDF version of this entry</a> at the <a href="https://leibniz.stanford.edu/friends/" target="other">Friends of the SEP Society</a>.</td></tr><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://plato.stanford.edu/symbols/inpho.png" alt="inpho icon" /></td><td><a href="https://inpho.cogs.indiana.edu/entity?sep=bonaventure&redirect=True" target="other">Look up this entry topic</a> at the <a href="https://inpho.cogs.indiana.edu/" target="other">Indiana Philosophy 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Notre Dame</li><li><a href="http://www.1911encyclopedia.org/Saint_Bonaventura" target="other">Bonaventura</a>, entry in <em>1911 Encyclopedia LoveToKnow</em></li><li><a href="http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/02648c.htm" target="other">St. Bonaventure</a> <em>New Advent Catholic Encyclopedia</em></li><li><a href="http://www.radicalacademy.com/philbonaventure.htm" target="other">The Philosophy of Bonaventure</a>, <em>The Radical Academy</em></li></ul><h2><a name="Rel" id="Rel">Related Entries</a></h2><p><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/anselm/">Anselm, Saint [Anselm of Bec, Anselm of Canterbury]</a> | <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle/">Aristotle</a> | <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/augustine/">Augustine, Saint</a> | <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/illumination/">divine: illumination</a> | <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology/">epistemology</a> | <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/existence/">existence</a> | <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/faith/">faith</a> | matter | <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/metaphysics/">metaphysics</a> | <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truth/">truth</a></p></div><div id="foot"><span class="c3"><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/info.html#c">Copyright © 2013</a> by</span><br /><a href="http://philosophy.cua.edu/Faculty/noone/" target="other">Tim Noone</a> <<a href="mailto:noonet%40cua.edu"><em>noonet<abbr title=" at ">@</abbr>cua<abbr title=" dot ">.</abbr>edu</em></a>><br /><a href="http://t4.stthom.edu/users/houser/index.html" target="other">R. E. Houser</a> <<a href="mailto:houser%40stthom.edu"><em>houser<abbr title=" at ">@</abbr>stthom<abbr title=" dot ">.</abbr>edu</em></a>></div><p><em>This entry passed through the <a href="http://fivefilters.org/content-only/">Full-Text RSS</a> service — if this is your content and you're reading it on someone else's site, please read the FAQ at <a href="http://fivefilters.org/content-only/faq.php#publishers">fivefilters.org/content-only/faq.php#publishers</a>. <a href="http://fivefilters.org">Five Filters</a> recommends: <a href="http://www.medialens.org/index.php/alerts/alert-archive/alerts-2013/715-eyes-like-blank-discs-the-guardian-s-steven-poole-on-george-orwell-s-politics-and-the-english-language.html">Eyes Like Blank Discs - The Guardian's Steven Poole On George Orwell's Politics And The English Language</a>.</em></p><br />This post was made using the <a href='http://www.webmagnates.org/auto-blogging-software.html' title='auto-blogging software'>Auto Blogging Software</a> from <a href='http://www.webmagnates.org' title'make money online'>WebMagnates.org</a> This line will not appear when posts are made after activating the software to full version.Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10303290079976590343noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5448411214494413217.post-80679010880118124142013-03-01T09:17:00.000-08:002013-03-01T09:18:03.760-08:00Make Over Your Guy's Grooming Routine (on the Sly) <div id="photoGallery"><a href="http://www.totalbeauty.com/content/gallery/mens-grooming-products/p130102/page2" title="Next"><img src="http://images.totalbeauty.com/uploads/editorial/lg420x280/mens-grooming-products-L1.jpg" alt="" /></a></div><p class="photoDescription">My husband Brandon's grooming products consists of a bar of soap. That's it.</p><p>Granted, it's a fancy bar of <a href="http://www.totalbeauty.com/reviews/product/49060/fresh-sugar-soap">Fresh Sugar Soap</a> -- because that's what I put in the shower -- but it's not doing much to get rid of his sun spots.</p><p>I sometimes fantasize that Brandon would help me test beauty products -- that he'd critique the latest eye cream or contemplate the nuances of a new body lotion scent. But that's probably taking it too far -- and I have plenty of girlfriends who'll happily test a $100 face cream for me.</p><p>But really, all I <em>truly</em> want is for Brandon to use sunscreen and wash his hair with shampoo. (Sorry, babe, soapsuds don't count -- even if they are by Fresh). Which is why I'm on a mission to revamp my husband's grooming routine.</p><p><a href="http://www.totalbeauty.com/content/gallery/mens-grooming-products/p130102/page2">Skip head to see how I finally got my husband to use grooming products.</a></p><p>I'm going into this with low expectations and realistic goals. I definitely don't expect him to adopt my seven-step evening skin care ritual. (Nor would I want him to -- if he starts using my favorite serums, we'll be in credit card debt as fast as you can say hyaluronic acid.) But there are so many new men's grooming products out there, and it's a shame for Brandon to not use at least use <em>some</em> of them.</p><p>Will I succeed at getting Brandon to change his bar-soap-only ways?</p><a href="http://www.totalbeauty.com/content/gallery/mens-grooming-products/p130102/page2"><span class="seeNext">See Next Page:</span> <span class="seeNextTitle">I've got to start somewhere</span></a><p class="byLine">By <span>Dawn Davis</span></p><p class="avgRating"><a class="rateImg lowLevel" href="http://www.totalbeauty.com/content/gallery/mens-grooming-products#rateThisJump" title="Rate this story">Rate this story</a><span>|</span>Avg member rating: 8</p><p><em>This entry passed through the <a href="http://fivefilters.org/content-only/">Full-Text RSS</a> service — if this is your content and you're reading it on someone else's site, please read the FAQ at <a href="http://fivefilters.org/content-only/faq.php#publishers">fivefilters.org/content-only/faq.php#publishers</a>. <a href="http://fivefilters.org">Five Filters</a> recommends: <a href="http://www.medialens.org/index.php/alerts/alert-archive/alerts-2013/715-eyes-like-blank-discs-the-guardian-s-steven-poole-on-george-orwell-s-politics-and-the-english-language.html">Eyes Like Blank Discs - The Guardian's Steven Poole On George Orwell's Politics And The English Language</a>.</em></p><br />This post was made using the <a href='http://www.webmagnates.org/auto-blogging-software.html' title='auto-blogging software'>Auto Blogging Software</a> from <a href='http://www.webmagnates.org' title'make money online'>WebMagnates.org</a> This line will not appear when posts are made after activating the software to full version.Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10303290079976590343noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5448411214494413217.post-12959494890171523812013-02-28T18:36:00.000-08:002013-02-28T18:38:01.281-08:00Leibniz on the Problem of Evil <div id="aueditable"><div id="pubinfo"><em>First published Sun Jan 4, 1998; substantive revision Wed Feb 27, 2013</em></div><p>There is no question that the problem of evil vexed Leibniz as much as any of the problems that he engaged in the course of his philosophical career. This is manifest in the fact that the first and the last book-length works that he authored, the <em>Philosopher's Confession</em> (written at age 26 in 1672) and the <em>Theodicy</em> (written in 1709, seven years before his death) were both devoted to this problem, as well as in the fact that in the intervening years Leibniz wrote numerous short pieces on related issues––many of which may be found in Gr and will soon be available in English translations currently being undertaken by R. C. Sleigh, Jr.–– and one full-length work, the <em>Dissertation on Predestination and Grace</em> (DPG), which was only published in 2011. The fact that the <em>Theodicy</em> was the only book-length treatise that Leibniz published during his lifetime provides further evidence of the significance that he attributed to the topic. It is therefore appropriate that it has now become an interpretive commonplace that Leibniz's concern with the problem of evil was central to his overarching philosophical concerns throughout his philosophical career. [See Rutherford (1995) and Antognazza (2009).] Leibniz's approach to the problem of evil became known to many readers through Voltaire's lampoon in <em>Candide</em>: the link that Voltaire seems to forge between Leibniz and the extravagant optimism of Dr. Pangloss continues––for better or worse––to shape the popular understanding of Leibniz's approach to the problem of evil. In this entry we examine the two main species of the problem of evil that Leibniz addresses. The first, “the underachiever problem,” is raised by a critic who would argue that the existence of evil in our world indicates that God cannot be as knowledgeable, powerful, or good as traditional monotheists have claimed. The second, “the holiness problem,” is raised by the critic who would argue that God's intimate causal entanglements with the world make God the cause of evil. God is thereby implicated in evil to the detriment of his holiness.</p><ul><li><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/leibniz-evil/#Var">1. Various Versions of the Problem of Evil in Leibniz</a></li><li><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/leibniz-evil/#Und">2. The Underachiever Problem</a></li><li><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/leibniz-evil/#Hol">3. The Holiness Problem</a></li><li><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/leibniz-evil/#Bib">Bibliography</a></li><li><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/leibniz-evil/#Aca">Academic Tools</a></li><li><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/leibniz-evil/#Oth">Other Internet Resources</a></li><li><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/leibniz-evil/#Rel">Related Entries</a></li></ul><hr /><h2><a name="Var" id="Var">1. Various Versions of the Problem of Evil in Leibniz</a></h2><p>Before examining Leibniz's views on the problem of evil, it is necessary to do some stage-setting in order to locate just what sort of problem Leibniz thought evil presented. Consideration of any present-day introductory textbook of philosophy reveals that the problem of evil in contemporary philosophy is standardly regarded as an argument for atheism. The atheist contends that God and evil are incompatible, and given that evil clearly exists, God cannot exist. Some philosophers, conceding that the claimed incompatibility in the foregoing argument is too strong, contend, nevertheless, that even if the existence of God and the existence of evil should prove to be compatible, the existence (or duration, or amount, or pervasiveness) of evil provides us at the very least with compelling circumstantial evidence that God does not exist.</p><p>Framed in this way, the “atheistic problem of evil” invites certain sorts of responses. In particular, it invites the theist to explain how a being that is omniscient, omnibenevolent, and omnipotent can allow evil to exist. Present-day responses to the problem of evil therefore focus largely on presenting “theodicies,” that is, reasons why a perfect being does or might permit evil of the sort (or duration, or amount, or distribution) that we find in our world to exist.</p><p>When we consider, however, the works of medieval philosophers who address the problem of evil, the “atheistic problem” is not to be found. Since these figures believed that the arguments of natural theology demonstrated the existence of God, the problem that evil presented for them was different from that engaged by present-day philosophers. In present-day terminology, medieval philosophers did not engage the “evidential” problem of evil: rather, they engaged the “aporetic” problem of evil, in order to try to resolve the apparent logical incompatibility between God's attributes and the existence of evil. [On the distinction between these problems, see Adams and Adams (1990), pp. 1–3.] The problem, therefore, was taken to be that of explaining the compatibility of the existence of evil with divine moral purity or holiness. These philosophers believed that God is the author of everything that exists, and given that evil is one of the things that exists, it might seem that God is therefore the author of evil. And if an agent is an “author of evil,” he is therefore implicated in the evil and cannot be morally pure or holy. Thus, God cannot be morally pure nor holy. Let's call this version of the problem of evil the “holiness problem.” Before moving on, it should be noted that in light of the fact that Leibniz and his predecessors shared a commitment to God's existence, one might think that their approach to the problem of evil begs the question against the atheistic critic who charges that the existence of evil provides evidence that God does not exist. But this issue simply did not arise for Leibniz and his predecessors, given their antecedent belief in God's existence, and therefore it is inappropriate to charge these philosophers with begging the question.</p><p>Traditional theists held––and present-day theists still do hold––that God is the “author” or cause of everything in the cosmos in at least three different respects, so discussions of the holiness problem often branch off in three correspondingly different directions. First, God is regarded as the <em>creative cause</em> of everything in the cosmos. Everything that exists contingently is brought into existence by means of the creative activity of God. Second, it is held that God is the <em>conserving cause</em> of everything that exists. So God not only creates every created being, but every created being that continues to exist does so in virtue of God's continuously <em>maintaining</em> it in existence. Third, every action caused by a created being requires direct divine activity as <em>concurrent cause</em>. So every whack of a hammer, every strike of my fingertip on the keyboard, every tug of a magnet on a piece of iron, requires not only that the created being act, but also that the creator act concurrently with the created being in order to bring about the particular effect of the cause in question. [For a classic exposition of these various modes of divine causal involvement see St. Thomas Aquinas, <em>Disputationes de Potentia Dei</em>, Q.3, a.7, resp.]</p><p>Given that on this traditional account, God is intimately intertwined with the workings of the cosmos, the holiness problem seemed all the more intractable. In light of the intimate connections between God and the created world, the problem is not just that God created a world that happens to include evil, but that God seems to be causally (and thus morally) implicated in, for example, every particular act of murder, every earthquake, and every death caused by plague. Consequently, responses to the holiness problem sought to explain not only how God could remain holy despite having <em>created</em> a world such as ours, but also how he could remain holy despite <em>conserving</em> the world in existence and causally <em>cooperating</em> with all the events that occur in it.</p><p>In light of the fact that Leibniz lived in between these two eras, eras in which evil was taken to present different problems for the monotheistic philosopher, we are immediately led to wonder what sort of problem he sought to address. Leibniz expends a great deal of effort attempting to solve the holiness problem, but he also takes up something akin to the atheistic problem. It would be anachronistic, however, to claim that Leibniz was engaged with the atheistic problem, for in his time the existence of evil was taken to be an argument for an unorthodox form of theism rather than an argument for atheism. Thus, for example, a group of thinkers collectively known as the “Socinians” held, among other things, that the existence of evil was not incompatible with God's <em>existence</em>, but that it was incompatible with the existence of an <em>omniscient</em> God. The Socinians therefore held that God must not be omniscient, and that he must at the very least lack knowledge of future contingent events. [For Leibniz's view on the Socinians see <em>Theodicy</em> 364 (H343; G VI 318) <em>et passim</em>. More details on Socinianism can be found in Jolley, c.2, and Maclachlan.]</p><p>We might then characterize the problem raised by atheists in our own century and by the Socinians, to cite just one example from the seventeenth century, more broadly as the “underachiever problem.” According to the underachiever problem, if the sort of being that traditional monotheism identifies as God were to exist, the existence of this world would represent a vast underachievement on his part: therefore there is no such being. Atheists take this conclusion to prove that there is no God; the Socinians take it to show that God is not the sort of being that the traditional theist supposes him to be.</p><p>Although Leibniz is concerned about the underachiever problem, it is the Socinian, and not the atheistic, version of the problem that he engages. The winds of atheism had not reached the gale force proportions that they would in succeeding centuries. Consequently, this stronger conclusion was not yet taken as a serious, or at least the main, threat presented by the existence of evil.</p><p>It is important to distinguish between these versions of the problem of evil since we cannot understand Leibniz's treatment of evil in a given text until we know what problem it is that he means to be addressing in that text. Having set the stage in this way, we can now consider Leibniz's solutions to the problem of evil: we first consider the underachiever problem, and then turn to the holiness problem.</p><h2><a name="Und" id="Und">2. The Underachiever Problem</a></h2><p>The core of Leibniz's solution to the underachiever problem is straightforward. Leibniz argues that God does not underachieve in creating this world because this world is the best of all possible worlds. Many thinkers have supposed that commitment to the claim that this world is the best of all possible worlds follows straightforwardly from monotheism. Because God is omnipotent and omniscient, nothing can prevent him from creating the best world, and his omnibenevolence obliges him to create the best world. So the created world is the best world.</p><p>Leibniz's reasoning to this conclusion does not, however, follow this straightforward path: among other things, this reasoning is not cogent as it stands. A number of seventeenth-century figures recognized that God would not be obliged to create the best world if there were no such thing as the best world. There would be no best world if the series of possible worlds formed a continuum of increasingly good worlds <em>ad infinitum</em>. And if there is no best world, God cannot be faulted for failing to create the best one since to do so would be as impossible as, say, naming the highest number. There is no such number of course, and likewise no such world. So while God may be obliged to create a world that has at least some measure of goodness, he cannot be obliged, on this view, to create the best. And therefore it might be the case that God simply chose arbitrarily to create one of infinitely many morally acceptable worlds. [This line of argument was common among certain Jesuit scholastics of the period. For discussions of this issue, see, for example, Ruiz de Montoya, <em>Commentaria ac Disputationes in primam partem Summae Thologicae S. Thomae. De voluntate Dei et propiis actibus eius</em>, Lyon 1630, disp. 9 and 10, and Diego Granado, <em>Comentarii in primam partem Summae Theologicae S. Thomae</em>, Pont-a-Mousson, 1624, pp.420–433.]</p><p>Leibniz was aware of this argument denying God's obligation to create the best, but he was firmly committed to rejecting it, in virtue of a central principle of his philosophical system, the Principle of Sufficient Reason. According to the Principle of Sufficient Reason, for any state of affairs, there must be a sufficient reason that explains why that state of affairs and not some other state of affairs obtains. When it comes to our world, then, there must be some reason that explains why it, and not some other world, obtains. But there can be no such reason if it is the case that the goodness of worlds increases <em>ad infinitum</em>. Leibniz therefore concluded that there can be no infinite continuum of worlds.</p><p>One might be tempted to resist Leibniz's argument by saying that even according to the view on which there is an “infinite continuum of good worlds,” there is something that can serve as the sufficient reason for existence of this world, namely, <em>God's decree that this world be actual</em>. But such a response, Leibniz observes, would merely push the problem back, because the Principle of Sufficient Reason applies to free choices just as it applies to any other event or state of affairs. Thus, we would have to provide a sufficient reason for God's choice of this world instead of some other world on the continuum of morally acceptable worlds. And it seems that such a sufficient reason cannot be given on the infinite continuum of good worlds view. Note that the sufficient reason cannot be derived from some feature or fact about the world that is actually chosen, for this would raise the obvious question: Why did <em>this</em> feature in particular serve as the sufficient reason for God's choice? The only possible answers, it appears, would be: (a) Because God arbitrarily selected that feature as the one he would favor in deciding which world to create; or (b) Because that feature made that world better than all its competitors. But notice that neither of these answers is acceptable. The first is inconsistent with the Principle of Sufficient Reason. The second is incompatible with the hypothesis at issue, that there is no “best world.”</p><p>One might think that declaring this world to be the best possible world does not constitute a valid response to the underachiever problem. Indeed, such a response might be taken to provide the basis for a new underachiever argument along the following lines:</p><ol><li>If God were all-powerful, all-knowing, and all-good, then this world would be the best possible world.</li><li>But surely this world is not the best possible world.</li><li>Thus, God is not all-powerful, all-knowing, and all-good.</li></ol><p>Leibniz believes, however, that there was overwhelming evidence that the conclusion of this argument was false. He therefore must take one of the two premises in this argument to be false. Given that he himself is committed to the first premise, he must reject the second premise. And this is precisely what he does.</p><p>What reason, Leibniz asks, does the critic have for thinking that (2) is true? When Leibniz addresses this issue, he usually has the critic say something along the following lines:</p><blockquote><p>Surely this world is not the best possible world since we can easily conceive of possible worlds that are better. Take some token instance of suffering: the tragic bombing of the Oklahoma City federal building. Surely a world without that event would be better than the actual world. And there is no reason why God couldn't have created the world without that event. Thus, this is not the best possible world. [See <em>Theodicy</em> 118–119 (H 188–191; G VI 168–172).]</p></blockquote><p>Leibniz's response to this sort of criticism comes in two stages. First, Leibniz says that while we can think of certain token features of the world that in and of themselves might be better than they are, we do not know whether it is possible to create a better world lacking those features, because we can never be certain of the nature of the connections between the token events in question and other events in the world. If we could improve or eliminate the token event in question without otherwise changing the world, we might well have a better world. Unfortunately, we have no way of knowing whether such a change to the token event would leave the world otherwise unchanged, or might instead make things, on balance, worse. [See <em>Theodicy</em> 211–214 (H 260–2; G VI 244–7) and Gr, p.64f., for examples of this sort of response.]</p><p>Second, examples such as these are deceptive because they presume that God utilizes standards of world goodness that he may not in fact use. For example, it may presume that a world is good only if each part taken in isolation is good (a standard, we have seen, that Leibniz rejects), or it might presume that a world is good only if human beings enjoy happiness in it.</p><p>Leibniz argues in numerous texts that it is parochial to think that human happiness is the standard whereby the goodness of worlds is to be judged. A more reasonable standard, according to Leibniz, would be the happiness of all sentient beings. But once we admit this, it may turn out that the amount of unhappiness in the created realm is quite small, given that for all we know, the sentient beings on Earth might constitute a very small percentage of the sentient beings created by God. Here Leibniz includes not only preternatural beings such as angels, but also the possibility of extraterrestrial rational beings [<em>Theodicy</em> 19 (H 134–5; G VI 113–4)].</p><p>There is disagreement among Leibniz scholars about the basis for judging the goodness of worlds. Various scholars have defended one or more of the following:</p><ol><li>The best world is the one that maximizes the happiness (i.e., virtue) of rational beings.</li><li>The best world is the one that maximizes the “quantity of essence.”</li><li>The best world is the one that yields the greatest variety of phenomena governed by the simplest set of laws.</li></ol><p>There is scholarly dispute about whether Leibniz believed that the maximization of the happiness or virtue of rational beings is one of the standards by which God judges the goodness of the world. [For supporters of this claim see Rutherford, c.3; Blumenfeld, Brown; for detractors see Russell, p. 199, Gale.] It is unlikely that Leibniz believed that (1) alone was the true standard of goodness of the world in light of following comment on an argument advanced by Bayle:</p><blockquote><p>the author is still presupposing that false maxim … stating that the happiness of rational creatures is the sole aim of God. [<em>Theodicy</em> 120 (H 192; G VI 172)]</p></blockquote><p>In part, the dispute over this standard hangs on whether or not (1) is compatible with the more metaphysical standards embodied in (2) and (3), since it is these more metaphysical standards that Leibniz seems to endorse most consistently. In some cases, Leibniz writes as if the standard of happiness is fully compatible with the more metaphysical criteria. For example, within a single work, the <em>Discourse on Metaphysics</em>, Leibniz entitled Section 5 “What the rules of the perfection of divine conduct consist in, and that the simplicity of the ways is in balance with the richness of effects,” and he entitled Section 36: “God is the monarch of the most perfect republic, composed of all minds, and the happiness of this city of God is his principal purpose.” So Leibniz seems to advance both standards (1) and (3) in the same work [For another example, see R p. 105 (K X pp.9–10)]. In other places however, he writes as if they compete with one another [See <em>Theodicy</em> 124 (H 197–8; G VI 178–9).]</p><p>Whatever position one comes to hold on this matter, Leibniz often points to the more metaphysical standards as the ones God utilizes in assessing the goodness of worlds. But there is further controversy over exactly which metaphysical standard, (2) or (3), Leibniz endorses. In general, Leibniz holds that God creates the world in order to share his goodness with created things in the most perfect manner possible [Gr 355–6]. In light of the fact that created beings, in virtue of their limitations, can mirror the divine goodness only in limited respects, God creates a variety of things, each of which has an essence that reflects a different facet of divine perfection in its own unique way. Since this is God's purpose in creating the world, it would be reasonable to think that maximizing the mirroring of divine goodness in creation is the goal that God seeks to achieve. And this in fact is one of the standards Leibniz seems to endorse. We might call this the “maximization of essence” standard. Leibniz seems convinced that the actual world meets this standard and that creatures are to be found that mirror the divine perfections in all the sorts of ways that creatures can do this. Thus, there are creatures with bodies and creatures without, creatures with freedom and intelligence and creatures without, creatures with sentience and creatures without, etc. [See, for example, MP pp. 75–6 and 138 (G VII 303–4 and 310).]</p><p>In some texts, however, Leibniz frames the standard of goodness in what some have taken to be a third distinct way. In these places he argues that the goodness of a world is measured by the ratio between the variety of phenomena that a world contains and the simplicity of the laws that govern that world. Here Leibniz emphasizes the fact that the perfection of a world that maximizes the variety of phenomena it contains is enhanced by the simplicity of its laws since this displays the intelligence of the creator who created it.</p><p>Some scholars have argued that one or the other of these two more metaphysical standards represents Leibniz's settled view on the true standard of goodness [Gale, for example]. Other scholars have argued that, in the end, the two standards are not exclusive of each other. [See Rutherford, cc.2–3 and Rescher, c.1 for two very different ways of harmonizing (2) and (3).]</p><p>Regardless of which of these interpretations is correct, if these are the standards by which God judges the world's goodness, it becomes much more difficult to defend the claim that this is not the best possible world. We can use standard (3) to illustrate. In order, for example, for God to eliminate the Oklahoma City bombing from the world, what would be required in order for him to do so? There are presumably a number of ways in which this might be done. The most obvious would involve miraculous intervention somewhere in the chain of events leading up to the explosion. God might miraculously prevent the explosives from detonating, or he might eliminate the truck and its contents from the world. But this sort of miraculous intervention would require that the laws governing the the world become more complex. Consequently, Leibniz, and others who share this view of what the goodness of a world consists in, such as Malebranche, think that miraculous intervention is generally repugnant and would require vastly outweighing goods to result from a miraculous intervention in order for such an intervention to be permissible. [See <em>Theodicy</em> 129 (H 192–3; G VI 182).]</p><p>In any event, Leibniz holds that we are simply unable to know how changing certain events would change the world's capacity to meet the standards of goodness described in (2) and (3). Thus, according to Leibniz, we are not justified in claiming that this world is not as good, all things considered, as some other possible world. According to Leibniz, then, the underachiever problem cannot get off the ground unless the critic is able to defend the claim that this world is not the best possible world. It should be noted that Leibniz's approach to the underachiever problem thus seems be immune to the line of criticism pressed by Voltaire in <em>Candide</em>, namely, that it is obvious that this world is not the best possible world because there are so many manifest evils in it. Leibniz does not believe that each individual event is the best possible event, and he does not think that it is possible for finite minds to demonstrate that every individual event must be a part of the best possible world: rather, he believes that the world as a whole is the best possible world. (That said, it should be noted that there is considerable scholarly controversy as to whether Voltaire's target in <em>Candide</em> is indeed Leibniz: it has been claimed, for example, that the “optimism” lampooned in <em>Candide</em> is closer to that of Pope (see Rutherford (1995); on the general reception of Leibniz in France, see Barber (1955)].) In any event, on Leibniz's view, our inability to know how changing certain events in the world would affect other events and our inability to know how such changes would affect the overall goodness of the world make it impossible to defend the claim that the manifest evils in the world constitute evidence that this is not the best possible world.</p><h2><a name="Hol" id="Hol">3. The Holiness Problem</a></h2><p>Far less scholarly attention has been devoted to Leibniz's treatment of the holiness problem, if only because this conception of the problem has only recently been recognized by Leibniz scholars. As noted above, the main problem here is that God's character seems to be stained by evil because God causally contributes to the existence of everything in the world, and evil is one of those things. [For two recent treatments see Sleigh (1996) and Murray (2005)]</p><p>The standard solution adopted by medieval thinkers was to deny an assumption of the preceding argument, namely, that evil is “something.” Evil was claimed not to have any positive reality, but to be a mere “privation” or “lack” of being. On such a view, evil has no more reality than the hole in the center of a donut. Making a donut does not require putting together two components, the cake and the hole: the cake is all that there is to the donut, and the hole is just the “privation of cake.” It therefore would be silly to say that making the donut requires causing both the cake and the hole to exist. Causing the cake to exist causes the hole as a “by-product” of causing a particular kind of cake to exist. Thus, we need not assume any additional cause for the hole beyond that assumed for the causing of the cake.</p><p>The upshot of our pastry analogy is this: given that evil, like the hole, is merely a privation, it requires no cause (or as the medievals, and Leibniz, liked to say, it needs no “cause <em>per se</em>”). God does not “causally contribute to the existence of evil” because evil <em>per se</em> is not a thing and therefore requires no cause in order to exist. And since God does not cause the existence of evil, God cannot be causally implicated in evil. Thus, the holiness problem evaporates.</p><p>Early in his philosophical career, Leibniz, like other seventeenth-century philosophers, scoffed at this solution to the holiness problem. In a short piece entitled “The Author of Sin,” Leibniz explains why he thinks the privation response to the holiness problem fails. Leibniz argues that God is the author of all that is real and positive in the world, and that God is therefore also the “author” of all of privations in the world. “It is a manifest illusion to hold that God is not the author of sin because there is no such thing as an author of a privation, even though he can be called the author of everything which is real and positive in the sinful act” [A.6.3.150].</p><p>Leibniz explains why he takes this response to be a “manifest illusion,” through the consideration of an example. Suppose that a painter creates two paintings that are identical in every respect, except that the one is a scaled down version of the other. It would be absurd, Leibniz remarks,</p><blockquote><p>… to say that the painter is the author of all that is real in the two paintings, without however being the author of what is lacking or the disproportion between the larger and the smaller painting… . In effect, what is lacking is nothing more than a simple result of an infallible consequence of that which is positive, without any need for a distinct author [of that which is lacking]. [A.6.3.151]</p></blockquote><p>So even if it is true that evil is a privation, this does not have as a consequence that God is not the author of sin. Given that what is positively willed by God is a sufficient condition for the existence of the evil state of affairs, in virtue of willing what is positive in some state of affairs, God is also the author of what is privative in that state of affairs. [A similar early critique is found at A.6.3.544].</p><p>Leibniz therefore sought to develop a different strategy in order to clear God of the charge of being the author of sin. In the <em>Philosopher's Confession</em>, his most significant treatise on evil aside from the <em>Theodicy</em>, Leibniz claims that although God wills everything in the world, his will with respect to goods is <em>decretory</em> , whereas his will with respect to evils is merely <em>permissive</em>. And Leibniz argues that God's permissive willing of evils is morally permissible if and only if such permission of evil is necessary in order for one to meet one's moral obligations..</p><p>It should be noted that Leibniz does not think that the permission of evil is morally justified on the grounds that such permission <em>brings about a greater good that may not otherwise be achieved</em>. Such an explanation, according to Leibniz, would make it the case that God would violate in the the Biblical injunction “not to do evil that good may come” [<em>Causa Dei</em> 36 (S 121; G VI 444)]. Leibniz therefore claims that the evil that God permits is a <em>necessary consequence of God's fulfilling his duty</em> (namely, to create the best world). Leibniz characterizes (morally permissible) permission as follows:</p><blockquote><p><em>P</em> permits <em>E</em> iff:</p><ol><li><em>P</em> fails to will that <em>E</em></li><li><em>P</em> fails to will that not-<em>E</em></li><li><em>P</em> brings it about that the state of affairs <em>S</em> obtains by willing that <em>S</em> obtains</li><li>If <em>S</em> obtains then <em>E</em> obtains</li><li><em>P</em> knows that (4)</li><li><em>P</em> believes that it is <em>P</em>'s duty to will <em>S</em> and that the good of performing one's duty outweighs the evil entailed by <em>E</em>'s obtaining</li></ol><p>[This account is distilled from A.6.3.129–131]</p></blockquote><p>This, Leibniz believes, resolves any holiness problem that might arise in so far as God is considered as the creator of the universe. However, after writing the <em>Philosopher's Confession</em>, Leibniz became increasingly concerned that a tension might arise in his account when it was applied to the holiness problem in the context of <em>concurrence</em>. Recall that traditional theists held that God was not only creator and conserver of all created things, but that God also was the concurrent cause of all actions of created things.</p><p>There were heated debates in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries concerning the nature of divine concurrence. The dispute centered on the respect in which God concurred with the free acts of creatures. This was an especially pressing problem for the obvious reason that positing too close a connection between God and created beings in cases where moral evils are committed runs the risk of implicating God in the evil, thus raising the holiness problem all over again. This debate often focused on a certain type of proposition and on what made this type of proposition true. The propositions in question are called “conditional future contingents”, propositions of the form:</p><blockquote><p>If agent <em>S</em> were in circumstances <em>C</em> and time <em>t</em>, <em>S</em> would freely chose to <em>f</em>.</p></blockquote><p>Propositions of this form were particularly important in discussions of philosophical theology in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries because it was believed that it was necessary that God know propositions of this type in order to exercise providential control over the free actions of created beings. In order to exercise providential control over free actions in the created world, God must know precisely how each such being will choose to act in each circumstance in which it will find itself. If God, for example, did not know what Eve would choose to do when confronted by the serpent, or what I would choose to do when confronted with a tuna sandwich, God could not know in advance the order of events in the universe he deigns to create.</p><p>But <em>how</em> does God know whether or not a token proposition of this type is true? In general, disputants in this period held that there are only two possible answers to this question. God knows that a token proposition of this type is true either because he wills that that proposition be true, or he knows that proposition to be true because something independent of his will makes it true, and God, in virtue of his omniscience, therefore knows it to be true. Following recent scholarship, we will call the first view the “postvolitional view” (since the truth of the proposition is determined only after God wills it) and the latter view the “prevolitional” view (since the truth of the proposition is independent of what God wills). In his early writings on the topic, Leibniz seemed inclined to postvolitionalism. So take the token proposition:</p><blockquote><p>If Peter were accused of consorting with Christ during Christ's trial, Peter would deny Christ.</p></blockquote><p>The early Leibniz holds that this type of proposition is true because God decrees that it would be true: that is, God decrees that Peter would deny Christ under these circumstances [see C 26–7 and Gr 312–3]. Furthermore, those who held this view generally held that it was in virtue of divine concurrence that God makes the proposition true in the actual world. So, in virtue of causally influencing Peter at the moment of his decision, God brings it about that Peter denies Christ in these circumstances.</p><p>This view obviously faces a number of difficulties. For our purposes, the most pressing one is that it seems to undercut Leibniz's solution to the holiness problem based on permission. For if the above proposition is true because God wills that it be true, then it would seem that God wills that Peter sin, and if he wills that Peter sin, he cannot merely permit it, in light of condition (1) of the definition of permission given above. Consequently, it appears that Leibniz must abandon his initial answer to the question of “what makes conditional future contingents true” and adopt the alternative answer.</p><p>The alternative answer also raises problems. What does it mean to say that the truth of the proposition is determined independently of God's will? Defenders of this view usually hold that the human will cannot be determined. When an agent chooses freely, nothing can “determine” or “cause” the choice, for otherwise the ehoice would not be free. Thus, for those who defended this view, the answer to the question of “what makes conditional future contingents true” ought to be “nothing.” For if something <em>made</em> future contingents true, then <em>that thing</em> would determine the choice, and the choice would not be free.</p><p>Given his commitment to the Principle of Sufficient Reason, however, Leibniz could not endorse such a view. Does Leibniz, then, have an answer to this question that will rescue him from the holiness problem? There is scholarly disagreement about this issue. Some have held that Leibniz is obliged to hold the postvolitional view despite the difficulties that it raises for him. [See Davidson (1996), Sleigh (1994).] Others have held that Leibniz tried to forge a third alternative in order to avoid this seemingly intractable dilemma. [See Murray (2005); for an alternative to Murray (2005), see Cover and Hawthorne (2000)]. I will close by considering the latter suggestion.</p><p>According to Leibniz, free choice in humans is brought about through the activity of the human intellect and the human will working in concert with each other. The intellect deliberates about alternatives and selects the one that it perceives to be the best, all things considered. The intellect then represents this alternative to the will as the best course of action. The will, which Leibniz takes to be an “appetite for the good,”, then chooses the alternative represented to it as containing the most goodness [<em>Theodicy</em>, 311 (H 314; G VI 300–1].</p><p>On this view, it appears that there are two ways in which I might exercise “control” over my acts of will. First, I might be able to control what appears to me to be the best course of action, all things considered. That is, I might control the process of deliberation. Second, I might be able to control which alternative is presented to the will as containing the greatest good. Leibniz seems to accept both of these possibilities. In certain passages, he argues that by engaging in some sort of moral therapy, I can control which things appear to me to be good, and thus control the outcome of my deliberations. In other passages, he seems to say that while the will does “infallibly” choose that which the intellect deems to be the best, the will nevertheless retains the power to resist the intellect because the intellect does not “cause” the will to choose as it does. [Concerning the first strategy, see, for example, <em>Reflections on Hobbes</em>, 5 (H 396–7; G VI 391–1). For more on this aspect of Leibniz's view of freedom see Seidler (1985). Concerning the second strategy see, for example <em>Theodicy</em> 282 (H 298–300; G VI 284–5).]</p><p>Both suggestions face difficulties. Consider the first. How might I go about engaging in “moral therapy”? First, I would have to choose to do something to begin to bring about a change in how I see things. But of course I can make a choice to do this only if I first deliberate about it and see that making this change is the best thing for me to do. But did I have control over this process of “coming to see that a change is the best thing for me to do”? It seems that I may have control here only if I have control over the actions that led me to see things this way in the first place. But do I have control over those actions? If the answer is yes, it is only because I had control over my prior deliberations, and it looks as if this will lead us back in the chain of explanation to certain very early formative stages of my moral and intellectual life, stages over which it is hard to believe I had any control. It therefore seems that this line of reasoning will be difficult to sustain.</p><p>Let us consider the second alternative then, according to which I have control because the will is never “causally determined” to choose that which the intellect deems to be best in those circumstances. Leibniz holds that the will is not causally determined in the act of choice but merely “morally necessitated.” There is scholarly disagreement about the interpretation of this phrase. Some think it just means “causally necessitated.” But if this is right, it appears that God, who establishes the laws of nature, determines how creatures act, and this leads us back to the suggestion that Leibniz was a postvolitionalist in these matters. As we noted above, this is a troubling position for Leibniz to adopt since it seems to undermine his response to the holiness problem. [For various positions on the nature of “moral necessity,” see Adams, pp. 21–2, Sleigh (2000), Murray (1995), pp. 95–102, and (1996), esp. Section IV].</p><p>Others have held that moral necessity is a philosophical novelty, invented to explain the unique relationship between intellect and will. On this view, the will infallibly follows the determination of the intellect, without thereby being causally determined. Leibniz sometimes hints at this reading, as in the following example derived from Pierre Nicole:</p><blockquote><p>It is considered impossible that a wise and serious magistrate, who has not taken leave of his senses, should publicly commit some outrageous action, as it would be, for instance, to run about the streets naked in order to make people laugh [<em>Theodicy</em> 282 (H299; G VI 284)]</p></blockquote><p>Here, the wise magistrate is not causally determined to refrain from streaking to make people laugh. Instead, he just considers streaking to be so unseemly that “he can't bring himself to do it.” Something about his psychological constitution prevents him from seeing this as something that he might actually do, even though there is surely some sense in which he nevertheless <em>could do it</em>.</p><p>If we allow Leibniz to locate control over actions in a will that is only morally necessitated by the intellect, is there a way for him to avoid the postvolitional/prevolitional dilemma discussed earlier? The answer is not obvious. One would have to say that the will's infallibly choosing in accordance with the deliverances of the intellect is a fact whose truth is <em>independent of God's will</em>, while also saying that the deliverances of the intellect provide a <em>sufficient reason</em> for the will's choice. If this can be done, Leibniz may have a way of avoiding the difficulty posed by conditional future contingents.</p><p>However we might think these questions should be resolved, Leibniz himself appears to have thought that the prevolitional route was the one to take. He does not think that God makes it the case how human beings would act if they were created; rather, Leibniz believes God "discovers" in the ideas of the possibles how human beings would act if they were created [on this topic see Sleigh (1994).] [Leibniz speaks of these truths about how human beings will act as “limitations” that prevent God from making them, and the world that contains them, more perfect. In the end, it is these limitations, Leibniz argues, that prevent there from being a better world than the actual one. [On the notion of “limitations” see AG 60–2, 11, <em>Theodicy</em> 20 (H 86–7; G VI 114–5), <em>Causa Dei</em> 69–71 (S 128–30; 457–8).] If this interpretation is correct, then we might think that the permission strategy will work as a solution to the holiness problem both when it comes to defending God as creator and as concurrent cause of all effects in the cosmos.</p><p>Interestingly, however, Leibniz comes to favor, in later life, the scholastic “privation” view that he rejected in his earliest writings on the problem of evil. [See, for example, <em>Theodicy</em> 20, 30, 153 (respectively, H 86–7, 91–2, 219–20; G VI 114–5, 119–20, 201.] Leibniz's conception of privation in general, and the relation between his earlier and later views on the topic, has recently received a sustained and searching examination in Newlands (forthcoming), to which readers interested in the topic are directed.</p><p>The issues that arise in thinking about Leibniz's views on the problem of evil have only in the past couple of decades begun to receive the sustained scholarly attention that they deserve in virtue of their manifest significance for Leibniz. In the last few years in particular––probably not coincidentally, the three-hundredth anniversary of the publication of the <em>Theodicy</em> was celebrated in 2010––considerable interpretive attention has been devoted to the details of Leibniz's treatment of the problem of evil and related topics. [Rateau (2008) is the first book-length treatment of Leibniz's work on the problem of evil; the essays in Rateau (2011) and Newlands and Jorgensen (forthcoming) are devoted to particular topics related to Leibniz's treatment of the problem of evil.] Given the fact that Leibniz's treatment of the problem of evil draws on medieval sources and also was taken as a target by later writers such as Voltaire and Kant, renewed interest in Leibniz's treatment of the problem of evil, combined with the resurgence of interest in contextual history of philosophy, have inspired recent work on the general historical significance of Leibniz's work on the problem of evil that seeks to illuminate later approaches to the problem of evil as well as the nature of the problem of evil itself. [See, <em>inter alia</em>, Larrimore (2004), Neiman (2002), and the essays in Rateau (2009).] In light of the fact that new translations of Leibniz's central texts devoted to the problem of evil have either only relatively recently been published (CP) or are in process––a new edition and English translation of the <em>Theodicy</em>, by Sean Greenberg and R. C. Sleigh, Jr., is well underway and under contract with Oxford University Press–and given that other new texts, like DPW, that bear on this nest of issues may well be discovered, there is reason to expect that this topic will continue to be an active area of Leibniz scholarship, and therefore that any conclusions about Leibniz's views on the problem of evil must, for now, remain tentative and subject to revision.</p><h2><a name="Bib" id="Bib">Bibliography</a></h2><h3>Primary Sources</h3><table border="0"><tr><td valign="top">[<strong>A</strong>]</td><td valign="top"><em>Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe</em> . Darmstadt and Berlin: Berlin Academy, 1923-. Cited by series, volume, and page.</td></tr><tr><td valign="top">[<strong>AG</strong>]</td><td valign="top"><em>Philosophical Essays</em>. Roger Ariew and Daniel Garber (eds. and trans.), Indianapolis: Hackett, 1989.</td></tr><tr><td valign="top">[<strong>C</strong>]</td><td valign="top">Louis Couturat (ed.), <em>Opuscules et Fragments Inédits de Leibniz.</em> Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1966.</td></tr><tr><td valign="top">[<strong>CP</strong>]</td><td valign="top">R. C. Sleigh, Jr. (editor and translator), with contributions from Brandon Look and James Stam, <em><span class="c3">Confessio Philosophi</span>: Papers Concerning the Problem of Evil, 1671–1678</em>. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005.</td></tr><tr><td valign="top">[<strong>DPW</strong>]</td><td valign="top">Michael Murray (editor and translator), <em>Dissertation on Predestination and Grace</em>. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2011.</td></tr><tr><td valign="top">[<strong>G</strong>]</td><td valign="top"><em>Die Philosophischen Schriften von Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz</em>. Edited by C.I. Gerhardt. Berlin: Weidman, 1875–1890. Cited by volume and page.</td></tr><tr><td valign="top">[<strong>Gr</strong>]</td><td valign="top"><em>Textes Inédits</em>. Edited by Gaston Grua. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1948.</td></tr><tr><td valign="top">[<strong>H</strong>]</td><td valign="top"><em>Theodicy</em>. Edited by Austin Farrer and translated by E.M. Huggard. New Haven: Yale UP, 1952.</td></tr><tr><td valign="top">[<strong>MP</strong>]</td><td valign="top">Mary Morris and G.H.R. Parkinson (eds. and trans.), <em>Leibniz-Philosophical Writings</em>, London: J.M. Dent and Sons, 1973.</td></tr><tr><td valign="top">[<strong>R</strong>]</td><td valign="top">G.W. Leibniz, <em>Political Writings</em>. Patrick Riley (ed. and trans.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988.</td></tr><tr><td valign="top">[<strong>S</strong>]</td><td valign="top">Paul Schrecker and Anne Martin Schrecker (eds. and trans.), <em>Leibniz: Monadology and Other Philosophical Essays</em>, Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965.</td></tr></table><h3>Secondary Sources</h3><ul class="hanging"><li>Antognazza, Maria Rosa, 2009, <em>Leibniz: An Intellectual Autobiography</em>, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.</li><li>Adams, Robert, 1995, <em>Leibniz: Determinist, Theist, Idealist</em>, Oxford: Oxford University Press.</li><li>Adams, Marilyn Mccord and Robert Adams (editors), 1990, <em>The Problem of Evil</em>, Oxford: Oxford University Press.</li><li>Barber, W. H., 1955, <em>Leibniz in France, from Arnauld to Voltaire: A Study in French Reactions to Leibnizianism</em>, Oxford: Oxford University Press.</li><li>Blumenfeld, David, 1994, “Perfection and Happiness in the Best Possible World,” <em>The Cambridge Companion to Leibniz</em>, Nicholas Jolley (ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.</li><li>Brown, Gregory, 1988, “Leibniz's Theodicy and the Confluence of Worldly Goods,” <em>Journal of the History of Philosophy</em>, 26: 571–91.</li><li>Cover, J. and Hawthorne, J., 2000, “Leibnizian Modality Again: A Reply to Murray,” <em>The Leibniz Review</em>, (December): 87–103.</li><li>Davidson, Jack, 1996, “Untying the Knot: Leibniz's on God's Knowledge of Future Free Contingents,” <em>History of Philosophy Quarterly</em>, 13: 89–116.</li><li>Gale, George, 1976, “On What God Chose: Perfection and God's Freedom,” <em>Studia Leibnitiana</em>, 8: 69–87.</li><li>Jolley, Nicholas, 1984, <em>Leibniz and Locke: A Study of the New Essays in Human Understanding</em>, Oxford: Clarendon Press.</li><li>Klopp, Onno (ed.), 1864–84, <em>Die Werke von Leibniz</em>. <em>Reihe I: Historisch-politische und staatswissenschaftliche Schriften</em>, Hannover: Klindworth.</li><li>Larrimore, Mark, 2004, “Autonomy and the Invention of Theodicy,” <em>New Essays on the History of Autonomy: A Collection Honoring J. B. Schneewind</em>, Natalie Brender and Lawrence Krasnoff (eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 61–91.</li><li>MacLachlan, H.J., 1951, <em>Socinianism in Seventeenth-century England</em>, Oxford: Oxford University Press.</li><li>Murray, Michael J., 1995, “Leibniz on Divine Knowledge of Conditional Future Contingents and Human Freedom,” <em>Philosophy and Phenomenological Research</em>, 55: 75–108.</li><li>–––, 1996, “Intellect, Will, and Freedom: Leibniz and His Precursors,” <em>The Leibniz Society Review</em>, 6: 25–60.</li><li>–––, 2005, “Spontaneity and Freedom in Leibniz,” <em>Leibniz: Nature and Freedom</em>, Donald Rutherford and Jan Cover (eds.), New York: Oxford University Press, 2005, pp. 194–216.</li><li>Neiman, Susan, 2002, <em>Evil in Modern Thought: An Alternative History of Philosophy</em>, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.</li><li>Newlands, Samuel, forthcoming, “Leibniz on Privations, Limitations, and the Metaphysics of Evil,” <em>Journal of the History of Philosophy</em>.</li><li>–––, and Larry M. Jorgensen (eds.), forthcoming, <em>New Essays on Leibniz's Theodicy</em>, Oxford: Oxford University Press.</li><li>Rateau, Paul, 2008, <em>La Question du mal chez Leibniz: Fondements et élaboration de la Théodicée</em>, Paris: Editions Honoré Champion.</li><li>––– (ed.), 2011, <em>Lectures et interprétations des Essais de théodicée de G. W. Leibniz</em>, Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag.</li><li>Rescher, Nicholas, 1981, <em>Leibniz's Metaphysics of Nature</em>, Dordrecht: D. Reidel.</li><li>Rutherford, Donald, 1995, <em>Leibniz and the Rational Order of Nature</em>, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.</li><li>Sleigh, Robert C., 1994, “Leibniz on Divine Foreknowledge,” <em>Faith and Philosophy</em>, 11(4): 547–571.</li><li>–––, 1996, “Leibniz's First Theodicy,” <em>Noûs</em>, 30: 481–499.</li><li>–––, 2000, “Determinism and Human Freedom,” <em>The Cambridge History of Seventeenth-Century Philosophy</em>, Daniel Garber and Michael Ayers (eds.), New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 1195–1273.</li></ul><h2><a name="Aca" id="Aca">Academic Tools</a></h2><blockquote><table><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://plato.stanford.edu/symbols/sepman-icon.jpg" alt="sep man icon" /></td><td><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/cgi-bin/encyclopedia/archinfo.cgi?entry=leibniz-evil" target="other">How to cite this entry</a>.</td></tr><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://plato.stanford.edu/symbols/sepman-icon.jpg" alt="sep man icon" /></td><td><a href="https://leibniz.stanford.edu/friends/preview/leibniz-evil/" target="other">Preview the PDF version of this entry</a> at the <a href="https://leibniz.stanford.edu/friends/" target="other">Friends of the SEP Society</a>.</td></tr><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://plato.stanford.edu/symbols/inpho.png" alt="inpho icon" /></td><td><a href="https://inpho.cogs.indiana.edu/entity?sep=leibniz-evil&redirect=True" target="other">Look up this entry topic</a> at the <a href="https://inpho.cogs.indiana.edu/" target="other">Indiana Philosophy Ontology Project</a> (InPhO).</td></tr><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://plato.stanford.edu/symbols/pp.gif" alt="phil papers icon" /></td><td><a href="http://philpapers.org/sep/leibniz-evil/" target="other">Enhanced bibliography for this entry</a> at <a href="http://philpapers.org/" target="other">PhilPapers</a>, with links to its database.</td></tr></table></blockquote><h2><a name="Oth" id="Oth">Other Internet Resources</a></h2><ul><li><a href="http://www.gwleibniz.com/" target="other">Leibnitiana</a>, maintained by Gregory Brown (University of Houston)</li><li><a href="http://www.leibniz-translations.com/" target="other">Web-only Leibniz translations</a>, maintained by Lloyd Strickland</li></ul><h2><a name="Rel" id="Rel">Related Entries</a></h2><p><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/leibniz/">Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm</a></p></div><div id="foot"><span class="c4"><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/info.html#c">Copyright © 2013</a> by</span><br /><a href="http://www.fandm.edu/x11310?id=204" target="other">Michael Murray</a><br />Sean Greenberg <<a href="mailto:greenbes%40uci.edu"><em>greenbes<abbr title=" at ">@</abbr>uci<abbr title=" dot ">.</abbr>edu</em></a>></div><p><em>This entry passed through the <a href="http://fivefilters.org/content-only/">Full-Text RSS</a> service — if this is your content and you're reading it on someone else's site, please read the FAQ at <a href="http://fivefilters.org/content-only/faq.php#publishers">fivefilters.org/content-only/faq.php#publishers</a>. <a href="http://fivefilters.org">Five Filters</a> recommends: <a href="http://www.medialens.org/index.php/alerts/alert-archive/alerts-2013/715-eyes-like-blank-discs-the-guardian-s-steven-poole-on-george-orwell-s-politics-and-the-english-language.html">Eyes Like Blank Discs - The Guardian's Steven Poole On George Orwell's Politics And The English Language</a>.</em></p><br />This post was made using the <a href='http://www.webmagnates.org/auto-blogging-software.html' title='auto-blogging software'>Auto Blogging Software</a> from <a href='http://www.webmagnates.org' title'make money online'>WebMagnates.org</a> This line will not appear when posts are made after activating the software to full version.Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10303290079976590343noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5448411214494413217.post-19987938999603811622013-02-28T17:24:00.000-08:002013-02-28T17:25:11.698-08:00Theoretical Terms in Science <div id="aueditable"><div id="pubinfo"><em>First published Mon Feb 25, 2013</em></div><p>The notion of a theoretical term may simply be understood as applying to expressions that refer to nonobservational entities. Paradigmatic examples of such entities are electrons, neutrinos, gravitational forces, genes etc. There is yet another explanation of theoreticity: a theoretical term is one whose meaning becomes determined through the axioms of a scientific theory. The meaning of the term ‘force’, for example, is seen to be determined by Newton's laws of motion and further laws about special forces, such as the law of gravitation. Theoreticity is a property that is commonly applied to both expressions in the language of science and the corresponding referents and concepts. Objects, relations and functions as well as concepts thereof may thus qualify as theoretical in a derived sense.</p><p>Several semantics have been devised that aim to explain how a scientific theory contributes to the interpretation of its theoretical terms and as such determines what they mean and how they are understood. All of these semantics assume the respective theory to be given in an axiomatic fashion. Yet, theoretical terms are also recognizable in scientific theories which have as yet resisted a satisfying axiomatization. This is due to the fact that these theories contain general propositions that have the logical form of universal axioms.</p><p>Theoretical terms pertain to a number of topics in the philosophy of science. A fully fledged semantics of such terms commonly involves a statement about scientific realism and its alternatives. Such a semantics, moreover, may involve an account of how observation is related to theory in science. All formal accounts of theoretical terms deny the analytic-synthetic distinction to be applicable to the axioms of a scientific theory. The recognition of theoretical terms in the language of science by Carnap thus amounts to a rejection of an essential tenet of early logical empiricism and positivism, viz., the demonstration that all empirically significant sentences are translatable into an observation language. The present article explains the principal distinction between observational and theoretical terms, discusses important criticisms and refinements of this distinction and investigates two problems concerning the semantics of theoretical terms. Finally, the major formal accounts of this semantics are expounded.</p><ul><li><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/theoretical-terms-science/#1">1. Two Criteria of Theoreticity</a><ul><li><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/theoretical-terms-science/#1.1">1.1 Reference to Nonobservable Entities and Properties</a></li><li><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/theoretical-terms-science/#1.2">1.2 Semantic Dependence upon a Scientific Theory</a></li></ul></li><li><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/theoretical-terms-science/#2">2. Criticisms and Refinements of the Theory-Observation Distinction</a><ul><li><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/theoretical-terms-science/#2.1">2.1 Criticisms</a></li><li><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/theoretical-terms-science/#2.2">2.2 Refinements</a></li></ul></li><li><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/theoretical-terms-science/#3">3. Two Problems of Theoretical Terms</a><ul><li><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/theoretical-terms-science/#3.1">3.1 Theoretical Entities</a></li><li><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/theoretical-terms-science/#3.2">3.2 Theoretical Functions and Relations</a></li></ul></li><li><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/theoretical-terms-science/#4">4. Formal Accounts</a><ul><li><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/theoretical-terms-science/#4.1">4.1 Ramsey Sentence</a></li><li><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/theoretical-terms-science/#4.2">4.2 Indirect Interpretation</a></li><li><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/theoretical-terms-science/#4.2">4.3 Direct Interpretation</a></li><li><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/theoretical-terms-science/#4.3">4.4 Defining Theoretical Terms</a></li></ul></li><li><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/theoretical-terms-science/#5">5. Conclusion</a></li><li><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/theoretical-terms-science/#Bib">Bibliography</a></li><li><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/theoretical-terms-science/#Aca">Academic Tools</a></li><li><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/theoretical-terms-science/#Oth">Other Internet Resources</a></li><li><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/theoretical-terms-science/#Rel">Related Entries</a></li></ul><hr /><h2><a name="1" id="1">1. Two Criteria of Theoreticity</a></h2><h3><a name="1.1" id="1.1">1.1 Reference to Nonobservable Entities and Properties</a></h3><p>As just explained, a theoretical term may simply be understood as an expression that refers to nonobservable entities or properties. Theoreticity, on this understanding, is the negation of observabilty. This explanation of theoreticity thus rests on an antecedent understanding of observability. What makes an entity or property observable? As Carnap (1966, Ch. 23) has pointed out, a philosopher understands the notion of observability in a narrower sense than a physicist. For a philosopher, a property is observable if it can be ‘directly perceived by the senses’. Hence, such properties as ‘blue’, ‘hard’ and ‘colder than’ are paradigmatic examples of observable properties in the philosopher's understanding of observability. The physicist, by contrast, would also count quantitative magnitudes that can be measured in a ‘relatively simple, direct way’ as observable. Hence, the physicist views such quantities as temperature, pressure and intensity of electric current as observable.</p><p>The notion of direct perception is spelled out by Carnap (1966, Ch. 23) by two conditions. Direct perception means, first, perception unaided by technical instruments and, second, that the perception is unaided by inferences. These conditions are obviously not satisfied for the measurement of quantities like temperature and pressure. For the philosopher, only spatial positions of liquids and pointers are observed when these quantities are measured. To an even higher degree, we are unable to observe electrons, molecules, gravitational forces and genes on this narrow understanding of observability. Hence, expressions referring to such entities qualify as theoretical.</p><p>In sum, a property or object is observable (in the philosopher's sense) if it can be perceived directly, where directness of observation precludes the use of technical artifacts and inferences. Notably, Carnap (1936/37, 455; 1966, 226) did not think his explanation of the distinction to be sufficiently precise to result in a sharp line between observational and theoretical terms. He rather views the theory-observation distinction as being introduced into a ‘continuum of degrees of observability’ by choice. Prominent criticisms of the theory-observation distinction will be discussed in Section 2.1.</p><h3><a name="1.2" id="1.2">1.2 Semantic Dependence upon a Scientific Theory</a></h3><p>The above explanation of theoreticity may be felt unsatisfactory as it determines the property of being theoretical only via negation of the property of being observable (Putnam 1962). This explanation does not indicate any specific connection between the semantics of theoretical terms and corresponding scientific theories. There is, however, also a direct characterization of theoreticity that complements the criterion of non-observability: an expression is theoretical if and only if its meaning is determined through the axioms of a scientific theory. This explanation rests on what has come to be referred to as the <em>contextual theory of meaning,</em> which says that the meaning of a scientific term depends, in some way or other, on how this term is incorporated into a scientific theory.</p><p>Why adopt the contextual theory of meaning for scientific terms? Suppose the notion of meaning is understood along the lines of the Fregean notion of sense. The sense of a term be understood as that what determines its reference (cf. Church 1956, 6n). It is, furthermore, a reasonable requirement that a semantic theory must account for our understanding of the sense and, hence, our methods of determining the extension of scientific terms (cf. Dummett 1991, 340). For a large number of scientific terms these methods rest upon axioms of one or more scientific theories. There is no way of determining the force function in classical mechanics without using some axiom of this theory. Familiar methods make use of Newton's second law of motion, Hooke's law, the law of gravitation etc. Likewise, virtually all methods of measuring temperature rest upon laws of thermodynamics. Take measurement by a gas thermometer which is based on the ideal gas law. The laws of scientific theories are thus essential to our methods of determining the extension of scientific terms. The contextual theory of meaning, therefore, makes intelligible how students in a scientific discipline and scientists grasp the meaning, or sense, of scientific terms. On this account, understanding the sense of a term is knowing how to determine its referent, or extension, at least in part.</p><p>The contextual theory of meaning can be traced back at least to the work of Duhem. His demonstration that a scientific hypothesis in physics cannot be tested in isolation from its theoretical context is joined with and motivated by semantic considerations, according to which it is physical theories that give meaning to the specific concepts of physics (Duhem 1906, 183). Poincare´ (1902, 90) literally claims that certain scientific propositions acquire meaning only by virtue of the adoption of certain conventions. Perhaps the most prominent and explicit formulation of the contextual theory of meaning is to be found in Feyerabend's landmark “Explanation, Reduction, and Empiricism” (1962, 88):</p><blockquote><p>For just as the meaning of a term is not an intrinsic property but is dependent upon the way in which the term has been incorporated into a theory, in the very same manner the content of a whole theory (and thereby again the meaning of the descriptive terms which it contains) depends upon the way in which it is incorporated into both the set of its empirical consequences and the set of all the alternatives which are being discussed at a given time: once the contextual theory of meaning has been adopted, there is no reason to confine its application to a single theory, especially as the boundaries of such a language or of such a theory are almost never well defined.</p></blockquote><p>The accounts of a contextual theory of meaning in the works of Duhem, Poincare´ and Feyerabend are informal insofar as they do not crystallize into a corresponding formal semantics for scientific terms. Such a crystallization is brought about by some of the formal accounts of theoretical terms to be expounded in Section 4.</p><p>The view that meaning is bestowed upon a theoretical term through the axioms of a scientific theory implies that only axiomatized or axiomatizable scientific theories contain theoretical terms. In fact, all formal accounts of the semantics of theoretical terms are devised to apply to axiomatic scientific theories. This is due, in part, to the fact that physics has dominated the philosophy of science for a long time. One must wonder, therefore, whether there are any theoretical terms in, for example, evolutionary biology which has as yet resisted complete axiomatization. Arguably, there are. Even though evolutionary biology has not yet been axiomatized, we can recognize general propositions therein that are essential to determining certain concepts of this theory. Consider the following two propositions. (i) Two DNA sequences are homologous if and only if they have a common ancestor sequence. (ii) There is an inverse correlation between the number of mutations necessary to transform one DNA-sequence <em>S</em><sub>1</sub> into another <em>S<sub>2</sub></em> and the likelihood that <em>S</em><sub>1</sub> and <em>S</em><sub>2</sub> are homologous. Notably, these two propositions are used to determine, among other methods, relations of homology in evolutionary biology. The majority of general propositions in scientific theories other than those of physics, however, have instances that fail to be true. (Some philosphers of science have argued that this so even for a large number of axioms in physics.) Formal semantics of theoretical terms in scientific theories with default axioms are presently being developed.</p><h2><a name="2" id="2">2. Criticisms and Refinements of the Theory-Observation Distinction</a></h2><h3><a name="2.1" id="2.1">2.1 Criticisms</a></h3><p>The very idea of a clear-cut theory-observation distinction has received much criticism. First, with the help of sophisticated instruments, such as telescopes and electron microscopes, we are able to observe more and more entities, which had to be considered unobservable at a previous stage of scientific and technical evolution. Electrons and a-particles which can be observed in a cloud chamber are a case in point (Achinstein 1965). Second, assume observability is understood as excluding the use of instruments. On this understanding, examples drawing on the use of cloud chambers and electron microscopes, which are adduced to criticize the theory-observation distinction, can be dealt with. However, we would then have to conclude that things being perceived with glasses are not observed either, which is counterintuitive (Maxwell 1962). Third, there are concepts applying to or being thought to apply to both macroscopic and submicroscopic particles. A case in point are spatial and temporal relations and the color concepts that play an important role in Newton's corpuscle theory of light. Hence, there are clear-cut instances of observation concepts that apply to unobservable entities, which does not seem acceptable (cf. Putnam 1962).</p><p>These objections to the theory-observation distinction can be answered in a relatively straightforward manner from a Carnapian perspective. As explained in Section 1.1, Carnap (1936/37, 1966) was quite explicit that the philosopher's sense of observation excludes the use of instruments. As for an observer wearing glasses, a proponent of the theory-observation distinction finds enough material in Carnap (1936/37, 455) to defend her position. Carnap is aware of the fact that color concepts are not observable ones for a color-blind person. He is thus prepared to relativize the distinction in question. In fact, Carnap's most explicit explanation of observability defines this notion in such a way that it is relativized to an organism (1936/37, 454n).</p><p>Recall, moreover, that Carnap's theory-observation distinction was not intended to do justice to our overall understanding of these notions. Hence, certain quotidian and scientific uses of ‘observation’, such as observation using glasses, may well be disregarded when this distinction is drawn as long as the distinction promises to be fruitful in the logical analysis of scientific theories. A closer look reveals that Carnap (1966, 226) agrees with critics of the logical empiricists' agenda, such as Maxwell (1962) and Achinstein (1965), on there being no clear-cut theory-observation distinction (see also Carnap's early (1936/37, 455) for a similar statement):</p><blockquote><p>There is no question here of who [the physicist thinking that temperature is observable or the philosopher who disagrees, H. A.] is using the term ‘observable’ in the right or proper way. There is a continuum which starts with direct sensory observations and proceeds to enormously complex, indirect methods of observation. Obviously no sharp line can be drawn across this continuum; it is a matter of degree.</p></blockquote><p>A bit more serious is Putnam's (1962) objection drawing on the application of apparently clear-cut instances of observation concepts to submicroscopic particles. Here, Carnap would have to distinguish between color concepts applying to observable entities and related color concepts applying to unobservable ones. So, the formal language in which the logical analysis proceeds would have to contain a predicate ‘red<sub>1</sub>’ applying to macroscopic objects and another one ‘red<sub>2</sub>’ applying to submicroscopic ones. Again, such a move would be in line with the artificial, or ideal language philosophy that Carnap proclaimed (see Lutz (2012) for a sympathetic discussion of artificial language philosophy.)</p><p>There is another group of criticisms coming from the careful study of the history of science: Hanson (1958), Feyerabend (1962) and Kuhn (1962) aimed to show that observation concepts are <em>theory-laden</em> in a manner that makes their meaning theory-dependent. In Feyerabend's (1978, 32) this contention takes on the formulation that all terms are theoretical. Hanson (1958, 18) thinks that Tycho and Kepler were (literally) ‘seeing’ different things when perceiving the sun rising because their astronomical background theories were different. Kuhn (1962) was more tentative when expounding his variant of the theory-ladenness of observation. In a discussion of the Sneed formalism of the structuralist school, he favored a theory-observation distinction that is relativized, first to a theory and second to an application of this theory (1976).</p><p>Virtually all formal accounts of theoretical terms in fact assume that those phenomena that a theory <em>T</em> is meant to account for can be described in terms whose semantics does not depend on <em>T</em> . The counter thesis that even the semantics of putative observation terms depends on a quotidian or scientific theory, therefore, attacks a core doctrine coming with the logical empiricists' and subsequent work on theoretical terms. A thorough discussion and assessment of theory-ladenness of observation in the works of the great historians of science is beyond the scope of this entry. Bird (2004), Bogen (2009) and Oberheim and Hoyningen-Huene (2009) are entries in the present encyclopedia that address, amongst other things, this issue.</p><h3><a name="2.2" id="2.2">2.2 Refinements</a></h3><p>There is a simple, intuitive and influential proposal how to relativize the theory-observation distinction in a sensible way: a term <em>t</em> is theoretical with respect to a theory <em>T</em>, or for short, a <em>T</em>-term if and only if it is introduced by the theory <em>T</em> at a certain stage in the history of science. O-terms, by contrast, are those that were antecedently available and understood before <em>T</em> was set forth (Lewis 1970; cf. Hempel 1973). This proposal draws the theory-observation distinction in an apparently sharp way by means of relativizing that distinction to a particular theory. Needless to say, the proposal is in line with the contextual theory of meaning.</p><p>The distinction between <em>T</em>-terms and antecedently available ones has two particular merits. First, it circumvents the view that any sharp line between theoretical and observational terms is conventional and arbitrary. Second, it connects the theory-observation distinction with what seemed to have motivated that distinction in the first place, viz., the investigation how we come to understand the meaning of terms that appear to be meaningful in virtue of certain scientific theories.</p><p>A similar proposal of a relativized theory-observation distinction was made by Sneed in his seminal <em>The Logical Structure of Mathematical Physics</em> (1971, Ch. II). Here is a somewhat simplified and more syntactic formulation of Sneed's criterion of <em>T</em>-theoreticity:</p><blockquote><p><strong>Definition 1 (<em>T</em>-theoreticity)</strong><br />A term <em>t</em> is theoretical with respect to the theory <em>T</em>, or for short, <em>T</em>-theoretical if and only if any method of determining the extension of <em>t</em>, or some part of that extension, rests on some axiom of <em>T</em>.</p></blockquote><p>It remains to explain what it is for a method <em>m</em> of determining the extension of <em>t</em> to rest upon an axiom f. This relation obtains if and only if the use of <em>m</em> depends on f being a true sentence. In other words, <em>m</em> rests upon f if and only if the hypothetical assumption of f being false or indeterminate would invalidate the use of <em>m</em> in the sense that we would be lacking the commonly presumed justification for using <em>m</em>. The qualification ‘or some part of that extension’ has been introduced in the present definition because we cannot expect a single measurement method to determine the extension of a scientific quantity completely. <em>T</em>-non-theoreticity is the negation of <em>T</em>-theoreticity:</p><blockquote><p><strong>Definition 2 (<em>T</em>-non-theoreticity)</strong><br />A term <em>t</em> is <em>T</em>-non-theoretical if and only if it is not <em>T</em>-theoretical.</p></blockquote><p>The concepts of classical particle mechanics (henceforth abbreviated by CPM) exemplify well the notions of <em>T</em>-theoreticity and <em>T</em>-non-theoreticity. As has been indicated above, all methods of determining the force acting upon a particle make use of some axiom of classical particle mechanics, such as Newton's laws of motion or some law about special forces. Hence, force is CPM-theoretical. Measurement of spatial distances, by contrast, is possible without using axioms of CPM. Hence, the concept of spatial distance is CPM-non-theoretical. The concept of mass is less straightforward to classify as we can measure this concept using classical collision mechanics (CCM). Still, it was seen to be CPM-theoretical by the structuralists since CCM appeared reducible to CPM (Balzer et al. 1987, Ch. 2).</p><p>Suppose for a term <em>t</em> once introduced by a scientific theory <em>T</em><sub>1</sub> novel methods of determination become established through another theory <em>T</em><sub>2</sub>, where these methods do not depend on any axiom of <em>T</em><sub>1</sub>. Then, <em>t</em> would neither qualify as <em>T</em><sub>1</sub>-theoretical nor as <em>T</em><sub>2</sub>-theoretical. It is preferable, in this situation, to relativize Definition 1 to theory-nets <em>N</em>, i.e., compounds of several theories. Whether there are such cases has not yet been settled.</p><p>The original exposition of the theoreticity criterion by Sneed (1971) is a bit more involved as it makes use of set-theoretic predicates and intended applications, rather technical notions of what became later on labeled the <em>structuralist approach to scientific theories</em>. There has been a lively discussion, mainly but not exclusively within the structuralist school, how to express the relativized notion of theoreticity most properly (Balzer 1986; 1996). As noted above, Kuhn (1976) proposed a twofold relativization of theoreticity, viz., first to a scientific theory and second to applications of such theories.</p><p>Notably, Sneed's criterion of <em>T</em>-theoreticity suggests a strategy that allows us to regain a global, non-relativized theory-observation distinction: simply take a term <em>t</em> to be theoretical if and only if it holds, for all methods <em>m</em> of determining its extension, that <em>m</em> rests upon some axiom of some theory <em>T</em>. A term <em>t</em> is non-theoretical, or observational, if and only if there are means of determining its extension, at least in part, that do not rest upon any axiom of any theory. This criterion is still relative to our present stage of explicit axiomatic theorizing but comes nonetheless closer to the original intention of Carnap's theory-observation distinction, according to which observation is understood in the narrow sense of unaided perception.</p><h2><a name="3" id="3">3. Two Problems of Theoretical Terms</a></h2><p>The problem of theoretical terms is a recurrent theme in the philosophy of science literature (Achinstein 1965; Sneed 1971, Ch. II; Tuomela 1973, Ch. V; Friedman 2011). Different shades of meaning have been associated with this problem. In its most comprehensive formulation, the problem of theoretical terms is to give a proper account of the meaning and reference of theoretical terms. There are at least two kinds of expression that pose a distinct problem of theoretical terms, respectively. First, unary predicates referring to theoretical entities, such as ‘electron’, ‘neutrino’ and ‘nucleotide’. Second, non-unary theoretical predicates, such as ‘homology’ in evolutionary biology and theoretical function expressions, such as ‘force’, ‘temperature’ and ‘intensity of the electromagnetic field’ in physics. Sneed's problem of theoretical terms, as expounded in (1971, Ch. II), concerns only the latter kind of expression. We shall now start surveying problems concerning the semantics of expressions for theoretical entities and then move on to expressions for theoretical relations and functions.</p><h3><a name="3.1" id="3.1">3.1 Theoretical Entities</a></h3><p>A proper semantics for theoretical terms involves an account of reference and one of meaning and understanding. Reference fixing needs to be related to meaning as we want to answer the following question: how do we come to refer successfully to theoretical entities? This question calls for different answers depending on what particular conception of a theoretical entity is adopted. The issue of realism and its alternatives, therefore, comes into play at this point.</p><p>For the realist, theoretical entities exist independently from our theories about the world. Also, natural kinds that classify these entities exist independently from our theories (cf. Psillos 1999; Lewis 1984). The instrumentalist picture is commonly reported to account for theoretical entities in terms of mere fictions. The formalist variant of instrumentalism denies theoretical terms to have referents at all. Between these two extreme cases there is a number of intermediate positions.<sup>[<a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/theoretical-terms-science/notes.html#1" name="note-1" id="note-1">1</a>]</sup></p><p>Carnap (1958; 1966, Ch. 26) attempted to attain a metaphysically neutral position so as to avoid a commitment to or denial of scientific realism. In his account of the theoretical language of science, theoretical entities were conceived as mathematical ones that are related to observable events in certain determinate ways. An electron, for example, figures as a certain distribution of charge and mass in a four-dimensional manifold of real numbers, where charge and mass are mere real-valued functions. These functions and the four-dimensional manifold itself are to be related to observable events by means of univsersal axioms. Notably, Carnap would not have accepted a charcterization of his view as antirealist or non-realist since he thought the metaphysical doctrine of realism to be void of content.</p><p>In sum, there are three major and competing characterizations of a theoretical entity in science that are in line with the common theoreticity criterion according to which such an entity is inaccessible by means of unaided perception. First, theoretical entities are characterized as mind and language independent. Second, theoretical entities are mind and language dependent in some way or other. Third, they are conceived as mathematical entities that are related to the observable world in certain determinate ways. We may thus distinguish between (i) a realist view, (ii) a collection of non-realist views and (iii) a Pythagorean view of theoretical entities.</p><p>Now, there are three major accounts of reference and meaning that have been used, implicitly or explicitly, for the semantics of theoretical terms: (i) the descriptivist picture, (ii) causal and causal-historical theories and (iii) hybrid ones that combine descriptivist ideas with causal elements (Reimer 2010). Accounts of reference and meaning other than these play no significant role in the philosophy of science. Hence, we need to survey at least nine combinations consisting, first, of an abstract characterization of the nature of a theoretical entity (realist, non-realist and Pythagorean), and, second, a particular account of reference (descriptivist, causal and hybrid). Some of these combinations are plainly inconsistent and, hence, can be dealt with very briefly. Let us start with the realist view of theoretical entities.</p><h4><a name="3.1.1" id="3.1.1">The realist view</a></h4><p>The descriptivist picture is highly intuitive with regard to our understanding of expressions referring to theoretical entities on the realist view. According to this picture, an electron is a spatiotemporal entity with such and such a mass and such and such a charge. We detect and recognize electrons when identifying entities having these properties. The descriptivist explanation of meaning and reference makes use of theoretical functions, mass and electric charge in the present example. The semantics of theoretical entities, therefore, is connected with the semantics of theoretical relations and functions, which will be dealt with in the next subsection. It seems to hold, in general, that theoretical entities in the sciences are to be characterized in terms of theoretical functions and (non-unary) relations.</p><p>The descriptivist account, however, faces two particular problems with regard to the historic evolution of scientific theories. First, if descriptions of theoretical entities are constitutive of the meaning of corresponding unary predicates, one must wonder what the common core of understanding is that adherents of successive theories share and whether there is such a core at all. Were Rutherford and Bohr talking about the same type of entities when using the expression ‘electron’? Issues of incommensurability arise with the descriptivist picture (Psillos 1999, 280). A second problem arises when elements of the description of an entity being given by a predecessor theory <em>T</em> are judged wrong from the viewpoint of the successor theory <em>T'</em>. Then, on a strict reading of the descriptivist account, the corresponding theoretical term failed to refer in <em>T</em>. For if there is nothing that satisfies a description, the corresponding expression has no referent. This is a simple consequence of the theory of description by Russell in his famous “On Denoting” (1905). Hence, an account of weighting descriptions is needed in order to circumvent such failures of reference.</p><p>As is well known, Kripke (1980) set forth a causal-historical account of reference as an alternative to the descriptivist picture. This account starts with an initial baptism that introduces a name and goes on with causal chains transmitting the reference of the name from speaker to speaker. In this picture, Aristotle is the man once baptized so; he might not have been the student of Plato or done any other thing commonly attributed to him. Kripke thought this picture to apply both to proper names and general terms. It is hardly indicated, however, how this picture works for expressions referring to theoretical entities (cf. Papineau 1996). Kripke's story is particularly counterintuitive in view of the ahistorical manner of teaching in the natural sciences, wherein the original, historical introduction of a theoretical term plays a minor role in comparison to up-to-date textbook and journal explanations. Such explanations are clearly of the descriptivist type. The Kripkean causal story can be read as an account of reference fixing without being read as a story of grasping the meaning of theoretical terms. Reference, however, needs to be related to meaning so as to ensure that scientists know what they are talking about and are able to identify the entities under investigation. Notably, even for expressions of everyday language, the charge of not explaining meaning has been leveled against Krikpe's causal-historical account (Reimer 2010). The same charge applies to Putnam's (1975) causal account of reference and meaning, which Putnam himself abandoned in his (1980).</p><p>A purely causal or causal-historical account of reference does not seem a viable option for theoretical terms. More promising are hybrid accounts that combine descriptivist intuitions with causal elements. Such an account has been given by Psillos (1999, 296):</p><ol><li>A term <em>t</em> refers to an entity <em>x</em> if and only if <em>x</em> satisfies the core causal description associated with <em>t</em>.</li><li>Two terms <em>t</em>' and <em>t</em> denote the same entity if and only if (a) their putative referents play the same causal role with respect to a network of phenomena; and (b) the core causal description of <em>t</em>' takes up the kind-constitutive properties of the core causal description associated with <em>t</em>.</li></ol><p>This account has two particular merits. First, it is much closer to the way scientists understand and use theoretical terms than purely causal accounts. Because of this, it is not only an account of reference but also one of meaning for theoretical terms. In purely causal accounts, by contrast, there is a tendency to abandon the notion of meaning altogether. Second, it promises to ensure a more stable notion of reference than in purely descriptivist accounts of reference and meaning. Notably, the kind of causation that Psillos's hybrid account refers to is different from the causal-historical chains that Kripke thought responsible for the transmission of reference among speakers. No further explanation, however, is given of what a kind-constitutive property is and how we are to recognize such a property. Psillos (1999, 288n) merely infers the existence of such properties from the assumption of there being natural kinds.</p><h4><a name="3.1.2" id="3.1.2">Non-realist views</a></h4><p>Non-realist and antirealist semantics for theoretical terms are motivated by the presumption that the problem of theoretical terms has no satisfying realist solution. What does a non-realist semantics of theoretical terms look like? The view that theoretical entities are mere fictions often figures only in realist portrays of antirealism and is hardly seriously maintained by any philosopher of science in the 20th century. Quine's comparison of physical objects with the gods of Homer in his (1951) seems to be an exception. If one were to devise a formal or informal semantics for the view that theoretical entities are mere fictions, a purely descriptive account seems most promising. Such an account could in particular make heavy use of the Fregean notion of sense. For this notion was introduced, amongst other objectives, with the intent to explain our understanding of expressions like ‘Odysseus’ and ‘Pegasus’. One would have to admit, however, that sentences with names that lack a referent may well have a truth-value and as such deviate from Frege. Causal elements do not seem of much use in the fiction view of theoretical entities.</p><p>Formalist variants of instrumentalism are a more serious alternative to realist semantics than the fiction view of theoretical entities. Formalist views in the philosophy of mathematics are ones which aim to account for mathematical concepts and objects in terms of syntactic entities and operations thereupon within a calculus. Such views have been carried over to theoretical concepts and objects in the natural sciences, with the qualification that the observational part of the calculus is interpreted in such a way that its symbols refer to physical or phenomal objects. Cognitive access to theoretical entities is thus explained in terms of our cognitive access to the symbols and rules of the calculus in the context of an antecedent understanding of the observation terms. Formalist ideas were sympathetically entertained by Hermann Weyl (1949). He was driven towards such ideas by adherence to Hilbert's distinction between real and ideal elements and the corresponding distinction between real and ideal propositions (Hilbert 1926). Propositions of the observation language were construed as real ones in the sense of this Hilbertian distinction by Weyl, whereas theoretical propositions as ideal ones. The content of an ideal proposition is to be understood in terms of the (syntactic) consistency of the whole system consisting of ideal and real propositions being asserted. This is the defining property of an ideal proposition.</p><h4><a name="3.1.3" id="3.1.3">The Pythagorean view</a></h4><p>We still need to discuss the view that theoretical entities are mathematical entities being related to observable events in certain determinate ways. This theory is clearly of the descriptivist type, as we shall see more clearly when dealing with the formal account by Carnap in Section 4. No causal elements are needed in Carnap's Pythagorean empiricism.</p><p>It is fair to characterize the Pythagorean view in general by saying that it shifts the problem of theoretical terms to the theory of meaning and reference for mathematical expressions. The question of how we are able to refer successfully to electrons is answered by the Pythagorean by pointing out that we are able to refer successfully to mathematical entities. Moreover, the Pythagorean explains, it is part of the notion of an electron that corresponding mathematical entities are connected to observable phenomena by means of axioms and inference rules. The empirical surplus of theoretical entities in comparison to “pure” mathematical entities is thus captured by axioms and inference rules that establish connections to empirical phenomena. Since mathematical entities do not, by themselves, have connections to observable phenomena, the question of truth and falsehood may not be put in a truth-conditional manner for those axioms that connect mathematical entities with phenomenal events (cf. Section 4.2). Carnap (1958), therefore, came to speak of <em>postulates</em> when referring to the axioms of a scientific theory.</p><p>How do we come to refer successfully to mathematical entities? This, of course, is a problem in the philosophy of mathematics. (For a classical paper that addresses this problem see Benacerraf (1973)). Carnap has not much to say about meaning and reference of mathematical expressions in his seminal “The Methodological Character of Theoretical Concepts” (1956) but discusses these issues in his “Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology” (1950). There he aims at establishing a metaphysically neutral position that avoids a commitment to Platonist, nominalist or formalist conceptions of mathematical objects. A proponent of the Pythagorean view other than Carnap is Hermann Weyl (1949). As for the cognition of mathematical entities, Weyl largely followed Hilbert's formalism in his later work. Hence, there is a non-empty intersection between the Pythagorean view and the formalist view of theoretical entities. Unlike Carnap, Weyl did not characterize the interpretation of theoretical terms by means of model-theoretic notions.</p><h3><a name="3.2" id="3.2">3.2 Theoretical Functions and Relations</a></h3><p>For theoretical functions and relations, a particular problem arises from the idea that a theoretical term is, by definition, semantically dependent upon a scientific theory. Let us recall the above explanation of <em>T</em>-theoreticity: a term <em>t</em> is <em>T</em>-theoretical if and only if any method of determining the extension of <em>t</em>, or some part of that extension, rests on some axiom of <em>T</em>. Let f be such an axiom and <em>m</em> be a corresponding method of determination. The present explanation of <em>T</em>-theoreticity, then, means that <em>m</em> is valid only on condition of f being true. The latter dependency holds because f is used either explicitly in calculations to determine <em>t</em> or in the calibration of measurement devices. Such devices, then, perform the calculation implicitly. A case in point is measurement of temperature by a gas thermometer. Such a device rests upon the law that changes of temperature result into proportional changes in the volume of gases.</p><p>Suppose now <em>t</em> is theoretical with respect to a theory <em>T</em>. Then it holds that in order to measure <em>t</em>, we need to assume the truth of some axiom f of <em>T</em>. Suppose, further, that <em>t</em> has occurrences in f, as is standard in examples of <em>T</em>-theoreticity. From this it follows that, in standard truth-conditional semantics, the truth-value of f is dependent on the semantic value of <em>t</em>. This leads to the following epistemological difficulty: on the one hand, we need to know the extension of <em>t</em> in order to find out whether f is true. On the other hand, it is simply impossible to determine the extension of <em>t</em> without using f or some other axiom of <em>T</em>. This mutual dependency between the semantic values of f and <em>t</em> makes it difficult, if not even impossible, to have evidence for f being true in any of its applications.</p><p>We could, of course, use an alternative measurement method of <em>t</em>, say one resting upon an axiom ? of <em>T</em>, to gain evidence for the axiom f being true in some selected instances. This move, however, only shifts the problem to applications of another axiom of <em>T</em>. For these applications the same type of difficulty arises, viz., mutual dependency of the semantic values of ? and <em>t</em>. We are thus caught either in a vicious circle or in an infinite regress when attempting to gain evidence for the propriety of a single measurement of a theoretical term. Sneed (1971, Ch. II) was the first to describe that particular difficulty in the present manner and termed it <em>the problem of theoretical terms</em>. Measurement of the force function in classical mechanics exemplifies this problem well. There is no method of measuring force that does not rest upon some law of classical mechanics. Likewise, it is impossible to measure temperature without using some law that depends upon either phenomenological or statistical thermodynamics.</p><p>Though its formulation is primarily epistemological, Sneed's problem of theoretical terms has a semantic reading. Let the meaning of a term be identified with the methods of determining its extension, as in Section 1.2. Then we can say that our understanding of <em>T</em>-theoretical relations and functions originates from the axioms of the scientific theory <em>T</em>. In standard truth-conditional semantics, by contrast, one assumes that the truth-value of an axiom f is determined by the semantic values of those descriptive constants that have occurrences in f. Among these constants, there are theoretical terms of <em>T</em>. Hence, it appears that standard truth-conditional semantics does not accord with the order of our grasping the meaning of theoretical terms. In the next section, we shall encounter indirect means of interpreting theoretical terms. These prove to be ways out of the present problem of theoretical terms.</p><h2><a name="4" id="4">4. Formal Accounts</a></h2><p>A few notational conventions and preliminary considerations are necessary to explain the formal accounts of theoretical terms and their semantics. Essential to all of these accounts is the division of the set of descriptive symbols into a set <em>V-o</em> of observational and another set <em>V-t</em> of theoretical terms. (The descriptive symbols of a formal language are simply the non-logical ones.) A scientific theory thus be formulated in a language <em>L</em>(<em>V-o,V-t</em>). The division of the descriptive vocabulary gives rise to a related distinction between <em>T</em>- and <em>C</em>-axioms among the axioms of a scientific theory. The <em>T</em>-axioms contain only <em>V-t</em> symbols as descriptive ones, while the <em>C</em>-axioms contain both <em>V-o</em> and <em>V-t</em> symbols. The latter axioms establish a connection between the theoretical and the observational terms. <em>TC</em> designates the conjunction of <em>T</em>- and <em>C</em>-axioms and <em>A</em>(<em>TC</em>) the set of these axioms. Let <em>n</em><sub>1</sub>,…,<em>n<sub>k</sub></em> be the elements of <em>V-o</em> and <em>t</em><sub>1</sub>,…,<em>t<sub>n</sub></em> the elements of <em>V-t</em>. Then, <em>TC</em> is a proposition of the following type:</p><p class="c3">(<em>TC</em>) <em>TC</em>(<em>n</em><sub>1</sub>,…,<em>n<sub>k</sub></em>, <em>t</em><sub>1</sub>,…, <em>t<sub>n</sub></em>)</p><p>As for the domain of interpretation of <em>L</em>(<em>V-o</em>,<em>V-t</em>), Ramsey (1929) assumes there to be only one for all descriptive symbols. Carnap (1956, 1958), by contrast, distinguishes between a domain of interpretation for observational terms and another for theoretical terms. Notably, the latter domain contains exclusively mathematical entities. Ketland (2004) has emphasized the importance of distinguishing between an observational and a theoretical domain of interpretation, where the latter is allowed to contain theoretical entities, such as electrons and protons.</p><p><em>TC</em> is a first-order sentence in a large number of accounts, as in Ramsey's seminal “Theories” (1929). Carnap (1956; 1958), however, works with higher-order logic to allow for the formulation of mathematical propositions and concepts.</p><h3><a name="4.1" id="4.1">4.1 The Ramsey Sentence</a></h3>The Ramsey sentence of a theory <em>TC</em> in the language <em>L</em>(<em>V-o</em>,<em>V-t</em>) is obtained by the following two transformations of the conjunction of <em>T</em>- and <em>C</em>-axioms. First, replace all theoretical symbols in this conjunction by higher-order variables of appropriate type. Then, bind these variables by higher-order existential quantifiers. As result one obtains a higher-order sentence of the following form:<p class="c3">(<em>TC<sup>R</sup></em>) ?<em>X</em><sub>1</sub>…?<em>X<sub>n</sub></em> <em>TC</em>(<em>n</em><sub>1</sub>, …, <em>n<sub>k</sub></em>, <em>X</em><sub>1</sub>, …, <em>X<sub>n</sub></em>)</p><p>where <em>X</em><sub>1</sub>, …, <em>X<sub>n</sub></em> are higher-order variables. This sentence says that there is an extensional interpretation of the theoretical terms that verifies, together with an antecedently given interpretation of the observation language <em>L</em>(<em>V-o</em>), the axioms <em>TC</em>. The Ramsey sentence expresses an apparently weaker proposition than <em>TC</em>, at least in standard truth-conditional semantics. If one thinks that the Ramsey sentence expresses the proposition of a scientific theory more properly than <em>TC</em>, one holds the <em>Ramsey view</em> of scientific theories.</p><p>Why should one prefer the Ramsey view to the standard one? Ramsey (1929, 120) himself seemed to have something like a contextual theory of meaning in mind when proposing the replacement of theoretical constants with appropriate higher-order variables:</p><blockquote><p>Any additions to the theory, whether in the form of new axioms or particular assertions like a(<em>0, 3</em>) are to be made within the scope of the original a, ß, ?. They are not, therefore, strictly propositions by themselves just as the different sentences in a story beginning ‘Once upon a time’ have not complete meanings and so are not propositions by themselves.</p></blockquote><p>a, ß, and ? figure in this explanation as theoretical terms to be replaced by higher-order variables. Ramsey goes on to suggest that the meaning of a theoretical sentence f is the difference between</p><ol start="1"><li>(<em>TC</em> ? <em>A</em> ? f)<sup><em>R</em></sup></li></ol><p>and</p><ol start="2"><li>(<em>TC</em> ? <em>A</em>)<sup><em>R</em></sup></li></ol><p>where <em>A</em> stands for the set of observation sentences being asserted and (...)<sup><em>R</em></sup> for the operation of Ramsification, i.e., existentially generalizing on all theoretical terms. This proposal of expressing theoretical assertions clearly makes such assertions dependent upon the context of the theory <em>TC</em>. Ramsey (1929, 124) thinks that a theoretical assertion f is not meaningful if no observational evidence can be found for either f or its negation. In this case there is no stock <em>A</em> of observation sentences such that (1) and (2) differ in truth-value.</p><p>Another important argument in favour of the Ramsey view was given later by Sneed (1979, Ch. III). It is easy to show that the problem of theoretical terms (Section 3.2) does not arise in the first place on the Ramsey view. For by <em>TC<sup>R</sup></em> it is only claimed that there are extensions of the theoretical terms satisfying each axiom of the set <em>A</em>(<em>TC</em>) under a given interpretation of the observational language. No claim, however, is made by <em>TC<sup>R</sup></em> as to whether or not the sentences of <em>A</em>(<em>TC</em>) are true. Nonetheless, it can be shown that <em>TC<sup>R</sup></em> and <em>TC</em> have the same observational consequences:</p><blockquote><p><strong>Proposition 1</strong> For all <em>L</em>(<em>V-o</em>) sentences f, <em>TC<sup>R</sup></em> ? f if and only if <em>TC</em> ? f, where ? designates the relation of logical consequence.</p></blockquote><p>Hence, the Ramsey sentence cannot be true in case the original theory <em>TC</em> is not consistent with the observable facts. For a discussion of empirical adequacy and Ramsification see Ketland (2004).</p><p>One difficulty, however, remains with the Ramsey view. It concerns the representation of deductive reasoning, for many logicians the primary objective of logic. Now, Ramsey (1929, 121) thinks that the ‘incompleteness’ of theoretical assertions does not affect our reasoning. No formal account, however, is given that relates our deductive practice, in which abundant use of theoretical constants is made, to the existentially quantified variables in the Ramsey sentence. One thing we lack is a translation of theoretical sentences (other than the axioms) that is in keeping with the view that the meaning of a theoretical sentence f is the difference between (<em>TC</em> ? <em>A</em> ? f)<sup><em>R</em></sup> and (<em>TC</em> ? <em>A</em>)<sup><em>R</em></sup>. As Ramsey observes, it would not be correct to take (<em>TC</em> ? <em>A</em> ? f)<sup><em>R</em></sup> as a translation of a theoretical sentence f since both (<em>TC</em> ? <em>A</em> ? f)<sup><em>R</em></sup> and (<em>TC</em> ? <em>A</em> ? ¬ f)<sup><em>R</em></sup> may well be true. Such a translation would not obey the laws of classical logic. These laws, however, are supposed to govern deductive reasoning in science. A proper semantics of theoretical terms must take the peculiarities of these terms into account without revising the rules and axioms of deduction in classical logic.</p><p>There thus remains the challenge of relating the apparent use of theoretical constants in deductive scientific reasoning to the Ramsey formulation of scientific theories. Carnap was well aware of this challenge and addressed it using a sentence that became labeled later on the <em>Carnap sentence</em> of a scientific theory (Carnap 1958; 1966, Ch. 23):</p><p class="c3">(<em>A<sub>T</sub></em>) <em>TC<sup>R</sup></em> ? <em>TC</em></p><p>This sentence is part of a proposal to draw the analytic-synthetic distinction at the global level of a scientific theory (as this distinction proved not to be applicable to single axioms): the analytic part of the theory is given by its Carnap sentence <em>A<sub>T</sub></em>, whereas the synthetic part is identified with the theory's Ramsey sentence in light of Proposition 1. Carnap (1958) wants <em>A<sub>T</sub></em> to be understood as follows: if the Ramsey sentence is true, then the theoretical terms be interpreted such that <em>TC</em> comes out true as well. So, on condition of <em>TC<sup>R</sup></em> being true, we can recover the original formulation of the theory in which the theoretical terms occur as constants. For, obviously, <em>TC</em> is derivable from <em>TC<sup>R</sup></em> and <em>A<sub>T</sub></em> using modus ponens.</p><p>From the viewpoint of standard truth-conditional semantics, however, this instruction to interpret the Carnap sentence appears arbitrary, if not even misguided. For in standard semantics, the Ramsey sentence may well be true without <em>TC</em> being so (cf. Ketland 2004). Hence, the Carnap sentence would not count as analytic, as Carnap intended. Carnap's interpretation of <em>A<sub>T</sub></em> receives a sound foundation in his (1961) proposal to define theoretical terms using Hilbert's epsilon operator, as we shall see in Section 4.3.</p><h3><a name="4.2" id="4.2">4.2 Indirect Interpretation</a></h3><p>The notion of an indirect interpretation was introduced by Carnap in his <em>Foundations of Logic and Mathematics</em> (1939, Ch. 23–24) with the intention of accounting for the semantics of theoretical terms in physics. It goes without saying that this notion is understood against the background of the notion of a direct interpretation. Carnap had the following distinction in mind. The interpretation of a descriptive symbol is direct if and only if (i) it is given by an assignment of an extension or an intension, and (ii) this assignment is made by expressions of the metalanguage. The interpretation of a descriptive symbol is indirect, by contrast, if and only if it is specified by one or several sentences of the object language, which then figure as axioms in the respective calculus. Here are two simple examples of a direct interpretation:</p><p class="c3">‘<em>R</em>’ designates the property of being rational.</p><p class="c3">‘<em>A</em>’ designates the property of being an animal.</p><p>The predicate ‘<em>H</em>’, by contrast, is interpreted in an indirect manner by a definition in the object language:</p><p class="c3">?<em>x</em>(<em>Hx</em> ? <em>Rx</em> ? <em>Ax</em>)</p><p>Interpretation of a symbol by a definition counts as one type of indirect interpretation. Another type is the interpretation of theoretical terms by the axioms of a scientific theory. Carnap (1939, 65) remains content with a merely syntactic explanation of indirect interpretation:</p><blockquote><p>The calculus is first constructed floating in the air, so to speak; the construction begins at the top and then adds lower and lower levels. Finally, by the semantical rules, the lowest level is anchored at the solid ground of the observable facts. The laws, whether general or special, are not directly interpreted, but only the singular sentences.</p></blockquote><p>The laws <em>A</em>(<em>TC</em>) are thus simply adopted as axioms in the calculus without assuming any prior interpretation or reference to the world for theoretical terms. (A sentence f being an axiom of a calculus <em>C</em> means that f can be used in any formal derivation in <em>C</em> without being a member of the premisses.) This account amounts to a formalist understanding of the theoretical language in science. It has two particular merits. First, it circumvents Sneed's problem of theoretical terms since the axioms are not required to be true in the interpretation of the respective language that represents the facts of the theory-independent world. The need for assuming such an interpretation is simply denied. Second, the account is in line with the contextual theory meaning for theoretical terms as our understanding of such terms is explained in terms of the axioms of the respective scientific theories (cf. Section 1.2).</p><p>There are less formalist accounts of indirect interpretation in terms of explicit model-theoretic notions by Przelecki (1969, Ch. 6) and Andreas (2010).<sup>[<a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/theoretical-terms-science/notes.html#2" name="note-2" id="note-2">2</a>]</sup> The latter account proves to formally work out ideas about theoretical terms in Carnap (1958). It emerged from an investigation into the similarities and dissimilarities between Carnapian postulates and definitions. Recall that Carnap viewed the axioms of a scientific theory as postulates since they contribute to the interpretation of theoretical terms. When explaining the Carnap sentence <em>TC<sup>R</sup></em> ? <em>TC</em>, Carnap says that, if the Ramsey sentence is true, the theoretical terms are to be understood in accordance with some interpretation that satisfies <em>TC</em>. This is the sense in which we can say that Carnapian postulates contribute to the interpretation of theoretical terms in a manner akin to the interpretation of a defined term by the corresponding definition. Postulates and definitions alike impose a constraint on the admissible, or intended, interpretation of the complete language <em>L</em>(<em>V</em>), where <em>V</em> contains basic and indirectly interpreted terms.</p><p>Yet, the interpretation of theoretical terms by axioms of a scientific theory differs in several ways from that of a defined term by a definition. First, the introduction of theoretical terms may be joined with the introduction of another, theoretical domain of interpretation, in addition to the basic domain of interpretation in which observation terms are interpreted. Second, it must not be assumed that the interpretation of theoretical terms results in a unique determination of the extension of these terms. This is an implication of Carnap's doctrine of partial interpretation (1958), as will become obvious at the end of this section. Third, axioms of a scientific theory are not conservative extensions of the observation language since they enable us to make predictions. Definitions, by contrast, must be conservative (cf. Gupta 2009). Taking these differences into account when observing the semantic similarities between definitions and Carnapian postulates suggests the following explanation: a set <em>A</em>(<em>TC</em>) of axioms that interprets a set <em>V-t</em> of theoretical terms on the basis of a language <em>L</em>(<em>V-o</em>) imposes a constraint on the admissible, or intended, interpretations of the language <em>L</em>(<em>V-o</em>,<em>V-t</em>). An <em>L</em>(<em>V-o</em>,<em>V-t</em>) structure is <em>admissible</em> if and only if it (i) satisfies the axioms <em>A</em>(<em>TC</em>) and (ii) extends the intended interpretation of <em>L</em>(<em>V-o</em>) to include an interpretation of the theoretical terms.</p><p>In more formal terms (Andreas 2010, 373; Przelecki 1969, Ch. 6):</p><blockquote><p><strong>Definition 3 (Set <span class="scriptuc">S</span> of admissible structures)</strong><br />Let <span class="scriptuc">A</span>-<em>o</em> designate the intended interpretation of the observation language. Further, <em>MOD</em>(<em>A</em>(<em>TC</em>)) designates the set of <em>L</em>(<em>V-o</em>,<em>V-t</em>) structures that satisfy the axioms <em>A</em>(<em>TC</em>). <em>EXT</em>(<span class="scriptuc">A</span>-<em>o</em>,<em>V-t</em>,<em>D-t</em>) is the set of <em>L</em>(<em>V-o</em>,<em>V-t</em>) structures that extend <span class="scriptuc">A</span>-<em>o</em> to interpret the theoretical terms, where these terms are allowed to have argument positions being interpreted in a domain <em>D-t</em> of theoretical entities.</p><ol><li>If <em>MOD</em>(<em>A</em>(<em>TC</em>)) n <em>EXT</em>(<span class="scriptuc">A</span>-<em>o</em>,<em>V-t</em>,<em>D-t</em>) ? Ø, then <span class="scriptuc">S</span> := <em>MOD</em>(<em>A</em>(<em>TC</em>)) n <em>EXT</em>(<span class="scriptuc">A</span>-<em>o</em>,<em>V-t</em>,<em>D-t</em>);</li><li>If <em>MOD</em>(<em>A</em>(<em>TC</em>)) n <em>EXT</em>(<span class="scriptuc">A</span>-<em>o</em>,<em>V-t</em>,<em>D-t</em>) = Ø, then <span class="scriptuc">S</span> := <em>EXT</em>(<span class="scriptuc">A</span>-<em>o</em>,<em>V-t</em>,<em>D-t</em>).</li></ol></blockquote><p>Given there is a range of admissible, i.e., intended structures, the following truth-rules for theoretical sentences are intuitive:</p><blockquote><p><strong>Definition 4 (Truth-rules for theoretical sentences)</strong><br />?: <em>L</em>(<em>V-o</em>,<em>V-t</em>) ? {<em>T</em>, <em>F</em>, <em>I</em>}.</p><ol><li>?(f) := <em>T</em> if and only if for all structures <span class="scriptuc">A</span> ? <span class="scriptuc">S</span>, <span class="scriptuc">A</span> ? f;</li><li>?(f) := <em>F</em> if and only if for all structures <span class="scriptuc">A</span> ? <span class="scriptuc">S</span>, <span class="scriptuc">A</span> ? f;</li><li>?(f) := <em>I</em> (indeterminate) if and only if there are structures <span class="scriptuc">A</span><sub>1</sub>, <span class="scriptuc">A</span><sub>2</sub> ? <span class="scriptuc">S</span> such that <span class="scriptuc">A</span><sub>1</sub> ? f but not <span class="scriptuc">A</span><sub>2</sub> ? f.</li></ol></blockquote><p>The idea lying behind these rules comes from supervaluation logic (van Fraassen 1969; Priest 2001, Ch. 7). A sentence is true if and only if it is true in every admissible structure. It is false, by contrast, if and only if it is false in every admissible structure. And a sentence does not have a determinate truth-value if and only if it is true in, at least, one admissible structure and false in, at least, another structure that is also admissible.</p><p>A few properties of the present semantics are noteworthy. First, it accounts for Carnap's idea that the axioms <em>A</em>(<em>TC</em>) have a twofold function, viz., setting forth empirical claims and determining the meaning of theoretical terms (Carnap 1958). For, on the one hand, the truth-values of the axioms <em>A</em>(<em>TC</em>) depend on empirical, observable facts. These axioms, on the other hand, determine the admissible interpretations of the theoretical terms. These two seemingly contradictory properties are combined by allowing the axioms <em>A</em>(<em>TC</em>) to interpret theoretical terms only on condition of there being a structure that both extends the given interpretation of the observation language and that satisfies these axioms. If there is no such structure, the theoretical terms remain uninterpreted. This semantics, therefore, can be seen to formally work out the old contextual theory of meaning for theoretical terms.</p><p>Second, Sneed's problem of theoretical terms (Section 3.2) does not arise in the present semantics since the formulation of this problem is bound to standard truth-conditional semantics. Third, it is closely related to the Ramsey view of scientific theories as the following biconditional holds:</p><blockquote><p><strong>Proposition 2</strong> <em>TC<sup>R</sup></em> if and only if for all f ? <em>A</em>(<em>TC</em>), ?(f) = <em>T</em>.</p></blockquote><p>Unlike the Ramsey account, however, the present one does not dispense with theoretical terms. It can be shown rather that allowing for a range of admissible interpretations as opposed to a single interpretation does not affect the validity of standard deductive reasoning (Andreas 2010). Hence, a distinctive merit of the indirect interpretation semantics of theoretical terms is that theoretical constants need not be recovered from the Ramsey sentence in the first place.</p><p>The label <em>partial interpretation</em> is more common in the literature to describe Carnap's view that theoretical terms are interpreted by the axioms or postulates of a scientific theory (Suppe 1974, 86–95). The partial character of interpretation is retained in the present account since there is a range of admissible interpretations of the complete language <em>L</em>(<em>V-o,V-t</em>). This allows for the interpretation of theoretical terms to be strengthened by further postulates, just as Carnap demanded in his (1958) and (1961). To strengthen the interpretation of theoretical terms is to further constrain the range of admissible interpretations of <em>L</em>(<em>V-o,V-t</em>).</p><h3><a name="4.3" id="4.3">4.3 Direct Interpretation</a></h3><p>Both the Ramsey view and the indirect interpretation semantics deviate from standard truth-conditional semantics at the level of theoretical terms and theoretical sentences. Such a deviation, however, was not felt to be necessary by all philosophers that have worked on theoretical concepts. Tuomela (1973, Ch. V) defends a position that he calls <em>semantic realism</em> and that retains standard truth-conditional semantics. Hence, direct interpretation is assumed for theoretical terms by Tuomela. Yet, semantic realism for theoretical terms acknowledges there to be an epistemological distinction between observational and theoretical terms. Tuomela's (1973, Ch. I) criterion of the theory-observation distinction largely coincides with Sneed's above expounded criterion. Since direct interpretation of theoretical terms amounts just to standard realist truth-conditions, there is no need for a further discussion here.</p><h3><a name="4.4" id="4.4">4.4 Defining Theoretical Terms</a></h3><p>In Weyl (1949), Carnap (1958), Feyerabend (1962) and a number of further papers we can identify different formulations of the idea that the axioms of a scientific theory determine the meaning of theoretical terms without these axioms qualifying as proper definitions of theoretical terms. This idea has become almost constitutive of the very notion of a theoretical term in the philosophy of science. Lewis (1970), however, wrote a paper with the title “How to Define Theoretical Terms” (1970). A closer look at the literature further reveals that the very idea of explicitly defining theoretical terms goes back to Carnap's (1961) use of Hilbert's epsilon operator in scientific theories. This operator is an indefinite description operator that was introduced by Hilbert to designate some object <em>x</em> that satisfies an open formula f. So</p><p class="c3">e<em>x</em> f(<em>x</em>)</p><p>designates some <em>x</em> satisfying f(<em>x</em>), where <em>x</em> is the only free variable of f (cf. Avigad and Zach 2002). Now, Carnap (1961, 161n) explicitly defines theoretical terms in two steps:</p><p class="c3">(<em>A</em><sub><em>T</em>(0)</sub>) <span class="c4"><em>t</em></span> = e<span class="c5"><em>X</em></span> <em>TC</em>(<span class="c5"><em>X</em></span>, <em>n</em><sub>1</sub>,…,<em>n<sub>k</sub></em>)</p><p>where <span class="c5"><em>X</em></span> is a sequence of higher-order variables and <span class="c5"><em>t</em></span> a corresponding instantiation. So, <span class="c5"><em>t</em></span> designates some sequence of relations and functions that satisfies <em>TC</em>, in the context of an antecedently given interpretation of <em>V-o</em>. Once such a sequence has been defined via the epsilon-operator, the second step of the definition is straightforward:</p><p class="c3">(<em>A</em><sub><em>T</em>(<em>i</em>)</sub>) <em>t</em><sub><em>i</em></sub> = e<em>x</em> (?<em>u</em><sub>1</sub> …?<em>u</em><sub><em>n</em></sub>(<span class="c4"><em>t</em></span> = <<em>u</em><sub>1</sub>,…,<em>u<sub>n</sub></em>> ? <em>x</em> = <em>u<sub>i</sub></em>))</p><p>Carnap could show these definitions to imply the Carnap sentence <em>A<sub>T</sub></em>. Hence, they allow for direct recovery of the theoretical terms for the purpose of deductive reasoning on condition of the Ramsey sentence being true.</p><p>Lewis (1970) introduced a number of modifications concerning both the language of the Carnap sentence and its interpretation in order to attain proper definitions of theoretical terms. First, theoretical terms are considered to refer to individuals as opposed to relations and functions. This move is made coherent by allowing the basic language <em>L</em>(<em>V-o</em>) to contain relations like ‘<em>x</em> has property <em>y</em>’. The basic, i.e., non-theoretical language is thus no observation language in this account. Yet, it serves as the basis for introducing theoretical terms. The set <em>V-o</em> of ‘O-terms’ is best described as our antecedently understood vocabulary.</p><p>Second, denotationless terms are dealt with along the lines of free logic by Dana Scott (1967). That means denotationless terms, such as an improper description, denote nothing in the domain of discourse. Atomic sentences containing denotationless terms are either true or false. Most notably, the free logic that Lewis refers to has it that an identity that contains a denotationless term on both sides is always true. If just one side of the identity formula has an occurrence of a denotationless term, this identity statement is false.</p><p>Third, Lewis (1970) insists on a unique interpretation of theoretical terms, thus rejecting Carnap's doctrine of partial interpretation. Carnap (1961) is most explicit about the indeterminacy that this doctrine implies. This indeterminacy of theoretical terms drives Carnap to using Hilbert's e-operator there, as just explained. For Lewis, by contrast, a theoretical term is denotationless if its interpretation is not uniquely determined by the Ramsey sentence. For a scientific theory to be true, it must have a unique interpretation.</p><p>Using these modifications, Lewis transforms the Carnap sentence into three Carnap-Lewis postulates, so to speak:</p><dl class="hang"><dt>(CL1)</dt><dd>?<em>y</em><sub>1</sub> … ?<em>y<sub>n</sub></em> ?<em>x</em><sub>1</sub> … ?<em>x<sub>n</sub></em> (<em>TC</em>(<em>n</em><sub>1</sub>,…,<em>n<sub>k</sub></em>, <em>x</em><sub>1</sub>,…,<em>x<sub>n</sub></em>) ? <em>y</em><sub>1</sub> = <em>x</em><sub>1</sub> ? … ? <em>y<sub>n</sub></em> = <em>x<sub>n</sub></em>) ? <em>TC</em>(<em>n</em><sub>1</sub>,…,<em>n<sub>k</sub></em>, <em>t</em><sub>1</sub>,…,<em>t<sub>k</sub></em>)</dd><dt>(CL2)</dt><dd>¬?<em>x</em><sub>1</sub> … ?<em>x<sub>n</sub></em> <em>TC</em>(<em>n</em><sub>1</sub>,…,<em>n<sub>k</sub></em>, <em>x</em><sub>1</sub>,…,<em>x<sub>n</sub></em>) ? ¬?<em>x</em>(<em>x</em> = <em>t</em><sub>1</sub>) ? … ? ¬?<em>x</em>(<em>x</em> = <em>t<sub>n</sub></em>)</dd><dt>(CL3)</dt><dd>?<em>x</em><sub>1</sub> … ?<em>x<sub>n</sub></em> <em>TC</em>(<em>n</em><sub>1</sub>,…,<em>n<sub>k</sub></em>, <em>x</em><sub>1</sub>,…,<em>x<sub>n</sub></em>) ? ¬?<em>y</em><sub>1</sub>… ?<em>y<sub>n</sub></em> ?<em>x</em><sub>1</sub>… ?<em>x<sub>n</sub></em> (<em>TC</em>(<em>n</em><sub>1</sub>,…,<em>n<sub>k</sub></em>, <em>x</em><sub>1</sub>,…,<em>x<sub>n</sub></em>) ? <em>y</em><sub>1</sub> = <em>x</em><sub>1</sub> ? … ? <em>y<sub>n</sub></em> = <em>x<sub>n</sub></em>) ? ¬?<em>x</em>(<em>x</em> = <em>t</em><sub>1</sub>) ? … ? ¬?<em>x</em>(<em>x</em>=<em>t<sub>n</sub></em>)</dd></dl><p>These postulates look more difficult than they actually are. CL1 says that, if <em>TC</em> has a unique realization, then it is realized by the entities named by <em>t<sub>1</sub>,…,t<sub>k</sub></em>. Realization of a theory <em>TC</em>, in this formulation, means interpretation of the descriptive terms under which <em>TC</em> comes out true, where the interpretation of the <em>V-o</em> terms is antecedently given. So, CL1 is to be read as saying that the theoretical terms are to be understood as designating those entities that uniquely realize <em>TC</em>, in the context of an antecedently given interpretation of the <em>V-o</em> terms. CL2 says that, if the Ramsey sentence is false, the theoretical terms do not designate anything. To see this, recall that ¬?<em>x</em>(<em>x</em>=<em>t<sub>i</sub></em>) means, in free logic, that <em>t<sub>i</sub></em> is denotationless. In case the theory <em>TC</em> has multiple realizations, the theoretical terms are denotationless too. This is expressed by CL3.</p><p>CL1–CL3 are equivalent, in free logic, to a set of sentences that properly define the theoretical terms <em>t<sub>i</sub></em> (1 = <em>i</em> = <em>n</em>) :</p><p class="c3">(<em>D-i</em>) <em>t<sub>i</sub></em> = ?<em>y<sub>i</sub></em> ?<em>y</em><sub>1</sub> … ?<em>y</em><sub><em>i</em>-1</sub> ?<em>y</em><sub><em>i</em>+1</sub>… ?<em>y<sub>n</sub></em> ?<em>x</em><sub>1</sub> … ?<em>x<sub>n</sub></em> (<em>TC</em>(<em>n</em><sub>1</sub>,…,<em>n<sub>k</sub></em>, <em>x</em><sub>1</sub>,…,<em>x<sub>n</sub></em>) ? <em>y</em><sub>1</sub> = <em>x</em><sub>1</sub> ? … ? <em>y<sub>i</sub></em> = <em>x<sub>i</sub></em> ? … ? <em>y<sub>n</sub></em> = <em>x<sub>n</sub></em>)</p><p><em>t<sub>i</sub></em> designates, according to this definition schema, the i-th component in that sequence of entities that uniquely realizes <em>TC</em>. If there is no such sequence, <em>t<sub>i</sub></em> (1 = <em>i</em> = <em>n</em>) is denotationless. Even so, the definitions of theoretical terms remain true if the complete language <em>L</em>(<em>V-o</em>,<em>V-t</em>) is interpreted in accordance with the postulates CL1–CL3, thanks to the use of free logic. Hence, all <em>L</em>(<em>V-o</em>,<em>V-t</em>) interpretations that extend the antecedently given interpretation of <em>L</em>(<em>V-o</em>) can be required to satisfy all definitions <em>D-i</em>.</p><p>A few further properties of Lewis's definitions of theoretical terms are noteworthy. First, they specify the interpretation of theoretical terms uniquely. This property is obvious for the case of unique realization of <em>TC</em> but holds as well for the other cases since assignment of no denotation counts as interpretation of a descriptive symbol in free logic. Second, it can be shown that these definitions do not allow for the derivation of any <em>L</em>(<em>V-o</em>) sentences except logical truths, just as the original Carnap sentence did. Lewis, therefore, in fact succeeds in <em>defining</em> theoretical terms. He does so without attempting to divide the axioms <em>A</em>(<em>TC</em>) into definitions and synthetic claims about the spatiotemporal world.</p><p>The replacement of theoretical relation and function symbols with individual terms was judged counterintuitive by Papineau (1996). A reformulation, however, of Lewis's definitions using second- or higher-order variables is not difficult to accomplish, as Schurz (2005) has shown. In this reformulation the problem arises that theoretical terms are usually not uniquely interpreted since our observational evidence is most of the time insufficient to determine the extension of theoretical relation and function symbols completely. Theoretical functions, such as temperature, pressure, electromagnetic force etc., are determined only for objects that have been subjected to appropriate measurements, however indirect. In view of this problem, Schurz (2005) suggests letting the higher-order quantifiers range only over those extensions that correspond to <em>natural kind</em> properties. This restriction renders the requirement of unique interpretation of theoretical terms plausible once again. Such a reading was also suggested by Psillos (1999, Ch. 3) with reference to Lewis's (1984) discussion of Putnam's (1980) model-theoretic argument. In that paper, Lewis himself suggests the restriction of the interpretation of descriptive symbols to extensions corresponding to natural kind properties.</p><p>One final note on indirect interpretation is in order. Both Carnap (1961) and Lewis (1970) interpret theoretical terms indirectly simply because any definition is an instance of an indirect interpretation. For this reason, Sneed's problem of theoretical terms (Section 3.2) does not arise. Yet, the pattern of Carnap's and Lewis's proposals conforms to the pattern of a definition in the narrow sense and not to the peculiar pattern of indirect interpretation that Carnap (1939) envisioned for the interpretation of theoretical terms. This is why the indirect interpretation semantics has been separated from the present discussion of defining theoretical terms.</p><h2><a name="5" id="5">5. Conclusion</a></h2><p>The very existence of scientific terms whose semantics is dependent upon a scientific theory was already contended by Duhem and Poincare´. Such terms came to be referred to as <em>theoretical terms</em> in 20th century philosophy of science. Properties and entities that are observable in the sense of direct, unaided perception did not seem to depend on scientific theories as forces, electrons and nucleotides did. Hence, philosophers of science and logicians started to investigate the distinct semantics of theoretical terms. Various formal accounts resulted from these investigations, among which the Ramsey sentence by Ramsey (1929), Carnap's notion of indirect interpretation (1939; 1958) and Lewis's (1970) proposal of defining theoretical terms are the most prominent ones. Though not all philosophers of science understand the notion of a theoretical term in such way that semantic dependence upon a scientific theory is essential, this view prevails in the literature.</p><p>The theory-observation distinction has been attacked heavily and is presumably discredited by a large number of philosophers of science. Still, this distinction continues to permeate a number of important strands in the philosophy of science, such as scientific realism and its alternatives and the logical analysis of scientific theories. A case in point is the recent interest in the Ramsey account of scientific theories which emerged in the wake of Worral's structural realism (cf. Ladyman 2009). We have seen, moreover, that the formal accounts of theoretical terms work well with a theory-observation distinction that is relativized to a particular theory. Critics of that distinction, by contrast, have commonly attacked a global and static division into theoretical and observational terms (Maxwell 1962; Achinstein 1965). Note finally that Carnap assigned no ontological significance to the theory-observation distinction in the sense that entities of the one type would be existent in a more genuine way than ones of the other.</p><h2><a name="Bib" id="Bib">Bibliography</a></h2><ul class="hanging"><li>Achinstein, P., 1965, “The Problem of Theoretical Terms”, <em>American Philosophical Quarterly</em>, 2(3): 193–203.</li><li>Andreas, H., 2010, “A Modal View of the Semantics of Theoretical Sentences”, <em>Synthese</em>, 174(3): 367–383.</li><li>Avigad, J. and Zach, R., 2002, “The Epsilon-Calculus”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2012 Edition), Edward N. 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Maxwell (eds.), Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, pp. 3–15.</li><li>Oberheim, E., and Hoyningen-Huene, P., 2009, “The Incommensurability of Scientific Theories”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2012 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <<a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/incommensurability/">http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/incommensurability/</a>>.</li><li>Papineau, D., 1996, “Theory-Dependent Terms”, <em>Philosophy of Science</em>, 63: 1–20.</li><li>Poincare´, H., 1902, <em>Science and Hypothesis</em>, G. B. 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Essays Philosophy, Logic, Mathematics and Economics</em>, H. D. Mellor (ed.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978, pp. 101–125.</li><li>Reimer, M., 2010, “Reference”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2010 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <<a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/reference/">http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/reference/</a>>.</li><li>Russell, B., 1905, “On Denoting”, <em>Mind</em>, 14: 479–493.</li><li>Schurz, G. 2005, “Semantic Holism and (Non-)Compositionality of Scientific Theories”, in <em>The Compositionality of Meaning and Content. Vol. I</em>, M. Werning, E. Machery, and G. Schurz (eds.), Frankfurt a. M.: Ontos, pp. 271–284.</li><li>Scott, D., 1967, “Existence and Description in Formal Logic”, in <em>Bertrand Russell: Philosopher of the Century</em>, R. Schoenman (ed.), London: Allen and Unwin.</li><li>Sneed, J., 1971, <em>The Logical Structure of Mathematical Physics</em>, Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company.</li><li>Suppe, F., 1974, “The Search for a Philosophical Understanding of Scientific Theories”, in <em>The Structure of Scientific Theories</em>, F. Suppe (ed.), Urbana: University of Illinois Press, pp. 3–232.</li><li>Tuomela, R., 1973, <em>Theoretical Concepts</em>, Wien: Springer.</li><li>van Fraassen, B., 1969, “Presuppositions, Supervaluations and Free Logic”, in <em>The Logical Way of Doing Things</em>, K. Lambert (ed.), New Haven: Yale University Press, pp. 67–92.</li><li>van Fraassen, B., 1980, <em>The Scientific Image</em>, Oxford: Clarendon Press.</li><li>Weyl, H., 1949, “Wissenschaft als Symbolische Konstruktion des Menschen”, in <em>Gesammelte Abhandlungen Bd. IV</em>, K. Chandrasekharan (ed.), Berlin: Springer, 1965.</li><li>Wright, C., 1993, <em>Realism, Meaning and Truth</em>, Oxford: Blackwell.</li></ul><h2><a name="Aca" id="Aca">Academic Tools</a></h2><blockquote><table><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://plato.stanford.edu/symbols/sepman-icon.jpg" alt="sep man icon" /></td><td><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/cgi-bin/encyclopedia/archinfo.cgi?entry=theoretical-terms-science" target="other">How to cite this entry</a>.</td></tr><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://plato.stanford.edu/symbols/sepman-icon.jpg" alt="sep man icon" /></td><td><a href="https://leibniz.stanford.edu/friends/preview/theoretical-terms-science/" target="other">Preview the PDF version of this entry</a> at the <a href="https://leibniz.stanford.edu/friends/" target="other">Friends of the SEP Society</a>.</td></tr><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://plato.stanford.edu/symbols/inpho.png" alt="inpho icon" /></td><td><a href="https://inpho.cogs.indiana.edu/entity?sep=theoretical-terms-science&redirect=True" target="other">Look up this entry topic</a> at the <a href="https://inpho.cogs.indiana.edu/" target="other">Indiana Philosophy Ontology Project</a> (InPhO).</td></tr><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://plato.stanford.edu/symbols/pp.gif" alt="phil papers icon" /></td><td><a href="http://philpapers.org/sep/theoretical-terms-science/" target="other">Enhanced bibliography for this entry</a> at <a href="http://philpapers.org/" target="other">PhilPapers</a>, with links to its database.</td></tr></table></blockquote><h2><a name="Oth" id="Oth">Other Internet Resources</a></h2><p>[Please contact the author with suggestions.]</p><h2><a name="Rel" id="Rel">Related Entries</a></h2><p><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/analytic-synthetic/">analytic/synthetic distinction</a> | Carnap, Rudolf | <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/definitions/">definitions</a> | <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logical-empiricism/">empiricism: logical</a> | <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epsilon-calculus/">epsilon calculus</a> | <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/incommensurability/">incommensurability: of scientific theories</a> | <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/natural-kinds/">natural kinds</a> | <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/physics-structuralism/">physics: structuralism in</a> | <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/reference/">reference</a> | <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/science-theory-observation/">science: theory and observation in</a> | <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/scientific-realism/">scientific realism</a> | <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/structural-realism/">structural realism</a> | <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/vienna-circle/">Vienna Circle</a></p></div><div id="foot"><span class="c6"><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/info.html#c">Copyright © 2013</a> by</span><br />Holger Andreas <<a href="mailto:holger.andreas%40lrz.uni-muenchen.de"><em>holger<abbr title=" dot ">.</abbr>andreas<abbr title=" at ">@</abbr>lrz<abbr title=" dot ">.</abbr>uni-muenchen<abbr title=" dot ">.</abbr>de</em></a>></div><p><em>This entry passed through the <a href="http://fivefilters.org/content-only/">Full-Text RSS</a> service — if this is your content and you're reading it on someone else's site, please read the FAQ at <a href="http://fivefilters.org/content-only/faq.php#publishers">fivefilters.org/content-only/faq.php#publishers</a>. <a href="http://fivefilters.org">Five Filters</a> recommends: <a href="http://www.medialens.org/index.php/alerts/alert-archive/alerts-2013/715-eyes-like-blank-discs-the-guardian-s-steven-poole-on-george-orwell-s-politics-and-the-english-language.html">Eyes Like Blank Discs - The Guardian's Steven Poole On George Orwell's Politics And The English Language</a>.</em></p><br />This post was made using the <a href='http://www.webmagnates.org/auto-blogging-software.html' title='auto-blogging software'>Auto Blogging Software</a> from <a href='http://www.webmagnates.org' title'make money online'>WebMagnates.org</a> This line will not appear when posts are made after activating the software to full version.Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10303290079976590343noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5448411214494413217.post-22213833461796635792013-02-28T11:13:00.001-08:002013-02-28T11:13:53.773-08:008 March Beauty Buys You Have to Own <div id="photoGallery"><a href="http://www.totalbeauty.com/content/gallery/new-spring-beauty-products-march-2013/p130012/page2" title="Next"><img src="http://images.totalbeauty.com/uploads/editorial/lg420x280/Sample_March_Products_L1.jpg" alt="" /></a></div><p class="photoDescription">March is the best month of the year.</p><p>Bold statement? Yup. Guaranteed to spark an argument? Sure. But do I have evidence to back up my proclamation? You know it.</p><p><a href="http://www.totalbeauty.com/content/gallery/new-spring-beauty-products-march-2013/p130012/page2">Skip ahead to see the eight best beauty buys launching in March 2013.</a></p><p>First, I should acknowledge that I'm a little biased, considering my birthday falls in March (feel free to leave gifts and well wishes in the comments below). But there are plenty of other reasons to love this third month of the calendar year. Let me count the ways:</p><p>First up, March marks the arrival of spring -- the first glimpse of hope that the dreary days of Uggs will soon be replaced by sunnier times that call for Havaianas. Then, there are all of those spring-is-in-the-air signs. Blooming flowers, people playing Frisbee in the park, fuchsia lipstick, March Madness … does it get better?</p><p>It does: March is also when beauty brands trot out some of their biggest releases of the year.</p><p>From Jo Malone's limited edition fragrance collection to Esteé Lauder's second "Mad Men" makeup line, I've rounded up a few more reasons (read: the best beauty products) to prove March's prowess as the best month ever.</p><a href="http://www.totalbeauty.com/content/gallery/new-spring-beauty-products-march-2013/p130012/page2"><span class="seeNext">See Next Page:</span> <span class="seeNextTitle">Estee Lauder's Mad Men Collection , $108</span></a><p class="byLine">By <span>Cinya Burton</span></p><p class="avgRating"><a class="rateImg lowLevel" href="http://www.totalbeauty.com/content/gallery/new-spring-beauty-products-march-2013#rateThisJump" title="Rate this story">Rate this story</a><span>|</span>Avg member rating: 9</p><p><em>This entry passed through the <a href="http://fivefilters.org/content-only/">Full-Text RSS</a> service — if this is your content and you're reading it on someone else's site, please read the FAQ at <a href="http://fivefilters.org/content-only/faq.php#publishers">fivefilters.org/content-only/faq.php#publishers</a>. <a href="http://fivefilters.org">Five Filters</a> recommends: <a href="http://www.medialens.org/index.php/alerts/alert-archive/alerts-2013/715-eyes-like-blank-discs-the-guardian-s-steven-poole-on-george-orwell-s-politics-and-the-english-language.html">Eyes Like Blank Discs - The Guardian's Steven Poole On George Orwell's Politics And The English Language</a>.</em></p><br />This post was made using the <a href='http://www.webmagnates.org/auto-blogging-software.html' title='auto-blogging software'>Auto Blogging Software</a> from <a href='http://www.webmagnates.org' title'make money online'>WebMagnates.org</a> This line will not appear when posts are made after activating the software to full version.Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10303290079976590343noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5448411214494413217.post-53360420945304563692013-02-26T05:58:00.000-08:002013-02-26T05:58:00.301-08:00The Oscar Looks We Think Deserve Their Own Awards <div id="photoGallery"><a href="http://www.totalbeauty.com/content/gallery/best-hair-makeup-2013-oscars/p129882/page2" title="Next"><img src="http://images.totalbeauty.com/uploads/editorial/lg420x280/Zoe_Saldana_L1.jpg" alt="" /></a></div><p class="photoDescription">As I'm writing this I have no idea who has won Best Actress or Best Picture (C'mon Argo!) at the 2013 Oscars but what I can say with certainty is who won the red carpet beauty awards (more about that on the next slide).</p><p>Overall, the trends were simple and safe, as they've been all award season long: loose waves, nude nails, and neutral makeup with the occasional red lip. As expected, Adele went for her signature cat eye, Sandra Bullock kept her hair extra sleek, and Ben Affleck opted not to shave his scruffy beard.</p><p><a href="http://www.totalbeauty.com/content/gallery/best-hair-makeup-2013-oscars">Click here to see our 2013 Oscar beauty awards</a>.</p><p>I'll admit, there were a few surprising missteps this year (sorry, Jennifer Aniston, but you're officially stuck in a hair rut, time to give up that simple blowout on the red carpet). But those slipups only meant that the gorgeous hair and makeup looks on the other actresses seemed that much more, well, flawless.</p><p>Ready to see if your favorites made the cut? Or did you skip watching the 2013 Academy Awards all together and need a quick cheat sheet? Either way, click on to see which stars earned top awards in our red carpet beauty categories.</p><a href="http://www.totalbeauty.com/content/gallery/best-hair-makeup-2013-oscars/p129882/page2"><span class="seeNext">See Next Page:</span> <span class="seeNextTitle">Best Makeup: Jessica Chastain</span></a><p class="byLine">By <span>Cinya Burton</span></p><p class="avgRating"><a class="rateImg lowLevel" href="http://www.totalbeauty.com/content/gallery/best-hair-makeup-2013-oscars#rateThisJump" title="Rate this story">Rate this story</a><span>|</span>Avg member rating: 9</p><p><em>This entry passed through the <a href="http://fivefilters.org/content-only/">Full-Text RSS</a> service — if this is your content and you're reading it on someone else's site, please read the FAQ at <a href="http://fivefilters.org/content-only/faq.php#publishers">fivefilters.org/content-only/faq.php#publishers</a>. <a href="http://fivefilters.org">Five Filters</a> recommends: <a href="http://www.medialens.org/index.php/alerts/alert-archive/alerts-2013/715-eyes-like-blank-discs-the-guardian-s-steven-poole-on-george-orwell-s-politics-and-the-english-language.html">Eyes Like Blank Discs - The Guardian's Steven Poole On George Orwell's Politics And The English Language</a>.</em></p>Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10303290079976590343noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5448411214494413217.post-32379506143772386922013-02-26T05:43:00.000-08:002013-02-26T05:43:00.556-08:00Red Carpet Roundup <div id="mainFeatureWrap" readability="22.922535211268"><div class="contentRight"><a href="http://www.totalbeauty.com/content/gallery/best-hair-makeup-2013-oscars" title="The Oscar Looks We Think Deserve Their Own Awards"><img src="http://images.totalbeauty.com/uploads/editorial/lg/Zoe_Saldana_L.jpg" alt="The Oscar Looks We Think Deserve Their Own Awards" /></a></div><div class="contentLeft" readability="24.014084507042"><h3><a href="http://www.totalbeauty.com/content/gallery/best-hair-makeup-2013-oscars" class="singleCta" title="The Oscar Looks We Think Deserve Their Own Awards">The Oscar Looks We Think Deserve Their Own Awards</a></h3><p>Consider this the Super Bowl of red carpet hair and makeup! See which celebrities took home our top prizes in best beauty looks at the 2013 Academy Awards<br /><a title="See looks" href="http://www.totalbeauty.com/content/gallery/best-hair-makeup-2013-oscars">See looks</a></p></div></div><p class="avgRating"><a class="rateImg lowLevel" href="http://www.totalbeauty.com/content/article/red-carpet-roundup#rateThisJump" title="Rate this story">Rate this story</a><span>|</span>Avg member rating: 6</p><p><em>This entry passed through the <a href="http://fivefilters.org/content-only/">Full-Text RSS</a> service — if this is your content and you're reading it on someone else's site, please read the FAQ at <a href="http://fivefilters.org/content-only/faq.php#publishers">fivefilters.org/content-only/faq.php#publishers</a>. <a href="http://fivefilters.org">Five Filters</a> recommends: <a href="http://www.medialens.org/index.php/alerts/alert-archive/alerts-2013/715-eyes-like-blank-discs-the-guardian-s-steven-poole-on-george-orwell-s-politics-and-the-english-language.html">Eyes Like Blank Discs - The Guardian's Steven Poole On George Orwell's Politics And The English Language</a>.</em></p>Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10303290079976590343noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5448411214494413217.post-18751759948032197772013-02-26T05:28:00.000-08:002013-02-26T05:29:03.590-08:00Theoretical Terms in Science <div id="message3">The SEP will be down intermittently for upgrade and maintenance from 9am–12pm PST February 26. We apologize for any inconvenience. During that time, please use our <a href="http://stanford.library.usyd.edu.au/contents.html" target="other">Australian</a> or <a href="http://www.science.uva.nl/~seop/contents.html" target="other">Dutch</a> mirror site.</div><div id="aueditable"><div id="pubinfo"><em>First published Mon Feb 25, 2013</em></div><p>The notion of a theoretical term may simply be understood as applying to expressions that refer to nonobservational entities. Paradigmatic examples of such entities are electrons, neutrinos, gravitational forces, genes etc. There is yet another explanation of theoreticity: a theoretical term is one whose meaning becomes determined through the axioms of a scientific theory. The meaning of the term ‘force’, for example, is seen to be determined by Newton's laws of motion and further laws about special forces, such as the law of gravitation. Theoreticity is a property that is commonly applied to both expressions in the language of science and the corresponding referents and concepts. Objects, relations and functions as well as concepts thereof may thus qualify as theoretical in a derived sense.</p><p>Several semantics have been devised that aim to explain how a scientific theory contributes to the interpretation of its theoretical terms and as such determines what they mean and how they are understood. All of these semantics assume the respective theory to be given in an axiomatic fashion. Yet, theoretical terms are also recognizable in scientific theories which have as yet resisted a satisfying axiomatization. This is due to the fact that these theories contain general propositions that have the logical form of universal axioms.</p><p>Theoretical terms pertain to a number of topics in the philosophy of science. A fully fledged semantics of such terms commonly involves a statement about scientific realism and its alternatives. Such a semantics, moreover, may involve an account of how observation is related to theory in science. All formal accounts of theoretical terms deny the analytic-synthetic distinction to be applicable to the axioms of a scientific theory. The recognition of theoretical terms in the language of science by Carnap thus amounts to a rejection of an essential tenet of early logical empiricism and positivism, viz., the demonstration that all empirically significant sentences are translatable into an observation language. The present article explains the principal distinction between observational and theoretical terms, discusses important criticisms and refinements of this distinction and investigates two problems concerning the semantics of theoretical terms. Finally, the major formal accounts of this semantics are expounded.</p><ul><li><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/theoretical-terms-science/#1">1. Two Criteria of Theoreticity</a><ul><li><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/theoretical-terms-science/#1.1">1.1 Reference to Nonobservable Entities and Properties</a></li><li><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/theoretical-terms-science/#1.2">1.2 Semantic Dependence upon a Scientific Theory</a></li></ul></li><li><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/theoretical-terms-science/#2">2. Criticisms and Refinements of the Theory-Observation Distinction</a><ul><li><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/theoretical-terms-science/#2.1">2.1 Criticisms</a></li><li><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/theoretical-terms-science/#2.2">2.2 Refinements</a></li></ul></li><li><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/theoretical-terms-science/#3">3. Two Problems of Theoretical Terms</a><ul><li><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/theoretical-terms-science/#3.1">3.1 Theoretical Entities</a></li><li><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/theoretical-terms-science/#3.2">3.2 Theoretical Functions and Relations</a></li></ul></li><li><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/theoretical-terms-science/#4">4. Formal Accounts</a><ul><li><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/theoretical-terms-science/#4.1">4.1 Ramsey Sentence</a></li><li><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/theoretical-terms-science/#4.2">4.2 Indirect Interpretation</a></li><li><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/theoretical-terms-science/#4.2">4.3 Direct Interpretation</a></li><li><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/theoretical-terms-science/#4.3">4.4 Defining Theoretical Terms</a></li></ul></li><li><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/theoretical-terms-science/#5">5. Conclusion</a></li><li><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/theoretical-terms-science/#Bib">Bibliography</a></li><li><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/theoretical-terms-science/#Aca">Academic Tools</a></li><li><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/theoretical-terms-science/#Oth">Other Internet Resources</a></li><li><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/theoretical-terms-science/#Rel">Related Entries</a></li></ul><hr /><h2><a name="1" id="1">1. Two Criteria of Theoreticity</a></h2><h3><a name="1.1" id="1.1">1.1 Reference to Nonobservable Entities and Properties</a></h3><p>As just explained, a theoretical term may simply be understood as an expression that refers to nonobservable entities or properties. Theoreticity, on this understanding, is the negation of observabilty. This explanation of theoreticity thus rests on an antecedent understanding of observability. What makes an entity or property observable? As Carnap (1966, Ch. 23) has pointed out, a philosopher understands the notion of observability in a narrower sense than a physicist. For a philosopher, a property is observable if it can be ‘directly perceived by the senses’. Hence, such properties as ‘blue’, ‘hard’ and ‘colder than’ are paradigmatic examples of observable properties in the philosopher's understanding of observability. The physicist, by contrast, would also count quantitative magnitudes that can be measured in a ‘relatively simple, direct way’ as observable. Hence, the physicist views such quantities as temperature, pressure and intensity of electric current as observable.</p><p>The notion of direct perception is spelled out by Carnap (1966, Ch. 23) by two conditions. Direct perception means, first, perception unaided by technical instruments and, second, that the perception is unaided by inferences. These conditions are obviously not satisfied for the measurement of quantities like temperature and pressure. For the philosopher, only spatial positions of liquids and pointers are observed when these quantities are measured. To an even higher degree, we are unable to observe electrons, molecules, gravitational forces and genes on this narrow understanding of observability. Hence, expressions referring to such entities qualify as theoretical.</p><p>In sum, a property or object is observable (in the philosopher's sense) if it can be perceived directly, where directness of observation precludes the use of technical artifacts and inferences. Notably, Carnap (1936/37, 455; 1966, 226) did not think his explanation of the distinction to be sufficiently precise to result in a sharp line between observational and theoretical terms. He rather views the theory-observation distinction as being introduced into a ‘continuum of degrees of observability’ by choice. Prominent criticisms of the theory-observation distinction will be discussed in Section 2.1.</p><h3><a name="1.2" id="1.2">1.2 Semantic Dependence upon a Scientific Theory</a></h3><p>The above explanation of theoreticity may be felt unsatisfactory as it determines the property of being theoretical only via negation of the property of being observable (Putnam 1962). This explanation does not indicate any specific connection between the semantics of theoretical terms and corresponding scientific theories. There is, however, also a direct characterization of theoreticity that complements the criterion of non-observability: an expression is theoretical if and only if its meaning is determined through the axioms of a scientific theory. This explanation rests on what has come to be referred to as the <em>contextual theory of meaning,</em> which says that the meaning of a scientific term depends, in some way or other, on how this term is incorporated into a scientific theory.</p><p>Why adopt the contextual theory of meaning for scientific terms? Suppose the notion of meaning is understood along the lines of the Fregean notion of sense. The sense of a term be understood as that what determines its reference (cf. Church 1956, 6n). It is, furthermore, a reasonable requirement that a semantic theory must account for our understanding of the sense and, hence, our methods of determining the extension of scientific terms (cf. Dummett 1991, 340). For a large number of scientific terms these methods rest upon axioms of one or more scientific theories. There is no way of determining the force function in classical mechanics without using some axiom of this theory. Familiar methods make use of Newton's second law of motion, Hooke's law, the law of gravitation etc. Likewise, virtually all methods of measuring temperature rest upon laws of thermodynamics. Take measurement by a gas thermometer which is based on the ideal gas law. The laws of scientific theories are thus essential to our methods of determining the extension of scientific terms. The contextual theory of meaning, therefore, makes intelligible how students in a scientific discipline and scientists grasp the meaning, or sense, of scientific terms. On this account, understanding the sense of a term is knowing how to determine its referent, or extension, at least in part.</p><p>The contextual theory of meaning can be traced back at least to the work of Duhem. His demonstration that a scientific hypothesis in physics cannot be tested in isolation from its theoretical context is joined with and motivated by semantic considerations, according to which it is physical theories that give meaning to the specific concepts of physics (Duhem 1906, 183). Poincaré (1902, 90) literally claims that certain scientific propositions acquire meaning only by virtue of the adoption of certain conventions. Perhaps the most prominent and explicit formulation of the contextual theory of meaning is to be found in Feyerabend's landmark “Explanation, Reduction, and Empiricism” (1962, 88):</p><blockquote><p>For just as the meaning of a term is not an intrinsic property but is dependent upon the way in which the term has been incorporated into a theory, in the very same manner the content of a whole theory (and thereby again the meaning of the descriptive terms which it contains) depends upon the way in which it is incorporated into both the set of its empirical consequences and the set of all the alternatives which are being discussed at a given time: once the contextual theory of meaning has been adopted, there is no reason to confine its application to a single theory, especially as the boundaries of such a language or of such a theory are almost never well defined.</p></blockquote><p>The accounts of a contextual theory of meaning in the works of Duhem, Poincaré and Feyerabend are informal insofar as they do not crystallize into a corresponding formal semantics for scientific terms. Such a crystallization is brought about by some of the formal accounts of theoretical terms to be expounded in Section 4.</p><p>The view that meaning is bestowed upon a theoretical term through the axioms of a scientific theory implies that only axiomatized or axiomatizable scientific theories contain theoretical terms. In fact, all formal accounts of the semantics of theoretical terms are devised to apply to axiomatic scientific theories. This is due, in part, to the fact that physics has dominated the philosophy of science for a long time. One must wonder, therefore, whether there are any theoretical terms in, for example, evolutionary biology which has as yet resisted complete axiomatization. Arguably, there are. Even though evolutionary biology has not yet been axiomatized, we can recognize general propositions therein that are essential to determining certain concepts of this theory. Consider the following two propositions. (i) Two DNA sequences are homologous if and only if they have a common ancestor sequence. (ii) There is an inverse correlation between the number of mutations necessary to transform one DNA-sequence <em>S</em><sub>1</sub> into another <em>S<sub>2</sub></em> and the likelihood that <em>S</em><sub>1</sub> and <em>S</em><sub>2</sub> are homologous. Notably, these two propositions are used to determine, among other methods, relations of homology in evolutionary biology. The majority of general propositions in scientific theories other than those of physics, however, have instances that fail to be true. (Some philosphers of science have argued that this so even for a large number of axioms in physics.) Formal semantics of theoretical terms in scientific theories with default axioms are presently being developed.</p><h2><a name="2" id="2">2. Criticisms and Refinements of the Theory-Observation Distinction</a></h2><h3><a name="2.1" id="2.1">2.1 Criticisms</a></h3><p>The very idea of a clear-cut theory-observation distinction has received much criticism. First, with the help of sophisticated instruments, such as telescopes and electron microscopes, we are able to observe more and more entities, which had to be considered unobservable at a previous stage of scientific and technical evolution. Electrons and α-particles which can be observed in a cloud chamber are a case in point (Achinstein 1965). Second, assume observability is understood as excluding the use of instruments. On this understanding, examples drawing on the use of cloud chambers and electron microscopes, which are adduced to criticize the theory-observation distinction, can be dealt with. However, we would then have to conclude that things being perceived with glasses are not observed either, which is counterintuitive (Maxwell 1962). Third, there are concepts applying to or being thought to apply to both macroscopic and submicroscopic particles. A case in point are spatial and temporal relations and the color concepts that play an important role in Newton's corpuscle theory of light. Hence, there are clear-cut instances of observation concepts that apply to unobservable entities, which does not seem acceptable (cf. Putnam 1962).</p><p>These objections to the theory-observation distinction can be answered in a relatively straightforward manner from a Carnapian perspective. As explained in Section 1.1, Carnap (1936/37, 1966) was quite explicit that the philosopher's sense of observation excludes the use of instruments. As for an observer wearing glasses, a proponent of the theory-observation distinction finds enough material in Carnap (1936/37, 455) to defend her position. Carnap is aware of the fact that color concepts are not observable ones for a color-blind person. He is thus prepared to relativize the distinction in question. In fact, Carnap's most explicit explanation of observability defines this notion in such a way that it is relativized to an organism (1936/37, 454n).</p><p>Recall, moreover, that Carnap's theory-observation distinction was not intended to do justice to our overall understanding of these notions. Hence, certain quotidian and scientific uses of ‘observation’, such as observation using glasses, may well be disregarded when this distinction is drawn as long as the distinction promises to be fruitful in the logical analysis of scientific theories. A closer look reveals that Carnap (1966, 226) agrees with critics of the logical empiricists' agenda, such as Maxwell (1962) and Achinstein (1965), on there being no clear-cut theory-observation distinction (see also Carnap's early (1936/37, 455) for a similar statement):</p><blockquote><p>There is no question here of who [the physicist thinking that temperature is observable or the philosopher who disagrees, H. A.] is using the term ‘observable’ in the right or proper way. There is a continuum which starts with direct sensory observations and proceeds to enormously complex, indirect methods of observation. Obviously no sharp line can be drawn across this continuum; it is a matter of degree.</p></blockquote><p>A bit more serious is Putnam's (1962) objection drawing on the application of apparently clear-cut instances of observation concepts to submicroscopic particles. Here, Carnap would have to distinguish between color concepts applying to observable entities and related color concepts applying to unobservable ones. So, the formal language in which the logical analysis proceeds would have to contain a predicate ‘red<sub>1</sub>’ applying to macroscopic objects and another one ‘red<sub>2</sub>’ applying to submicroscopic ones. Again, such a move would be in line with the artificial, or ideal language philosophy that Carnap proclaimed (see Lutz (2012) for a sympathetic discussion of artificial language philosophy.)</p><p>There is another group of criticisms coming from the careful study of the history of science: Hanson (1958), Feyerabend (1962) and Kuhn (1962) aimed to show that observation concepts are <em>theory-laden</em> in a manner that makes their meaning theory-dependent. In Feyerabend's (1978, 32) this contention takes on the formulation that all terms are theoretical. Hanson (1958, 18) thinks that Tycho and Kepler were (literally) ‘seeing’ different things when perceiving the sun rising because their astronomical background theories were different. Kuhn (1962) was more tentative when expounding his variant of the theory-ladenness of observation. In a discussion of the Sneed formalism of the structuralist school, he favored a theory-observation distinction that is relativized, first to a theory and second to an application of this theory (1976).</p><p>Virtually all formal accounts of theoretical terms in fact assume that those phenomena that a theory <em>T</em> is meant to account for can be described in terms whose semantics does not depend on <em>T</em> . The counter thesis that even the semantics of putative observation terms depends on a quotidian or scientific theory, therefore, attacks a core doctrine coming with the logical empiricists' and subsequent work on theoretical terms. A thorough discussion and assessment of theory-ladenness of observation in the works of the great historians of science is beyond the scope of this entry. Bird (2004), Bogen (2009) and Oberheim and Hoyningen-Huene (2009) are entries in the present encyclopedia that address, amongst other things, this issue.</p><h3><a name="2.2" id="2.2">2.2 Refinements</a></h3><p>There is a simple, intuitive and influential proposal how to relativize the theory-observation distinction in a sensible way: a term <em>t</em> is theoretical with respect to a theory <em>T</em>, or for short, a <em>T</em>-term if and only if it is introduced by the theory <em>T</em> at a certain stage in the history of science. O-terms, by contrast, are those that were antecedently available and understood before <em>T</em> was set forth (Lewis 1970; cf. Hempel 1973). This proposal draws the theory-observation distinction in an apparently sharp way by means of relativizing that distinction to a particular theory. Needless to say, the proposal is in line with the contextual theory of meaning.</p><p>The distinction between <em>T</em>-terms and antecedently available ones has two particular merits. First, it circumvents the view that any sharp line between theoretical and observational terms is conventional and arbitrary. Second, it connects the theory-observation distinction with what seemed to have motivated that distinction in the first place, viz., the investigation how we come to understand the meaning of terms that appear to be meaningful in virtue of certain scientific theories.</p><p>A similar proposal of a relativized theory-observation distinction was made by Sneed in his seminal <em>The Logical Structure of Mathematical Physics</em> (1971, Ch. II). Here is a somewhat simplified and more syntactic formulation of Sneed's criterion of <em>T</em>-theoreticity:</p><blockquote><p><strong>Definition 1 (<em>T</em>-theoreticity)</strong><br />A term <em>t</em> is theoretical with respect to the theory <em>T</em>, or for short, <em>T</em>-theoretical if and only if any method of determining the extension of <em>t</em>, or some part of that extension, rests on some axiom of <em>T</em>.</p></blockquote><p>It remains to explain what it is for a method <em>m</em> of determining the extension of <em>t</em> to rest upon an axiom φ. This relation obtains if and only if the use of <em>m</em> depends on φ being a true sentence. In other words, <em>m</em> rests upon φ if and only if the hypothetical assumption of φ being false or indeterminate would invalidate the use of <em>m</em> in the sense that we would be lacking the commonly presumed justification for using <em>m</em>. The qualification ‘or some part of that extension’ has been introduced in the present definition because we cannot expect a single measurement method to determine the extension of a scientific quantity completely. <em>T</em>-non-theoreticity is the negation of <em>T</em>-theoreticity:</p><blockquote><p><strong>Definition 2 (<em>T</em>-non-theoreticity)</strong><br />A term <em>t</em> is <em>T</em>-non-theoretical if and only if it is not <em>T</em>-theoretical.</p></blockquote><p>The concepts of classical particle mechanics (henceforth abbreviated by CPM) exemplify well the notions of <em>T</em>-theoreticity and <em>T</em>-non-theoreticity. As has been indicated above, all methods of determining the force acting upon a particle make use of some axiom of classical particle mechanics, such as Newton's laws of motion or some law about special forces. Hence, force is CPM-theoretical. Measurement of spatial distances, by contrast, is possible without using axioms of CPM. Hence, the concept of spatial distance is CPM-non-theoretical. The concept of mass is less straightforward to classify as we can measure this concept using classical collision mechanics (CCM). Still, it was seen to be CPM-theoretical by the structuralists since CCM appeared reducible to CPM (Balzer et al. 1987, Ch. 2).</p><p>Suppose for a term <em>t</em> once introduced by a scientific theory <em>T</em><sub>1</sub> novel methods of determination become established through another theory <em>T</em><sub>2</sub>, where these methods do not depend on any axiom of <em>T</em><sub>1</sub>. Then, <em>t</em> would neither qualify as <em>T</em><sub>1</sub>-theoretical nor as <em>T</em><sub>2</sub>-theoretical. It is preferable, in this situation, to relativize Definition 1 to theory-nets <em>N</em>, i.e., compounds of several theories. Whether there are such cases has not yet been settled.</p><p>The original exposition of the theoreticity criterion by Sneed (1971) is a bit more involved as it makes use of set-theoretic predicates and intended applications, rather technical notions of what became later on labeled the <em>structuralist approach to scientific theories</em>. There has been a lively discussion, mainly but not exclusively within the structuralist school, how to express the relativized notion of theoreticity most properly (Balzer 1986; 1996). As noted above, Kuhn (1976) proposed a twofold relativization of theoreticity, viz., first to a scientific theory and second to applications of such theories.</p><p>Notably, Sneed's criterion of <em>T</em>-theoreticity suggests a strategy that allows us to regain a global, non-relativized theory-observation distinction: simply take a term <em>t</em> to be theoretical if and only if it holds, for all methods <em>m</em> of determining its extension, that <em>m</em> rests upon some axiom of some theory <em>T</em>. A term <em>t</em> is non-theoretical, or observational, if and only if there are means of determining its extension, at least in part, that do not rest upon any axiom of any theory. This criterion is still relative to our present stage of explicit axiomatic theorizing but comes nonetheless closer to the original intention of Carnap's theory-observation distinction, according to which observation is understood in the narrow sense of unaided perception.</p><h2><a name="3" id="3">3. Two Problems of Theoretical Terms</a></h2><p>The problem of theoretical terms is a recurrent theme in the philosophy of science literature (Achinstein 1965; Sneed 1971, Ch. II; Tuomela 1973, Ch. V; Friedman 2011). Different shades of meaning have been associated with this problem. In its most comprehensive formulation, the problem of theoretical terms is to give a proper account of the meaning and reference of theoretical terms. There are at least two kinds of expression that pose a distinct problem of theoretical terms, respectively. First, unary predicates referring to theoretical entities, such as ‘electron’, ‘neutrino’ and ‘nucleotide’. Second, non-unary theoretical predicates, such as ‘homology’ in evolutionary biology and theoretical function expressions, such as ‘force’, ‘temperature’ and ‘intensity of the electromagnetic field’ in physics. Sneed's problem of theoretical terms, as expounded in (1971, Ch. II), concerns only the latter kind of expression. We shall now start surveying problems concerning the semantics of expressions for theoretical entities and then move on to expressions for theoretical relations and functions.</p><h3><a name="3.1" id="3.1">3.1 Theoretical Entities</a></h3><p>A proper semantics for theoretical terms involves an account of reference and one of meaning and understanding. Reference fixing needs to be related to meaning as we want to answer the following question: how do we come to refer successfully to theoretical entities? This question calls for different answers depending on what particular conception of a theoretical entity is adopted. The issue of realism and its alternatives, therefore, comes into play at this point.</p><p>For the realist, theoretical entities exist independently from our theories about the world. Also, natural kinds that classify these entities exist independently from our theories (cf. Psillos 1999; Lewis 1984). The instrumentalist picture is commonly reported to account for theoretical entities in terms of mere fictions. The formalist variant of instrumentalism denies theoretical terms to have referents at all. Between these two extreme cases there is a number of intermediate positions.<sup>[<a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/theoretical-terms-science/notes.html#1" name="note-1" id="note-1">1</a>]</sup></p><p>Carnap (1958; 1966, Ch. 26) attempted to attain a metaphysically neutral position so as to avoid a commitment to or denial of scientific realism. In his account of the theoretical language of science, theoretical entities were conceived as mathematical ones that are related to observable events in certain determinate ways. An electron, for example, figures as a certain distribution of charge and mass in a four-dimensional manifold of real numbers, where charge and mass are mere real-valued functions. These functions and the four-dimensional manifold itself are to be related to observable events by means of univsersal axioms. Notably, Carnap would not have accepted a charcterization of his view as antirealist or non-realist since he thought the metaphysical doctrine of realism to be void of content.</p><p>In sum, there are three major and competing characterizations of a theoretical entity in science that are in line with the common theoreticity criterion according to which such an entity is inaccessible by means of unaided perception. First, theoretical entities are characterized as mind and language independent. Second, theoretical entities are mind and language dependent in some way or other. Third, they are conceived as mathematical entities that are related to the observable world in certain determinate ways. We may thus distinguish between (i) a realist view, (ii) a collection of non-realist views and (iii) a Pythagorean view of theoretical entities.</p><p>Now, there are three major accounts of reference and meaning that have been used, implicitly or explicitly, for the semantics of theoretical terms: (i) the descriptivist picture, (ii) causal and causal-historical theories and (iii) hybrid ones that combine descriptivist ideas with causal elements (Reimer 2010). Accounts of reference and meaning other than these play no significant role in the philosophy of science. Hence, we need to survey at least nine combinations consisting, first, of an abstract characterization of the nature of a theoretical entity (realist, non-realist and Pythagorean), and, second, a particular account of reference (descriptivist, causal and hybrid). Some of these combinations are plainly inconsistent and, hence, can be dealt with very briefly. Let us start with the realist view of theoretical entities.</p><h4><a name="3.1.1" id="3.1.1">The realist view</a></h4><p>The descriptivist picture is highly intuitive with regard to our understanding of expressions referring to theoretical entities on the realist view. According to this picture, an electron is a spatiotemporal entity with such and such a mass and such and such a charge. We detect and recognize electrons when identifying entities having these properties. The descriptivist explanation of meaning and reference makes use of theoretical functions, mass and electric charge in the present example. The semantics of theoretical entities, therefore, is connected with the semantics of theoretical relations and functions, which will be dealt with in the next subsection. It seems to hold, in general, that theoretical entities in the sciences are to be characterized in terms of theoretical functions and (non-unary) relations.</p><p>The descriptivist account, however, faces two particular problems with regard to the historic evolution of scientific theories. First, if descriptions of theoretical entities are constitutive of the meaning of corresponding unary predicates, one must wonder what the common core of understanding is that adherents of successive theories share and whether there is such a core at all. Were Rutherford and Bohr talking about the same type of entities when using the expression ‘electron’? Issues of incommensurability arise with the descriptivist picture (Psillos 1999, 280). A second problem arises when elements of the description of an entity being given by a predecessor theory <em>T</em> are judged wrong from the viewpoint of the successor theory <em>T′</em>. Then, on a strict reading of the descriptivist account, the corresponding theoretical term failed to refer in <em>T</em>. For if there is nothing that satisfies a description, the corresponding expression has no referent. This is a simple consequence of the theory of description by Russell in his famous “On Denoting” (1905). Hence, an account of weighting descriptions is needed in order to circumvent such failures of reference.</p><p>As is well known, Kripke (1980) set forth a causal-historical account of reference as an alternative to the descriptivist picture. This account starts with an initial baptism that introduces a name and goes on with causal chains transmitting the reference of the name from speaker to speaker. In this picture, Aristotle is the man once baptized so; he might not have been the student of Plato or done any other thing commonly attributed to him. Kripke thought this picture to apply both to proper names and general terms. It is hardly indicated, however, how this picture works for expressions referring to theoretical entities (cf. Papineau 1996). Kripke's story is particularly counterintuitive in view of the ahistorical manner of teaching in the natural sciences, wherein the original, historical introduction of a theoretical term plays a minor role in comparison to up-to-date textbook and journal explanations. Such explanations are clearly of the descriptivist type. The Kripkean causal story can be read as an account of reference fixing without being read as a story of grasping the meaning of theoretical terms. Reference, however, needs to be related to meaning so as to ensure that scientists know what they are talking about and are able to identify the entities under investigation. Notably, even for expressions of everyday language, the charge of not explaining meaning has been leveled against Krikpe's causal-historical account (Reimer 2010). The same charge applies to Putnam's (1975) causal account of reference and meaning, which Putnam himself abandoned in his (1980).</p><p>A purely causal or causal-historical account of reference does not seem a viable option for theoretical terms. More promising are hybrid accounts that combine descriptivist intuitions with causal elements. Such an account has been given by Psillos (1999, 296):</p><ol><li>A term <em>t</em> refers to an entity <em>x</em> if and only if <em>x</em> satisfies the core causal description associated with <em>t</em>.</li><li>Two terms <em>t</em>′ and <em>t</em> denote the same entity if and only if (a) their putative referents play the same causal role with respect to a network of phenomena; and (b) the core causal description of <em>t</em>′ takes up the kind-constitutive properties of the core causal description associated with <em>t</em>.</li></ol><p>This account has two particular merits. First, it is much closer to the way scientists understand and use theoretical terms than purely causal accounts. Because of this, it is not only an account of reference but also one of meaning for theoretical terms. In purely causal accounts, by contrast, there is a tendency to abandon the notion of meaning altogether. Second, it promises to ensure a more stable notion of reference than in purely descriptivist accounts of reference and meaning. Notably, the kind of causation that Psillos's hybrid account refers to is different from the causal-historical chains that Kripke thought responsible for the transmission of reference among speakers. No further explanation, however, is given of what a kind-constitutive property is and how we are to recognize such a property. Psillos (1999, 288n) merely infers the existence of such properties from the assumption of there being natural kinds.</p><h4><a name="3.1.2" id="3.1.2">Non-realist views</a></h4><p>Non-realist and antirealist semantics for theoretical terms are motivated by the presumption that the problem of theoretical terms has no satisfying realist solution. What does a non-realist semantics of theoretical terms look like? The view that theoretical entities are mere fictions often figures only in realist portrays of antirealism and is hardly seriously maintained by any philosopher of science in the 20th century. Quine's comparison of physical objects with the gods of Homer in his (1951) seems to be an exception. If one were to devise a formal or informal semantics for the view that theoretical entities are mere fictions, a purely descriptive account seems most promising. Such an account could in particular make heavy use of the Fregean notion of sense. For this notion was introduced, amongst other objectives, with the intent to explain our understanding of expressions like ‘Odysseus’ and ‘Pegasus’. One would have to admit, however, that sentences with names that lack a referent may well have a truth-value and as such deviate from Frege. Causal elements do not seem of much use in the fiction view of theoretical entities.</p><p>Formalist variants of instrumentalism are a more serious alternative to realist semantics than the fiction view of theoretical entities. Formalist views in the philosophy of mathematics are ones which aim to account for mathematical concepts and objects in terms of syntactic entities and operations thereupon within a calculus. Such views have been carried over to theoretical concepts and objects in the natural sciences, with the qualification that the observational part of the calculus is interpreted in such a way that its symbols refer to physical or phenomal objects. Cognitive access to theoretical entities is thus explained in terms of our cognitive access to the symbols and rules of the calculus in the context of an antecedent understanding of the observation terms. Formalist ideas were sympathetically entertained by Hermann Weyl (1949). He was driven towards such ideas by adherence to Hilbert's distinction between real and ideal elements and the corresponding distinction between real and ideal propositions (Hilbert 1926). Propositions of the observation language were construed as real ones in the sense of this Hilbertian distinction by Weyl, whereas theoretical propositions as ideal ones. The content of an ideal proposition is to be understood in terms of the (syntactic) consistency of the whole system consisting of ideal and real propositions being asserted. This is the defining property of an ideal proposition.</p><h4><a name="3.1.3" id="3.1.3">The Pythagorean view</a></h4><p>We still need to discuss the view that theoretical entities are mathematical entities being related to observable events in certain determinate ways. This theory is clearly of the descriptivist type, as we shall see more clearly when dealing with the formal account by Carnap in Section 4. No causal elements are needed in Carnap's Pythagorean empiricism.</p><p>It is fair to characterize the Pythagorean view in general by saying that it shifts the problem of theoretical terms to the theory of meaning and reference for mathematical expressions. The question of how we are able to refer successfully to electrons is answered by the Pythagorean by pointing out that we are able to refer successfully to mathematical entities. Moreover, the Pythagorean explains, it is part of the notion of an electron that corresponding mathematical entities are connected to observable phenomena by means of axioms and inference rules. The empirical surplus of theoretical entities in comparison to “pure” mathematical entities is thus captured by axioms and inference rules that establish connections to empirical phenomena. Since mathematical entities do not, by themselves, have connections to observable phenomena, the question of truth and falsehood may not be put in a truth-conditional manner for those axioms that connect mathematical entities with phenomenal events (cf. Section 4.2). Carnap (1958), therefore, came to speak of <em>postulates</em> when referring to the axioms of a scientific theory.</p><p>How do we come to refer successfully to mathematical entities? This, of course, is a problem in the philosophy of mathematics. (For a classical paper that addresses this problem see Benacerraf (1973)). Carnap has not much to say about meaning and reference of mathematical expressions in his seminal “The Methodological Character of Theoretical Concepts” (1956) but discusses these issues in his “Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology” (1950). There he aims at establishing a metaphysically neutral position that avoids a commitment to Platonist, nominalist or formalist conceptions of mathematical objects. A proponent of the Pythagorean view other than Carnap is Hermann Weyl (1949). As for the cognition of mathematical entities, Weyl largely followed Hilbert's formalism in his later work. Hence, there is a non-empty intersection between the Pythagorean view and the formalist view of theoretical entities. Unlike Carnap, Weyl did not characterize the interpretation of theoretical terms by means of model-theoretic notions.</p><h3><a name="3.2" id="3.2">3.2 Theoretical Functions and Relations</a></h3><p>For theoretical functions and relations, a particular problem arises from the idea that a theoretical term is, by definition, semantically dependent upon a scientific theory. Let us recall the above explanation of <em>T</em>-theoreticity: a term <em>t</em> is <em>T</em>-theoretical if and only if any method of determining the extension of <em>t</em>, or some part of that extension, rests on some axiom of <em>T</em>. Let φ be such an axiom and <em>m</em> be a corresponding method of determination. The present explanation of <em>T</em>-theoreticity, then, means that <em>m</em> is valid only on condition of φ being true. The latter dependency holds because φ is used either explicitly in calculations to determine <em>t</em> or in the calibration of measurement devices. Such devices, then, perform the calculation implicitly. A case in point is measurement of temperature by a gas thermometer. Such a device rests upon the law that changes of temperature result into proportional changes in the volume of gases.</p><p>Suppose now <em>t</em> is theoretical with respect to a theory <em>T</em>. Then it holds that in order to measure <em>t</em>, we need to assume the truth of some axiom φ of <em>T</em>. Suppose, further, that <em>t</em> has occurrences in φ, as is standard in examples of <em>T</em>-theoreticity. From this it follows that, in standard truth-conditional semantics, the truth-value of φ is dependent on the semantic value of <em>t</em>. This leads to the following epistemological difficulty: on the one hand, we need to know the extension of <em>t</em> in order to find out whether φ is true. On the other hand, it is simply impossible to determine the extension of <em>t</em> without using φ or some other axiom of <em>T</em>. This mutual dependency between the semantic values of φ and <em>t</em> makes it difficult, if not even impossible, to have evidence for φ being true in any of its applications.</p><p>We could, of course, use an alternative measurement method of <em>t</em>, say one resting upon an axiom ψ of <em>T</em>, to gain evidence for the axiom φ being true in some selected instances. This move, however, only shifts the problem to applications of another axiom of <em>T</em>. For these applications the same type of difficulty arises, viz., mutual dependency of the semantic values of ψ and <em>t</em>. We are thus caught either in a vicious circle or in an infinite regress when attempting to gain evidence for the propriety of a single measurement of a theoretical term. Sneed (1971, Ch. II) was the first to describe that particular difficulty in the present manner and termed it <em>the problem of theoretical terms</em>. Measurement of the force function in classical mechanics exemplifies this problem well. There is no method of measuring force that does not rest upon some law of classical mechanics. Likewise, it is impossible to measure temperature without using some law that depends upon either phenomenological or statistical thermodynamics.</p><p>Though its formulation is primarily epistemological, Sneed's problem of theoretical terms has a semantic reading. Let the meaning of a term be identified with the methods of determining its extension, as in Section 1.2. Then we can say that our understanding of <em>T</em>-theoretical relations and functions originates from the axioms of the scientific theory <em>T</em>. In standard truth-conditional semantics, by contrast, one assumes that the truth-value of an axiom φ is determined by the semantic values of those descriptive constants that have occurrences in φ. Among these constants, there are theoretical terms of <em>T</em>. Hence, it appears that standard truth-conditional semantics does not accord with the order of our grasping the meaning of theoretical terms. In the next section, we shall encounter indirect means of interpreting theoretical terms. These prove to be ways out of the present problem of theoretical terms.</p><h2><a name="4" id="4">4. Formal Accounts</a></h2><p>A few notational conventions and preliminary considerations are necessary to explain the formal accounts of theoretical terms and their semantics. Essential to all of these accounts is the division of the set of descriptive symbols into a set <em>V-o</em> of observational and another set <em>V-t</em> of theoretical terms. (The descriptive symbols of a formal language are simply the non-logical ones.) A scientific theory thus be formulated in a language <em>L</em>(<em>V-o,V-t</em>). The division of the descriptive vocabulary gives rise to a related distinction between <em>T</em>- and <em>C</em>-axioms among the axioms of a scientific theory. The <em>T</em>-axioms contain only <em>V-t</em> symbols as descriptive ones, while the <em>C</em>-axioms contain both <em>V-o</em> and <em>V-t</em> symbols. The latter axioms establish a connection between the theoretical and the observational terms. <em>TC</em> designates the conjunction of <em>T</em>- and <em>C</em>-axioms and <em>A</em>(<em>TC</em>) the set of these axioms. Let <em>n</em><sub>1</sub>,…,<em>n<sub>k</sub></em> be the elements of <em>V-o</em> and <em>t</em><sub>1</sub>,…,<em>t<sub>n</sub></em> the elements of <em>V-t</em>. Then, <em>TC</em> is a proposition of the following type:</p><p class="c3">(<em>TC</em>) <em>TC</em>(<em>n</em><sub>1</sub>,…,<em>n<sub>k</sub></em>, <em>t</em><sub>1</sub>,…, <em>t<sub>n</sub></em>)</p><p>As for the domain of interpretation of <em>L</em>(<em>V-o</em>,<em>V-t</em>), Ramsey (1929) assumes there to be only one for all descriptive symbols. Carnap (1956, 1958), by contrast, distinguishes between a domain of interpretation for observational terms and another for theoretical terms. Notably, the latter domain contains exclusively mathematical entities. Ketland (2004) has emphasized the importance of distinguishing between an observational and a theoretical domain of interpretation, where the latter is allowed to contain theoretical entities, such as electrons and protons.</p><p><em>TC</em> is a first-order sentence in a large number of accounts, as in Ramsey's seminal “Theories” (1929). Carnap (1956; 1958), however, works with higher-order logic to allow for the formulation of mathematical propositions and concepts.</p><h3><a name="4.1" id="4.1">4.1 The Ramsey Sentence</a></h3>The Ramsey sentence of a theory <em>TC</em> in the language <em>L</em>(<em>V-o</em>,<em>V-t</em>) is obtained by the following two transformations of the conjunction of <em>T</em>- and <em>C</em>-axioms. First, replace all theoretical symbols in this conjunction by higher-order variables of appropriate type. Then, bind these variables by higher-order existential quantifiers. As result one obtains a higher-order sentence of the following form:<p class="c3">(<em>TC<sup>R</sup></em>) ∃<em>X</em><sub>1</sub>…∃<em>X<sub>n</sub></em> <em>TC</em>(<em>n</em><sub>1</sub>, …, <em>n<sub>k</sub></em>, <em>X</em><sub>1</sub>, …, <em>X<sub>n</sub></em>)</p><p>where <em>X</em><sub>1</sub>, …, <em>X<sub>n</sub></em> are higher-order variables. This sentence says that there is an extensional interpretation of the theoretical terms that verifies, together with an antecedently given interpretation of the observation language <em>L</em>(<em>V-o</em>), the axioms <em>TC</em>. The Ramsey sentence expresses an apparently weaker proposition than <em>TC</em>, at least in standard truth-conditional semantics. If one thinks that the Ramsey sentence expresses the proposition of a scientific theory more properly than <em>TC</em>, one holds the <em>Ramsey view</em> of scientific theories.</p><p>Why should one prefer the Ramsey view to the standard one? Ramsey (1929, 120) himself seemed to have something like a contextual theory of meaning in mind when proposing the replacement of theoretical constants with appropriate higher-order variables:</p><blockquote><p>Any additions to the theory, whether in the form of new axioms or particular assertions like α(<em>0, 3</em>) are to be made within the scope of the original α, β, γ. They are not, therefore, strictly propositions by themselves just as the different sentences in a story beginning ‘Once upon a time’ have not complete meanings and so are not propositions by themselves.</p></blockquote><p>α, β, and γ figure in this explanation as theoretical terms to be replaced by higher-order variables. Ramsey goes on to suggest that the meaning of a theoretical sentence φ is the difference between</p><ol start="1"><li>(<em>TC</em> ∧ <em>A</em> ∧ φ)<sup><em>R</em></sup></li></ol><p>and</p><ol start="2"><li>(<em>TC</em> ∧ <em>A</em>)<sup><em>R</em></sup></li></ol><p>where <em>A</em> stands for the set of observation sentences being asserted and (...)<sup><em>R</em></sup> for the operation of Ramsification, i.e., existentially generalizing on all theoretical terms. This proposal of expressing theoretical assertions clearly makes such assertions dependent upon the context of the theory <em>TC</em>. Ramsey (1929, 124) thinks that a theoretical assertion φ is not meaningful if no observational evidence can be found for either φ or its negation. In this case there is no stock <em>A</em> of observation sentences such that (1) and (2) differ in truth-value.</p><p>Another important argument in favour of the Ramsey view was given later by Sneed (1979, Ch. III). It is easy to show that the problem of theoretical terms (Section 3.2) does not arise in the first place on the Ramsey view. For by <em>TC<sup>R</sup></em> it is only claimed that there are extensions of the theoretical terms satisfying each axiom of the set <em>A</em>(<em>TC</em>) under a given interpretation of the observational language. No claim, however, is made by <em>TC<sup>R</sup></em> as to whether or not the sentences of <em>A</em>(<em>TC</em>) are true. Nonetheless, it can be shown that <em>TC<sup>R</sup></em> and <em>TC</em> have the same observational consequences:</p><blockquote><p><strong>Proposition 1</strong> For all <em>L</em>(<em>V-o</em>) sentences φ, <em>TC<sup>R</sup></em> ⊢ φ if and only if <em>TC</em> ⊢ φ, where ⊢ designates the relation of logical consequence.</p></blockquote><p>Hence, the Ramsey sentence cannot be true in case the original theory <em>TC</em> is not consistent with the observable facts. For a discussion of empirical adequacy and Ramsification see Ketland (2004).</p><p>One difficulty, however, remains with the Ramsey view. It concerns the representation of deductive reasoning, for many logicians the primary objective of logic. Now, Ramsey (1929, 121) thinks that the ‘incompleteness’ of theoretical assertions does not affect our reasoning. No formal account, however, is given that relates our deductive practice, in which abundant use of theoretical constants is made, to the existentially quantified variables in the Ramsey sentence. One thing we lack is a translation of theoretical sentences (other than the axioms) that is in keeping with the view that the meaning of a theoretical sentence φ is the difference between (<em>TC</em> ∧ <em>A</em> ∧ φ)<sup><em>R</em></sup> and (<em>TC</em> ∧ <em>A</em>)<sup><em>R</em></sup>. As Ramsey observes, it would not be correct to take (<em>TC</em> ∧ <em>A</em> ∧ φ)<sup><em>R</em></sup> as a translation of a theoretical sentence φ since both (<em>TC</em> ∧ <em>A</em> ∧ φ)<sup><em>R</em></sup> and (<em>TC</em> ∧ <em>A</em> ∧ ¬ φ)<sup><em>R</em></sup> may well be true. Such a translation would not obey the laws of classical logic. These laws, however, are supposed to govern deductive reasoning in science. A proper semantics of theoretical terms must take the peculiarities of these terms into account without revising the rules and axioms of deduction in classical logic.</p><p>There thus remains the challenge of relating the apparent use of theoretical constants in deductive scientific reasoning to the Ramsey formulation of scientific theories. Carnap was well aware of this challenge and addressed it using a sentence that became labeled later on the <em>Carnap sentence</em> of a scientific theory (Carnap 1958; 1966, Ch. 23):</p><p class="c3">(<em>A<sub>T</sub></em>) <em>TC<sup>R</sup></em> → <em>TC</em></p><p>This sentence is part of a proposal to draw the analytic-synthetic distinction at the global level of a scientific theory (as this distinction proved not to be applicable to single axioms): the analytic part of the theory is given by its Carnap sentence <em>A<sub>T</sub></em>, whereas the synthetic part is identified with the theory's Ramsey sentence in light of Proposition 1. Carnap (1958) wants <em>A<sub>T</sub></em> to be understood as follows: if the Ramsey sentence is true, then the theoretical terms be interpreted such that <em>TC</em> comes out true as well. So, on condition of <em>TC<sup>R</sup></em> being true, we can recover the original formulation of the theory in which the theoretical terms occur as constants. For, obviously, <em>TC</em> is derivable from <em>TC<sup>R</sup></em> and <em>A<sub>T</sub></em> using modus ponens.</p><p>From the viewpoint of standard truth-conditional semantics, however, this instruction to interpret the Carnap sentence appears arbitrary, if not even misguided. For in standard semantics, the Ramsey sentence may well be true without <em>TC</em> being so (cf. Ketland 2004). Hence, the Carnap sentence would not count as analytic, as Carnap intended. Carnap's interpretation of <em>A<sub>T</sub></em> receives a sound foundation in his (1961) proposal to define theoretical terms using Hilbert's epsilon operator, as we shall see in Section 4.3.</p><h3><a name="4.2" id="4.2">4.2 Indirect Interpretation</a></h3><p>The notion of an indirect interpretation was introduced by Carnap in his <em>Foundations of Logic and Mathematics</em> (1939, Ch. 23–24) with the intention of accounting for the semantics of theoretical terms in physics. It goes without saying that this notion is understood against the background of the notion of a direct interpretation. Carnap had the following distinction in mind. The interpretation of a descriptive symbol is direct if and only if (i) it is given by an assignment of an extension or an intension, and (ii) this assignment is made by expressions of the metalanguage. The interpretation of a descriptive symbol is indirect, by contrast, if and only if it is specified by one or several sentences of the object language, which then figure as axioms in the respective calculus. Here are two simple examples of a direct interpretation:</p><p class="c3">‘<em>R</em>’ designates the property of being rational.</p><p class="c3">‘<em>A</em>’ designates the property of being an animal.</p><p>The predicate ‘<em>H</em>’, by contrast, is interpreted in an indirect manner by a definition in the object language:</p><p class="c3">∀<em>x</em>(<em>Hx</em> ↔ <em>Rx</em> ∧ <em>Ax</em>)</p><p>Interpretation of a symbol by a definition counts as one type of indirect interpretation. Another type is the interpretation of theoretical terms by the axioms of a scientific theory. Carnap (1939, 65) remains content with a merely syntactic explanation of indirect interpretation:</p><blockquote><p>The calculus is first constructed floating in the air, so to speak; the construction begins at the top and then adds lower and lower levels. Finally, by the semantical rules, the lowest level is anchored at the solid ground of the observable facts. The laws, whether general or special, are not directly interpreted, but only the singular sentences.</p></blockquote><p>The laws <em>A</em>(<em>TC</em>) are thus simply adopted as axioms in the calculus without assuming any prior interpretation or reference to the world for theoretical terms. (A sentence φ being an axiom of a calculus <em>C</em> means that φ can be used in any formal derivation in <em>C</em> without being a member of the premisses.) This account amounts to a formalist understanding of the theoretical language in science. It has two particular merits. First, it circumvents Sneed's problem of theoretical terms since the axioms are not required to be true in the interpretation of the respective language that represents the facts of the theory-independent world. The need for assuming such an interpretation is simply denied. Second, the account is in line with the contextual theory meaning for theoretical terms as our understanding of such terms is explained in terms of the axioms of the respective scientific theories (cf. Section 1.2).</p><p>There are less formalist accounts of indirect interpretation in terms of explicit model-theoretic notions by Przelecki (1969, Ch. 6) and Andreas (2010).<sup>[<a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/theoretical-terms-science/notes.html#2" name="note-2" id="note-2">2</a>]</sup> The latter account proves to formally work out ideas about theoretical terms in Carnap (1958). It emerged from an investigation into the similarities and dissimilarities between Carnapian postulates and definitions. Recall that Carnap viewed the axioms of a scientific theory as postulates since they contribute to the interpretation of theoretical terms. When explaining the Carnap sentence <em>TC<sup>R</sup></em> → <em>TC</em>, Carnap says that, if the Ramsey sentence is true, the theoretical terms are to be understood in accordance with some interpretation that satisfies <em>TC</em>. This is the sense in which we can say that Carnapian postulates contribute to the interpretation of theoretical terms in a manner akin to the interpretation of a defined term by the corresponding definition. Postulates and definitions alike impose a constraint on the admissible, or intended, interpretation of the complete language <em>L</em>(<em>V</em>), where <em>V</em> contains basic and indirectly interpreted terms.</p><p>Yet, the interpretation of theoretical terms by axioms of a scientific theory differs in several ways from that of a defined term by a definition. First, the introduction of theoretical terms may be joined with the introduction of another, theoretical domain of interpretation, in addition to the basic domain of interpretation in which observation terms are interpreted. Second, it must not be assumed that the interpretation of theoretical terms results in a unique determination of the extension of these terms. This is an implication of Carnap's doctrine of partial interpretation (1958), as will become obvious at the end of this section. Third, axioms of a scientific theory are not conservative extensions of the observation language since they enable us to make predictions. Definitions, by contrast, must be conservative (cf. Gupta 2009). Taking these differences into account when observing the semantic similarities between definitions and Carnapian postulates suggests the following explanation: a set <em>A</em>(<em>TC</em>) of axioms that interprets a set <em>V-t</em> of theoretical terms on the basis of a language <em>L</em>(<em>V-o</em>) imposes a constraint on the admissible, or intended, interpretations of the language <em>L</em>(<em>V-o</em>,<em>V-t</em>). An <em>L</em>(<em>V-o</em>,<em>V-t</em>) structure is <em>admissible</em> if and only if it (i) satisfies the axioms <em>A</em>(<em>TC</em>) and (ii) extends the intended interpretation of <em>L</em>(<em>V-o</em>) to include an interpretation of the theoretical terms.</p><p>In more formal terms (Andreas 2010, 373; Przelecki 1969, Ch. 6):</p><blockquote><p><strong>Definition 3 (Set <span class="scriptuc">S</span> of admissible structures)</strong><br />Let <span class="scriptuc">A</span>-<em>o</em> designate the intended interpretation of the observation language. Further, <em>MOD</em>(<em>A</em>(<em>TC</em>)) designates the set of <em>L</em>(<em>V-o</em>,<em>V-t</em>) structures that satisfy the axioms <em>A</em>(<em>TC</em>). <em>EXT</em>(<span class="scriptuc">A</span>-<em>o</em>,<em>V-t</em>,<em>D-t</em>) is the set of <em>L</em>(<em>V-o</em>,<em>V-t</em>) structures that extend <span class="scriptuc">A</span>-<em>o</em> to interpret the theoretical terms, where these terms are allowed to have argument positions being interpreted in a domain <em>D-t</em> of theoretical entities.</p><ol><li>If <em>MOD</em>(<em>A</em>(<em>TC</em>)) ∩ <em>EXT</em>(<span class="scriptuc">A</span>-<em>o</em>,<em>V-t</em>,<em>D-t</em>) ≠ ∅, then <span class="scriptuc">S</span> := <em>MOD</em>(<em>A</em>(<em>TC</em>)) ∩ <em>EXT</em>(<span class="scriptuc">A</span>-<em>o</em>,<em>V-t</em>,<em>D-t</em>);</li><li>If <em>MOD</em>(<em>A</em>(<em>TC</em>)) ∩ <em>EXT</em>(<span class="scriptuc">A</span>-<em>o</em>,<em>V-t</em>,<em>D-t</em>) = ∅, then <span class="scriptuc">S</span> := <em>EXT</em>(<span class="scriptuc">A</span>-<em>o</em>,<em>V-t</em>,<em>D-t</em>).</li></ol></blockquote><p>Given there is a range of admissible, i.e., intended structures, the following truth-rules for theoretical sentences are intuitive:</p><blockquote><p><strong>Definition 4 (Truth-rules for theoretical sentences)</strong><br />ν: <em>L</em>(<em>V-o</em>,<em>V-t</em>) → {<em>T</em>, <em>F</em>, <em>I</em>}.</p><ol><li>ν(φ) := <em>T</em> if and only if for all structures <span class="scriptuc">A</span> ∈ <span class="scriptuc">S</span>, <span class="scriptuc">A</span> ⊨ φ;</li><li>ν(φ) := <em>F</em> if and only if for all structures <span class="scriptuc">A</span> ∈ <span class="scriptuc">S</span>, <span class="scriptuc">A</span> ⊭ φ;</li><li>ν(φ) := <em>I</em> (indeterminate) if and only if there are structures <span class="scriptuc">A</span><sub>1</sub>, <span class="scriptuc">A</span><sub>2</sub> ∈ <span class="scriptuc">S</span> such that <span class="scriptuc">A</span><sub>1</sub> ⊨ φ but not <span class="scriptuc">A</span><sub>2</sub> ⊨ φ.</li></ol></blockquote><p>The idea lying behind these rules comes from supervaluation logic (van Fraassen 1969; Priest 2001, Ch. 7). A sentence is true if and only if it is true in every admissible structure. It is false, by contrast, if and only if it is false in every admissible structure. And a sentence does not have a determinate truth-value if and only if it is true in, at least, one admissible structure and false in, at least, another structure that is also admissible.</p><p>A few properties of the present semantics are noteworthy. First, it accounts for Carnap's idea that the axioms <em>A</em>(<em>TC</em>) have a twofold function, viz., setting forth empirical claims and determining the meaning of theoretical terms (Carnap 1958). For, on the one hand, the truth-values of the axioms <em>A</em>(<em>TC</em>) depend on empirical, observable facts. These axioms, on the other hand, determine the admissible interpretations of the theoretical terms. These two seemingly contradictory properties are combined by allowing the axioms <em>A</em>(<em>TC</em>) to interpret theoretical terms only on condition of there being a structure that both extends the given interpretation of the observation language and that satisfies these axioms. If there is no such structure, the theoretical terms remain uninterpreted. This semantics, therefore, can be seen to formally work out the old contextual theory of meaning for theoretical terms.</p><p>Second, Sneed's problem of theoretical terms (Section 3.2) does not arise in the present semantics since the formulation of this problem is bound to standard truth-conditional semantics. Third, it is closely related to the Ramsey view of scientific theories as the following biconditional holds:</p><blockquote><p><strong>Proposition 2</strong> <em>TC<sup>R</sup></em> if and only if for all φ ∈ <em>A</em>(<em>TC</em>), ν(φ) = <em>T</em>.</p></blockquote><p>Unlike the Ramsey account, however, the present one does not dispense with theoretical terms. It can be shown rather that allowing for a range of admissible interpretations as opposed to a single interpretation does not affect the validity of standard deductive reasoning (Andreas 2010). Hence, a distinctive merit of the indirect interpretation semantics of theoretical terms is that theoretical constants need not be recovered from the Ramsey sentence in the first place.</p><p>The label <em>partial interpretation</em> is more common in the literature to describe Carnap's view that theoretical terms are interpreted by the axioms or postulates of a scientific theory (Suppe 1974, 86–95). The partial character of interpretation is retained in the present account since there is a range of admissible interpretations of the complete language <em>L</em>(<em>V-o,V-t</em>). This allows for the interpretation of theoretical terms to be strengthened by further postulates, just as Carnap demanded in his (1958) and (1961). To strengthen the interpretation of theoretical terms is to further constrain the range of admissible interpretations of <em>L</em>(<em>V-o,V-t</em>).</p><h3><a name="4.3" id="4.3">4.3 Direct Interpretation</a></h3><p>Both the Ramsey view and the indirect interpretation semantics deviate from standard truth-conditional semantics at the level of theoretical terms and theoretical sentences. Such a deviation, however, was not felt to be necessary by all philosophers that have worked on theoretical concepts. Tuomela (1973, Ch. V) defends a position that he calls <em>semantic realism</em> and that retains standard truth-conditional semantics. Hence, direct interpretation is assumed for theoretical terms by Tuomela. Yet, semantic realism for theoretical terms acknowledges there to be an epistemological distinction between observational and theoretical terms. Tuomela's (1973, Ch. I) criterion of the theory-observation distinction largely coincides with Sneed's above expounded criterion. Since direct interpretation of theoretical terms amounts just to standard realist truth-conditions, there is no need for a further discussion here.</p><h3><a name="4.4" id="4.4">4.4 Defining Theoretical Terms</a></h3><p>In Weyl (1949), Carnap (1958), Feyerabend (1962) and a number of further papers we can identify different formulations of the idea that the axioms of a scientific theory determine the meaning of theoretical terms without these axioms qualifying as proper definitions of theoretical terms. This idea has become almost constitutive of the very notion of a theoretical term in the philosophy of science. Lewis (1970), however, wrote a paper with the title “How to Define Theoretical Terms” (1970). A closer look at the literature further reveals that the very idea of explicitly defining theoretical terms goes back to Carnap's (1961) use of Hilbert's epsilon operator in scientific theories. This operator is an indefinite description operator that was introduced by Hilbert to designate some object <em>x</em> that satisfies an open formula φ. So</p><p class="c3">ε<em>x</em> φ(<em>x</em>)</p><p>designates some <em>x</em> satisfying φ(<em>x</em>), where <em>x</em> is the only free variable of φ (cf. Avigad and Zach 2002). Now, Carnap (1961, 161n) explicitly defines theoretical terms in two steps:</p><p class="c3">(<em>A</em><sub><em>T</em>(0)</sub>) <span class="c4"><em>t</em></span> = ε<span class="c5"><em>X</em></span> <em>TC</em>(<span class="c5"><em>X</em></span>, <em>n</em><sub>1</sub>,…,<em>n<sub>k</sub></em>)</p><p>where <span class="c5"><em>X</em></span> is a sequence of higher-order variables and <span class="c5"><em>t</em></span> a corresponding instantiation. So, <span class="c5"><em>t</em></span> designates some sequence of relations and functions that satisfies <em>TC</em>, in the context of an antecedently given interpretation of <em>V-o</em>. Once such a sequence has been defined via the epsilon-operator, the second step of the definition is straightforward:</p><p class="c3">(<em>A</em><sub><em>T</em>(<em>i</em>)</sub>) <em>t</em><sub><em>i</em></sub> = ε<em>x</em> (∃<em>u</em><sub>1</sub> …∃<em>u</em><sub><em>n</em></sub>(<span class="c4"><em>t</em></span> = <<em>u</em><sub>1</sub>,…,<em>u<sub>n</sub></em>> ∧ <em>x</em> = <em>u<sub>i</sub></em>))</p><p>Carnap could show these definitions to imply the Carnap sentence <em>A<sub>T</sub></em>. Hence, they allow for direct recovery of the theoretical terms for the purpose of deductive reasoning on condition of the Ramsey sentence being true.</p><p>Lewis (1970) introduced a number of modifications concerning both the language of the Carnap sentence and its interpretation in order to attain proper definitions of theoretical terms. First, theoretical terms are considered to refer to individuals as opposed to relations and functions. This move is made coherent by allowing the basic language <em>L</em>(<em>V-o</em>) to contain relations like ‘<em>x</em> has property <em>y</em>’. The basic, i.e., non-theoretical language is thus no observation language in this account. Yet, it serves as the basis for introducing theoretical terms. The set <em>V-o</em> of ‘O-terms’ is best described as our antecedently understood vocabulary.</p><p>Second, denotationless terms are dealt with along the lines of free logic by Dana Scott (1967). That means denotationless terms, such as an improper description, denote nothing in the domain of discourse. Atomic sentences containing denotationless terms are either true or false. Most notably, the free logic that Lewis refers to has it that an identity that contains a denotationless term on both sides is always true. If just one side of the identity formula has an occurrence of a denotationless term, this identity statement is false.</p><p>Third, Lewis (1970) insists on a unique interpretation of theoretical terms, thus rejecting Carnap's doctrine of partial interpretation. Carnap (1961) is most explicit about the indeterminacy that this doctrine implies. This indeterminacy of theoretical terms drives Carnap to using Hilbert's ε-operator there, as just explained. For Lewis, by contrast, a theoretical term is denotationless if its interpretation is not uniquely determined by the Ramsey sentence. For a scientific theory to be true, it must have a unique interpretation.</p><p>Using these modifications, Lewis transforms the Carnap sentence into three Carnap-Lewis postulates, so to speak:</p><dl class="hang"><dt>(CL1)</dt><dd>∃<em>y</em><sub>1</sub> … ∃<em>y<sub>n</sub></em> ∀<em>x</em><sub>1</sub> … ∀<em>x<sub>n</sub></em> (<em>TC</em>(<em>n</em><sub>1</sub>,…,<em>n<sub>k</sub></em>, <em>x</em><sub>1</sub>,…,<em>x<sub>n</sub></em>) ↔ <em>y</em><sub>1</sub> = <em>x</em><sub>1</sub> ∧ … ∧ <em>y<sub>n</sub></em> = <em>x<sub>n</sub></em>) → <em>TC</em>(<em>n</em><sub>1</sub>,…,<em>n<sub>k</sub></em>, <em>t</em><sub>1</sub>,…,<em>t<sub>k</sub></em>)</dd><dt>(CL2)</dt><dd>¬∃<em>x</em><sub>1</sub> … ∃<em>x<sub>n</sub></em> <em>TC</em>(<em>n</em><sub>1</sub>,…,<em>n<sub>k</sub></em>, <em>x</em><sub>1</sub>,…,<em>x<sub>n</sub></em>) → ¬∃<em>x</em>(<em>x</em> = <em>t</em><sub>1</sub>) ∧ … ∧ ¬∃<em>x</em>(<em>x</em> = <em>t<sub>n</sub></em>)</dd><dt>(CL3)</dt><dd>∃<em>x</em><sub>1</sub> … ∃<em>x<sub>n</sub></em> <em>TC</em>(<em>n</em><sub>1</sub>,…,<em>n<sub>k</sub></em>, <em>x</em><sub>1</sub>,…,<em>x<sub>n</sub></em>) ∧ ¬∃<em>y</em><sub>1</sub>… ∃<em>y<sub>n</sub></em> ∀<em>x</em><sub>1</sub>… ∀<em>x<sub>n</sub></em> (<em>TC</em>(<em>n</em><sub>1</sub>,…,<em>n<sub>k</sub></em>, <em>x</em><sub>1</sub>,…,<em>x<sub>n</sub></em>) ↔ <em>y</em><sub>1</sub> = <em>x</em><sub>1</sub> ∧ … ∧ <em>y<sub>n</sub></em> = <em>x<sub>n</sub></em>) → ¬∃<em>x</em>(<em>x</em> = <em>t</em><sub>1</sub>) ∧ … ∧ ¬∃<em>x</em>(<em>x</em>=<em>t<sub>n</sub></em>)</dd></dl><p>These postulates look more difficult than they actually are. CL1 says that, if <em>TC</em> has a unique realization, then it is realized by the entities named by <em>t<sub>1</sub>,…,t<sub>k</sub></em>. Realization of a theory <em>TC</em>, in this formulation, means interpretation of the descriptive terms under which <em>TC</em> comes out true, where the interpretation of the <em>V-o</em> terms is antecedently given. So, CL1 is to be read as saying that the theoretical terms are to be understood as designating those entities that uniquely realize <em>TC</em>, in the context of an antecedently given interpretation of the <em>V-o</em> terms. CL2 says that, if the Ramsey sentence is false, the theoretical terms do not designate anything. To see this, recall that ¬∃<em>x</em>(<em>x</em>=<em>t<sub>i</sub></em>) means, in free logic, that <em>t<sub>i</sub></em> is denotationless. In case the theory <em>TC</em> has multiple realizations, the theoretical terms are denotationless too. This is expressed by CL3.</p><p>CL1–CL3 are equivalent, in free logic, to a set of sentences that properly define the theoretical terms <em>t<sub>i</sub></em> (1 ≤ <em>i</em> ≤ <em>n</em>) :</p><p class="c3">(<em>D-i</em>) <em>t<sub>i</sub></em> = ι<em>y<sub>i</sub></em> ∃<em>y</em><sub>1</sub> … ∃<em>y</em><sub><em>i</em>−1</sub> ∃<em>y</em><sub><em>i</em>+1</sub>… ∃<em>y<sub>n</sub></em> ∀<em>x</em><sub>1</sub> … ∀<em>x<sub>n</sub></em> (<em>TC</em>(<em>n</em><sub>1</sub>,…,<em>n<sub>k</sub></em>, <em>x</em><sub>1</sub>,…,<em>x<sub>n</sub></em>) ↔ <em>y</em><sub>1</sub> = <em>x</em><sub>1</sub> ∧ … ∧ <em>y<sub>i</sub></em> = <em>x<sub>i</sub></em> ∧ … ∧ <em>y<sub>n</sub></em> = <em>x<sub>n</sub></em>)</p><p><em>t<sub>i</sub></em> designates, according to this definition schema, the i-th component in that sequence of entities that uniquely realizes <em>TC</em>. If there is no such sequence, <em>t<sub>i</sub></em> (1 ≤ <em>i</em> ≤ <em>n</em>) is denotationless. Even so, the definitions of theoretical terms remain true if the complete language <em>L</em>(<em>V-o</em>,<em>V-t</em>) is interpreted in accordance with the postulates CL1–CL3, thanks to the use of free logic. Hence, all <em>L</em>(<em>V-o</em>,<em>V-t</em>) interpretations that extend the antecedently given interpretation of <em>L</em>(<em>V-o</em>) can be required to satisfy all definitions <em>D-i</em>.</p><p>A few further properties of Lewis's definitions of theoretical terms are noteworthy. First, they specify the interpretation of theoretical terms uniquely. This property is obvious for the case of unique realization of <em>TC</em> but holds as well for the other cases since assignment of no denotation counts as interpretation of a descriptive symbol in free logic. Second, it can be shown that these definitions do not allow for the derivation of any <em>L</em>(<em>V-o</em>) sentences except logical truths, just as the original Carnap sentence did. Lewis, therefore, in fact succeeds in <em>defining</em> theoretical terms. He does so without attempting to divide the axioms <em>A</em>(<em>TC</em>) into definitions and synthetic claims about the spatiotemporal world.</p><p>The replacement of theoretical relation and function symbols with individual terms was judged counterintuitive by Papineau (1996). A reformulation, however, of Lewis's definitions using second- or higher-order variables is not difficult to accomplish, as Schurz (2005) has shown. In this reformulation the problem arises that theoretical terms are usually not uniquely interpreted since our observational evidence is most of the time insufficient to determine the extension of theoretical relation and function symbols completely. Theoretical functions, such as temperature, pressure, electromagnetic force etc., are determined only for objects that have been subjected to appropriate measurements, however indirect. In view of this problem, Schurz (2005) suggests letting the higher-order quantifiers range only over those extensions that correspond to <em>natural kind</em> properties. This restriction renders the requirement of unique interpretation of theoretical terms plausible once again. Such a reading was also suggested by Psillos (1999, Ch. 3) with reference to Lewis's (1984) discussion of Putnam's (1980) model-theoretic argument. In that paper, Lewis himself suggests the restriction of the interpretation of descriptive symbols to extensions corresponding to natural kind properties.</p><p>One final note on indirect interpretation is in order. Both Carnap (1961) and Lewis (1970) interpret theoretical terms indirectly simply because any definition is an instance of an indirect interpretation. For this reason, Sneed's problem of theoretical terms (Section 3.2) does not arise. Yet, the pattern of Carnap's and Lewis's proposals conforms to the pattern of a definition in the narrow sense and not to the peculiar pattern of indirect interpretation that Carnap (1939) envisioned for the interpretation of theoretical terms. This is why the indirect interpretation semantics has been separated from the present discussion of defining theoretical terms.</p><h2><a name="5" id="5">5. Conclusion</a></h2><p>The very existence of scientific terms whose semantics is dependent upon a scientific theory was already contended by Duhem and Poincaré. Such terms came to be referred to as <em>theoretical terms</em> in 20th century philosophy of science. Properties and entities that are observable in the sense of direct, unaided perception did not seem to depend on scientific theories as forces, electrons and nucleotides did. Hence, philosophers of science and logicians started to investigate the distinct semantics of theoretical terms. Various formal accounts resulted from these investigations, among which the Ramsey sentence by Ramsey (1929), Carnap's notion of indirect interpretation (1939; 1958) and Lewis's (1970) proposal of defining theoretical terms are the most prominent ones. Though not all philosophers of science understand the notion of a theoretical term in such way that semantic dependence upon a scientific theory is essential, this view prevails in the literature.</p><p>The theory-observation distinction has been attacked heavily and is presumably discredited by a large number of philosophers of science. Still, this distinction continues to permeate a number of important strands in the philosophy of science, such as scientific realism and its alternatives and the logical analysis of scientific theories. A case in point is the recent interest in the Ramsey account of scientific theories which emerged in the wake of Worral's structural realism (cf. Ladyman 2009). We have seen, moreover, that the formal accounts of theoretical terms work well with a theory-observation distinction that is relativized to a particular theory. Critics of that distinction, by contrast, have commonly attacked a global and static division into theoretical and observational terms (Maxwell 1962; Achinstein 1965). Note finally that Carnap assigned no ontological significance to the theory-observation distinction in the sense that entities of the one type would be existent in a more genuine way than ones of the other.</p><h2><a name="Bib" id="Bib">Bibliography</a></h2><ul class="hanging"><li>Achinstein, P., 1965, “The Problem of Theoretical Terms”, <em>American Philosophical Quarterly</em>, 2(3): 193–203.</li><li>Andreas, H., 2010, “A Modal View of the Semantics of Theoretical Sentences”, <em>Synthese</em>, 174(3): 367–383.</li><li>Avigad, J. and Zach, R., 2002, “The Epsilon-Calculus”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2012 Edition), Edward N. 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Chandrasekharan (ed.), Berlin: Springer, 1965.</li><li>Wright, C., 1993, <em>Realism, Meaning and Truth</em>, Oxford: Blackwell.</li></ul><h2><a name="Aca" id="Aca">Academic Tools</a></h2><blockquote><table><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://plato.stanford.edu/symbols/sepman-icon.jpg" alt="sep man icon" /></td><td><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/cgi-bin/encyclopedia/archinfo.cgi?entry=theoretical-terms-science" target="other">How to cite this entry</a>.</td></tr><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://plato.stanford.edu/symbols/sepman-icon.jpg" alt="sep man icon" /></td><td><a href="https://leibniz.stanford.edu/friends/preview/theoretical-terms-science/" target="other">Preview the PDF version of this entry</a> at the <a href="https://leibniz.stanford.edu/friends/" target="other">Friends of the SEP Society</a>.</td></tr><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://plato.stanford.edu/symbols/inpho.png" alt="inpho icon" /></td><td><a href="https://inpho.cogs.indiana.edu/entity?sep=theoretical-terms-science&redirect=True" target="other">Look up this entry topic</a> at the <a href="https://inpho.cogs.indiana.edu/" target="other">Indiana Philosophy Ontology Project</a> (InPhO).</td></tr><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://plato.stanford.edu/symbols/pp.gif" alt="phil papers icon" /></td><td><a href="http://philpapers.org/sep/theoretical-terms-science/" target="other">Enhanced bibliography for this entry</a> at <a href="http://philpapers.org/" target="other">PhilPapers</a>, with links to its database.</td></tr></table></blockquote><h2><a name="Oth" id="Oth">Other Internet Resources</a></h2><p>[Please contact the author with suggestions.]</p><h2><a name="Rel" id="Rel">Related Entries</a></h2><p><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/analytic-synthetic/">analytic/synthetic distinction</a> | Carnap, Rudolf | <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/definitions/">definitions</a> | <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logical-empiricism/">empiricism: logical</a> | <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epsilon-calculus/">epsilon calculus</a> | <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/incommensurability/">incommensurability: of scientific theories</a> | <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/natural-kinds/">natural kinds</a> | <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/physics-structuralism/">physics: structuralism in</a> | <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/reference/">reference</a> | <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/science-theory-observation/">science: theory and observation in</a> | <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/scientific-realism/">scientific realism</a> | <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/structural-realism/">structural realism</a> | <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/vienna-circle/">Vienna Circle</a></p></div><div id="foot"><span class="c6"><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/info.html#c">Copyright © 2013</a> by</span><br />Holger Andreas <<a href="mailto:holger.andreas%40lrz.uni-muenchen.de"><em>holger<abbr title=" dot ">.</abbr>andreas<abbr title=" at ">@</abbr>lrz<abbr title=" dot ">.</abbr>uni-muenchen<abbr title=" dot ">.</abbr>de</em></a>></div><p><em>This entry passed through the <a href="http://fivefilters.org/content-only/">Full-Text RSS</a> service — if this is your content and you're reading it on someone else's site, please read the FAQ at <a href="http://fivefilters.org/content-only/faq.php#publishers">fivefilters.org/content-only/faq.php#publishers</a>. <a href="http://fivefilters.org">Five Filters</a> recommends: <a href="http://www.medialens.org/index.php/alerts/alert-archive/alerts-2013/715-eyes-like-blank-discs-the-guardian-s-steven-poole-on-george-orwell-s-politics-and-the-english-language.html">Eyes Like Blank Discs - The Guardian's Steven Poole On George Orwell's Politics And The English Language</a>.</em></p>Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10303290079976590343noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5448411214494413217.post-32632169402544626182013-02-23T21:01:00.000-08:002013-02-23T21:02:00.138-08:00Truthmakers <div id="aueditable"><div id="pubinfo"><em>First published Sat Feb 23, 2013</em></div><p>This much is agreed: “<em>x</em> makes <em>p</em> true” is a construction that signifies, if it signifies anything at all, a relation borne to a truth-bearer by something else, a truth-maker. But it isn't generally agreed what that something else might be, or what truth-bearers are, or what the character might be of the relationship that holds, if it does, between them, or even whether such a relationship ever does hold. Indeed sometimes there's barely enough agreement amongst the parties to the truth-maker dispute for them to be disagreeing about a common subject matter. This makes navigating the literature about truth-makers a treacherous undertaking but a necessary one because of the significance the debate about truth-makers bears for contemporary metaphysics.</p><p>We can distinguish between the following questions that different approaches to truth-makers have been framed to answer:</p><dl class="hangindent"><dt>(1)</dt><dd>What is it to be a truth-maker?</dd><dt>(2)</dt><dd>Which range, or ranges, of truths are eligible to be made true (if any are)?</dd><dt>(3)</dt><dd>What kinds of entities are truth-makers?</dd><dt>(4)</dt><dd>What is the motivation for adopting a theory of truth-makers?</dd></dl><p>These questions cannot be addressed in isolation from one another. Our thinking about what it is to be a truth-maker will likely have knock-on effects for how we answer the second and third questions. Our beliefs about which truths have truth-makers will likely shape our answer to the first and third. And the theoretical benefits that we think will come our way from positing truth-makers in the first place will no doubt exert a controlling influence upon our responses to the other questions. But since the first is, in a significant sense, prior to the rest—otherwise it's unclear what we're talking about—I will start out by addressing, at least in a preliminary way, the issue of what it is to be a truth-maker.</p><p>The notion of a truth-maker, like that of a clapping hand, cannot ultimately be understood in isolation from the notion of what it makes true, the other hand with which it claps, a truth-bearer. There are a variety of different candidate fillers for the role of truth-bearers—sentence tokens, judgements, propositions <em>etc—</em>and very often discussion of truth-makers and truth-making proceeds without an eye to which candidate best fills this role. This is understandable: metaphysicians are typically interested in what there is rather than representations thereof. But truth-bearers are the elephant in the room during these discussions. Eventually we'll have to talk about them because what we think about truth-bearers will have consequences for what we think about truth-makers. So there's a further question that we can't put off answering indefinitely,</p><dl class="hangindent"><dt>(5)</dt><dd>What are the truth-bearers?</dd></dl><p>For the time being I'll remain relatively non-committal about the character of truth-bearers except for making the minimal assumption that truth-bearers are inherently representational in character. But eventually the issue will become unavoidable.</p><p>I will not dwell upon the history of the concept <em>truth-maker</em>. Anticipations of the contemporary use of the concept have been found in Aristotle and Suarez (Fox 1987; Künne 2003: 150–4; Schmutz 2007), Leibniz (Armstrong 1997: 14; Mulligan 2009: 39–42), Russell and Wittgenstein (Hochberg 1978; Mulligan, Simons, & Smith 1984: 287–9, 308–12; Simons 1992: 156–61; Künne 2003: 118–226, 145–8), Stout, McTaggart and Pfänder (Mulligan 2009). But it has also been disputed whether these authors are really deploying the concept of <em>truth-making</em> with which we are familiar rather than employing, perhaps for reasons of grammatical convenience, superficially similar turns of phrase that make it sound as if they are expressing our concept (Dodd 2002: 81–3; MacBride 2005: 137–9; Glock 2007).</p><ul><li><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truthmakers/#WhaTruMak">1. What is a Truth-maker?</a><ul><li><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truthmakers/#TruMakEnt">1.1 Truth-making as Entailment</a></li><li><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truthmakers/#TruMakNec">1.2 Truth-making as Necessitation</a></li><li><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truthmakers/#TruMakPro">1.3 Truth-making as Projection</a></li><li><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truthmakers/#Ess">2.4 Essentialism</a></li><li><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truthmakers/#AxiTruMak">1.5 Axiomatic Truth-making</a></li><li><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truthmakers/#TruMakGro">1.6 Truth-Making as Grounding</a></li></ul></li><li><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truthmakers/#WhiRanTruEliMadTruIfAny">2. Which range of truths are eligible to be made true (if any are)?</a><ul><li><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truthmakers/#Max">2.1 Maximalism</a></li><li><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truthmakers/#Opt">2.2 Optimalism</a></li><li><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truthmakers/#TruSupUpoBei">2.3 Truth Supervenes Upon Being</a></li><li><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truthmakers/#HumSce">2.4 Humean Scepticism</a></li></ul></li><li><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truthmakers/#WhaMotDocTruMak">3. What Motivates the Doctrine of Truth-makers?</a><ul><li><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truthmakers/#CatChe">3.1 To catch a cheater</a></li><li><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truthmakers/#SupPri">3.2 Supervenience Principles</a></li><li><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truthmakers/#Cor">3.3 Correspondence</a></li><li><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truthmakers/#Def">3.4 Deflationism</a></li><li><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truthmakers/#TarTruMak">3.5 Tarski and the Truth-makers</a></li><li><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truthmakers/#TruMakExp">3.6 Truth-making and Explanation</a></li><li><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truthmakers/#TruMakConExp">3.7 Truth-making and Conceptual Explanation</a></li><li><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truthmakers/#TruMakQua">3.8 Truth Making and Quantification</a></li></ul></li><li><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truthmakers/#Bib">Bibliography</a></li><li><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truthmakers/#Aca">Academic Tools</a></li><li><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truthmakers/#OthIntRes">Other Internet Resources</a></li><li><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truthmakers/#Rel">Related Entries</a></li></ul><hr /><h2><a name="WhaTruMak" id="WhaTruMak">1. What is a Truth-maker?</a></h2><p>When introducing truth-makers it has become routine to begin with a disclaimer: that the sense in which a truth-maker “makes” something true is not the causal sense in which, e.g., a potter makes a pot. The concept of a truth-maker is then often elucidated in the following terms (Bigelow 1988: 125; Armstrong 1989c: 88):</p><dl><dt>(<em>Virtue-T</em>)</dt><dd>a truth-maker is that in virtue of which something is true</dd></dl><p>An earlier but equivalent form of introduction is supplied by the dictum that a truth-maker is the “ground” or “ontological ground” of a true claim (Bergmann 1961: 229, Hochberg 1967: 416–7). (<em>Virtue-T</em>) and its equivalents certainly <em>seem</em> to convey some information: that a truth-maker is a thing that stands in some significant relationship to something true. It is added that the primary notion of a truth-maker is that of a <em>minimal</em> one: a truth-maker for a truth-bearer <em>p</em> none of whose proper parts or constituents are truth-makers for <em>p</em>. (Whether every proposition has a minimal truth-maker is contentious.) We are also cautioned that even though people often speak as if there is a unique truth-maker for each truth, it is usually the case that one truth is made true by many things (collectively or severally).</p><p>Whether (<em>Virtue-T</em>) provides a satisfactory elucidation of truth-making depends on whether we have a clear understanding of “in virtue of”. Some philosophers argue this notion is an unavoidable primitive (Rodriguez-Pereyra 2006a: 960–1). But others are wary. Thus, for example, Bigelow finds the locution “in virtue of” both obscure and, as will see, avoidable “we should not rest content with an explanation which turns on the notion of <em>virtue</em>!” (Bigelow 1988). These kinds of concern provides a significant motivation for establishing whether it is possible to elucidate the concept of <em>truth making</em> in terms of notions that enjoy a life independently of the circle of notions to which <em>in virtue of</em> and <em>truth making</em> belong.</p><h3><a name="TruMakEnt" id="TruMakEnt">1.1 Truth-making as Entailment</a></h3><p>One influential proposal for making an elucidatory advance upon (<em>Virtue-T</em>) appeals to the notion of <em>entailment</em> (Fox 1987: 189; Bigelow 1988: 125–7):</p><dl><dt>(<em>Entailment-T</em>)</dt><dd>a truth-maker is a thing the very existence of which entails that something is true.</dd></dl><p>So <em>x</em> is a truth-maker for a truth <em>p</em> iff <em>x</em> exists and another representation that says <em>x</em> exists entails the representation that <em>p</em>. It is an attraction of this principle that the key notion it deploys, namely entailment, is ubiquitous, unavoidable and enjoys a rich life outside philosophy—both in ordinary life and in scientific and mathematical practice.</p><p>Unfortunately this account threatens to over-generate truth-makers for necessary truths—at least if the notion of entailment it employs is classical. It's a feature of this notion that anything whatsoever entails a necessary truth <em>p</em>. It follows as a special case of this that any claim that a given object exists must entail <em>p</em> too. So it also follows—if (<em>Entailment-T</em>) is granted—that any object makes any necessary truth true. But this runs counter to the belief that, e.g., the leftovers in your refrigerator aren't truth-makers for the representation that 2+2=4. Even worse, Restall has shown how to plausibly reason from (<em>Entailment-T</em>) to “truth-maker monism”: the doctrine that every truth-maker makes every truth true (whether necessary or contingent). Every claim of the form <em>p</em> ∨ ~<em>p</em> is a necessary truth. So every existing thing <em>s</em> is a truth-maker for each instance of this form (see preceding paragraph). Now let <em>p</em> be some arbitrary truth (grass is green) and <em>s</em> any truth-maker for <em>p</em> ∨ ~<em>p</em> (a particular ice floe in the Antarctic ocean). Now it is intuitively plausible that something makes a disjunction true <em>either</em> by making one disjunct true <em>or</em> by making the other disjunct true (Mulligan, Simons, & Smith 1984: 316). This is what Restall calls “the disjunction thesis”. It follows from this thesis that either <em>s</em> makes <em>p</em> true or <em>s</em> makes ~<em>p</em> true. Given that <em>p</em> is true, neither <em>s</em> nor anything else makes it true that ~<em>p</em>. So <em>s</em> (the ice floe) must make it true that <em>p</em> (grass is green)! But since <em>s</em> and <em>p</em> were chosen arbitrarily it follows that all truth-makers are on a par, making true every truth (Restall 1996: 333–4).</p><p>The unacceptability of these results indicates that insofar as we have an intuitive grip upon the concept of a truth-maker it is constrained by the requirement that a truth-maker for a truth must be relevant to or about what it represents as being the case. For example, the truths of pure arithmetic are not about what's at the back of your refrigerator; what's there isn't relevant to their being true. So we're constrained to judge that what's there cannot be truth-makers for them. This suggests that operating at the back of our minds when we issue these snap judgements there must be something like the principle:</p><dl><dt>(<em>Relevance</em>)</dt><dd>what makes something true must—<em>in some sense</em>—be what it is “about”.</dd></dl><p>Of course the notions of “about” and “relevance” are notoriously difficult to pin down (Goodman 1961). And a speaker can know something is true without knowing everything about what makes it true. Often it will require empirical research to settle what makes a statement true. Moreover, what is determined <em>a posteriori</em> to be a truth-maker may exhibit a complexity quite different from that of the statement it makes true (Mulligan, Simons, & Smith 1984: 299). Nevertheless, it is clear that unless (<em>Entailment-T</em>) is constrained in some way it will generate truth-makers that are unwanted because their presence conflicts with (<em>Relevance</em>).</p><p>One way to restore accord between them would be to abandon the Disjunction Thesis that together with (<em>Entailment-T</em>) led us down the path to Truth-maker Monism. Indeed isn't the Disjunction Thesis dubious anyway? Consider examples involving the open future. Can't we imagine a situation arising that makes it true that one or other of the horses competing in a race will win, but which neither makes it true that one of the horses in particular will win nor makes it true that another will (Read 2000; Restall 2009)?</p><p>But even if the Disjunction Thesis is given up still this leaves in place the embarrassing consequence of defining what it is to be a truth-maker in terms of classical entailment, <em>viz.</em> that <em>any</em> existing thing turns out to be a truth-maker for <em>any</em> necessary truth. Some more radical overhaul of (<em>Entailment-T</em>) is needed to avoid over-generation. One possibility is to redefine what is to be a truth-maker in terms of a more restrictive notion of “relevant entailment” (in the tradition of Anderson & Belnap) that requires what is entailed to be relevant to what it is entailed by (Restall 1996, 2000; Armstrong 2004: 10–12). Whether exploring this avenue will take us very far remains a matter of dispute. Simons, for example, reflects,</p><blockquote><p>In truth however I suspect our intuitions about truth-makers may be at least as robust as our intuitions about what is good for a logical system of implication, and I would not at present attempt to explicate truth-making via the arrow of the relevance logic system <strong>R</strong>. (2008: 13)</p></blockquote><p>Nevertheless since truth-making concerns the bestowal of truth, entailment its preservation, there must <em>at some level</em> be an important connection to be made out between truth-making and entailment; the effort expended to make out such a connection will be effort spent to the advantage of metaphysicians and logicians alike. But even granted this is so there are reasons to be doubtful that any overhaul of (<em>Entailment-T</em>), however radical, will capture what it is to be a truth-maker. One vital motivation for believing in truth-makers is this. Positing truth-makers enables us to make sense of the fact that the truth of something depends on how things stand with an independently given reality. This is how Bigelow reports what happens to him when he stops believing in truth-makers:</p><blockquote><p>I find I have no adequate anchor to hold me from drifting onto the shoals of some sort of pragmatism or idealism. And that is altogether uncongenial to me; I am a congenital realist. (1988: 123)</p></blockquote><p>Truth-makers are posited to provide the point of semantic contact whereby true representations touch upon an independent reality, upon something non-representational. Since entailment is a relation between representations it follows that the notion of a truth-maker cannot be fully explicated in terms of the relation of entailment—regardless of whether representations are best understood as sentences or propositions or some other candidate truth-bearer (Heil 2000: 233–4; 2003: 62–5; Merricks 2007: 12–13). Ultimately (<em>Entailment-T</em>), or a relevance logic version if it, will leave us wanting an account of what makes a representation of the existence of a truth-maker—whatever it entails—itself beholden to an independent reality.</p><h3><a name="TruMakNec" id="TruMakNec">1.2 Truth-making as Necessitation</a></h3><p>This difficulty arises because entailment is a relation that lights upon representations at both ends. Appreciating this Armstrong recognised that truth-making</p><blockquote><p>cannot be any form of entailment. Both terms of an entailment relation must be propositions, but the truth-making term of the truth-maker relation is a portion of reality, and, in general at least, portions of reality are not propositions. (2004: 5–6; see also Lowe 2006: 185)</p></blockquote><p>Accordingly Armstrong made a bold maneuver. He posited a metaphysically primitive relation of necessitation (i.e., one not itself defined in terms of possible worlds because Armstrong is “opposed to the extensional view proposed by those who put metaphysical faith in possible worlds”’ preferring an ‘intensional account” of modality instead (1997: 151, 2004: 96)). The relation in question lights upon a portion of reality at one end and upon a truth at the other. In the simplest case that means that the truth making relation is one that “holds between any truthmaker, <em>T</em>, which is something in the world, and the proposition” that <em>T</em> exists (2004: 6). Armstrong then defined what is to be a truth-maker in terms of this metaphysical bridging relation:</p><dl><dt>(<em>Necessitation-T</em>)</dt><dd>a truth-maker is a thing that necessitates something's being true.</dd></dl><p>This conception of truth making avoids the “category” mistake that results from attempting to define truth-making in terms of entailment. It also makes some advance upon (<em>Virtue-T</em>) and its primitive use of “in virtue of” because at least (<em>Necessitation-T</em>) relates the notion of truth making to other modal notions, like that of necessity, upon which we have some independent handle. But what is there positively to be said in favour of conceiving of truth-makers in terms of “necessitation”? Suppose that <em>T</em> is a candidate truth-maker for a truth <em>p</em> even though <em>T</em> fails to necessitate <em>p</em>. Then it is possible for <em>T</em> to exist even when <em>p</em> is false. Armstrong now reflects “we will surely think that the alleged truth-maker was insufficient by itself and requires to be supplemented in some way” (1997: 116). Suppose this supplementary condition is the existence of another entity, <em>U</em>. Then “<em>T</em>+<em>U</em> would appear to be the true and necessitating truth-maker for <em>p</em>” (2004: 7). Armstrong concludes that a truth-maker for a truth must necessitate the truth in question.</p><p>Unfortunately this argument takes us nowhere except around in a circle. (<em>Necessitation-T</em>) embodies the doctrine that it is both necessary and sufficient for being a truth-maker that a thing necessitates the truth it makes true. Armstrong's argument for this doctrine relies upon the dual assumptions: (1) anything that fails to necessitate <em>p</em> (witness <em>T</em>) cannot be a truth-maker for <em>p</em>,whereas (2) anything that succeeds in necessitating <em>p</em> (witness <em>T</em>+<em>U</em>) must be. But (1) just is the claim that it is necessary, and (2) just the claim that it is sufficient for being a truth-maker that a thing necessitates the truth it makes true. Since it relies upon (1) and (2), and (1) and (2) are just equivalent to (<em>Necessitation-T</em>), it follows that Armstrong's argument is incapable of providing independent support for the conception he favours of what it is to be a truth-maker.</p><p>Even though this argument may be circular, does (<em>Necessitation-T</em>) at least have the favourable feature that adopting it enables us to avoid the other difficulty that beset (<em>Entailment-T</em>), <em>viz</em>. over-generation? Not if there are things that necessitate a truth whilst still failing to be sufficiently relevant to be plausible truth-makers for it. If the necessitation relation is so distributed that it holds between any contingently existing portion of reality, e.g., an ice-floe, and any necessary truth, e.g., 2+2=4, then we shall be no further forward than we were before. So Armstrong needs to tell us more about the cross-categorial relation in question to assure us that such cases cannot arise. Smith suggests another problem case for (<em>Necessitarian-T</em>).</p><blockquote><p>Suppose that God wills that John kiss Mary now. God's willing act thereby necessitates the truth of “John is kissing Mary”. (For Malebranche, all necessitation is of this sort.) But God's act is not a truth-maker for this judgement. (Smith 1999: 6)</p></blockquote><p>If such cases are possible then (<em>Necessitation-T</em>) fails to provide a sufficient condition for being a truth-maker.</p><h3><a name="TruMakPro" id="TruMakPro">1.3 Truth-making as Projection</a></h3><p>Smith tries to get around this problem by adding to (<em>Necessitation-T</em>) the further constraint that a truth-maker for a given truth should be part of what that truth is <em>about</em>: “roughly: it should fall within the mereological fusion of all the objects to which reference is made in the judgment” (1999: 6). His suggestion is that a typical contingent judgement <em>p</em> not only makes singular reference to the objects whose antics it describes but also “generic reference” to the events, processes and states that are associated with the main verb of the sentence that is used to express the judgement in question. So, for example, the judgement that John is kissing Mary incorporates not only singular reference to John and Mary but also generic reference to all kisses. Smith identifies the <em>projection</em> of a judgement with the fusion of all these things to which it refers (singularly or generically). He then defines what is to be a truth-maker in terms of this notion:</p><dl><dt>(<em>Projection T</em>)</dt><dd>a truth-maker for a judgement <em>p</em> is something that necessitates <em>p and</em> falls within its projection</dd></dl><p>Since God's act of willing isn't one of the things to which the judgement that John is kissing Mary makes singular or generic reference—it doesn't fall within the projection of this judgement—His act isn't a truth-maker for this judgement. But that fateful kiss does fall within the generic reference of the judgement that John is kissing Mary <em>and</em> necessitates the truth of that judgement; so the kiss is a truth-maker for it.</p><p>Whether taking up (<em>Projection-T</em>) will avoid classifying malignant cases of necessitating things as truth-makers will depend upon whether the notion of projection can be made sufficiently precise to vindicate the intuition that the net cast by a judgement won't catch these unwanted fishes with the rest of its haul; whether if the judgement that <em>x</em>φ incorporates singular reference to <em>x</em> and generic reference to φ<em>-</em>ings, it doesn't incorporate (even more) generic reference to anything else that may (waywardly) necessitate <em>x</em>φ.</p><p>Smith attempts to make the notion of projection precise using just mereology and classical entailment. Something belongs to the projection of a judgement <em>x</em>φ only if it is one of the things to which the judgement is existentially committed (Smith 1999: 7). In order to capture the “generic” as well as the singular consequences of a judgement, Smith includes amongst its existential consequences the fusions that result from applying the mereological comprehension principle (<em>T</em>≤) (∃<em>x</em>φ<em>x</em> iff there exists a unique fusion of all and only φ-ers) to the immediate commitments of the judgement. For example, the judgement that Nikita meows is immediately committed to the existence of a meow and thereby to the unique fusion of all and only meows. Because God's act of willing John to kiss Mary doesn't fall within the class of logical-cum-mereological consequences of the judgement that John is kissing Mary, His act isn't a truth-maker for it.</p><p>But this still threatens to over-generate truth-makers (Gregory 2001). The judgement that John is kissing Mary has amongst it existential consequences that someone exists. Since Smith assumes that “<em>x</em> exists”, like “<em>x</em> meows” and “<em>x</em> kisses Mary”, is a predicate, it also follows via (<em>T</em>≤) that the projection of this judgement includes the fusion of all and only existing things (Smith 1999: 10). But since (<em>ex hypothesi</em>) God's act exists—and so belongs to the aforementioned fusion and thereby the projection of the judgement in question—and necessitates that John is kissing Mary, it fails to rule out God's act as a truth-maker for it!</p><p>The projection of a judgement needs to be made far more relevant to what a judgement is intuitively about; the logical-mereological notion of a projection supplied doesn't even provide a basis for affirming that singular judgements don't generically refer to every existing thing. An initial attractive move to avoid this particular problem would be to deny that “exists” is a predicate. But more generally, it remains to be seen whether an appropriate notion of a judgement's referential net, its projection, can be made out that's isn't too permissive—thereby including illegitimate truth-makers—without having to deploy resources that are not obviously clearer or more problematic than that of truth-making itself (see Smith 2002 and Schnieder 2006b for contrasting prognoses).</p><h3><a name="Ess" id="Ess">1.4 Essentialism</a></h3><p>Others attempt to avoid over-generating truth-makers by appealing to the notion of <em>essence</em>, a notion that purports to be far more discriminating than <em>necessitation</em> (Fine 1994; Lowe 1994). The difference in grain between these notions becomes evident when we reflect that although it is (supposed to be) necessarily the case that if Socrates exists then his singleton does too, it isn't part of the essence of Socrates that he belongs to this set. If these notions really are different then we will need to distinguish between those entities that merely necessitate a true claim on the one hand and those that are also part of its essence on the other. This suggests a strategy for ruling out spurious truth-makers: they're the ones that only necessitate true claims, whereas the real ones are also implicated (somehow) in the essences of the claims they make true.</p><p>We have so far avoided any definite conception of truth-bearers. But we can no longer avoid talking about the elephant in the room. If truth-makers are implicated in the essences of truth-bearers then truth-bearers can neither be sentences nor judgements. Truth-bearers of these kinds only bear their representational features accidentally; they could have been used to say or think something different, or occurred in contexts where they lacked significance altogether. Since they could have meant something different, or nothing at all, the truth-makers of these truth-bearers can hardly be implicated in their essences. Accordingly truth-bearers that essentially implicate their truth-makers must be creatures that could not have shifted or lacked their representational features. They must be <em>propositions</em> in the deep sense of being items that are incapable of meaning anything other than they do. Conceiving of propositions only in this sense and appealing to their essences, what is to be a truth-maker admits of the following definition (Mulligan 2003: 547, 2006: 39, 2007; Lowe 2006: 203–10, 2009: 209–15):</p><dl><dt>(<em>Essential-T</em>)</dt><dd>a truth-maker of a proposition is something such that it is part of the essence of that proposition that it is true if that thing exists.</dd></dl><p>If this definition is adopted then it is plausible to maintain that many of the spurious cases of truth-makers we have considered will thereby be weeded out (Lowe 2006: 202–3). It isn't part of the essence of the proposition that John is kissing Mary that it is true if there exists an act of God's willing it. Nor is it part of the essence of the proposition that 2+2=4 that it is true if there is a particular ice floe in the Antarctic. It isn't even part of the essence of the proposition that 2+2=4 that it is true if π exists. So none of these things are (spuriously) classified, if (<em>Essential-T</em>) is our touchstone, as truth-makers for these propositions.</p><p>But the benefits of adopting (<em>Essential-T</em>) come only at significant cost. The idea of a truth-maker is introduced as “intuitively attractive” (Lowe 2006: 207). But (<em>Essential-T</em>) requires an ontology of propositions that is not only platonic—already anathema to naturalists—but also mysterious, <em>viz</em>. “self-interpreting” propositions that mean what they do irrespective of what speakers or thinkers ever do with the signs or judgements that express them. So the idea of a truth-maker turns out to be far less intuitive and attractive than it initially seemed because of its commitment to an abstract and mysterious array of truth-bearers. (Of course if the notion of truth making did enough illuminatory work for us that would provide a reason for relinquishing such doubts about propositions so conceived but that the notion of truth making does so remains to be established). It's also questionable whether our grip upon the notion of the essence of a proposition is any firmer than our grasp of the notion of the generic reference of a judgement, or what a statement is about, or that in virtue of which it is true, or even the notion of truth-maker itself.</p><p>In fact the commitment already emerges from (<em>Necessitarian-T</em>) if the necessitation relation it embodies is conceived as internal in the following sense: “An internal relation is one where the existence of the terms entails the existence of the relation” strung out between the terms; otherwise a relation is external (Armstrong 1997: 87). Armstrong argues that the relation of truth-making has to be internal (in just this sense) because if it weren't then we would have to allow that, absurdly, “anything may be a truth-maker for any truth” (1997: 198). But then nothing but propositions—conceived in the self-interpreting sense—can be truth-bearers that are internally related to their truth-makers. Any other candidate for this representational role, as we've already reflected—a token belief state or utterance—could have been endowed with a different representational significance than the one it possesses. So the other eligible candidates, by contrast to propositions, aren't internally related to what makes them true.</p><p>Armstrong's commitment to the truth-making relation's being internal clashes with his naturalism (David 2005: 156–9). According to Armstrong,</p><blockquote><p>Truth attaches in the first place to propositions, those propositions which have a truth-maker. But no Naturalist can be happy with a realm of propositions. (Armstrong 1997: 131)</p></blockquote><p>So Armstrong counsels that we don't take propositions with “ontological seriousness”:</p><blockquote><p>What exists are classes of intentionally equivalent tokens. The <em>fundamental</em> correspondence, therefore, is not between entities called truths and their truth-makers, but between the token beliefs and thoughts, on the one hand, and truth-makers on the other. (Armstrong 1997: 131)</p></blockquote><p>But naturalistically kosher token beliefs and thoughts aren't internally related to what makes them true. So Armstrong's naturalism commits him to denying that the truth-making relation is internal after all. Heil has also inveighed in a naturalistic spirit against incurring a commitment to propositions that are designed to have their own “built-in intentionality” whilst continuing to maintain that truth-making is an internal relation (2006: 240–3). Since we have no idea of what a naturalistic representation would look like that was internally related to what made it true, this appears to be an impossible combination of views. Our inability to conjure up a credible class of truth-bearers that are internally related to their truth-makers provides us with a very strong incentive for supposing that the truth-making relation is external. The long and short of it: if we are wary, as many naturalists are, of the doctrine that truth-bearers are propositions, then we should also be wary of thinking that the truth-making relation is internal. This spells trouble for (<em>Necessitarian-T</em>) and (<em>Essentialist-T</em>) if <em>necessitation</em> and <em>essential dependence</em> are supposed to be internal relations.</p><p>One strategy for getting around this difficulty holds that truth-making is a relation between a sentence <em>given a fixed meaning</em> and its truth-maker (Bigelow 2009: 136). But what kind of entity is a sentence, e.g., <em>with its actual meaning</em>? And how does the meaning of a sentence enable the truth-making relation to hold between the sentence in question and its truth-maker? Not, presumably, by the meaning of the sentence filling a further (hidden) argument position in the truth-making relation—intermediate between the truth-bearer and the truth-maker—because that would be to reintroduce propositions by the back door. But it not, then how does the meaning of a sentence feed into the obtaining of the truth-making relation?</p><h3><a name="AxiTruMak" id="AxiTruMak">1.5 Axiomatic Truth-making</a></h3><p>The difficulties that have beset the definitions of truth-making proffered so far have suggested to some philosophers that a pessimistic induction is in order: that the project of defining truth-making in more basic terms is misconceived, much as the project of defining knowledge in more basic terms has come to seem misconceived because e.g., of the Gettier cases. But there's no gain to be had from, doing nothing more than declaring the notion of a truth-maker to be primitive. If it's primitive then we also need to know how the notion may be fruitfully applied in association with other concepts we already deploy—entailment, existence, truth <em>etc.</em>—to describe the interplay of truth-bearers and the world. As Simons remarks,</p><blockquote><p>The signs are that truth-making is not analysable in terms of anything more primitive, but we need to be able to say more than just that. So we ought to consider it as specified by principles of truth-making. (2000: 20)</p></blockquote><p>In other words, the notion needs to be introduced non-reductively but still informatively and this is to be achieved by appealing to its systematic liaisons with other concepts.</p><p>This is the approach that was originally shared by Mulligan, Simons and Smith (1984: 312–8). The principal schemata they employed to convey to us an articulate grasp of what <em>truth-making</em> means in non-reductive terms included:</p><dl class="hangindent"><dt>(i)</dt><dd>(Factive) If <em>A</em> makes it true that <em>p</em>, then <em>p</em></dd><dt>(ii)</dt><dd>(Existence) If <em>A</em> exists, then <em>A</em> makes it true that <em>A</em> exists</dd><dt>(iii)</dt><dd>(Entailment) If <em>A</em> makes it true that <em>p</em>, and that <em>p</em> entails that <em>q</em>, then <em>A</em> makes it true that <em>q</em></dd></dl><p>Each of these schemata specifies a definite linkage between the application of the notion of <em>truth-making</em> and some other condition. <em>Truth-making</em> is introduced as the notion that sustains all of these linkages. Putting the schemata together what it is to be a truth-maker is then definable intra-theoretically as follows,</p><dl><dt>(<em>Axiomatic-T</em>)</dt><dd>A truth-maker is something <em>x</em> such that (i) if <em>x</em> makes it true that <em>p</em> then <em>p</em>, (ii) if <em>x</em> exists then <em>x</em> makes it true that <em>x</em> exists… and so on for each of the axiom schemata of our favoured theory of truth-makers.</dd></dl><p>It is important to appreciate that adopting this approach to truth-making doesn't have the benefits of theft over honest toil. For one thing it doesn't obviate the threat of superfluous truth-makers for necessary truths. (<em>Entailment</em>) is the principle that truth-making tracks entailment: if <em>A</em> makes <em>p</em> true then it makes all the consequences of <em>p</em> true too. It's a principle that recommends itself irrespective of whether truth-making can be defined. This is because it dovetails smoothly with the idea that one truth-maker can make many truths true. For example, suppose that a particular <em>a</em> has some absolutely determinate mass. It is entailed by this description that various determinable descriptions are also truly predicable of <em>a</em>. Some of these truths say more than others, nonetheless they all have the same truth-maker. Why so? Because they are entailed by <em>a</em>'s having the mass it does (Armstrong 1997: 130; 2004: 10–11). To answer so is to appeal to (<em>Entailment</em>). But if the entailment that truth-making tracks is classical then we are back to flouting (<em>Relevance</em>). If <em>q</em> is necessary then any contingent <em>p</em> classically entails <em>q.</em> So if something at the back of your refrigerator makes it true that <em>p</em> then by (<em>Entailment</em>) it makes <em>q</em> true too. To avoid flouting (<em>Relevance</em>) in this way (<em>Entailment</em>) had better be a principle that links truth-making to a more restrictive, non-classical notion of entailment (Mulligan, Simons, & Smith 1984: 316). So we won't be saved the logical labour of figuring out which non-classical connective it is that contributes to capturing what it is to be a truth-maker.</p><p>Nor will appealing to (<em>Axiomatic-T</em>) save us the hard work of figuring out what truth-makers and truth-bearers must be like in order to collectively realise the structure described by the axiom schemata for truth-makers we favour. But there is nothing about these schemata that demands truth-bearer and truth-maker be internally related.</p><h3><a name="TruMakGro" id="TruMakGro">1.6 Truth-Making as Grounding</a></h3><p>A more recent approach attempts to define truth-making in terms of primitive notions of <em>grounding</em> and <em>fundamentality</em>. According to Schaffer, if a proposition <em>p</em> is true at a world <em>w</em>, then <em>p</em>'s truth at <em>w</em> is grounded in the fundamental features of <em>w</em> (2008a: 10–18, 2008b: 309–12, 2010: 309–11). What is it then to be a truth-maker?</p><dl><dt>(<em>Grounding-T</em>)</dt><dd>A truth-maker <em>x</em> for a proposition <em>p</em> at <em>w</em> is something such that (<em>i</em>) x is fundamental at <em>w</em> and (<em>ii</em>) the truth of <em>p</em> at <em>w</em> is grounded in <em>x</em>.</dd></dl><p>Schaffer recommends this approach partly because the notion of grounding it incorporates is “hyperintensional”: it's a notion that's fine-grained enough to distinguish those entities, e.g., the cardinal numbers, that ground a necessary truth, such as 2+2=4, from those that don't, e.g., our friend the ice floe. His hope is that because the notion is so fine-grained (<em>Grounding-T</em>) will be able to avoid the over-generation that beset (<em>Entailment-T</em>) and (<em>Necessitation-T</em>) but without having to appeal, like (<em>Projection-T</em>), to an underdeveloped notion of “about” or “relevance”. But do we have a sufficiently developed notion of <em>grounding</em> and what it means to be <em>fundamental</em>?</p><p>Schaffer tells us “Grounding is an asymmetric, irreflexive and transitive relation. It thus induces a partial ordering, whose minimal elements are the fundamental entities” (2008a: 17, 2008b: 311, 2009: 376). But this informs us only about their <em>formal</em> properties, not about the <em>content</em> of those notions. Schaffer undertakes to clarify their content further “by way of illustration”. He invites us to consider the following pairs: (<em>a</em>) Socrates and his singleton, {Socrates}, (<em>b</em>) Socrates and the fact that Socrates exists, (<em>c</em>) the Swiss cheese and its holes, (<em>d</em>) natural features and moral ones, (<em>e</em>) sparse and abundant properties, (f) “neural” properties and mental ones, (<em>g</em>) “truth-makers and truths” (2008b: 311, 2009: 375). Schaffer suggests that these pairs provide “clear examples of grounding”: it is “plausible”, “natural” and “standard” to regard the second term of each pair as grounded in the first. He then reflects, “The relation of the truth of propositions to what is fundamental fits this pattern” (2008b: 311).</p><p>But to many philosophers no common pattern is apparent here. They have found membership, fact-constituency and truth-making altogether unlike one another—relationships with very different characters that bind together <em>prima facie</em> very different structures about which we want to say quite different things. The concept of “grounding” appears to cry out for treatment as a family resemblance concept, a concept whose instances have no more in common than different games do (Wittgenstein 1953: §§ 66–7).</p><p>Consider, just for example, Lewis who denied the existence altogether of sets, facts and holes (except as a manner of speaking) (Lewis & Lewis 1970, Lewis 1986, 1993). For Lewis, (<em>a</em>), (<em>b</em>) and (<em>c</em>) don't have anything in common except that he doubted the existence of the second term of each pair; whereas, as we will see, he doubted the existence of the first term of (g), viz. truth makers. It's an further indicator of the lack of consensus about <em>truth-making</em> and <em>grounding</em> that even other philosophers who are willing to take both these notions seriously and conceive of them as constitutively related, e.g., Cameron, find it “natural”, as he puts it (2010: 184), to define <em>grounding</em> in terms of <em>truth-making</em> rather than the other way around as Schaffer proposes.</p><p>(<em>Grounding-T</em>) also quantifies over propositions that are related by a hyperintensional relation to their truth-makers. Schaffer doesn't tell us whether <em>grounding</em> is external or internal but this already means that propositions must have their meanings essentially. So it needs to be explained how this conception of truth-making avoids the problem that afflicted (<em>Necessitarian-T</em>) and (<em>Essentialist-T</em>), <em>viz</em>. that explaining how it is possible for propositions to be so tightly related to their truth-makers without being committed to an abstruse ontology of self-interpreting propositions. (For other concerns about <em>grounding</em> see Incurvati 2012 and Daly 2012).</p><h2><a name="WhiRanTruEliMadTruIfAny" id="WhiRanTruEliMadTruIfAny">2. Which range of truths are eligible to be made true (if any are)?</a></h2><p>Even when truth-maker panegyrists agree about what it is to be a truth-maker, they often still disagree about the range of truths that are eligible to be made true. This results in further disagreement about what kinds of entities truth-makers are. There is potential for disagreement here because of the appearance that different ranges of truths require different kinds of truth-makers. Sometimes, discovering themselves unable to countenance the existence of one or other kind of truth-maker, panegyrists may find themselves obliged to reconsider what truths really require truth-makers or to reconsider what it is to be a truth-maker. We can get a sense of the complex interplay of forces at work here by starting out from the most simple and general principle about truth-making (maximalism) and then seeing what pressures are generated to make us step back from it.</p><h3><a name="Max" id="Max">2.1 Maximalism</a></h3><p>Truth-maker <em>maximalists</em> demand that every truth has a truth-maker—no exceptions granted. So they advance the completely general principle,</p><dl><dt>(<em>Maximalism</em>)</dt><dd>For every truth, then there must be something in the world that makes it true.</dd></dl><p>The principle lies at one end of the spectrum of positions we can potentially occupy. At the other end, we find <em>truth-maker nihilism</em>, the idea that no truth needs to be made true because (roughly) the very idea of a truth-maker is a corrupt one: there is no such role as making something true for anything to perform. <em>Truth-maker optimalism</em> is the intermediate position that only some truths stand in need of truth-makers: not so few that truth fails to be anchored in reality but not so many that we strain credulity about the kinds of things there are.</p><h4>2.1.1 The Liar?</h4><p>Milne (2005) has offered the following knock-down, if not knock-out, argument against maximalism. Take the sentence,</p><dl class="hangindent"><dt>(<em>M</em>)</dt><dd>This sentence has no truth-maker.</dd></dl><p>Suppose that (<em>M</em>) has a truth-maker. Since it's made true, <em>M</em> must be true. And since it's true, what (<em>M</em>) says must also be the case: that <em>M</em> has no truth-maker. So if (<em>M</em>) has a truth-maker then it doesn't have a truth-maker. By <em>reductio ad absurdum</em> (<em>M</em>) therefore has no truth-maker. But this is just what (<em>M</em>) says. So, <em>contra</em> (Maximalism), there is at least one sentence, (<em>M</em>), that is true without benefit of a truth-maker.</p><p>Rodriguez-Pereyra (2006c) has responded to this argument by maintaining that (<em>M</em>) is like the Liar sentence</p><dl class="hangindent"><dt>(<em>L</em>)</dt><dd>This sentence is false.</dd></dl><p>It's a familiar position in the philosophy of logic to respond to the inconsistency that arises from supposing that (<em>L</em>) is either true or false—if it is, it isn't and if it isn't, it is—that the <em>sentence</em> (<em>L</em>) isn't meaningful, despite superficial appearances (see, for a useful introduction to these issues, Sainsbury 1995: 111–33). According to Rodriguez-Pereyra, because (<em>M</em>) is akin to the Liar sentence there's no reason to suppose that (<em>M</em>) is meaningful either. But if (<em>M</em>) isn't meaningful then (<em>M</em>) certainly can't be true; in which case (<em>M</em>) can't be a counterexample to maximalism either.</p><p>This response is flawed because, as Milne points out, (<em>M</em>) is importantly unlike (<em>L</em>): (<em>L</em>) gives rise to an outright inconsistency when only elementary logic rules are applied to it; whereas (<em>M</em>) isn't inconsistent <em>per se</em> but only when combined with a substantive metaphysical principle: maximalism. If, by contrast, you don't believe in truth-makers then you have every right to treat (<em>M</em>) as just another true sentence—just as you have every right to think (<em>P</em>) is true if you don't believe in propositions,</p><dl class="hangindent"><dt>(<em>P</em>)</dt><dd>This sentence does not express a proposition</dd></dl><p>It's only if one was (absurdly) to think that maximalism was a logical truth that (<em>M</em>) could be intelligibly thought to be “Liar-like”. Of course, one person's <em>modus ponens</em> is another's <em>modus tollens</em>. So if one already had very strong independent reasons for being committed to maximalism, Milne's argument would provide a reason for thinking that (<em>M</em>) is meaningless (even though it isn't Liar-like). But even if there are such reasons—or appear to be—we can't claim to have control of our subject matter until we have established what it is about the constitutive connections that obtain between truth-making, truth and truth-bearers that determines (<em>M</em>) to be meaningless (if it is); until we've established the lie of the land, we can't be sure that we're not kidding ourselves thinking (<em>M</em>) to be meaningless rather than maximalism to be false. The lesson repeats itself: a convincing theory of truth-makers requires a coeval theory of truth bearers.</p><h4>2.1.2 Could there be nothing rather than something?</h4><p>Here's another shot across the bows, this time from Lewis. Take the most encompassing negative existential of all: absolutely nothing exists. Surely this statement is possibly true. But if it were true then something would have to exist to make it true if the principle that every truth has a truth-maker is to be upheld. But then there would have to be something rather than nothing. So combining maximalism with the conviction that there could have been nothing rather than something leads to contradiction (Lewis 1998: 220, 2001: 611). So unless we already have reason to think there must be something rather than nothing—as both Armstrong (1989b: 24–5) and Lewis (1986: 73–4) think they do—maximalism is already in trouble.</p><h4>2.1.3 Maximalism is distinct from 1–1 Correspondence</h4><p>What is there to be said in defence of maximalism? Even though he favours it, Armstrong finds himself obliged to admit that “I do not have any direct argument” for recommending the position (2004: 7). Instead he expresses the hope that</p><blockquote><p>philosophers of realist inclinations will be immediately attracted to the idea that a truth, any truth, should depend for its truth for something “outside” it, in virtue of which it is true.</p></blockquote><p>Let us follow Armstrong's lead and treat maximalism as a “hypothesis to be tested”. (See Schaffer 2008b: 308 for a more direct argument that relies upon (<em>Grounding-T</em>).)</p><p>Maximalism needs to be distinguished from the even stronger claim,</p><dl><dt>(<em>Correspondence</em>)</dt><dd>For each truth there is exactly one thing that makes it true and for each truth-maker there is exactly one truth made true by it.</dd></dl><p>But that there's clear blue water between these claims is evident if we combine maximalism with (<em>Entailment</em>)—that whatever makes a truth <em>p</em> true makes what <em>p</em> entails true too. So <em>p</em> and all of its consequences are not only all made true (as maximalism demands) but they also share a truth-maker (as <em>Correspondence</em> denies). This takes us halfway to appreciating that so far from being an inevitably profligate doctrine—as its name suggests—maximalism is compatible with denying that some logically complex claims have their own bespoke truth-makers. (The inspiration for thinking this way comes from the logical atomism of Russell (1918–19) that admitted some logically complex facts but not others—it is to be contrasted with Wittgenstein's version of the doctrine (1921) which admitted only atomic facts.)</p><p>Suppose, for the sake of expounding the view, that some truth-bearers are atomic. Also suppose that <em>P</em> and <em>Q</em> are atomic and <em>t</em> makes <em>P</em> true. Then, by <em>Entailment</em>, <em>t</em> makes <em>P</em> ∨ <em>Q</em> true too. Similarly, if <em>s</em> makes <em>P</em> true and <em>s</em>* makes <em>Q</em> true then, by <em>Entailment</em>, <em>s</em> and <em>s*</em> together make <em>P</em> & <em>Q</em> true. Since the task of making <em>P</em> ∨ <em>Q</em> and <em>P</em> & <em>Q</em> true has already been discharged by the truth-makers for the atomic truth bearers, there is no need to posit additional truth-makers for making these disjunctive and conjunctive truths true. Similar reasoning suggests that there is no need to posit bespoke truth-makers for existential generalisations or truths of identity either (Mulligan, Simons, & Smith 1984: 313; Simons 1992: 161–3; Armstrong 2004: 54–5). But maximalism is not thereby compromised: even though disjunctive and conjunctive truths lack specific truth-makers of their own, they're still made true by the truth-makers of the basic claims from which they're compounded by the logical operations of disjunction and conjunction.</p><h4>2.1.4 The need for bespoke truth-makers</h4><p>But positing truth-makers for atomic truths doesn't obviate the need—supposing maximalism—to posit additional truth-makers for negative and universal truths. This becomes apparent in the case of negative truths when we compare the truth-tables for conjunction and disjunction with the truth-table for negation. The former tell us that the truth of a disjunctive formula is determined by the truth of one or other of its disjuncts, whilst the truth of a conjunctive formula is determined by the truth of both its conjuncts. But the truth-table for negation doesn't tell us how the truth of ~<em>P</em> is determined by the truth of some other atomic formula <em>Q</em> from which ~<em>P</em> follows; it only tells us that ~<em>P</em> is true iff <em>P</em> is <em>false</em>. The strategy for avoiding bespoke truth-makers for logically complex truths can't get a grip in this case: there's no <em>Q</em> such that supplying a truth-maker for it obviates the necessity of positing an additional truth-maker for ~<em>P</em> (Russell 1918–19: 209–11; Hochberg 1969: 325–7).</p><p>The problem is even starker for universal truths: there's no truth-table for them because there is no set of atomic formulae whose truth determines that a universally quantified formula is true too. Why so? Because whatever true atomic formulae we light upon (<em>Fa</em>, <em>Fb</em>… <em>Fn</em>), it doesn't follow from them that ∀<em>xFx</em> is true. To extract the general conclusion one would need to add to the premises that <em>a</em>, <em>b</em>… <em>n</em> are <em>all</em> the things there are; that there's no extra thing waiting in the wings to appear on stage that isn't <em>F</em>. But this extra premise is itself universally quantified, not atomic. So it can't be argued that the truth-makers for <em>Fa</em>, <em>Fb</em>… <em>Fn</em> put together already discharge the task of making ∀<em>xFx</em> true because they entail it (Russell 1918–9: 236–7; Hochberg 1969: 335–7).</p><h5>2.1.4.1 Truth-makers for Negative Truths</h5><p>The most straightforward response—since we are treating maximalism as a working hypothesis—is to find more fitting truth-makers for those truths that aren't already made true by the truth-makers for the atomic truths that entail them. Whilst looking around for truth-makers for negative truths Russell reflected,</p><blockquote><p>There is implanted in the human breast an almost unquenchable desire to find some way of avoiding the admission that negative facts are as ultimate as those that are positive. (1919: 287)</p></blockquote><p>He was right that our desire for positive facts and things makes us awkward about acknowledging that negative facts or things are the truth-makers of negative truths. Nonetheless, discussions about whether there are truth-makers for a given range of truth bearers on one or the other side of the positive-negative divide are apt to appear nebulous. This is because, as Russell had himself previously noted, there is “no formal test” or “general definition” for being a negative fact; we “must go into the meanings of words” (1918–19: 215–6). Statements of the form “<em>a</em> is <em>F</em>” aren't invariably positive (“so-and-so is dead”), nor are statements of the form “<em>a</em> isn't <em>F</em>” (“so-and-so isn't blind”) always negative. But it doesn't follow from the fact that a syntactic test cannot be given that there is nothing to the contrast between positive and negative. Molnar suggests that the contrast can be put on a sound scientific footing. For Molnar, natural kinds are paradigm instances of the positive, to be identified on <em>a posteriori</em> grounds (2000: 73). To say that a thing belongs to a natural kind identified in this way is to state a positive fact. To state a negative fact is to negate a statement of a positive fact.</p><p>It's a very natural suggestion that if the negative claim that <em>a</em> isn't <em>F</em> is true it's made true by the existence of something positive that's <em>incompatible</em> with <em>a</em>'s being <em>F</em> (Demos 1917). For example, the truth-maker for the claim that kingfishers aren't yellow is the fact that they're blue because their being blue is incompatible with their being yellow. But what makes it true that these colours are incompatible? The notion of <em>incompatibility</em> appears itself to be negative—a relation that obtains between two states when it's <em>not</em> possible for them to obtain together. So this proposal threatens to become regressive: we'll need to find another positive truth-maker for the further negative claim that yellow and blue are incompatible, something whose obtaining is incompatible with the state of yellow and blue's being compatible, and so on (Russell 1918–9: 213–5, 1919: 287–9; Taylor 1952: 438–40; Hochberg 1969: 330–1; Grossman 1992: 130–1; Molnar 2000: 74–5; Simons 2008). There's another worry: it's not obvious that there are enough positive states out there to underwrite all the negative truths there are. Even though it may be true that this liquid is odourless this needn't be because there's something further about it that excludes its being odorous (Taylor 1952: 447; Mulligan, Simons, & Smith 1984: 314; Molnar 2000: 75; Armstrong 2004: 62–3; Dodd 2007: 387).</p><p>One could circumvent the threatened regress by denying that the incompatibilities in question require truth-makers of their own because they're necessary truths and such truths are a legitimate exception to maximalism—because “they are true come (or exist) what may” (Simons 2005: 254; Mellor 2003: 213). There is some plausibility to the idea that formal truths (tautologies) don't stand in need of truth-makers; their truth is settled by the truth-tables of the logical constants. But material necessary truths—such as that expressed by “yellow is incompatible with blue”—appear to make just as substantive demands upon the world as contingent truths do (Molnar 2000: 74). In a sense they appear to make even more of a demand since the world must be so endowed that it could not in any circumstances have failed to live up to the expectations of material necessary truths. It's a peculiar feature of our philosophical culture that even though it's almost universally acknowledged that Wittgenstein's plan (1921: 6.37) to show all necessity is logical necessity ended in failure—indeed foundered upon the very problem of explaining colour incompatibilities—that so many philosophers continue to think and talk as though the only necessities were formal ones so that necessary truths don't need truth-makers (MacBride 2011: 176–7).</p><p>Russell reluctantly chose to acknowledge negative facts as truth-makers for negative truths. He just couldn't see any way of living without them. But negative facts are an unruly bunch. Try to think of all the ways you are. Contrast that with the even harder task of thinking of all the ways you aren't! If negative truths are acknowledged as truth-makers they will have to be indefinitely numerous, unbounded in their variety; choosing to live with them is a heavy commitment to make (Armstrong 2004: 55). What's worse, if negative facts are akin to positive facts—as their name suggests—then they must be made up out of things, properties and relations arranged together. But, <em>prima facie</em>, many of these things, properties and relations aren't existing elements of reality. So unless, like Meinong, we believe in the non-existent, we'll have to admit that negative facts aren't configurations of their constituents and so an entirely different kind of entity from positive facts altogether (Molnar 2000: 77; Dodd 2007: 388).</p><p>It is for such reasons that Armstrong counsels us to adopt a more parsimonious account of what makes negative truths true (2004: 56–9). Armstrong's own account lies at the opposite extreme to Russell's. Whereas Russell posited indefinitely <em>many</em> negative facts to make negative truths true, Armstrong posits just <em>one</em> thing that's responsible for making them <em>all</em> true, <em>viz</em>. a totality fact.</p><p>We should register C.B. Martin's doubt that this is throwing out the baby with the bath water (1996: 59). According to Martin, we already recognise in ordinary discourse that different negative truths have different truth-makers—not just one as Armstrong proposes. For example, we recognise that what makes it true that there is no oil in this engine is different from what makes it true that there are no dodos left. What makes claims like these true are absences, lacks, limits, holes and voids, where these are conceived not as things but as “<em>localised</em> states of the world”, robustly first-order and “causally relevant” to what goes on (Martin 1996: 58, 65–6; Taylor 1952: 443–5). But, as many philosophers have argued, when we talk about an absence having causal effects what we're really saying can be understood without reifying negative states and appealing instead to the actual effects, or the counterfactual effects, of a positive state (Molnar 2000: 77–80; Armstrong 2004: 64–7; Lewis 2004; Beebee 2004).</p><h5>2.1.4.2 Truth-makers for general truths</h5><p>Armstrong's grand design is to sweep away the difficulties that attend the admission of negative facts by positing a special kind of general fact that also serves as the truth-maker for general truths. Russell admitted general facts too but he acknowledged that, “I do not profess to know what the right analysis of general facts is” (Russell 1918–9: 236–7). But Armstrong has gone further and assigned to general facts the following structure: a general, or totality fact consists in a binary relation <em>T</em> of <em>totality</em> that holds between an aggregate on the one hand and a property on the other when the aggregate comprises <em>all</em> the items that fall under the property in question (Armstrong 1989b: 93–4, 1997: 199–200, 2004: 72–5).</p><p>For example, China, France, the Russian Federation, the U.K. and the U.S.A. comprise the permanent membership of the UN Security Council. So the aggregate (<em>A</em>) of them bears the <em>T</em> relation to the property (<em>P</em>) of being a permanent member of the Council (<em>T</em>(<em>A</em>, <em>P</em>)). Since the aggregate bears that relation to that property, there can be other permanent members of the Council who aren't already included in it. So the totality fact <em>T</em>(<em>A</em>, <em>P</em>) suffices for the general truth that China, France, the Russian Federation, the U.K. and the U.S.A are <em>all</em> its members. It also suffices for the truth of the negative existential that there are <em>no</em> other members of the Council. So once we've recognised that <em>T</em>(<em>A, P</em>) exists, there's no need to recognise additional bespoke truth-makers for these negative truths.</p><p>In a similar way Armstrong endeavours to sweep away the need for negative facts by affirming “the biggest totality state of all, the one embracing all lower-order states of affairs”, i.e., the existence of a totality state that consists in an aggregate of all the (1<sup>st</sup> order) states of affairs there are related by <em>T</em> to the property of <em>being a (1<sup>st</sup> order) states of affairs</em> (2004: 75). It's one of Armstrong's abiding contentions that the world is “a world of states of affairs, with particulars and universals only having existence within states of affairs” (1989: 94). Consequently this totality state comprises a vast swathe of what exists—whether particulars, universals or states of affairs that consist in particulars having universals. So it follows from the existence of this totality fact that there are no more (1<sup>st</sup> order) states of affairs that are not already included in the aggregate of states that <em>T</em> relates to the property of <em>being a (1<sup>st</sup> order) states of affairs</em>. Nor are there any particulars or (1<sup>st</sup> order) universals had by those particulars that are not constituents of the state of affairs included in that aggregate. It also follows that there are no more particulars or (1<sup>st</sup> order) universals. So this totality fact serves as truth-maker for all these negative truths.</p><p>It is sometimes objected that such totality facts are just negative facts in disguise: “Totality statements state the non-existence of certain entities, they state ‘no more facts’”; so we should reject totality facts if we are dissatisfied with negative ones (Molnar 2000: 81–2; Dodd 2007: 389). Armstrong responds to this charge with equanimity: “It is not denied, of course, that the totalling or alling relation involves negation. It sets a limit to the things of that sort” (2004: 73). But if negation has indeed been smuggled into the description of the role that <em>T</em> performs in comprising a totality state then it is difficult to avoid the suspicion that Armstrong has simply exchanged many negative facts for one big one. But we may think of Armstrong's contribution in a different way. There are two ostensible concerns that negative states of affairs present. First, there is a concern about their number. Second, there is a concern about, so to speak, their <em>negativity</em>. Armstrong has addressed the first concern by showing how we may reduce the number of negative states of affairs. But the second concern neither cannot be met—because, as Armstrong reflects, we cannot eliminate negation from our description of the world.</p><p>It has also been objected that Armstrong's position gives rise to a “paradox of totality” (Armstrong 1989: 94, 1997: 198–9, 2004: 78–9; Cox 1997: 53–60; Molnar 2000: 81). Take the totality state of affairs that comprises all the (1<sup>st</sup> order) state of affairs. Since this (2<sup>nd</sup> order) state is itself a state of affairs it follows that the initial aggregate of (1<sup>st</sup> order) states of affairs failed to comprise all the states of affairs there are. So there must be a further totality state that comprised the aggregate of all of them. But this (3<sup>rd</sup> order) state is also a state of affairs so it will need to be added to the mix too, and so <em>ad infinitum</em>.</p><p>Armstrong responds to this objection with equanimity too:</p><blockquote><p>we can afford to be casual about this infinite series. For after the first fact of totality these “extra” states of affairs are all supervenient. As such, we do not have to take them with ontological seriousness. (1989b: 94)</p></blockquote><p>To understand this we need to appreciate that Armstrong's notion of <em>supervenience</em> is non-standard: “an entity <em>Q</em> supervenes upon entity <em>P</em> if and only if it is impossible that P should exist and <em>Q</em> not exist” or, in other words that the existence of <em>P</em> entails the existence of <em>Q</em>. (Armstrong 1997: 11). He also holds a non-standard conception of ontological commitment, <em>viz</em>. that “What supervenes is no addition of being” (Armstrong 1997: 12, 2004: 23–4). Armstrong's idea is (roughly) that to be a genuine addition to being is to be a net (indispensible) contributor to the schedule of truth-makers for all the truths. But supervenient entities are superfluous as truth-makers. If the existence of an <em>R</em> entails the existence of a certain <em>S</em> which in turn entails the truth of <em>P</em>, then <em>R</em> already makes <em>P</em> true so there is no need to include <em>S</em> in the inventory of truth-makers. It follows that supervenient entities, like <em>S,</em> are no addition of being (Lewis 1992: 202–3).</p><p>Now bring this non-standard conception of ontological commitment to bear upon the envisaged infinite series of totality facts. It is impossible that the 2<sup>nd</sup> order totality fact comprising all the 1st order states of affairs exist and the 3<sup>rd</sup> order totality fact comprising all the 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> order states not exist. So the 3<sup>rd</sup> totality fact—or any other state higher-order than it—is entailed by the existence of the 2<sup>nd</sup> order totality state. So all of these <em>n</em> > 2 higher-order totality states supervene on it. That's why Armstrong doesn't think we need to take any of them with ontological seriousness.</p><p>What should we make of this non-standard conception of ontological commitment in terms of truth-making: that to be is to be a truth-maker? Cameron (2008c) has proposed that this conception should <em>replace</em> the standard one that to be is to be the value of a variable. But this threatens to cut off the branch the advocates of truth-maker theory are sitting on: if they disavow that existential quantification is ontologically committing then they will be left without a means of determining the ontological commitments of truth-maker theory itself, i.e., the theory that gives the inventory, using existential quantification, of what makes all the truths true (Schaffer 2010: 16–7).</p><p>Of course, if someone grants that existential quantification is ontologically committing <em>in</em> the context of a theory of truth-makers then they won't stultify themselves in this way (Heil 2003: 9, 2009: 316–7, Simons 2010: 200). But this just seems like special pleading. An argument is owed that we can't legitimately commit ourselves to the existence of things that perform theoretical roles outside the theory of truth-makers (MacBride 2011: 169). Why should there be only one theoretical dance allowed in town? Why shouldn't we allow that there are other theoretical roles for existing things to perform? Indeed it's a very real possibility that when we come to understand the capacity of the truth-makers to make truth-bearers true we will find ourselves embroiled in commitment to the existence of other things in their explanatory wake that aren't truth-makers themselves. In fact Armstrong himself should have been one of the first to recognise this. For it has been an abiding feature of Armstrong's world view that we are obliged to acknowledge not only states affairs, which are truth makers, but also properties and relations, constituents of states of affairs, which aren't.</p><p>More generally, can we make any sense of the idea of “an ontological free lunch”? Why is something supervenient no addition to being? Even if we only ever came to recognise the existence of one supervening entity would we not thereby have <em>added</em> at least one extra item to our inventory of things that exist? Of course in the special case where the supervening entity is <em>constituted</em> by the entities it supervenes upon—i.e., the things that are already there—it makes some sense to say that it's not adding anything new; but it's not at all obvious that what Armstrong et al. declare to be ontological free lunches are constituted from the entities upon which they supervene (Melia 2005: 74–5).</p><p>Where does this leave us? So long as Armstrong's non-standard conception of ontological commitment remains controversial, it also remains controversial whether the infinite series of totality facts to which Armstrong is “committed” may be dismissed as mere ontological frippery.</p><h3><a name="Opt" id="Opt">2.2 Optimalism</a></h3><p>One way to respond to these difficulties is to abandon maximalism in favour of optimalism, to deny that universal and negative statements need truth-makers. But Merricks argues the optimalist “way out” is blocked. Negative truths need truth-makers if any truths do, but they can't have them. So we must give up thinking that truths need truth-makers in the first place (2007: 39–67).</p><p>Here's why Merricks thinks so. In order to avoid the over-generation of truth-makers for necessary truths (<em>etc</em>.) Merricks imposes a relevance constraint: “a truth-maker must be that which its truth is about” (2007: 28). But can this constraint be satisfied in the case of negative existentials, such as the statement there are no hobbits? This statement isn't about hobbits, because there aren't any, and other apparent candidates, such as the universe's exhibiting the global property of <em>being such that there are no hobbits in it</em>, appear hoaxed up and artificial (2007: 43–55). Even if one follows Merricks this far, one may still think that negative existentials are the principled exception that proves the rule that a truth-maker for a positive truth must be what its truth is about. But, so far as Merricks is concerned, this is throwing the baby out with the bathwater:</p><blockquote><p>I deny that if we set aside the intuition that “a truth, any truth” depends on being we are left with the equally compelling intuition that all truths <em>except negative existentials</em> depend on being. (2007: 41)</p></blockquote><p>He also suggests that this position is theoretically disingenuous because no one would consider retreating to it from full-blown maximalism unless he or she had already been “spooked” by his or her failure to find truth-makers for negative truths; or if they held onto the view that truth is correspondence (Merricks 2007: 40–1; Dodd 2007: 394; Cameron 2008a: 411). Merricks surmises that if we have any reason to commit to truth-makers, we have only reason to commit outright to a truth-maker for every truth (maximalism). But since maximalism cannot be sustained because of the lack of things for negative existentials to be about, Merricks recommends the rejection of truth-makers altogether.</p><p>But optimalists aren't just “spooked” or “timid” maximalists. They stand on their two feet with a principled position of their own that need neither be based upon “gerrymandered intuition” nor adopted as a consequence of a forced retreat from maximalism. If maximalism is intellectual heir to Russell's logical atomism, then optimalism (at least in the form under consideration) is heir to Wittgenstein's version of the doctrine according to which it is only atomic propositions that represent the existence of states of affairs. The optimalists' idea is that once truth-makers have been supplied for the atomic truths there is simply <em>no need</em> to posit further truth-makers for the molecular ones. All we need to recognise is that an atomic statement <em>P</em> is true whenever a truth-maker for <em>P</em> exists, that <em>P</em> is false if and only if no truth-maker for <em>P</em> exists. Once the existence and non-existence of the truth-makers has settled the truth-values of all the atomic statements, the logical operations described by the truth-tables then settle the truth and falsity of all the molecular statements (another story must be told about what the truth-makers are for the non-extensional constructions—another elephant in the room). In particular, the truth-table for negation—that tells us what “~” means—assures us that if <em>P</em> is false then ~<em>P</em> is true. So all it takes to make ~<em>P</em> true is that no truth-maker for <em>P</em> exists. Thus Mulligan, Simons, and Smith:</p><blockquote><p>it seems more adequate to regard sentences of the given kind as true not in virtue of any truth-maker of their own, but simply in virtue of the fact that the corresponding positive sentences have no truth-maker. (1984: 315; see also Mellor 2003: 213–4, 2009; Simons 2000:7–8, 2005: 255–6)</p></blockquote><p>Simons offers the illuminating reflection:</p><blockquote><p>This is the truth-maker end of Wittgenstein's insight that propositions are bi-polar: if a proposition has one truth-value, however it gets it, its contradictory opposite has the opposite truth-value without further ado;</p></blockquote><p>Simons dubs the truth functional mechanism whereby the negation of an atomic statement gets the value true, “truth by default” (2008: 14).</p><p>Optimalists also think that general truths are true by default so there is no need for bespoke truth-makers for them (like totality facts). Universal quantifications ∀<em>xFx</em> are logically equivalent to negative statements of the form ∼∃<em>x</em>∼<em>Fx</em>. Since the latter are negative, they're true, if they are, only by default. Then because the former statements are logically equivalent to them, the optimalists surmise that universal quantifications are true by default too (Mellor 2003: 214; Simons 2008: 14–5).</p><h3><a name="TruSupUpoBei" id="TruSupUpoBei">2.3 Truth Supervenes Upon Being</a></h3><p>Optimalism retains the original demand for truth-makers but restricts it to atomic statements. Optimalism accordingly disavows a commitment to truth-makers for negative statements and statements of generality. But Bigelow⎯also wary of the commitments that maximalism engenders to negative and totality facts⎯ weakens what truth-making means to a point where negative and general statements don't require bespoke truth-makers of their own (1988: 131–3). He offers the following principle to capture the kernel of truth in truth-making worth saving.</p><dl><dt>(<em>Truth Supervenes on Being</em>)</dt><dd>If something is true then it would not be possible for it to be false unless either certain things were to exist which don't, or else certain things had not existed which do (1988: 133).</dd></dl><p>This principle allows atomic truths to have truth-makers⎯because it would only be possible for them to be false if certain things had not existed: their truth-makers. But it also allows negative truths to be true without them. The statement that there are no dragons gets to be true because it would only be possible for that statement to be false if something which hadn't existed (dragons) did exist. Such statements are true not because they have truth-makers but because they have no counterexamples, ìthey lack false-makersî (Lewis 1992: 204, 2001: 610).</p><p>General truths are also true for lack of false-makers. The statement that everything is physical (if true) is true because it would only be possible for the statement to be false if something that hadn't existed did, <em>viz</em>. something that wasn't physical. So when truth-making is understood in this weakened sense there is no need to acknowledge, e.g., an additional totality fact to make it true that there are only five coins in my pocket; it's enough that if I hadn't stopped adding coins that statement would have been false because then there would have been at least one other coin in my pocket (Heil 2000: 236–240, 2003: 68–72, 2006: 238–40; Bricker 2006).</p><p>Despite their differences, optimalism and (<em>Truth Supervenes Upon Being</em>) share a key idea in common—that a negative existential truth isn't true because something exists, but because something doesn't, <em>viz</em>. a truth-maker for its contradictory, a false-maker for it. C.B. Martin has objected that this doesn't obviate the need to posit truth-makers for negative existentials. This is because a statement that there are no false-makers for a negative existential truth is itself a negative existential truth. So this statement “can't be used to explain or show how the latter needs no truth-making state of the world for it to be true” (1996: 61). Lewis takes Martin object that this account of the truth of negative truths isn't informative. Take the statement that there are no unicorns. Why is it true? Well because there are no unicorns. That's not much of an explanation! But, Lewis retorts, the positive existential statement that there is a cat is true because there is a cat. That's “No explanation at all, and none the worse for that” (Lewis 2001: 611–12). Fair enough; but perhaps Martin meant that optimalists and their fellow-travellers were presupposing what they set out to show—because they assumed without argument that a special class of negative claims stood in no need of truth-makers, those according to which other negative statements lacked false makers.</p><h3><a name="HumSce" id="HumSce">2.4 Humean Scepticism</a></h3><p>Lewis has anyway argued that the doctrine that truth supervenes upon being—and, by implication, optimalism—are an uncomfortable halfway house. He began by trying to persuade us that the retreat from maximalism was already mandated. He pointed out how deeply counterintuitive it is to suppose that negative existentials are true because their truth-makers exist. It seems, offhand, that they are true not because some things do exist but because some don't. “Why defy this first impression?” (1992: 204). But, more importantly, Lewis pointed out that maximalism was incompatible with what he took to be the master principle governing our thought about modality: Hume's denial of necessary connection between distinct existences. It is a consequence of this principle that anything can co-exist with anything else that's distinct. But it is the <em>raison d'être</em> of any truth-maker for the negative existential truth that there are no unicorns—if there is one and whatever else it is like—that even though it is distinct from all unicorns it cannot co-exist with any of them, else it would make it true that there are no unicorns even in circumstances where unicorns existed. Similarly it is the <em>raison d'être</em> of any truth-maker for a general truth that such-and-such are all the facts there are that it refuses to co-exist with any other facts even though it is distinct from them. So if we're to hang onto Hume's denial of necessary connexions, we'd better give up the demand for truth-makers for negative and general truths, i.e., maximalism (Lewis 1992: 205, 2001: 610–11).</p><p>Lewis also argues that we can't stop here—just giving up maximalism for optimalism—because even the truth-makers for atomic statements conflict with Humeanism. Suppose that the statement that Dog Harry is golden is atomic. Also suppose that Harry is only accidentally golden, so the statement is contingent. What is its truth-maker? It can't be Harry because it's possible for him to exist even in circumstances where the statement is false, i.e., when he has a different coloured coat. But it can't be the property of <em>being golden</em> either since there are possible circumstances in which plenty of things are golden but not Harry. It can't even be the mereological fusion Harry + <em>being golden</em> because it's a feature of fusions that they exist even in circumstances where their parts are otherwise unrelated—e.g., when Harry is black whilst Harriet is golden. For this reason, many maximalists make common cause with optimalists to posit another fundamental kind of thing to perform the truth-making role in the case of contingent (atomic) predications: facts that consist in objects, properties and relations bound together; in this case the fact <em>Harry's being golden</em> (Armstrong 1989a: 41–2, 1997: 115–6; Mellor 1995: 24). Now facts in general and <em>Harry's being golden</em> in particular cannot be built up mereologically from Harry and <em>being golden</em>; otherwise <em>Harry's being golden</em> would be no more fit a candidate for making the statement that Harry is golden true than the fusion Harry + <em>being golden</em>. Since <em>Harry's being golden</em> isn't built up mereologically from Harry and <em>being golden</em>, they cannot be parts of it. But if they aren't parts of it they must be entirely distinct from this state of affairs. This is where Lewis pounced. Even though <em>Harry's being golden</em> is entirely distinct from its “constituents” it cannot obtain without Harry and <em>being golden</em> existing. More generally, the obtaining of a fact necessitates the existence of its constituents even though the fact and its constituents are entirely distinct. So we cannot posit facts as truth-makers for contingent (atomic) statements without going against Humeanism (Lewis 1992: 200, 1998: 215–6, 2001: 611).</p><p>Other maximalists and optimalists, often those wary of facts, posit (non-transferrable) tropes as truth-makers for contingent predications (Martin 1980; Mulligan, Simons, & Smith 1984: 295–304, Lowe 2006: 186–7, 204–5) Tropes, in the non-transferrable sense, are particular instances of properties that are existentially dependent upon their bearers. For example, the particular golden colour <em>g</em> of Harry's coat is a non-transferrable trope because <em>g</em> could not have existed except as the colour of <em>his</em> coat. Since <em>g</em> is non-transferrable, this trope only exists in circumstances where Harry's coat is golden; hence <em>g</em>'s eligibility to be a truth-maker for the statement that Harry is golden. (If <em>g</em> was transferrable, then <em>g</em> could have existed in circumstances where whilst borne by Harriet, Harry bore another black trope <em>d</em>; so if <em>g</em> is transferrable it isn't eligible to be a truth-maker for the statement that Harry is golden.) But Lewis' reasoning can be easily extended to show that non-transferrable tropes cannot serve as the truth-makers for contingent statements without contradicting Humeanism. If trope <em>g</em> is a property that Harry bears rather than a part of him, then <em>g</em> is wholly distinct from Harry. Nevertheless, the existence of <em>g</em> necessitates the existence of Harry even though they are distinct (MacBride 2005: 121). Alternatively if <em>g</em> is a part of the bundle of tropes that constitute Harry, if <em>g</em> is non-transferrable, then the existence of <em>g</em> necessitates the existence of some other distinct tropes that are also parts of this bundle. So Humeanism is violated either way.</p><h4>2.4.1 Subject Matter</h4><p>In order to avoid contradicting Humeanism, Lewis recommended a further weakening of (<em>Truth Supervenes upon Being</em>). According to Lewis, the kernel of truth in truth-making is the idea that propositions have a <em>subject matter</em>. They are <em>about</em> things so whether they are true or false depends on how those things stand. This led Lewis to endorse (2003: 25):</p><dl><dt>(<em>Subject matter</em>)</dt><dd>Any proposition has a subject matter, on which its truth value supervenes.</dd></dl><p>Equivalently, <em>there cannot be a difference in the truth-value of a proposition without a difference in its subject matter</em>. This might consist in (1) an increase or decrease in the population of things that fall within the subject matter; or (2) a shift in the pattern of fundamental properties and relations those things exhibit (Lewis 2001: 612). Now the truth value of “Harry is golden” supervenes upon its subject matter without there needing to be any existing thing distinct from Harry or <em>being golden</em> that necessitates their existence; it is enough that the statement would have been false if Harry had lost his hair or been dyed. So we can avoid contradicting Humeanism by abandoning optimalism in favour of (<em>Subject matter</em>).</p><p>In an intriguing twist to the plot, Lewis subsequently appeared to withdraw his doubts about truth-makers (2003: 30, Lewis & Rosen 2003: 39). When building the case for (<em>Subject Matter</em>) Lewis had deliberately remained neutral about the metaphysics of modality (2001: 605). But Lewis recognised that if he gave up his neutrality and availed himself of counterpart theory then he could supply truth-makers aplenty whilst still adhering to his Humeanism.</p><p>According to Lewis's counterpart theory, “<em>a</em> is essentially <em>F</em> just in case all of <em>a</em>'s counterparts (including <em>a</em> itself) are <em>F</em>” (2003: 27). Counterparts of <em>x</em> are objects that are similar to <em>x</em> in certain salient respects. Different conversational contexts make different respects salient. This means that the truth (or falsity) of essentialist judgements is always relative to the counterpart relation conversational cues select; so it will often be the case that whilst something is essentially <em>F</em> with respect to one counterpart relation it won't be with respect to another (Lewis 1968). In a conversation that makes it salient to think about Harry under the counterpart relation of <em>being a golden Labrador</em> then every relevant counterpart of him will be golden. So relative to this counterpart relation he is essentially golden. But in a different conversation that selects the counterpart relation of <em>being a dog</em> because then whilst all of his counterparts will be dogs Harry won't be essentially golden because some of his counterparts will be other colours. What's important is that it's one and the same thing, our beloved Harry, that's essentially golden with respect to the former counterpart relation but only accidentally so with respect to the latter. To make these essentialist judgements count as true in the right contexts we don't need one dog that's essentially golden, and another that's only accidentally so; we just need to think about Harry in two different (but compatible) ways.</p><p>According to (<em>Necessitarian-T</em>) and other related views, the property a truth-maker <em>x</em> has of making a given proposition <em>P</em> true is an essential feature of it. Why so? Because <em>x</em> is supposed to be something the mere existence of which suffices for the truth of <em>P</em>; it couldn't have existed without <em>P</em> being true (Armstrong 1997: 115). But Lewis' proposal is to treat essentialist attributions about truth-making in the same relativistic spirit that counterpart theory treats every other modal attribution (2003: 27–32). Think of Harry <em>qua</em> golden Labrador, i.e., under the counterpart relation of being a golden Labrador. All his counterparts selected by this relation are golden. So every world in which Harry or one of the counterparts exists is a world in which “Harry is golden” is true. In other words, Harry <em>qua</em> golden is truth-maker for the proposition that Harry is golden. But this doesn't commit us to necessary connexions between distinct existences—to a dog that couldn't have failed to be golden. In another context it will be just as legitimate to talk about Harry in a different way, as Harry <em>qua</em> dog. In that context his counterparts will include dogs that aren't golden. So Harry <em>qua</em> dog will be the truth-maker for the statement that Harry is a dog, but not the statement that he is golden.</p><p>In the same way that ordinary objects like Harry can serve as truth-makers for contingent predications, Lewis & Rosen (2003) suggest that the entire world—“the totality of everything there actually is”—can serve as the truth-maker for negative existentials. Take the world <em>qua</em> unaccompanied by unicorns. In the conversational context just set up, the world has no counterparts that are inhabited by unicorns. So the world <em>qua</em> unaccompanied by unicorns is essentially lacking in unicorns and therefore qualifies as a truth-maker for the statement that there are no unicorns.</p><p>Has Lewis shown how it is possible to garner truth-makers for contingent predications and negative existentials without positing totality facts or tropes that ensnare us in a web of necessary connections? Indeed has he shown how we can get by using only ordinary objects and collections of them to serve as truth-makers? We need to be clear about what Lewis is trying to do in this paper. He isn't reporting upon a damascene conversion, belatedly recognising what he had previously denied, that the truth-making role is genuine, but then ingeniously coming up with the idea that <em>qua</em>-versions of things perform this role just as effectively as states of affairs, only without necessary connections between distinct existences. Rather, Lewis' aim in this paper is to damn the very idea of truth-makers with faint praise. By showing how <em>qua</em> versions of things performed the truth-making role just as effectively as facts or tropes Lewis aimed to show how explanatorily bankrupt the truth-making role truly was (MacBride 2005: 134–6).</p><p>One might object to Lewis' controversial modal metaphysical assumptions of counterpart theory (Rodriguez-Pereyra 2006b: 193; Dodd 2007: 385). More broadly, one might question whether Lewis was right to place so much weight upon Hume's denial of necessary connections between distinct existences or question whether Lewis had interpreted it correctly (Daly 2000: 97–8; MacBride 2005: 123–7; Hoffman 2006; Cameron 2008b). It's one thing to say that we shouldn't multiply necessities without necessity but it's another thing to demand that we purge our world-view of them altogether. What about dispositions, chances, laws <em>etc</em>? Hume relied upon an empiricist theory of content to underpin his rejection of necessary connections. But Lewis certainly didn't advocate such a view. One is left wondering therefore whether Hume's denial of necessary connexions should be abandoned along with the theory of content that inspired it, an antiquated relic. If so, then we have yet to be given a reason to retreat from either optimalism or (<em>Truth Supervenes Upon Being</em>) to (<em>Subject Matter</em>)(MacBride 2005: 126–7).</p><h2><a name="WhaMotDocTruMak" id="WhaMotDocTruMak">3. What Motivates the Doctrine of Truth-makers?</a></h2><h3><a name="CatChe" id="CatChe">3.1 To catch a cheater</a></h3><p>What is the motivation for adopting a theory of truth-makers, whether maximalist or optimalist? Following Sider, it has become customary to describe the “whole point” of adopting a theory of truth-makers thus: to “Catch the cheaters” who don't believe in truth-makers (Sider 2001: 40–1; see also Merricks 2007: 2–3). But this is a bit like saying that the point of a benefit system is to catch out benefit frauds. It's only if there is some antecedent point in favour of truth-makers that there can be anything wrong with leaving them out. Nonetheless, it is possible that we can come to appreciate the need for truth-makers by appreciating what is lacking in theories that neglect them. This is how C.B. Martin and Armstrong came to recognise the necessity for admitting truth-makers (Armstrong 1989b: 8–11, 2004: 1–3). Consider phenomenalism: the view that the physical world is a construction out of sense-impressions. One obstacle for this view is the need to make sense in sense-impression terms of true claims we make about the unobserved world. Martin noticed that the phenomenalist could only appeal to brute, ungrounded counterfactuals about possible experience to do so. But counterfactuals do not float free in a void. They must be responsive to an underlying reality, the reality that makes them true. For Martin this was the phenomenalists' fatal error: their inability to supply credible truth-makers for truths about unobserved objects. The same error afflicted Ryle's behaviourism with its brute counterfactuals about non-existent behaviour and Prior's presentism according to which there is nothing outside the present and so there is nothing for past-tensed and future-tensed truths to be held responsible to. We come to appreciate the need for truth-makers as the common need these different theories fail to fulfil.</p><p>As Lewis points out, this demand for truth-makers represented an overreaction to what was undoubtedly a flaw in phenomenalism (1992: 217). We can already understand what's wrong with phenomenalism when we appreciate that it fails to provide an account of the things upon which the truth of counterfactuals about sense impressions supervene, i.e., when we see that it fails to satisfy (<em>Subject Matter</em>). This leaves under-motivated the claim that phenomenalism should also be faulted for failing to supply truth-makers to ground counterfactuals about sense-impressions. The same reasoning applies to behaviourism and presentism; they also fail to satisfy (<em>Subject Matter</em>). So there's no need to adopt truth makers to catch cheats. All we need to do is to recognise the strictures (<em>Subject Matter</em>) places upon us.</p><p>It's a further flaw of Martin and Armstrong's reasoning that even if we accede to the demand for truth-makers it doesn't follow that even idealism is ruled out. According to Armstrong if we forsake the demand for truth-makers we thereby challenge “the realistic insight that there is a world that exists independently of our thoughts and statements, making the latter true or false” (1997: 128). But even an idealist could accept that there are truth-makers whilst thinking of them as mind-dependent entities. So acceding to the demand for truth-makers doesn't tell us what's wrong with idealism (Daly 2005: 95–7). Bergmann, the grandfather of the contemporary truth-maker movement, was explicit about this: “the truth of <em>S</em> must be grounded ontologically. On this first move idealists and realists agree” (Bergmann 1961: 229). The realist-idealist distinction cuts across the distinction between philosophers who admit truth-makers and those that don't (Dodd 2002: 83–4).</p><p>The demand for truth-makers doesn't help “catch cheaters” at all. Just acknowledge, e.g., some brute counterfactual facts about sense data, or brute dispositions to behave in one way or another, or brute facts about what happened in the past or will happen in the future. What's unsatisfactory about these posits isn't that if they existed they'd fail to make true statements about unobserved objects or statements about mental states that failed to manifest themselves in actual behaviour or statements about the past or future. The problem is that we have difficulty in understanding how such facts or dispositions could be explanatorily sound (Horwich 2009: 195–7). Whatever we find lacking in theories that posit such items, it isn't that they fail to provide truth-makers, because they do. Of course if we are already committed to the need for truth makers then we will likely conceive of the demand for them as, e.g., drawing the phenomenalist out into the open to reveal the unfitness of their explanatory posits. But unless we already have independent reasons for recognising the demand for truth makers, catching cheaters cannot provide a motivation for positing them.</p><h3><a name="SupPri" id="SupPri">3.2 Supervenience Principles</a></h3><p>Does this mean that we should join Bigelow in his retreat to (<em>Truth Supervenes Upon Being</em>) or step back with Lewis to (<em>Subject Matter</em>)? The problem is that these supervenience principles don't seem a satisfactory resting place either, not if our concern is to understand how true representations can touch upon an independent reality, i.e., something non-representational. First, it is familiar point that just appealing to a systematic pattern of modal co-variation between truths and their subject matters—so that there is no difference in the former without a difference in the latter—doesn't provide us within any insight into the underlying mechanism or mechanisms that sustains this dependency (Molnar 2000: 82–3; Heil 2003: 67; Daly 2005: 97–8; Melia 2005: 82–3). Second, if possible worlds are conceived as maximal representations then these supervenience principles (understood in the idiom of possible worlds) fail to articulate what it is for a representation to touch upon being, something non-representational: “For the idea that every truth <em>depends on being</em> is not the idea that every truth is <em>entailed by propositions of a certain sort</em>” (Merricks 2007: 86).</p><p>A third reason for being unsatisfied with Lewis' (<em>Subject Matter</em>) is based upon the observation that the supervenience involved is symmetric. Just as there is no difference in the distribution of truth-values amongst the body of propositions without a reciprocating difference in their subject matter, there is no difference in their subject matter without a difference in the distribution of their truth-values (Armstrong 2004: 7–8). But we also have the firm intuition that the truth or falsity of a proposition depends upon the state of the world in a way in which the state of the world doesn't depend upon the proposition's truth or falsity. This means that a supervenience principle like (<em>Subject Matter</em>) cannot be used to articulate the asymmetric way in which truth so depends upon being; for this, it is argued, we need to rely upon a robust asymmetric notion of truth-making (Rodriguez-Pereyra 2005: 18–19).</p><h3><a name="Cor" id="Cor">3.3 Correspondence</a></h3><p>“Catching cheats” doesn't supply a motivation for adopting truth-makers. Are there other motivations for so doing? One such motivation is that truth-making falls out naturally from the correspondence theory of truth.</p><blockquote><p>Anybody who is attracted to the correspondence theory of truth should be drawn to the truth-maker [<em>sic</em>]. Correspondence demands a correspondent, and a correspondent for a truth is a truth-maker. (Armstrong 1997: 14; see also 1997: 128–9, 2004: 16–7)</p></blockquote><p>According to Armstrong, the “truth-maker principle” (aka maximalism) just is what we are left with once we drop the assumption from the correspondence theory that the relation between truth bearers and truth-makers is one-one. Of course, the truth-making relation, however it is explicated, cannot be the relation of correspondence in terms of which <em>truth</em> is defined—for whereas the latter is symmetric, the former isn't (Beebee & Dodd 2005b: 13–4). But this doesn't prevent truth being defined using the <em>truth-making</em> relation, albeit in a more roundabout way according to the following pattern,</p><dl class="hangindent"><dt>(C)</dt><dd><em>S</em> is true ⇔ (∃<em>x</em>)(<em>S</em> is-made-true-by <em>x</em>).</dd></dl><p>Of course such a definition will only succeed if the relation expressed by “is-made-true-by” can itself be explicated without relying upon the notion of <em>truth</em> itself or other notions that implicitly presuppose it, e.g., entailment (Merricks 2007: 15). This is no doubt one of the reasons that principles of truth-making are typically not put forward as definitions of truth (David 2009: 144). Another objection made by Horwich is that it is implausible to suppose that an ordinary person understands the notion of truth <em>via</em> the heterogeneous principles that govern the provision of truth-makers for different types of propositions. It's more plausible to suppose that we first grasp what truth is, and only subsequently figure out what truth-makers are required for the various kinds of propositions there are (Horwich 2009: 188).</p><h3><a name="Def" id="Def">3.4 Deflationism</a></h3><p>Several philosophers have argued that so far from presupposing the notion of <em>truth</em>, the various truth-making principles we have discussed operate at a far more subterranean level. Bigelow writes, “The force behind Truth-maker lies deeper than worries about the nature of truth and of truth-bearers” (Bigelow 1988: 127, 2009: 396–7; Robinson 2000: 152; Lewis 2001: 605–6; Horwich 2009: 188–9). Suppose we understand what it is to be truth-maker in terms of entailment. Then whatever the range of truths we think are capable of being rendered true, the “guts” of our truth-maker principle can be stated using the schema,</p><dl><dt>(<em>Schema</em>)</dt><dd>If <em>P</em>, then there must be something in the world whose existence entails that <em>P</em>.</dd></dl><p>This schema is equivalent to the infinitely many conditionals that fall under it:</p><dl class="hangindent"><dt>(<em>i</em>1)</dt><dd>If the donkey is brown, then there must be something in the world whose existence entails that the donkey is brown;</dd><dt>(<em>i</em>2)</dt><dd>if the Parthenon is on the Acropolis then there must be something in the world whose existence entails that the Parthenon is on the Acropolis; and so on.</dd></dl><p>Note that neither “true” nor “truth” shows up anywhere in the schema or its instances. Arguably the only role that the notion of <em>truth</em> perform<em>s</em> is the one that minimalist or deflationary theories of truth emphasize, that of enabling us to capture all of that unending string of conditionals in a single slogan,</p><dl><dt>(<em>Slogan</em>)</dt><dd>For <em>any truth</em>, there must be something in the world whose existence entails <em>that truth</em>.</dd></dl><p>But since truth is serving here <em>only</em> as a device of generalization, the real subject matter of (<em>Principle</em>) is already expressed by the conditionals (<em>i</em>1), (<em>i2</em>) <em>etc</em>. Since they make no explicit mention of either propositions or truth, a theory of truth-makers is neither a theory about propositions nor a theory about truth. If so, then the theory of truth-makers can neither gain inspiration from, nor be tarred by the same brush as the correspondence theory of truth. Nor need the theory of truth-makers be bedeviled by concerns about the nature of truth bearers.</p><h3><a name="TarTruMak" id="TarTruMak">3.5 Tarski and the Truth-makers</a></h3><p>We have just seen that some philosophers, such as Bigelow, have sought to liberate truth-making from its (apparently) spurious association with the correspondence theory of truth by deploying deflationist techniques (treating “truth” merely as a device of generalization). It's a measure of just how little consensus has been achieved in the field that other philosophers have sought to use truth-maker principles to remedy what is (purportedly) lacking in deflationary theories of truth (Mulligan, Simons, & Smith 1984; Simons 1992). According to deflationary theories of truth, there isn't much more to be said about, e.g., the truth of the statement that snow is white except that it is true iff snow is white; more generally, that there isn't much more to be said about truth than is captured by the instances of the Tarskian schema,</p><dl class="hangindent"><dt>(<em>T</em>)</dt><dd><em>s</em> is true iff <em>p</em></dd></dl><p>where “<em>s</em>” is replaced by the designation of any sentence of the object language under study, and “<em>p</em>” is replaced by a meta-language translation of the sentence in question. But these highly abstract characterizations of truth arguably leave something out. The truth of a statement is the upshot of two distinguishable factors, what the statement says about reality on the one hand, whether reality accords with what the statement says on the other. Now the provision of a Tarski-style theory of truth for a language <em>L</em> allows us to derive for each sentence in <em>L</em> an instance of the schema (<em>T</em>). Such a theory provides us with systematic insight into what each sentence says, i.e., the conditions under which it is true. But whilst a Tarski-style theory of truth consequently achieves a high score on the meaning side—and thereby tells us everything we need to know about truth with respect to <em>L</em> by deflationist lights—it lets us down on the reality side; “approaches of this kind do nothing to explain how sentences about the real world are made true or false”, “so Tarski's theory is in need of supplementation by considerations about the entities in virtue of which propositions are true” (Mulligan, Simons, & Smith 1984: 288; Simons 1992: 158–9).</p><p>Have Mulligan et al. pinpointed whence the demand for truth-makers arises? It's correct to say, as they do, that a Tarski-style theory of truth for a language <em>L</em> doesn't tell us how the true sentences of <em>L</em> are made true—in the sense of explaining the truth of a sentence in terms of a relation between it as a whole and some entity or entities. But pointing out that a Tarski-style theory of truth doesn't tell us this, doesn't establish that the theory is lacking in this respect—not unless it has already been established that a theory of truth for a language that fails to explain how its sentences are made true fails to articulate in some critical respect how reality conspires with meaning to deliver their mutual upshot, <em>viz</em>. truth. But this hasn't been established—at least not yet.</p><h3><a name="TruMakExp" id="TruMakExp">3.6 Truth-making and Explanation</a></h3><p>According to McFetridge, the best way to hear questions of the form “what makes sentence <em>S</em> true?” is as “requests for (partial) <em>explanations</em> of <em>why</em> certain particular sentences are true” (1977: 38–39). It is striking then that Hochberg and Armstrong should have originally introduced truth-makers as entities the existence of which provide not a partial but a “full” account of the truth of a statement (Hochberg 1967: 416–7, 1978: 282–3; Armstrong 1973: 118; Bigelow 1988: 121). To provide a full account, truth-makers cannot be anything else except entities that guarantee without further ado or qualification that the statements they make true are true; if further assistance is needed then whatever entities we've appealed to so far can't be truth-makers. This gives us some insight into the otherwise puzzling assumption made by Hochberg and Armstrong that truth-makers are entities the existence of which necessitates the truth of the statements they make true; if they didn't they would fail to be the consummate explainers truth-makers are supposed to be. But it also brings to the surface a deeper and even more puzzling assumption, <em>viz</em>. that it's possible and necessary to provide an explanation of each and every true statement that's full in the relevant sense.</p><p>McFetridge also noted that talk of facts enters naturally into our answers to “What makes a (any) sentence true?” questions. Talk of facts does so</p><blockquote><p>not because what we are particularly explaining is why certain sentences are <em>true</em>, but simply because such talk enters naturally into answers to <em>any</em> explanation seeking questions put in the idiom “What makes…?” or “In virtue of what is…?”. Thus if one were asked—“What makes salt soluble in water?”, the most natural answer would be something of the style, “<em>The fact that</em> it has such-and-such structure.” (1977: 39)</p></blockquote><p>McFetridge remained open-minded about whether this kind of explanatory talk requires us to admit facts. He countenanced the possibility that the point of explaining truths could be grasped without positing such entities, appealing only to the philosophically austere resources of the deductive-nomological model (McFetridge 1977: 40–2; see Ruben 1990: 210, 231 for a contrary point of view).</p><p>Consider what explains why “Snow is white” is a true sentence of English. It's not enough to appeal to the axioms of a truth theory for English. These will only enable us to settle that “Snow is white” is a true sentence of English if and only if snow is white. We need to add the further premise that snow is white. Our naïve way of putting this—that what makes the (English) sentence “Snow is white” true is the fact that snow is white—is thereby justified by the point that</p><blockquote><p>“the premiss that snow is white is an essential constituent of an explanation of the truth of ‘Snow is white’” (1977: 42).</p></blockquote><p>If McFetridge is right that all of this can be expressed without appealing to the existence of facts then we can explain why sentences are true, describe what makes them true, without mention of the truth-makers that Hochberg, Armstrong et al. demand.</p><p>This will certainly require a great deal of elaboration before we can begin to have confidence in it. For example, McFetridge's key claim is that the premise that snow is white is “an essential constituent” of an explanation of the truth of “Snow is white”. But this seems too strong. It may be enough to explain the truth of “Snow is white” that another premise is adduced that entails “Snow is white”. But whatever else this premise might be—perhaps something about the lattice structure of snow and the way it reflects light—it will still need to be a premise about the world. So introducing qualifications of this kind still seem to leave the structure of McFetridge's insight intact. Of course, whether McFetridge has opened up a fruitful line of enquiry will itself turn upon more general issues with regard to the nature of explanation itself—e.g., upon the controversial thesis that explanations are arguments.</p><h3><a name="TruMakConExp" id="TruMakConExp">3.7 Truth-making and Conceptual Explanation</a></h3><p>Other philosophers have sought in a different way to exploit the linkage between truth-making and explanation to the detriment of the idea that a true statement stands in need of a truth-maker. They appeal to the idea that when we say that a statement is true <em>because</em> a truth-maker for it exists, the “because” we employ is a connective (Künne 2003: 150–6; Hornsby 2005: 35–7; Melia 2005: 78–9; Schnieder 2006a: 29–37; Mulligan 2007). The truth functional operators (“&”, “∼” etc.) provide paradigm instances of what are commonly thought to be connectives, i.e., expressions that link sentences but without expressing a relation that holds between the states of affairs, facts or tropes that these sentences denote. Connectives are to be contrasted with ordinary verbs, such “<em>x</em> hit <em>y</em>”, that plausibly do expresses a relation between whatever is denoted by the singular terms that flanks its occurrence in a given statement. According to these philosophers, the truth-maker panegyrists have misconstrued the logical form of “makes true”. They have taken it to be a verb like “<em>x</em> hits <em>y</em>” when really it is akin to the connective “→” or “because” (Melia 2005: 78). There's no need to introduce truth-makers as the special things that stand at one end of the <em>truth-making</em> relation with true statements at the other, no need to because it's only superficial features of the grammar of our language that suggest there is a truth-making relation to stand at the ends of.</p><p>Typically philosophers who maintain that “makes true” is a connective do not argue for this conclusion directly but encourage us to dwell upon the fact that it natural to hear the “because” that occurs in equivalent constructions as a connective. When we hear, e.g., “It is true that the rose is red because the rose is red” we don't naturally hear it as expressing a binary relation between two things. So we shouldn't hear, or at least don't have to hear, “It's true that the rose is red in virtue of the rose's being red” or “the rose's being red makes it true that the rose is red” as a expressing a binary relation between a truth and truth-maker either.</p><p>Künne has gone further and suggested that the truth-making connective is really the “because” of conceptual explanation (2003: 154–5; see also Schnieder 2006a: 36–7 who also suggests that causal explanatory ingredients are typically added to the mix in “making true” constructions too). He encourages us to hear the equivalence between,</p><dl class="hangindent"><dt>(<em>R</em>)</dt><dd>He is a child of a sibling of one of your parents, which makes him your first cousin</dd></dl><p>and,</p><dl class="hangindent"><dt>(<em>R*</em>)</dt><dd>He is your first cousin because he is a child of a sibling of one of your parents.</dd></dl><p>He tells us that the “because” in (<em>R*</em>) is the “because” of “conceptual explanation”. Since (<em>R</em>) and (<em>R*</em>) are equivalent, he concludes that the “makes” construction in (<em>R</em>) is just a cumbersome way of expressing the “because” of conceptual explanation in (<em>R*)</em>. Künne then invites us take the use of “makes” in (<em>R</em>) as a model for understanding the truth-making construction,</p><dl class="hangindent"><dt>(<em>S</em>)</dt><dd>The fact that snow is white makes the statement that snow is white true.</dd></dl><p>This enables us to see that (<em>S</em>) does “not affirm a relation of any kind between a truth vehicle and something in the world” (Künne 2003: 155). Why? Because it is equivalent to,</p><dl class="hangindent"><dt>(<em>S*</em>)</dt><dd>The statement that snow is white is true because snow is white.</dd></dl><p>a claim that makes no (explicit) mention of facts. Moreover, the second clause of (<em>S</em>*), like the second clause of (<em>R*</em>), tells us when it is correct to affirm its first clause. In both cases we have an explanation that draws respectively upon our understanding of the concepts <em>cousin</em> and <em>truth.</em> Drawing upon these materials, we are then able to construct an explanation of the felt asymmetry whereby the truth of what we say about the world depends upon what the world is like, but not the other way around. What is written on the left-hand-side of (<em>S</em>*) is conceptually more sophisticated than what is written upon the right-hand-side because the former requires us to be able to grasp the concepts of <em>statement</em> and <em>truth</em> to understand it whereas the latter does not. Accordingly the latter requires less of both the world and us than the former to be both understood and true. That's why it makes sense to deploy the right-hand-side (a claim about reality) to explain the left-hand-side (a claim about a truth bearer) but not the other way around (Hornsby 2005: 44; Dodd 2007: 399–400). Of course it may still be the case that this way of thinking is just wishful thinking, and this will continue to be our predicament until it has been established in some more exacting sense that the “because” of truth making is a connective rather than a relational expression—i.e., not just because it would be technically convenient for us to believe it to be so or because it sounds like a connective to someone with the ears of a naive grammarian.</p><h3><a name="TruMakQua" id="TruMakQua">3.8 Truth Making and Quantification</a></h3><p>A final supporting suggestion: that the grand truth-maker projects of the late twentieth century arose (partly) out of a failure to appreciate the logical variety of natural language quantifiers that we unreflectively employ when expressing the intuitions that speak in favour of truth- makers.</p><p>Consider how Armstrong expressed himself when he started out:</p><blockquote><p>It seems obvious that for every true contingent proposition there must be something in the world (in the largest sense of “something”) which makes the proposition true. For consider any true contingent proposition and imagine that it is false. We must automatically imagine some difference in the world. (Armstrong 1973: 11)</p></blockquote><p>Bigelow asks us to compare two worlds, one in which <em>A</em> is true, the other in which it is false. According to Bigelow,</p><blockquote><p>There must surely be some difference between these two possible worlds! They are clearly different in that <em>A</em> is true in one but not the other. So there must be something in one of these worlds which is lacking in the other and which accounts for the difference in truth. (1988: 126)</p></blockquote><p>Armstrong and Bigelow make the same assumption about the “some” they employ in their expression of what makes the difference between the world in which <em>A</em> is true and the world in which <em>A</em> is false; they assume it is an objectual quantifier in name position.</p><p>With this assumption in place it is an easy move to make to think that there must be some thing that we quantify over that <em>constitutes</em> the difference between these circumstances, <em>viz.</em> the truth-maker for <em>A</em>. But as Williamson remarks “We should not assume that all quantification is either objectual or substitutional” (1999: 262–3; <em>cf</em>. Prior 1971: 31–4). Williamson argues that that the truth maker principle in fact</p><blockquote><p>involves irreducible non-substitutional quantification into sentence position… We should not even assume that all non-substitutional quantification is interpreted in terms of assignments of values to the variables. For “value” is a noun, not a sentence. (1999: 263)</p></blockquote><p>But suppose the “some” Armstrong and Bigelow employ is understood not as an objectual quantifier that comes equipped with a domain of entities over which it ranges but is understood in some other way. Then it would be open to us to acknowledge the force of Armstrong and Bigelow's intuition that the circumstances in which <em>A</em> is true are somehow different from those in which it isn't, but without our having to think that there exists something that we've quantified over than makes it so. Evidently it will not be until we have arrived at a settled view of the admissible interpretations our quantifiers may bear that this issue can be settled in a principled rather than dogmatic manner.</p><h2><a name="Bib" id="Bib">Bibliography</a></h2><ul class="hanging"><li>Anderson, A. R. and N. D. 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Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.</li><li>–––, 1953, <em>Philosophical Investigations</em>, G.E.M. Anscombe (trans.), Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd.</li></ul><h2><a name="Aca" id="Aca">Academic Tools</a></h2><blockquote><table><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://plato.stanford.edu/symbols/sepman-icon.jpg" alt="sep man icon" /></td><td><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/cgi-bin/encyclopedia/archinfo.cgi?entry=truthmakers" target="other">How to cite this entry</a>.</td></tr><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://plato.stanford.edu/symbols/sepman-icon.jpg" alt="sep man icon" /></td><td><a href="https://leibniz.stanford.edu/friends/preview/truthmakers/" target="other">Preview the PDF version of this entry</a> at the <a href="https://leibniz.stanford.edu/friends/" target="other">Friends of the SEP Society</a>.</td></tr><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://plato.stanford.edu/symbols/inpho.png" alt="inpho icon" /></td><td><a href="https://inpho.cogs.indiana.edu/entity?sep=truthmakers&redirect=True" target="other">Look up this entry topic</a> at the <a href="https://inpho.cogs.indiana.edu/" target="other">Indiana Philosophy Ontology Project</a> (InPhO).</td></tr><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://plato.stanford.edu/symbols/pp.gif" alt="phil papers icon" /></td><td><a href="http://philpapers.org/sep/truthmakers/" target="other">Enhanced bibliography for this entry</a> at <a href="http://philpapers.org/" target="other">PhilPapers</a>, with links to its database.</td></tr></table></blockquote><h2><a name="OthIntResSec" id="OthIntResSec">Other Internet Resources</a></h2><p>[Please contact the author with suggestions.]</p><h2><a name="Rel" id="Rel">Related Entries</a></h2><p><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/facts/">facts</a> | <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/david-lewis/">Lewis, David</a> | <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logical-atomism/">logical atomism: Russell's</a> | <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/properties/">properties</a> | <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/propositions/">propositions</a> | <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/states-of-affairs/">states of affairs</a> | <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truth/">truth</a> | <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/wittgenstein-atomism/">Wittgenstein, Ludwig: logical atomism</a></p><h3>Acknowledgements</h3><p>This material provided the basis of a course on truth makers I gave in Cambridge, Michaelmas 2012. I am grateful for helpful feedback from the participants and also many helpful conversations and correspondence concerning truth making with Helen Beebee, John Bigelow, Jeremy Butterfield, Ross Cameron, Chris Daly, Julian Dodd, Dominic Gregory, Ghislain Guigon, Jane Heal, John Heil, Herbert Hochberg, Jennifer Hornsby, Frédérique Janssen-Lauret, Nick Jones, Jonathan Lowe, Mike Martin, Hugh Mellor, Peter Milne, Kevin Mulligan, Laurie Paul, Bryan Pickel, Stephen Read, Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra, Jonathan Schaffer, Peter Simons, Tim Williamson and Ed Zalta.</p></div><div id="foot"><span class="c3"><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/info.html#c">Copyright © 2013</a> by</span><br /><a href="http://www.gla.ac.uk/schools/humanities/staff/frasermacbride/" target="other">Fraser MacBride</a> <<a href="mailto:fraser.macbride%40glasgow.ac.uk"><em>fraser<abbr title=" dot ">.</abbr>macbride<abbr title=" at ">@</abbr>glasgow<abbr title=" dot ">.</abbr>ac<abbr title=" dot ">.</abbr>uk</em></a>></div><p><em>This entry passed through the <a href="http://fivefilters.org/content-only/">Full-Text RSS</a> service — if this is your content and you're reading it on someone else's site, please read the FAQ at <a href="http://fivefilters.org/content-only/faq.php#publishers">fivefilters.org/content-only/faq.php#publishers</a>. <a href="http://fivefilters.org">Five Filters</a> recommends: <a href="http://www.medialens.org/index.php/alerts/alert-archive/alerts-2013/715-eyes-like-blank-discs-the-guardian-s-steven-poole-on-george-orwell-s-politics-and-the-english-language.html">Eyes Like Blank Discs - The Guardian's Steven Poole On George Orwell's Politics And The English Language</a>.</em></p>Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10303290079976590343noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5448411214494413217.post-83489185081279992842013-02-23T10:21:00.000-08:002013-02-23T10:21:00.249-08:00Girls' Night Out Makeover <div id="photoGallery"><a href="http://www.totalbeauty.com/content/gallery/girls-night-makeover/p129452/page2" title="Next"><img src="http://images.totalbeauty.com/uploads/editorial/lg420x280/almay-makeover-01.jpg" alt="" /></a></div><p class="photoDescription">Ever have one of those weeks where by Friday, you need to round up your favorite girlfriends and hit the town for a big night out? Heather Carrillo, from Simi Valley, Calif., knows the feeling. Between school, her job, and her two adorable (but high maintenance) puppies, she's more than ready to blow off some steam with a girls' night.</p><p>But there's a big difference between <em>feeling</em> ready for a girls' night and looking it. And as you can see, right now Heather could use a little help. Enter our makeover dream team: Jenna Anton, makeup artist, and Eddie Neuangthavong, master designer for <a href="http://www.thedovesstudio.com/" target="new">The Doves Studio</a> in Santa Monica, Calif. Together they did a complete 180 on Heather, making the odds of her being the hottest girl at the bar very good. Keep clicking to see what they did -- then steal their tricks for yourself.</p><a href="http://www.totalbeauty.com/content/gallery/girls-night-makeover/p129452/page2"><span class="seeNext">See Next Page:</span> <span class="seeNextTitle">Hair</span></a><p class="avgRating"><a class="rateImg lowLevel" href="http://www.totalbeauty.com/content/gallery/girls-night-makeover#rateThisJump" title="Rate this story">Rate this story</a><span>|</span>Avg member rating: 0</p><p><em>This entry passed through the <a href="http://fivefilters.org/content-only/">Full-Text RSS</a> service — if this is your content and you're reading it on someone else's site, please read the FAQ at <a href="http://fivefilters.org/content-only/faq.php#publishers">fivefilters.org/content-only/faq.php#publishers</a>. <a href="http://fivefilters.org">Five Filters</a> recommends: <a href="http://www.medialens.org/index.php/alerts/alert-archive/alerts-2013/715-eyes-like-blank-discs-the-guardian-s-steven-poole-on-george-orwell-s-politics-and-the-english-language.html">Eyes Like Blank Discs - The Guardian's Steven Poole On George Orwell's Politics And The English Language</a>.</em></p>Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10303290079976590343noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5448411214494413217.post-11982119556734103922013-02-23T10:06:00.000-08:002013-02-23T10:07:04.891-08:00The 10 Best Lip and Cheek Stains <div id="photoGallery"><a href="http://www.totalbeauty.com/content/gallery/best-lip-cheek-stains/p129772/page2" title="Next"><img src="http://images.totalbeauty.com/uploads/editorial/lg420x280/best-lip-cheek-stains-L1.jpg" alt="" /></a></div><p class="photoDescription">Most stains are total day-ruiners. Marinara sauce on your white jeans, wine on your new dress. And then you become that awkward "stain girl" at the party who is frantically asking everyone if they have a Tide To Go pen in their purse. Nobody ever does.</p><p>But in the beauty world, stains are actually a good thing. A great cheek stain can brighten up even the most sallow complexion. And cheek and lip stains are the perfect way to achieve that effortless, "I'm not really wearing any makeup (but I am actually wearing makeup)" look.</p><p>And sure, it would be nice if we were all walking around with gorgeous, just-bitten lips and flushed cheeks on a daily basis, but that's just not the real world. We can only eat so many strawberry popsicles before those pretty stained lips inevitably fade. We need a little help to get that gorgeous flush.</p><p>So we've rounded up the best reader-approved cheek and lip stains so you don't have to waste your money on the stuff that just doesn't work. These stains have the best staying power, look the most natural, and help give you that perfect rosy glow every single time. Click ahead to see the 10 top-rated picks out there.</p><a href="http://www.totalbeauty.com/content/gallery/best-lip-cheek-stains/p129772/page2"><span class="seeNext">See Next Page:</span> <span class="seeNextTitle">No. 10: Benefit Posietint , $29</span></a><p class="byLine">By <span>Erica Smith</span></p><p class="avgRating"><a class="rateImg lowLevel" href="http://www.totalbeauty.com/content/gallery/best-lip-cheek-stains#rateThisJump" title="Rate this story">Rate this story</a><span>|</span>Avg member rating: 9</p><p><em>This entry passed through the <a href="http://fivefilters.org/content-only/">Full-Text RSS</a> service — if this is your content and you're reading it on someone else's site, please read the FAQ at <a href="http://fivefilters.org/content-only/faq.php#publishers">fivefilters.org/content-only/faq.php#publishers</a>. <a href="http://fivefilters.org">Five Filters</a> recommends: <a href="http://www.medialens.org/index.php/alerts/alert-archive/alerts-2013/715-eyes-like-blank-discs-the-guardian-s-steven-poole-on-george-orwell-s-politics-and-the-english-language.html">Eyes Like Blank Discs - The Guardian's Steven Poole On George Orwell's Politics And The English Language</a>.</em></p>Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10303290079976590343noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5448411214494413217.post-61603584398678137422013-02-22T11:44:00.000-08:002013-02-22T11:44:00.146-08:00Front Row Beauty at Fashion Week <div id="photoGallery"><a href="http://www.totalbeauty.com/content/gallery/front-row-beauty/p129282/page2" title="Next"><img src="http://images.totalbeauty.com/uploads/editorial/lg420x280/front-row-beauty-L1.jpg" alt="" /></a></div><p class="photoDescription">No one in her right mind would be caught dead at Fashion Week looking anything less than flawless. But while most would-be style judges focus their attention on what's happening from the neck down, we're far more interested in what's going on up top. Forget the designer duds. For us, it's all about the bold lips, extreme eyeliner, and intricate braids we see on celebrities and trendsetters in the front rows at Lincoln Center.</p><p><a href="http://www.totalbeauty.com/content/gallery/front-row-beauty/p129282/page2">Click here to see our favorite hair and makeup looks spotted in the front rows at fashion week.</a></p><p>In fact, there were more than a few hairstyles and makeup looks at Fashion Week that made us whip out our phones to "text a friend" -- aka take a covert picture. Some of the gorgeous lipstick shades and topknots even stole our focus away from the models strutting down the runway. They were that stunning.</p><p>If you're looking for some "real girl" hair and makeup inspiration, or just a glimpse at how your favorite celebrities stepped up their looks for Mercedes Benz New York Fashion Week Fall 2013, keep reading.</p><a href="http://www.totalbeauty.com/content/gallery/front-row-beauty/p129282/page2"><span class="seeNext">See Next Page:</span> <span class="seeNextTitle">Jamie King</span></a><p class="avgRating"><a class="rateImg lowLevel" href="http://www.totalbeauty.com/content/gallery/front-row-beauty#rateThisJump" title="Rate this story">Rate this story</a><span>|</span>Avg member rating: 0</p><p><em>This entry passed through the <a href="http://fivefilters.org/content-only/">Full-Text RSS</a> service — if this is your content and you're reading it on someone else's site, please read the FAQ at <a href="http://fivefilters.org/content-only/faq.php#publishers">fivefilters.org/content-only/faq.php#publishers</a>. <a href="http://fivefilters.org">Five Filters</a> recommends: <a href="http://www.medialens.org/index.php/alerts/alert-archive/alerts-2013/715-eyes-like-blank-discs-the-guardian-s-steven-poole-on-george-orwell-s-politics-and-the-english-language.html">Eyes Like Blank Discs - The Guardian's Steven Poole On George Orwell's Politics And The English Language</a>.</em></p>Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10303290079976590343noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5448411214494413217.post-8528269478364724542013-02-22T11:29:00.000-08:002013-02-22T11:29:00.074-08:007 Hotels With the Best Bathroom Loot <div id="photoGallery"><a href="http://www.totalbeauty.com/content/gallery/hotel-bathroom-amenities/p129542/page2" title="Next"><img src="http://images.totalbeauty.com/uploads/editorial/lg420x280/best-hotel-products-L1new.jpg" alt="" /></a></div><p class="photoDescription"><strong>Reasons a so-called normal person chooses a hotel:</strong> It's close to the event she's attending, the beds are comfy, it has a kick-ass pool.</p><p><strong>Reasons a beauty junkie chooses a hotel:</strong> The in-room blow dryer actually works, it's got a salon and spa on the premises, the bathroom amenities are worthy of stashing in her suitcase.</p><p><a href="http://www.totalbeauty.com/content/gallery/hotel-bathroom-amenities/p129542/page2">Click here to see our hotel amenities travel guide.</a></p><p>Sure, you could say one would have to be nuts to go out of her way for a nice bottle of shampoo. But is it so crazy? Think about it. If your hotel has stellar toiletries, you don't have to pack your own. Plus, if you've got room to stash some leftover bottles, you can use them for your next trip, your guest bathroom, or in your own shower as a fun reminder of your vacation. It's sounding more sane every second, right?</p><p>Right. So, to help all of you beauty-focused travelers out there, we created this travel guide to the hotels with the best bathroom amenities. Now all you need to do is make sure you save some room in your suitcase for all of those mini bottles you're going to want to lug home.</p><a href="http://www.totalbeauty.com/content/gallery/hotel-bathroom-amenities/p129542/page2"><span class="seeNext">See Next Page:</span> <span class="seeNextTitle">The Four Seasons</span></a><p class="byLine">By <span>Sarah Carrillo</span></p><p class="avgRating"><a class="rateImg lowLevel" href="http://www.totalbeauty.com/content/gallery/hotel-bathroom-amenities#rateThisJump" title="Rate this story">Rate this story</a><span>|</span>Avg member rating: 9</p><p><em>This entry passed through the <a href="http://fivefilters.org/content-only/">Full-Text RSS</a> service — if this is your content and you're reading it on someone else's site, please read the FAQ at <a href="http://fivefilters.org/content-only/faq.php#publishers">fivefilters.org/content-only/faq.php#publishers</a>. <a href="http://fivefilters.org">Five Filters</a> recommends: <a href="http://www.medialens.org/index.php/alerts/alert-archive/alerts-2013/715-eyes-like-blank-discs-the-guardian-s-steven-poole-on-george-orwell-s-politics-and-the-english-language.html">Eyes Like Blank Discs - The Guardian's Steven Poole On George Orwell's Politics And The English Language</a>.</em></p>Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10303290079976590343noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5448411214494413217.post-23345699925458170582013-02-22T11:14:00.000-08:002013-02-22T11:14:00.136-08:00The 2013 Self-Tanner Awards <div id="photoGallery"><a href="http://www.totalbeauty.com/content/gallery/self-tanners-2013/p129622/page2" title="Next"><img src="http://images.totalbeauty.com/uploads/editorial/lg420x280/self-tanners-2013-L1.jpg" alt="" /></a></div><p class="photoDescription">I've had some major self-tanner mishaps over the years. From orange palms for weeks (yes, <em>weeks</em>) to splotches that looked like rare skin diseases, I've experienced it all.</p><p>And after a string of self-tanner woes, I've finally had what Oprah would call an "Aha! Moment": Most self-tanners are terrible. So terrible, in fact, that I'd rather be pale.</p><p>However, there are a few gems -- a select group of self-tanners that stand out among their awful competitors -- and they can be found in drugstores, Sephora, and department stores alike. When I'm desperate for color (i.e. the last Vegas bachelorette party I attended), I turn to one of these.</p><p><a href="http://www.totalbeauty.com/content/gallery/self-tanners-2013/p129622/page2">Skip ahead to see which self-tanners made the cut.</a></p><p>Since the self-tanning formula is so tricky to get right, I've decided the good self-tanners out there deserve an award. Which is why I'm handing out self-tanner superlatives. Some of these are new for 2013, while others are oldies but goodies. I hope you find the one that works for you so you never have to go out in public looking like Tony the Tiger. I already suffered for you.</p><a href="http://www.totalbeauty.com/content/gallery/self-tanners-2013/p129622/page2"><span class="seeNext">See Next Page:</span> <span class="seeNextTitle">Best scent: Brazilian True Tan , $40</span></a><p class="byLine">By <span>Dawn Davis</span></p><p class="avgRating"><a class="rateImg lowLevel" href="http://www.totalbeauty.com/content/gallery/self-tanners-2013#rateThisJump" title="Rate this story">Rate this story</a><span>|</span>Avg member rating: 0</p><p><em>This entry passed through the <a href="http://fivefilters.org/content-only/">Full-Text RSS</a> service — if this is your content and you're reading it on someone else's site, please read the FAQ at <a href="http://fivefilters.org/content-only/faq.php#publishers">fivefilters.org/content-only/faq.php#publishers</a>. <a href="http://fivefilters.org">Five Filters</a> recommends: <a href="http://www.medialens.org/index.php/alerts/alert-archive/alerts-2013/715-eyes-like-blank-discs-the-guardian-s-steven-poole-on-george-orwell-s-politics-and-the-english-language.html">Eyes Like Blank Discs - The Guardian's Steven Poole On George Orwell's Politics And The English Language</a>.</em></p>Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10303290079976590343noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5448411214494413217.post-24648098009490888852013-02-22T10:59:00.000-08:002013-02-22T10:59:00.648-08:00Epictetus <div id="aueditable"><div id="pubinfo"><em>First published Tue Dec 23, 2008; substantive revision Tue Feb 19, 2013</em></div><p>A Greek philosopher of 1<sup>st</sup> and early 2<sup>nd</sup> centuries C.E., and an exponent of Stoic ethics notable for the consistency and power of his ethical thought and for effective methods of teaching. Epictetus' chief concerns are with integrity, self-management, and personal freedom, which he advocates by demanding of his students a thorough examination of two central ideas, the capacity he terms ‘volition’ <em>(prohairesis)</em> and the correct use of impressions <em>(chrēsis tōn phantasiōn).</em> Heartfelt and satirical by turns, Epictetus has had significant influence on the popular moralistic tradition, but he is more than a moralizer; his lucid resystematization and challenging application of Stoic ethics qualify him as an important philosopher in his own right.</p><ul><li><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epictetus/#LifWor">1. Life and Works</a></li><li><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epictetus/#Ant">2. Antecedents</a></li><li><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epictetus/#PreInt">3. Preliminaries to interpretation</a></li><li><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epictetus/#MaiCon">4. Main contentions</a><ul><li><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epictetus/#Rat">4.1. Rationality</a></li><li><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epictetus/#KinGod">4.2. Kinship with god</a></li><li><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epictetus/#Vol">4.3. Volition</a></li><li><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epictetus/#Val">4.4. Value</a></li><li><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epictetus/#EmoAdj">4.5. Emotional adjustment</a></li><li><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epictetus/#AppOthCon">4.6. Appropriate other-concern</a></li><li><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epictetus/#SelCulAut">4.7. Self-cultivation and autonomy</a></li><li><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epictetus/#MinBod">4.8. Mind and body</a></li></ul></li><li><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epictetus/#EduMet">5. Educational method</a></li><li><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epictetus/#Inf">6. Influence</a></li><li><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epictetus/#Bib">Bibliography</a><ul><li><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epictetus/#TexTra">Texts and Translations</a></li><li><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epictetus/#Gen">General</a></li><li><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epictetus/#LifTim">Life and Times</a></li><li><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epictetus/#Phi">Philosophy</a></li><li><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epictetus/#RecInf">Reception and Influence</a></li></ul></li><li><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epictetus/#Aca">Academic Tools</a></li><li><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epictetus/#Oth">Other Internet Resources</a></li><li><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epictetus/#Rel">Related Entries</a></li></ul><hr /><h2><a name="LifWor" id="LifWor">1. Life and Works</a></h2><p>Born sometime in the 50s C.E. in Hierapolis, a Greek city of Asia Minor, Epictetus spent a portion of his life as the slave of Epaphroditus, an important administrator in the court of Nero. The date at which he came to Rome is unknown, but it must have been either prior to 68, at which time Epaphroditus fled the capital, or after the accession of Domitian in 81, under whom Epaphroditus was allowed to return and perhaps to resume his position. The circumstances of Epictetus' education are likewise unknown, except that he studied for a time under Musonius Rufus, a Roman senator and Stoic philosopher who taught intermittently at Rome. Eventually receiving his freedom, he began lecturing on his own account but was forced to leave the city, presumably by the edict of Domitian (in 89) banning philosophers from the Italian peninsula. He then established his own school at Nicopolis, an important cultural center in Epirus, on the Adriatic coast of northwest Greece, and remained there teaching and lecturing until his death around 135. The teaching represented in the <em>Discourses</em> (compiled by Arrian) is that of his later career, around the year 108 by Millar's (1965) dating, at which time he walked with a limp attributed variously to arthritis or to physical abuse during his time of slavery. Epictetus never married, but for reasons of benevolence he late in life adopted a child whose parents could not provide for its maintenance.</p><p>The major compilation of Epictetus' teaching is the four-volume work standardly referred to in English as the <em>Discourses</em>; it was variously titled in antiquity. According to their preface, the <em>Discourses</em> are not the writing of Epictetus but are ghostwritten by the essayist and historiographer Arrian of Nicomedia in an effort to convey the personal impact of his instruction. Although we lack independent means of verification, we have reason to be confident that the works we have represent Epictetus' thought rather than Arrian's own: first, because the language employed is <em>koinē</em> or common Greek rather than the sophisticated literary language of Arrian's other writings; and second because the brusque, elliptical manner of expression, the precise philosophical vocabulary, and the intellectual rigor of the content are quite different from what Arrian produces elsewhere. A few scholars, including especially Dobbin (1998), argue that Epictetus must have composed them himself, the role of Arrian being merely to preserve a mild fiction of orality.</p><p>The shorter <em>Encheiridion</em> (titled in English either <em>Manual</em> or <em>Handbook)</em> is a brief abridgment of the <em>Discourses,</em> apparently including the four or more additional volumes of <em>Discourses</em> that circulated in antiquity. As such it offers a much attenuated account which is of little independent value for the understanding of Epictetus' thought and which at some points gives a misleading impression of his philosophical motivations. There are also some quotations by other ancient authors from the <em>Discourses</em> as they knew them. A few of these fragments, notably those numbered by Schenkl 8, 9, and 14, are useful supplements to our knowledge of Epictetus.</p><p>The standard Greek edition of all the above works is by Schenkl (1916); for the <em>Discourses,</em> there is also a valuable edition by Souilhé (4 vols., 1948–65) which includes a French translation. Important English translations include that of Robin Hard (1995), which revises the eighteenth-century translation by Elizabeth Carter (this translation is quoted occasionally in this article) and a near-complete new translation by Robert Dobbin (2008). Dobbin (1998) provides an extensive general introduction and notes to accompany a translation of <em>Discourses</em> Book I.</p><p>The so-called “Golden Sayings” is a later compendium of aphorisms drawn from the <em>Discourses</em> and <em>Encheiridion</em>.</p><h2><a name="Ant" id="Ant">2. Antecedents</a></h2><p>The essentials of Epictetus' thought derive from the early or foundational period of Stoicism, from the third-century writings of Zeno of Citium, Cleanthes, and Chrysippus. Treatises he mentions by title include Chrysippus' <em>On Choice, On Impulse,</em> and <em>On the Possibles,</em> and he also mentions reading in works by Zeno, Cleanthes, Antipater, and Archedemus. Extant reports and fragments of these and other Stoic works offer many points of congruence with what we find in him.</p><p>It may still be the case that he accepts influence from other currents in philosophy, or that he develops some ideas on his own. The clearest instance of such influence concerns Plato, for Epictetus draws much inspiration from the Socrates depicted in Plato's shorter dialogues. Comparisons can be drawn especially to the Socrates of Plato's <em>Gorgias,</em> with his fondness for give and take, his willingness to challenge the hearer's presuppositions, and his optimism about what can be achieved through values clarification. Epictetus also knows the Master Argument from Megarian philosophy (3<sup>rd</sup> c. BCE) and even names Diodorus and Panthoides, although this knowledge might easily have been drawn from Stoic treatises on logic (2.19.1–11; see further Barnes 1997 ch. 3 and Crivelli in Scaltsas and Mason 2007).</p><p>An argument has sometimes been made for Aristotelian influence, primarily because Epictetus' favored term <em>prohairesis</em> (see section 4.3 below) is prominent in <em>Nicomachean Ethics</em> 3.1–5 as a quasi-technical term (there usually translated “choice” or “decision”). In particular, Dobbin (1991), has suggested that Epictetus' use of this term reflects the influence of the early Aristotle commentaries (1<sup>st</sup> c. BCE-1<sup>st</sup> c. CE), none of which have survived for our inspection. But neither Aristotle nor any author in the Aristotelian tradition is ever mentioned in the <em>Discourses</em>, and to obscure an important connection is hardly in keeping with Epictetus' usual mode of presentation. It is better to make the provisional assumption that his interest in volition derives, like other main elements of his philosophy, from the early Stoa, though with greater emphasis. Although the term <em>prohairesis</em> is only barely attested in surviving accounts of early Stoic philosophy, there is some evidence to suggest that it did play a significant role; see Graver 2003.</p><p>Epictetus never refers by name to the second century BCE Stoics Panaetius and Posidonius, and although he has something in common with Panaetius' reported interest in practical ethics and role-based responsibilities, the evidence hardly suffices for an influence claim. References to other philosophers or schools are only in passing. He is impressed with Cynicism, but sees it as a vocation to itinerant teaching and bare-bones living rather than as a body of doctrine (3.22). Epicureanism he identifies with the pleasure principle and accordingly despises (3.7).</p><h2><a name="PreInt" id="PreInt">3. Preliminaries to interpretation</a></h2><p>Any effort to come to grips with Epictetus' thought must proceed from an awareness of his chosen objectives. The philosopher we meet in the <em>Discourses</em> seeks above all to foster ethical development in others, keeping his personal intellectual satisfaction strictly subordinate. Consequently we possess no point-by-point exposition of his views. Those themes he regards as most difficult for students to internalize are hammered again and again; other issues may be treated sporadically as the occasion arises, or omitted altogether, if he regards them as inessential to moral development. His apparent inclination to hold back some of his thinking, as well as the incomplete condition in which the <em>Discourses</em> have been transmitted to us, make it quite unsafe to draw any assumption about his views from silences or gaps in the account we have. On the other hand, the recursive manner of presentation makes it unlikely that the non-extant volumes broached any entirely new themes.</p><p>Interpreters must be careful not to prejudge the question of Epictetus' relation to earlier Greek philosophy. While it is evident that his principal contentions are substantially related to earlier philosophical developments, claims concerning his relation to the earlier Stoics, or possible philosophical innovations or shifts of emphasis, must be governed by a healthy respect for the fragmentary nature of our sources. We possess no comparable record of the oral teaching that took place in the Hellenistic Stoa. Where corroborating evidence exists in literary or doxographical works, we are justified in describing his views as reformulations of the Stoic tradition; otherwise the question of continuity should generally be left open.</p><h2><a name="MaiCon" id="MaiCon">4. Main contentions</a></h2><h3><a name="Rat" id="Rat">4.1. Rationality</a></h3><p>The linchpin of Epictetus' entire philosophy is his account of what it is to be a human being; that is, to be a rational mortal creature. “Rational” as a descriptive term means that human beings have the capacity to “use impressions” in a reflective manner. Animals, like humans, use their impressions of the world in that their behavior is guided by what they perceive their circumstances to be. But human beings also examine the content of their impressions to determine whether they are true or false; we have the faculty of “assent” (1.6.12–22).</p><p>Assent is regulated by our awareness of logical consistency or contradiction between the proposition under consideration and beliefs that one already holds: when we are not aware of any consideration, we assent readily, but when we perceive a conflict we are strongly constrained to reject one or the other of the conflicting views (2.26.3). Thus Medea kills her children because she believes it is to her advantage to do so; if someone were to show her clearly that she is deceived in this belief, she would not do it (1.28.8). Our hatred of being deceived, our inability to accept as true what we clearly see to be false, is for Epictetus the most basic fact about human beings and the most promising (1.28.1–5).</p><h3><a name="KinGod" id="KinGod">4.2. Kinship with god</a></h3><p>Equally important for him is that human rationality has as its setting a maximally rational universe. His confidence in the fundamental orderliness of all things is expressed in frequent references to Zeus or “the god” as the designer and administrator of the universe. There seems to be no question of competition with any other deities or powers. Epictetus does sometimes speak, conventionally for a Greek, of “gods” in the plural, but Zeus remains unquestionably supreme: he enjoys having some company, just as we do (3.13.4), but does not require assistance and cannot be opposed.</p><p>Immanent rather than transcendent, Zeus inheres in, and may indeed be identified with, the natural order. As such he is in theory fully accessible to human comprehension in the same way as all objects and events are accessible to our comprehension. With effort, rational beings can come to understand Zeus as a person, a rational being with thoughts and intentions like ours. That recognition inspires awe and gratitude, a “hymn of praise” that it is our duty to offer in each occasion of life (1.16.19).</p><p>God is the creator of humankind as of all else, and his attitude toward us is one of complete benevolence. It is by his gift that we are rational beings, and our rational nature qualifies us as his kindred. More: our minds are actually fragments of Zeus's mind, “parts and offshoots of his own being” (1.14.6, 2.8.10–12). When we make choices on our own account, we exercise the very same power as governs the universe. Hence it can be said that Zeus has ceded to us a portion of his governance (1.1.12).</p><h3><a name="Vol" id="Vol">4.3. Volition</a></h3><p>It is, again, the capacity for choice that makes us accountable for our own actions and states. Epictetus is particularly fond of exploring the implications of this essentially Stoic conception. In studying his usage it is helpful to remember that his favored term <em>prohairesis</em> refers more often to the capacity for choice than it does to particular acts of choosing. The word is variously translated; the rendering “volition” is adopted here as in Long 2002.</p><p>The volition, Epictetus argues, is “by nature unimpeded” (1.17.21), and it is for this reason that freedom is for him an inalienable characteristic of the human being. The very notion of a capacity to make one's own decisions implies as a matter of logical necessity that those decisions are free of external compulsion; otherwise they would not be decisions. But humans do have such a capacity and are thus profoundly different from even the higher animals, which deal with impressions merely in an unreflective way (2.8).</p><p>It is the volition that is the real person, the true self of the individual. Our convictions, attitudes, intentions and actions are truly ours in a way that nothing else is; they are determined solely by our use of impressions and thus internal to the sphere of volition. The appearance and comfort of one's body, one's possessions, one's relationships with other people, the success or failure of one's projects, and one's power and reputation in the world are all merely contingent facts about a person, features of our experience rather than characteristics of the self. These things are all “externals”; that is, things external to the sphere of volition.</p><h3><a name="Val" id="Val">4.4. Value</a></h3><p>This distinction between what is internal to the sphere of volition and what is external to it is the foundation of Epictetus' system of value. What is ultimately worth having, the “good of humankind,” consists in “a certain disposition of the volition” (1.8.16). More explicitly, this disposition is the condition of virtue, the proper expression of our rational nature, in which we not only act correctly and on the basis of knowledge, but also recognize our kinship to god and witness with joy the god's orderly management of the universe. This glad condition is the only thing a person can properly desire.</p><p>We are not wrong to believe that whatever is good is advantageous to us and worthy of unconditional pursuit, for this is just the “preconception” <em>(prolēpsis)</em> of good which all human beings possess (1.22). But we err in applying that preconception to particular cases, for we frequently assume that external objects have unconditional value. In reality, the various circumstances of our lives are merely what the volition has to work with and cannot in themselves be either good or bad. “The materials of action are indifferent, but the use we make of them is not indifferent” (2.5.1).</p><p>Admittedly some external things are more natural to us than others, just as it is natural for a foot, considered solely for itself, to be clean rather than muddy, and for an ear of grain to continue growing rather than being cut. But this is only when we consider ourselves in isolation rather than as parts of a larger whole. As Chrysippus says, the foot if it had a mind would welcome becoming muddy for the sake of the whole (2.6.11). Even one's own death is of no particular concern if that is what the orderly workings of the universe require.</p><p>This does not mean that one is to be heedless of externals. “Externals must be used with care, because their usage is not an indifferent matter, yet at the same time with composure and tranquility, because the material being used is indifferent” (2.5.6). One can recognize that a thing is without ultimate value and still act vigorously in pursuit of it, when doing so is in accordance with one's rational character. Epictetus offers the analogy of ball players who recognize that the ball they are running after is of no value in itself, and yet exert their full energy to catch it because of the value they set on playing the game properly (2.5).</p><h3><a name="EmoAdj" id="EmoAdj">4.5. Emotional adjustment</a></h3><p>The revaluation of external objects brings with it a tremendous sense of confidence and inner peace. Grief, fear, envy, desire, and every form of anxiety, result from the incorrect supposition that happiness is to be found outside oneself (2.16, 3.13.10, etc.). Like earlier Stoics, Epictetus rejects the supposition that such emotions are imposed on us by circumstances or internal forces and are largely beyond our control. Our feelings, as well as our behavior, are an expression of what seems right to us, conditioned by our judgments of value (1.11.28–33). If we correct our judgments, our feelings will be corrected as well.</p><p>The analysis is applicable also to feelings like anger and betrayal which relate to the conduct of other people. The choices made by others are of ethical significance only for the agents themselves; to anyone else they are externals and so of no consequence. One should not, then, be angry at Medea for her bad decision. Pity would be better than that, though the really proper response, if one has the opportunity, would be to help her to see her mistake (1.28).</p><p>Epictetus' conception of emotional adjustment is not that one should be “unfeeling like a statue” (3.2.4). Even the wisest person may tremble or grow pale at some sudden danger, though without false assent (fragment 9). More importantly, there are affective responses it is right to have. “It is fitting to be elated at the good”; that is, at the goods of the soul (2.11.22; 3.7.7), and one should also experience the aversive feeling he calls “caution” (<em>eulabeia,</em> 2.1.1–7) when considering potential bad choices. Gratitude toward god is also affective in nature (2.23). In addition, it is appropriate during the period of ethical training to experience the pain of remorse as a stimulus to ethical development (3.23.30–38).</p><h3><a name="AppOthCon" id="AppOthCon">4.6. Appropriate other-concern</a></h3><p>In our relations with other people we are to be governed by the attitudes Epictetus calls “modesty” (<em>aidōs</em>) and “love of humanity”<em>(philanthrōpia).</em> Modesty consists in an awareness of the perspective of others and a readiness to curtail one's own unseemly behavior; love of humanity is a willingness to exert oneself on others' behalf. The latter extends especially toward those with whom we are associated by our particular role in life: toward children if one is a parent, toward husband or wife if one is married, and so on (2.10, 2.22.20). While our best service to others is in helping them develop their own rational nature, it is also entirely appropriate that we should act to further the temporal interests of those to whom we are connected by birth or situation.</p><p>It is a misconception to suppose that proper affection for friends and family members necessarily leaves us vulnerable to debilitating emotions when their welfare is threatened. Just as one can be fond of a crystal goblet and yet not be upset when it breaks, having realized all along that it was a fragile thing, so we should love our children, siblings, and friends while also reminding ourselves of their mortality (3.24). The primary relationship is with god; our human relationships should never give us reason to reproach god but should enable us to rejoice in the natural order. Concern for others, and enjoyment of their company, is indeed part of human nature (3.13.5); whereas irresponsible behavior driven by emotion is not. The father who remains at the bedside of a desperately sick child behaves more, not less, naturally than the one who runs away to weep (1.11).</p><h3><a name="SelCulAut" id="SelCulAut">4.7. Self-cultivation and autonomy</a></h3><p>Achieving the correct disposition of one's capacity for choice requires more than inclination. The learner must also undertake an extensive program of self-examination and correction of views. While ethical development is made easier by the direct instruction and self-help techniques a teacher like Epictetus himself might provide, it is also possible without such aid. It is indeed a capability inherent in human nature, for the faculty that perceives and corrects errors of judgment is the reasoning faculty itself. It is even possible to alter such emotional dispositions as timorousness or quickness of temper, through repeated practice in giving more appropriate responses (2.16, 2.18).</p><p>Our ability to improve our own dispositions also provides the implicit answer to any question that might be asked about human autonomy in a Zeus-governed universe. Since for Epictetus action is determined by character (what seems right to an individual; 1.2) and not by spontaneous impulses, some readers might be inclined to object that this autonomy is only of a limited kind, for a person's character must itself have been assigned to him by Zeus, through the circumstances of his birth and education. Epictetus would reply that autonomy is guaranteed not by the absence of antecedent causes but by the very nature of the reasoning faculty. Specific skills like horsemanship make judgments about their own subject matter; the reasoning faculty judges other things and also its own prior judgments. When it performs this function well, the inherited character will improve over time; otherwise it will deteriorate.</p><h3><a name="MinBod" id="MinBod">4.8. Mind and body</a></h3><p>Zeus's power is limited in that he cannot do what it is logically impossible to do. He could not cause a person to be born before his parents (1.12.28–29), and he could not have made volition execute any choices but its own (1.1.23, 1.17.27). For the same kind of reason, he could not, for all his benevolence, cause a person's body to be unimpeded in the way volition is unimpeded (4.1.100). Our bodies do not in fact belong to us, since we cannot always decide what will happen to them. There is therefore a clear contrast in status between body and mind or soul. Epictetus repeatedly uses language belittling the body or representing it as a mere instrument of the mind: it is “pathetic little flesh,” “cleverly molded clay,” a “little donkey” (1.1.10, 1.3.5, 4.1.79). At least once he speaks of the body and possessions together as “fetters” upon the mind (1.9.11), language that, as A.A. Long (2002) remarks, recalls Plato's image of the body as prison house. He seems nonetheless to assume his school's position on the mind's material nature, not the Platonic view of it as a separate incorporeal substance; at least, he speaks of the mind as “breath” (<em>pneuma)</em> that is “infused” by god into the sense organs, and in one striking image he describes the mind (again <em>pneuma)</em> as a vessel of water entered by impressions as by rays of light (3.3.20–22).</p><h2><a name="EduMet" id="EduMet">5. Educational method</a></h2><p>Epictetus draws a sharp distinction between book learning, i.e. mastering the content of particular treatises, and what may be called education for living, in which one acquires the attitudes and habits that enable correct behavior. The latter is of paramount importance; the former may be of instrumental value but if overemphasized may prove a hindrance to ethical development.</p><p>The program of study offered in the school at Nicopolis included the reading of philosophical treatises by Stoic authors of the Hellenistic period, for instance the work <em>On Impulse</em> by Chrysippus (1.4.14) and the logical writings of Archedemus (1.10.8). Frequent references to formal logical schemata suggest that these, too, were taught, as they had been in the curriculum of Musonius Rufus, Epictetus' own teacher at Rome (1.7.32; cf. 1.7.5–12). Learning of this kind may be instrumental in developing one's intellectual acumen, just as the lead weights used by athletes in their exercises serve to develop the muscles (1.4.13; 1.17). Finally, there is some evidence for instruction in what the ancients called physics (philosophy of nature); this is discussed by Barnes (1997).</p><p>Education for living is primarily self-education, a function of that capacity for self-correction which is inherent in our rational nature. Epictetus rejects the way of thinking that says moral improvement is achievable only by divine assistance.</p><blockquote><p>Have you not hands, fool? Has not god made them for you? Sit down now and pray your nose may not run! Wipe it, rather, and do not blame god. (2.16.11)</p></blockquote><p>The example of Socrates serves to remind the hearer that intellectual independence remains the primary objective. For while Socrates teaches others, he is himself untaught or rather self-taught; his unshakeable comprehension of ethical issues has been attained through rigorous application of methods anyone might use. Admittedly, Socrates was exceptionally gifted, and yet his achievement is what all are born for and can at least hope to match (1.2.33–37).</p><p>Direct coaching by a philosophical teacher may nonetheless be of assistance to persons seeking to correct their own dispositions. Epictetus explains the process in <em>Discourses</em> 3.2. Above all, one must attend to “desire and aversion”: one must correct one's emotional responses by pondering questions of value and indifference, for desire or fear of objects outside one's own control results in a host of strong emotions that make one “incapable of listening to reason” while experiencing them. Further, one must study practical ethics, “the impulse to act and not to act,” for vigorous action may be part of proper relations to the gods, to family members, and to the state, and those actions should be orderly and well-considered. Finally, one must attend to one's own reasoning processes, to “freedom from deception and hasty judgment and in general whatever is concerned with assent.” This last entails some study of logic, to prevent the conclusions reached in the two principal areas of study from being dislodged “even in dreams or drunkenness or melancholy.” This however is a non-technical approach to logic, grounded in essentials, in contrast to the sterile conundrums and oversubtle analyses enjoyed by some of Epictetus' contemporaries.</p><p>The actual process of self-improvement is initially a matter of consciously slowing down one's thought processes to allow for reflection prior to assent. “Impression, wait for me a little. Let me see what you are, and what you represent” (2.18.24). As the habit of screening impressions becomes established, correct responses will begin to come automatically. Yet constant vigilance is still required, to guard against backsliding (4.3). One can never rely solely on habituation.</p><p>More specific therapeutic techniques may also be of use to the one making ethical progress. Epictetus recommends that pupils refrain from using the terms “good” and “bad,” not because those terms have no application in human life, but because they are too easily misapplied. Thus one should “suppress” desire and aversion, and use only plain, emotionally unadorned impulse and counter-impulse (<em>Encheiridion</em> 2). To combat some individual bad habit, one should practice the opposite behavior: for instance, if one is quick tempered, one should accustom oneself to bearing insults with patience (3.12.6–12). Regular self-examination at bedtime—a practice borrowed from the Pythagorean tradition—will enable one to correct errors before they become ingrained (3.10.1).</p><p>Occasionally Epictetus offers preprofessional advice to pupils who intend to pursue a teaching career of their own. He chastises the teacher who assigns a technical treatise in logic without providing any preliminary training or assessing the pupil's capabilities (1.23.13). In <em>Discourses</em> 3.23.33 he distinguishes three “modes” or “characters” of philosophical discourse. The “protreptic” mode is that which convinces hearers, singly or in groups, to care about philosophical study as a means toward personal ethical development. The “elenctic” mode, named from the Socratic <em>elenchos,</em> is more confrontational and is aimed at removing false convictions, while the “instructional” mode imparts sound doctrines. As Long (2002) has noted, the three modes are associated respectively with Diogenes the Cynic, with Socrates, and with Zeno of Citium, the founder of the Stoic school (3.21.19; cf. 2.12.5).</p><h2><a name="Inf" id="Inf">6. Influence</a></h2><p>Though much cultivated in person by the nobles of local Greek cities (as Brunt 1997 describes), Epictetus exerted far more influence through the written works produced by Arrian. The emperor Marcus Aurelius was never in fact his pupil, but was so deeply impressed with what he had read as to consider himself a follower of the freedman philosopher. In the early third century Origen remarks on the popularity of Epictetus with his own contemporaries, which he finds to rival that of Plato (<em>Contra Celsum</em> 6.2). Whether Origen was himself much influenced by Epictetus' version of Stoicism is another matter, for Origen had studied the writings of Chrysippus on his own account and the strands cannot easily be separated. More demonstrable is the homage paid to Epictetus by Simplicius, the sixth-century Aristotle commentator, who composed a long philosophical commentary on the <em>Encheiridion</em> combining Stoic elements with his own Neoplatonism.</p><p>The <em>Encheiridion</em> was translated into Latin by Poliziano in 1497 and during the subsequent two centuries became exceptionally popular in Europe. Spanneut (1972) traces its use in monasteries in superficially Christianized form. Seventeenth-century intellectuals like Guillaume du Vair, Justus Lipsius, and Thomas Gataker generally found Epictetus' Stoicism to be fully compatible with Christianity; see the discussion in Brooke (2006). Pascal reacted against this perception; he admired Epictetus as a moralist but regarded it as sheer arrogance to believe that the human psyche is part of the divine and can be perfected by one's own efforts. Descartes adopted a recognizably Epictetan value system as part of his personal ethics. An engagingly satirical portrayal of the potential impact of Epictetus' philosophy in contemporary American life may be found in Tom Wolfe's 1998 novel <em>A Man in Full.</em></p><h2><a name="Bib" id="Bib">Bibliography</a></h2><h3><a name="TexTra" id="TexTra">Texts and Translations</a></h3><ul class="hanging"><li><em>Epicteti Dissertationes ab Arriano Digestae</em> (Greek text), H. Schenkl (ed.), Leipzig: Teubner, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., 1916.</li><li><em>Epictetus: The Discourses as reported by Arrian, the Manual, and Fragments</em>, W.A. Oldfather (trans.), 2 vols., Loeb Classical Library, London and Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1925–1928.</li><li><em>The Discourses of Epictetus</em>, revised translation by Robin Hard, with an introduction by Christopher Gill, London: Everyman, 1995.</li><li><em>Epictète: Entretiens</em>, J. Souilhé (trans.), 4 vols., Paris: Budé, 1948–65.</li><li><em>Epictetus: Discourses and Selected Writings</em>, R. Dobbin (trans.), New York: Penguin, 2008 (= Dobbin 2008).</li><li><em>Epictetus: Discourses Book 1</em>, translated and with an introduction and commentary by R. Dobbin, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998 (= Dobbin 1998).</li><li><em>The Handbook of Epictetus</em>, N.P. White (trans.), Indianapolis: Hackett, 1983.</li></ul><h3><a name="Gen" id="Gen">General</a></h3><ul class="hanging"><li>Hershbell, J.P., 1989, “The Stoicism of Epictetus: Twentieth-Century Perspectives,” <em>Aufstieg und Niedergang der Römischen Welt</em>, vol. 2.36.3, Berlin: W. De Gruyter, 2148–2163.</li><li>Long, A.A., 2002, <em>Epictetus: A Stoic and Socratic Guide to Life</em>, Oxford: Oxford University Press.</li><li>Spanneut, M., 1962, “Epiktet,” in T. Klauser (ed.), <em>Reallexicon für Antike und Christentum</em> (Volume V), Stuttgart: Hiersemann, 599–681.</li><li>Stephens, W.O., 2007, <em>Epictetus and Happiness as Freedom</em>, London: Continuum.</li></ul><h3><a name="LifTim" id="LifTim">Life and Times</a></h3><ul class="hanging"><li>Brunt, P. A., 1977, “From Epictetus to Arrian,” <em>Athenaeum</em>, 55: 19–48.</li><li>Millar, Fergus, 1965, “Epictetus and the Imperial Court,” <em>Journal of Roman Studies</em>, 55: 141–48.</li><li>Stadter, P. A., 1980, <em>Arrian of Nicomedia</em>, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.</li><li>Starr, C., 1949, “Epictetus and the Tyrant,” <em>Classical Philology</em>, 44: 20–29.</li><li>Wirth, T., 1967, “Arrians Erinnerungen an Epiktet,” <em>Museum Helveticum</em>, 24: 149–89, 197–216.</li></ul><h3><a name="Phi" id="Phi">Philosophy</a></h3><ul class="hanging"><li>Algra, K., et al., 1999, <em>The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy</em>, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.</li><li>Barnes, J., 1997, <em>Logic and the Imperial Stoa</em>, Leiden: Brill.</li><li>Billerbeck, M., 1978, <em>Epiktet: von Kynismus</em>, Leiden: Brill.</li><li>Bonhöffer, Adolf, 1890, <em>Epiktet und die Stoa</em>, Stuttgart: Ferdinand Enke.</li><li>Bonhöffer, Adolf, 1894, <em>The Ethics of the Stoic Epictetus</em>, W.O. Stephens (trans.), New York: Peter Lang, 1996.</li><li>Brennan, T., 2005, <em>The Stoic Life: Emotions, Duties, and Fate</em>, Oxford: Oxford University Press.</li><li>De Lacy, P., 1979, “The Four Stoic Personae,” <em>Illinois Classical Studies</em>, 3: 163–72.</li><li>De Lacy, P., 1943, “The Logical Structure of the Ethics of Epictetus,” <em>Classical Philology</em>, 38: 112–25.</li><li>Dobbin, R., 1991, “Προαίρεσις in Epictetus,” <em>Ancient Philosophy</em>, 11: 111–35.</li><li>Döring, K., 1979, <em>Exemplum Socratis</em>, Wiesbaden: F. Steiner.</li><li>Graver, M., 2003, “Not Even Zeus: A Discussion of A.A. Long, <em>Epictetus: A Stoic and Socratic Guide to Life,” Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy</em>, 24: 343–359.</li><li>Graver, M., 2007, <em>Stoicism and Emotion</em>, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.</li><li>Gretenkord, J.C., 1981, <em>Der Freiheitsbegriff Epiktets</em>, Bochum: Brockmeyer.</li><li>Hijmans, B. L., 1959, <em>AΣΚΗΣΙΣ: Notes on Epictetus' educational system</em>, Assen: Van Gorcum.</li><li>Jagu, A., 1946, <em>Épictète et Platon</em>, Paris: J. Vrin.</li><li>Johnson, B.E., 2012, “Ethical roles in Epictetus,” <em>Epoché</em>, 16: 287–316.</li><li>Kamtekar, R., 1998, “<em>Aidôs</em> in Epictetus,” <em>Classical Philology</em>, 93: 136–60.</li><li>Long, A.A., 1996, <em>Stoic Studies</em>, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.</li><li>Long, A.A., 1986, <em>Hellenistic Philosophy: Stoics, Epicureans, Sceptics</em>, Los Angeles: Scribner's.</li><li>Long, A. A., and D. N. Sedley (eds.), 1987, <em>The Hellenistic Philosophers</em>, 2 vols., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.</li><li>Pohlenz, M., 1948–9, <em>Die Stoa: Geschichte einer geistigen Bewegung</em>, Gōttingen: Vandenhōck & Ruprecht.</li><li>Sandbach, F.H., 1989. <em>The Stoics</em>, Indianapolis: Hackett, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition.</li><li>Scaltsas, Theodore and Andrew S. Mason (eds.), 2007, <em>The Philosophy of Epictetus</em>, Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press.</li><li>Schofield, Malcolm, 2004, “Epictetus: Socratic, Cynic, Stoic,” <em>Philosophical Quarterly</em>, 54: 448–456.</li><li>Sellars, J., 2003, <em>The Art of Living: The Stoics on the Nature and Function of Philosophy</em>, Burlington VT: Ashgate.</li><li>Sorabji, R., 2000, <em>Emotion and Peace of Mind: The Stoic Legacy</em>, Oxford: Oxford University Press.</li><li>Stephens, W.O., 1996, “Epictetus on How the Stoic Sage Loves,” <em>Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy</em>, 14: 193–210.</li><li>Xenakis, J., 1969, <em>Epictetus: Philosopher-Therapist</em>, The Hague: E.J. Brill.</li></ul><h3><a name="RecInf" id="RecInf">Reception and Influence</a></h3><ul class="hanging"><li>Boter, G., 1999, <em>The Encheiridion of Epictetus and its Three Christian Adaptations</em>, Leiden, Boston: Brill.</li><li>Brennan, T. and C. Brittain (trans.), 2002, <em>Simplicius: On Epictetus' Handbook 1–26</em>, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.</li><li>Brennan, T. and C. Brittain (trans.), 2002, <em>Simplicius: On Epictetus' Handbook 27–53</em>, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.</li><li>Brooke, C., 2006, “How the Stoics Became Atheists,” <em>Historical Journal</em>, 49: 387–402.</li><li>Brunt, P. A., 1977, “From Epictetus to Arrian,” <em>Athenaeum</em>, 55: 19–48.</li><li>Jagu, A., 1989, “Le Morale d' Épictète et le Christianism,.” <em>Aufstieg und Niedergang der Römischen Welt</em>, vol. 2.36.3, Berlin: W. de Gruyter, 2164–2100.</li><li>MacMillan, D.J. (ed.), 1979, <em>The Stoic Strain in American Literature</em>, Toronto: University of Toronto Press.</li><li>Spanneut, M., 1972, “Épictètechez les moines,” <em>Mélanges de Science Religieuse</em>, 29: 49–57.</li><li>Stadter, P. A., 1980, <em>Arrian of Nicomedia</em>, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.</li><li>Stanton, G.R., 1968, “The Cosmopolitan Ideas of Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius,” <em>Phronesis</em>, 13: 183–95.</li><li>Strange, S. and J. Zupko (eds.), 2004, <em>Stoicism: Traditions and Transformations</em>, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.</li><li>Wright, Gillian, 2007, “Women Reading Epictetus,” <em>Women's Writing</em>, 14(2): 321–37.</li></ul><h2><a name="Aca" id="Aca">Academic Tools</a></h2><blockquote><table><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://plato.stanford.edu/symbols/sepman-icon.jpg" alt="sep man icon" /></td><td><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/cgi-bin/encyclopedia/archinfo.cgi?entry=epictetus" target="other">How to cite this entry</a>.</td></tr><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://plato.stanford.edu/symbols/sepman-icon.jpg" alt="sep man icon" /></td><td><a href="https://leibniz.stanford.edu/friends/preview/epictetus/" target="other">Preview the PDF version of this entry</a> at the <a href="https://leibniz.stanford.edu/friends/" target="other">Friends of the SEP Society</a>.</td></tr><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://plato.stanford.edu/symbols/inpho.png" alt="inpho icon" /></td><td><a href="https://inpho.cogs.indiana.edu/entity?sep=epictetus&redirect=True" target="other">Look up this entry topic</a> at the <a href="https://inpho.cogs.indiana.edu/" target="other">Indiana Philosophy Ontology Project</a> (InPhO).</td></tr><tr><td valign="top"><img src="http://plato.stanford.edu/symbols/pp.gif" alt="phil papers icon" /></td><td><a href="http://philpapers.org/sep/epictetus/" target="other">Enhanced bibliography for this entry</a> at <a href="http://philpapers.org/" target="other">PhilPapers</a>, with links to its database.</td></tr></table></blockquote><h2><a name="Oth" id="Oth">Other Internet Resources</a></h2><ul><li><a href="http://www.iep.utm.edu/e/epictetu.htm" target="other">Epictetus</a>, entry at the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy</li><li><a href="http://classics.mit.edu/Browse/browse-Epictetus.html" target="other">Epictetus' works in translation</a> at the Internet Classics Archive</li></ul><h2><a name="Rel" id="Rel">Related Entries</a></h2><p><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-character/">character, moral</a> | <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-ancient/">ethics: ancient</a> | <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/natural-law-ethics/">ethics: natural law tradition</a> | <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/stoicism/">Stoicism</a></p></div><div id="foot"><span class="c3"><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/info.html#c">Copyright © 2013</a> by</span><br />Margaret Graver <<a href="mailto:Margaret.R.Graver%40Dartmouth.EDU"><em>Margaret<abbr title=" dot ">.</abbr>R<abbr title=" dot ">.</abbr>Graver<abbr title=" at ">@</abbr>Dartmouth<abbr title=" dot ">.</abbr>EDU</em></a>></div><p><em>This entry passed through the <a href="http://fivefilters.org/content-only/">Full-Text RSS</a> service — if this is your content and you're reading it on someone else's site, please read the FAQ at <a href="http://fivefilters.org/content-only/faq.php#publishers">fivefilters.org/content-only/faq.php#publishers</a>. <a href="http://fivefilters.org">Five Filters</a> recommends: <a href="http://www.medialens.org/index.php/alerts/alert-archive/alerts-2013/715-eyes-like-blank-discs-the-guardian-s-steven-poole-on-george-orwell-s-politics-and-the-english-language.html">Eyes Like Blank Discs - The Guardian's Steven Poole On George Orwell's Politics And The English Language</a>.</em></p>Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10303290079976590343noreply@blogger.com1